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Didz -> (6/5/2002 4:41:30 AM)
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by CJ Martin
[B]
"The Bombardment" was the term used by those that lived through the first IJN bombardment of Henderson Field by Battleships...the damage was awesome. Henderson was virtually destroyed and more importently most of the av gas went up in flames.
-CJ [/B][/QUOTE]
I think we are straying a bit off the point here. The issue is NOT whether the IJN bombarded Henderson Field or whether the bombardment was effective but whether the bombardment of Henderson Field is a valid example of an IJN Battlegroup using the cover of darkness to avoid interception by allied LBA's.
My point is that it is physically impossible for a ship with a maximum speed of 30 knots to cover a distance of 400 miles, bombard an allied base and travel 400 miles back again before dawn. The maximum distance it could possibly cover is about half that meaning that for at least half its approach and withdrawal it would be liable to interception by Land Based Aircraft.
If anything the naval battles around Guadacanal in August through November 1942 do more to support than undermine this augument.
From what little I have read it is clear that both the Japanese and the Allies were only too well aware that success or failure at Guadacanal hinged on the operational effectiveness of Henderson Field. The whole focus of the IJN's bombarment missions during this period was to disrupt the development of this airstrip and disable the facilities already in place. Whilst the Americans realised equally well that the island was terribly vulnerable until such time as it could provide its own air cover effectively.
From what I have been able to piece together this issue was not resoved until November 1942.
9th August 42 Battle of Savo Island Fought.
10 August first marine landings.
18 August "Tokyo Express" begins with first landing of Japanese soldiers.
On August 20th twelve SBD dive bombers of VMSB-232 and nineteen F4F fighters of VMF-223 flew off of the escort carrier Long Island and arrived at Henderson Field. They were warmly greeted by the ground Marines, who had felt abandoned ever since the American naval forces had left the area leaving them without any tangible air support.
With few supplies and very little help from the outside world, the Marines really were "on their own". Everything depended on the aviators and aircraft stationed at Henderson Field to protect the Marines on the ground. Therefore the first planes to arrive simply could not be spared for Naval Search or attack duties and were concentrated on CAP and ground support roles.
Even though VMF-223 was reinforced by Major Robert E. Galer's VMF-224 on August 30th, the F4F Wildcats were nearly always outnumbered by Japanese fighters, even with the addition of the USAAF's 67th Fighter Squadron's P-39 Airacobras.
The men on Cactus soon settled into what was to become a familiar routine. Japanese aerial attacks on Henderson Field were an almost daily occurrence. Bombing raids by Japanese "Betty" bombers, escorted by Zero fighters, would be sent down the Slot from their base at Rabaul. All the Catus Airforce could do was keep the bombers from disabling their base there was no doubt that the IJN enjoyed total air superiority over the slot at this time.
On Sept 11th another fighter squadron: (U.S. Navy) VF-5 with 24 Wildcats arrived from the carrier Saratoga. The Saratoga had been torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, and it sent most of its air group to Guadalcanal while it was out for repairs, however; out of the 24 F4Fs that arrived on September 11th, only 5 remained five weeks later.
Through the entire month of September the Tokyo Express runs, made by destroyers, went unopposed by anything but sporadic air attacks from Henderson Field.
Another group of reinforcements arrived on October 9th, when Major 'Duke' Davis' VMF-121 came to Cactus with 24 much-needed Wildcats. However, by early October VMF-223 and VMF-224 were largely a spent force and were withdrawn.
11th-12th October The Battle of Cape Esperance fought
13-14 October bombardment of Henderson Field, by battleships Kongo and Haruna, had a devastating effect on the local air units, which lost most of their fuel and half of their planes, with more damaged.
15 October: yet another 8” bombardment, this one by cruisers Myoko and Maya, hit Henderson, but it neither turned the tide of operations. Henderson remained more or less operable, although the amount of planes it housed had considerably decreased
24-27 October Battle of Santa Cruz. Japanese launched their offensive on Henderson Field. In a battle lasting three days and nights, the Sendai Division hurled itself into the southern side of the U.S. perimeter, while IJN forces moved into support range to Guadalcanal's north, expecting the battle to be successful and hoping for a crack at the elusive U.S. Navy forces.
Thus even as late as 26 Oct the total compliment of operational aircraft was only numbered 29 (12xF4F, 11xSBD's, 3xP400 & 3xP39's) due mainly to supply difficulties and damage inflicted by IJN naval bombardment. However, the strip was never fully disabled and the planes were used to support ground operations during the day.
13-14 November Despite the tactical victory Japan scored in the Battle of Santa Cruz, it had not by any means secured a major advantage over the enemy. At Santa Cruz the U.S. Navy lost the service of both of its carriers, with Enterprise damaged and Hornet sunk, the planes from both carriers found refuge on Guadalcanal. Had the Japanese followed their success off Santa Cruz with a bombardment of Henderson Field, there might very well might have remained close to no opposition to further Japanese reinforcement runs.
In an final attempt to achieve victory the IJN decided to repeat the October bombardment in two steps: after a two day offensive by units of the 11th Air Fleet, the battleships Hiei and Kirishima would smash Henderson with concentrated gunfire a day before the arrival of Tanaka's convoy. Then, the day of Tanaka's arrival, Admiral Mikawa would pulverize the remnants of Henderson Field's air units with 203mm fire, leaving no opposition to Japanese reinforcement attempts.
However, the attack failed and the next dawn saw airplanes being readied frantically at Henderson Field to pursue the fleeing enemy, and Marine dive bomber squadrons were astonished to find a victim such as Hiei so close. She had suffered underwater damage to her steering gear, which flooded, preventing a swift escape. Aircraft attacked frequently and effectively in preventing the battleship's men from concentrating their efforts.
At 1015, TBFs from Enterprise, launched by Rear-Admiral Kinkaid to supplement the Marines at Henderson, attacked the damaged battlewagon, and throughout the next four hours the intensity of air attacks increased. Abe had hoped to move Kirishima back under cover of darkness to tow Hiei, but abandoned his efforts to save the ship, ordering her abandoned and scuttled. Admiral Yamamoto cancelled the scuttling order, instead wanting to retain her as a decoy to distract enemy planes from the rest of his fleet.
But Hiei did not accept this honor bestowed upon her, as she foundered during the next night. Abe retired northward, meeting Admiral Kondo's battleships north of the Solomons.
I have been unable to determine exactly when Henderson Field received its first long-range bombers but according to the journal of the Engineering unit responsible the Bomber1 and Bomber2 strips were not started until December 1942.
Therefore, it appears to me that the Allies never had a valid air umbella over the slot during the period between the withdrawal of the carriers in August until the arrival of the first long range bomber squadrons at Henderson Field possibly in December.
As a result the USN had no choice but to rely on the sacrifices of its surface ships to disrupt the IJN's attempts to land troops and destroy the airfield and the IJN were able to run the slot with their ships safe in the knowledge that there was no LBA umbrella to oppose them. Hence, IMO Guadacanal is NOT evidence of the ability of fast surface ships to avoid detection by LBA aircraft but is actually a demostration of why LBA air cover is so vital in preventing just such tactic's and the price that must be paid in surface vessels should it not be available.
It seems to me that had Henderson Field been fully operational in August 42 then, a) the marines would never have got ashore in the first place and b) the "Tokyo Express" would have been bombed to oblivion as it came up the slot.
Which is of course exactly the issue I have with the BB bombarment of Gilli Gilli which has a fully operational LBA umbrella and no supply problems and yet is being denied the opportunity to use them.
With thanks to: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Guadalcanal.html
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