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crsutton -> RE: January 1943 (2/12/2010 9:59:10 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: wpurdom
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Of course, this does not mean it is OK. There are some serious problems with the air war in this game as Japan can take and hold air superiority way too long. 1. Biggest problem that I see is that it is just too easy to mass airpower from forward bases. 2. The Allies should have ways to increase production in reply to Japanese offensive. Either pay PP to double production of certain aircraft for a month-or release of reserves for any Japanese offensive into, India, OZ, NZ, Noumea, Sulva, Pago Pago and so on.
Disagree on 2. Roosevelt was under a lot of political pressure in late 1942 and suffered heavy losses in the mid-term elections due to the crisis at Guadalcanal but insisted on giiving priority to the invasion of North Africa, if he couldn't invade France. Remember that from his and Marshall's perspective, what happened in the pacific didn't really matter, but the future of world civilization turned on the outsome against Hitler, and they were dubious that Stalin could survive without taking off the pressure. Maybe the fall of Hawaii or the prospective conquest of southern Austrailia might have made a difference, but I don't know. Northern Austrailia clearly wouldn't have been enough.
Well, actually the Allies did commit more planes and ships to the Pacific theater. Reinforcments of cruisers, DDs were diverted to the Pacific after the serious losses in the Solomon's campaign, and the British loaned the Victorious out to the Pacific fleet for a few months. And, as the Allies began to do better than expected in the Pacific more men and equipment were sent to the Pacific than originally intended as success in itself had a snowballing effect.
We can agree to disagree since we can only speculate but I firmly believe that there would have been a significant diversion of resources to the Pacific not only if OZ were invaded but if the Allies lost the Solomon's campaign.
My point is that Political points are exactly what they are intended to be in game and serve very well to reflect the realities of the situation. Any diversion of resources from Europe had a determental effect politically with our Allies-especially the Soviets and the cost of PP for this kind of diversion would reflect that exactly. As the Allied player in June of 42, I still have hardly any PP to spare-so the expense of say, doubling my producton of p40Es for a month will come at a cost. So to pay Paul I will have to rob Peter. But as it is now, any Japanese player knows exactly to the plane what the Allied player is getting and by a little guesswork can really focus on a particular plane type. My suggestion allows the Allied player the option of putting a little uncertainity back into the situation-but not without some cost.
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