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Nikademus -> Battles, military minds, and lack of hindsight (6/19/2002 4:44:48 AM)
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Its hard to say for sure what the true reasons were behind Kurita's withdrawl, given that from what i've read, the man himself refused to comment about his view of things after the war.
I've heard, in addition to the fear of heavy surface units being nearby, that he also feared an impending attack by the returning Fleet carriers as well. Odd, i've always thought.....given that a key part of the plan was to lure away the American carriers by using their own as bait. Why would not Kurita have faith that this part of the plan might not work? And if so, what does it matter if they return as long as the mission goal is achieved? One might point to the heavy and sustained air attacks he suffered on the way in. However the attacks did cease allowing him to get into the Strait come the morning
As for heavy surface units.....again a puzzling conclusion (if it's true) A pitched battle through heavy surface elements, even in defeat would be preferable to a slow death sitting in harbor. More importantly would be the realization that his force would never get a better shot at the transports even if heavy surface elements are in the way. I can better understand Kurita's puzzlement here though. Any commander in his position would not make the assumption that the enemy would leave their front door unguarded, but in fact, thats what Halsey did and whatever the reason (flubbed communications are often cited), he must bear the responsibility for that. It might have proven costly
But thats the benefit of not only hindsight, but being able to calmly think about things over time with no pressure or heavy weight of responsibility on one's shoulder. Kurita had none of that during the fight, was not a well man, had his flagship shot out from under him, and had previously suffered some of the most intensive air attacks yet seen in the conflict over an entire day.
So in other words, he, and his men were anything but "fresh" for the upcoming fight. Surgio Strait is often taken as an extreme indication of IJN proficiancy vis-a-vis a straight gunfight, which in my personal view is silly. It was anything but a conventional fight, the main element of the "enemy" was doing everything in it's power to avoid the fight, while at the same time brave and heroic light forces, aided by up to 300 aircraft (all told) making sporadic but nearly constant air attacks, harrassed the pursuing Japanese and forced them to manuever against them disrupting their formations and causing the Yamato in particular to take herself out of the fight to avoid torpedoes. Such conditions make it hard to conduct a gunnery practice.
The really sad part is that, even had Kurita been more agressive and stayed around, he would never have succeeded in the IJN's ultimate goal, which were the transports.
Because they had already for the most part unloaded. SHO-1 was doomed even before the Japanese arrived.
All he would have succeeded in doing is allowing Halsey enough time to close the front door with either his carriers, his heavy surface elements or both.
So was Kurita right even if for the wrong assumptions? Guess thats a matter of hindsight again. After Leyte, there would be no more opportunities, even to inflict serious damage.
Gotterdamerung in the 1st degree.
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