So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (Full Version)

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fbs -> So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 3:13:51 AM)

Quite a bit of criticism about Nagumo camping Pearl Harbor for a week.

But... is that such an outrageous option for the Japs to stay around? Say that Nagumo took the gamble and preyed around PH for a few more days - either by attacking PH again, or by keeping distance from PH and looking for incoming/fleeing ships. How much of that was actually possible?

Of course, some solution for refueling his destroyers would have to be found - like return the capital ships by themselves, and let the destroyers crawl back home.

My point is... the idea of sticking around for a few days may not be so out of this world. What do you guys think?

Thanks,
fbs



wworld7 -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 3:43:01 AM)

These types of discussions are what the War Room for above.



fbs -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 5:14:44 AM)

Err... I'm trying to ask about the historical feasibility of Nagumo camping PH.

People say that the game is unhistorical because it allows Nagumo to do that, so my question is whether it could actually have happened.

I thought the War Room was about game tactics, but if such discussion should be there I'll be happy to move the thread there

Thanks,
fbs



bretg80 -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 6:06:42 AM)

Nagumo was a long way from home and the entire premise of the attack on Pearl was surprise. The Japanese knew that once the American's were aware of their presence they would send everything after them, so they really couldn't hang out. Also, the supply line for the Japanese was very extended and they could not last that long from that position. The same thing happened to the Americans when we bombed Japan in April '42. We got in and got out quickly.

War is about calculated risks and the most damage can be had when surprise exists. Once surprise was lost, the Japanese were vulnerable. Also, remember that they didn't know where the American carriers were and even though the American's were not that experienced, we had 4 carriers available that could cause serious damage if they had found the Japanese lurking off the islands.

Keep in mind, as soon as the Japanese attacked us, the US subs and search planes were out looking for them. They more than accomplished their mission by hit and run. Staying around was not ever an option for the Japanese and was never considered in any of their planning. Nagumo wasn't in charge, Yamamoto was running the show and the plan to attack Pearl was orchestrated from Japan, not by Nagumo. He didn't have a choice to stay at Pearl even if he had wanted to.

That is why many of us complained when the AI was hanging around Pearl. Not only is it not historically accurate, it really isn't plausible because the risk is too high. The Japanese were very calculating in their risk assessment during the war. They seldom attacked when the odds didn't favor them and they used surprise whenever possible. Why you say? Well, because those big ships are very expensive and take a long time to build. They could not afford to lose any of them, especially knowing that the American's were going to be building a lot of ships in the coming years.

The only reason the Japanese were so handily defeated in many instances is that we cracked their intelligence and were basically cheating. So we were able to get the upper hand on them in many instances. The Japanese were absolutely stunned at Midway. They were the stronger force and were significantly prepared for their task. We crushed them because we had the surprise. Had that been a fair fight, we would have been obliterated. We would still have won the war, and maybe in the same amount of time, but Midway would have been their win and not ours.

Only at the end of the War did Japan attack out of desperation in suicide attacks that were hopeless. They creamed us in the early part of the war, hands down, and they didn't have to hang around at Midway to do that!![:)] I believe that Nagumo and his men were more than happy to head home as quickly as possible. Battle is an ugly business and the game doesn't represent the human desire for self preservation. Too many battles are fought in the game that would not have been fought in the real world because the loss of life and loss of equipment was too high. The game abstracts that element out and if anything could be added, I think that would add a lot of realism to the game.




Fishbed -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 8:30:17 AM)

Erh... Tell me if I am wrong, but from what I know, the KB didn't even have the needed oil to linger a couple days (you know, the Yamagushi story "let's scuttle the Hiryu" and all)



Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 11:10:06 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs


Err... I'm trying to ask about the historical feasibility of Nagumo camping PH.

People say that the game is unhistorical because it allows Nagumo to do that, so my question is whether it could actually have happened.



Nagumo and KB certainly had the ability to attack again on the 7th (which due to game limits would be on the 8th)..., that much is clear. The real question is how long KB could just sit around before fuel became a crisis. Problems arise when that one "extra" attack becomes 3, or 4, or 5. For one thing, it is extremely rare in AE for Kido Butai to take anything close to it's historical A/C losses, which further upsets the situation.

Then there is the "gamey" question. The game forces MacArthur and Phillips into making their historical blunders..., so why does Nagumo get a "free ride"?
So I'd say that while ONE additional attack is within the spirit of the situation, any more than that is "pushing the envelope".



Gilbert -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 11:23:19 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Fishbed

Erh... Tell me if I am wrong, but from what I know, the KB didn't even have the needed oil to linger a couple days (you know, the Yamagushi story "let's scuttle the Hiryu" and all)


Fishbed,
This has been discussed here: http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=8086.0 . According to this interesting debate, Kido Butai had enough fuel to conduct at least another strike on Pearl Harbor.

Regards
Gilbert



castor troy -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 11:39:34 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs


Err... I'm trying to ask about the historical feasibility of Nagumo camping PH.

People say that the game is unhistorical because it allows Nagumo to do that, so my question is whether it could actually have happened.



Nagumo and KB certainly had the ability to attack again on the 7th (which due to game limits would be on the 8th)..., that much is clear. The real question is how long KB could just sit around before fuel became a crisis. Problems arise when that one "extra" attack becomes 3, or 4, or 5. For one thing, it is extremely rare in AE for Kido Butai to take anything close to it's historical A/C losses, which further upsets the situation.

Then there is the "gamey" question. The game forces MacArthur and Phillips into making their historical blunders..., so why does Nagumo get a "free ride"?
So I'd say that while ONE additional attack is within the spirit of the situation, any more than that is "pushing the envelope".



one extra attack would mean one attack on 7, one on 8 and one on 9 th Dec as you only get one per day. And not two waves on 7th Dec. While the 7th Dec attack is bigger than a single wave was in real life though, donīt know if itīs exact if both waves are combined.



Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 1:01:54 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: castor troy

one extra attack would mean one attack on 7, one on 8 and one on 9 th Dec as you only get one per day. And not two waves on 7th Dec. While the 7th Dec attack is bigger than a single wave was in real life though, donīt know if itīs exact if both waves are combined.



No..., there was ONE two-wave attack (half of KB's A/C in each wave) on the morning of the 7th. If Nagumo had chosen to do what his air staff was asking, there could have been ONE more 2-wave attack in the afternoon (which in game terms would occur on the 8th.) NOTE: KB was incapable of launching more than 1/2 of each carrier's A/C in a single strike due to deck space, hanger, and time restraints.



Panther Bait -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 2:03:37 PM)

It's too bad the surprise option for the start of the campaign always models the first strike as a unified strike package both benefitting from the lack of CAP, lowered AA, etc.  It would be more realistic if the second half of the strike faced some CAP and AA from what remains after the first strike.  I think it would increase the KB's average air losses as well.

Mike



xj900uk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 2:41:42 PM)

You also have to understand the mind of Nagumo.  His attitude to the 'Hawaiian Operation' was luke-warm from the word go.  Also in various scenarios/war games played in advance nearly all his carriers had ended up at the bottomo of the ocean, & he was also privately concerned he would have to fight his way into PH to begin with.  He was a very comptent Admiral but far too cautious,  Yamamoto had considered having him replaced by the far more aggressive Yamagushi (who was on the Hiryu at Midway) but in the end decided against it as it would be bad for fleet morale.
Also Nagumo justified his withdrawl as soon as his 2nd wave had landed withouth flying off the 3rd to hit the PH shore installations & fuel tanks (in retrospect a serious blunder).  They did not know where the US carriers were (likewise they hadn't a clue where the Japs were) nor any subs which were bound to be out & looking for them.  Also he turned to his aides and said (very unusually for a high fleet admiral) 'The fight against the Americans will be long and bitter.  This fleet will be invaluable in the struggle that lies ahead for us all.  It is my duty to His Majesty to return in intact to Him.'

Of course,  it makes for a fascinating 'what if' Yamamoto had replaced Nagumo with Yamagushi prior to the Hawaiian operation... (other than Nagumo probably committing suicide in 1941 rather than 1944)



pad152 -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 4:07:43 PM)

Gamey and complete fantasy, even a modern carrier combat group only carriers enough arms/ammo for three days of combat ops, before it has to go off station to rearm/replenish! The Japanese could have launched a second strike but that's about it. They needed to keep some in case they ran into US carriers. Also they lost about 20+ aircraft, about 10% of their total, with about 20-30% more damaged, if they launched a second strike that number could have been as high as 50%, not good if they meet the US carriers.






fbs -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 4:14:05 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Then there is the "gamey" question. The game forces MacArthur and Phillips into making their historical blunders..., so why does Nagumo get a "free ride"?
So I'd say that while ONE additional attack is within the spirit of the situation, any more than that is "pushing the envelope".



Right, that's why I'm not asking about having a 3rd strike on the 7th, but to linger around on the 8th onwards. No free ride, but from the 8th onwards how could the situation have evolved with someone bolder than Nagumo in command - say Yamaguchi's?

If one removes Nagumo's fears from the equation, one finds an almost intact force in complete domination of the surroundings. Provided that the fuel situation could be worked out, perhaps Nagumo could have stalked out PH? Or not?


Thanks,
fbs



Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 5:02:32 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Then there is the "gamey" question. The game forces MacArthur and Phillips into making their historical blunders..., so why does Nagumo get a "free ride"?
So I'd say that while ONE additional attack is within the spirit of the situation, any more than that is "pushing the envelope".



Right, that's why I'm not asking about having a 3rd strike on the 7th, but to linger around on the 8th onwards. No free ride, but from the 8th onwards how could the situation have evolved with someone bolder than Nagumo in command - say Yamaguchi's?

If one removes Nagumo's fears from the equation, one finds an almost intact force in complete domination of the surroundings. Provided that the fuel situation could be worked out, perhaps Nagumo could have stalked out PH? Or not?


Thanks,
fbs



As the game is constructed..., you only get ONE strike on the 7th (representing the 2 waves Nagumo launched). The only sure way (using this game engine) to represent a second strike in the afternoon of the 7th (historically possible) is to make a strike on the 8th as KB is leaving.



Nikademus -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 5:10:26 PM)

Stick around and bomb to your heart's content. Just watch your fuel and ammo. Exhaust it and hope you don't get ambushed by one or more USN carriers along the way. [;)]



fbs -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 5:34:10 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Then there is the "gamey" question. The game forces MacArthur and Phillips into making their historical blunders..., so why does Nagumo get a "free ride"?
So I'd say that while ONE additional attack is within the spirit of the situation, any more than that is "pushing the envelope".



Right, that's why I'm not asking about having a 3rd strike on the 7th, but to linger around on the 8th onwards. No free ride, but from the 8th onwards how could the situation have evolved with someone bolder than Nagumo in command - say Yamaguchi's?

If one removes Nagumo's fears from the equation, one finds an almost intact force in complete domination of the surroundings. Provided that the fuel situation could be worked out, perhaps Nagumo could have stalked out PH? Or not?


Thanks,
fbs



As the game is constructed..., you only get ONE strike on the 7th (representing the 2 waves Nagumo launched). The only sure way (using this game engine) to represent a second strike in the afternoon of the 7th (historically possible) is to make a strike on the 8th as KB is leaving.



Oh, that's a good point.

Thanks,
fbs



Mynok -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 5:38:06 PM)

I suppose a nitpicker would say that the two waves were really two strikes, since they were targeted differently. But they only used essentially 50% of the air component for each wave, so the one strike in the game really represents both waves as Mike said. I would only ever do one more strike on the 8th representing the planned but not executed third wave.

EDIT: Hmm...just thinking and was it half in each wave or more like 30% in each wave....[&:]



Nikademus -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 5:45:29 PM)

Port/Airfield attacks for both sides are resolved during one air phase per turn using all/most available assets and no coordination issues. Its an abstraction.




Cavalry Corp -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/27/2009 6:16:18 PM)

Looking at the strength of Coral sea scn where 3 US CV V 2 JAP AND 1 CVL, US pretty much win everytime. Even in one game out of four where as Japs I won ( without loss ) I still lost almost all the Kates in the strikes, I think I had 4 left from the whole TF.

I would say Midway would be a total US vistory everytime in AE ( except for the odd bit of luck) .IF THERE is a Midway scn later I think it would expose some issues.Thats one thing I am nervous about , the allied CV and fighters seem to take full advantage of the game parameters somehow. The JAP CV feel extra fragile and the level of aircraft just that bit too small to stop the US attacks.

Cav



Kadrin -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 12:39:50 AM)

One additional strike is all you should get, and then you'll would be sucking fumes all the way back to Japan.

I honestly don't know why you would bother sticking around, every run of the PH Strike I've seen results in a minimum of 6 battleships sunk along with a number of other ships. Far more than the Japanese actually accomplished with fewer losses to boot. Perhaps my favorite was a 2 day strike where they managed to sink every surface combat vessel in Pearl. All Battleships, Heavy Cruisers, Light Cruisers, Destroyers, a number of Submarines, and a few auxiliaries.

I would actually like to see the Pearl Harbor strike toned down severely to historical levels.



spence -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 12:56:12 AM)

The results of the actual PH attack seem to be at the lower end of the bell curve of possible results. I've seen 2 x BBs sunk twice in about 20 tries. Every attack seems to damage nearly twice as many ships as historically. Plus the airbase(s) is always knocked out and the repair yard is sometimes damaged. Toning down the torpedo carrying Kates to something akin to their real historical performance (50% hits on the unmoving surprised ships at PH and around 10% on ships underway at sea) would go a long way to fixing things.




Kull -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 3:53:15 AM)

The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.



Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 9:49:33 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.



Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"

From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.



NightFlyer -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 1:28:42 PM)

The risk KB took or did not take at PH was Nagumo's decision. Yamamoto expected to lose 2 carriers and Yamaguchi would have scuttled two carriers if they ran out of fuel (ref. Shattered Sword). So when you say it was too risky to hang around PH, you really mean, "Nagumo was too cautious (I would use the word useless - he knew little of naval aviation tactics) to hang around PH". KB never had the same opportunity again and they should have launched more strikes at the fuel depots, drydocks, sub pens and searched for the US carriers. This would make it "ahistorical" but I enjoy playing these games for the "what-if" factor as long as it doesn't become too unrealistic. In the end though the result would have been the same, Japan could never match the US in industrial output of carriers and aircraft. Japan stupidly thought the US would sign a peace treaty after the attack, mostly because of the "America First" movement in the US at that time.



PawnPower -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 1:41:56 PM)

I don't see anything wrong with the Japanese staying longer at Pearl Harbour. The major problem are the full campaign scenarios are not designed for a longer operation at Pearl Harbour. More resources would have been used for the operation. It is a whatif scenario.

In WitP AE and WitP the allied player will not give in. In RL the Japanese hope for a short war.

This is a game not RL. For pbem players playing the full campaign the limiting factor is the time taken to play a scenario.



xj900uk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 2:36:22 PM)

The Japs made two serious strategic errors at PH,  the first being to launch the attack in the first place!  The second being that the over-cautious Nagumo cancelled the 3rd strike,  which was to hit the shore installations, fuel dumps, repair shops and dry dock faciluties.  If they'd been knocked out then the remains fo the Pacific fleet would have been in serious trouble.
I seem to recall that the US had two carriers in the area at the time, Lexington & Enterprise (Saratoga was on the west coast, not sure where Yorktown was) and could possibly have interfered in the 8th.  However given the poor state of the US forces coupled with the fact that both were going used for ferry missions and had a bare reduced complement of planes,  could they have damaged or destroyed the KB?  Probably not considering that each Jap carrier held back 9 planes as constant CAP over the KB during the entire 12.07.41 just in case the US carriers showed.  Total of 54 planes,  assuming (say) 50% effectiveness at any one time is 27 Zero's flown by pilots at the peak of their efficiency, morale, skill & training against incoming and almost certainly unescorted fragmented attacks by SBD's and TBD's and their unprepared and bewildered pilots, assuming the US carrier fleets could even find the KB in the first place (bearing in mind PH would be of no help whatsoever and at that time all the US 'Orange' plans revolved around battleships still as the primary weapon...  know who I would I be putting money on...



fbs -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 2:56:50 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: NightFlyer
This would make it "ahistorical" but I enjoy playing these games for the "what-if" factor as long as it doesn't become too unrealistic.



I do believe that Dec 7, 1941 should be scripted and follow the actual events (although with slightly different results) for historical accuracy. But, from Dec 8, 1941 it is the supreme commander's (i.e., player's or AI's) decision. I don't think that anyone intends that all events until 1945 to be scripted -- they will follow the supreme commander's will, although they must be bound by what was historically possible. That is, everything from Dec 8 onwards is really an "what-if".

So, given the actual resources on Dec 7 and the actual events on Dec 7... it would be non-historical if the KB camped PH for a month, but was it historically possible for a commander other than Nagumo to stick around PH for 2 or 3 days more to do more damage?

If it was historically possible, without giving 20 oilers to KB, then both the AI and the player should be allowed to do that -- and bear the consequences of a bad decision (the player, I mean, not the AI.. the AI won't mind if all its carriers are sunk by Catalinas).


Thanks,
fbs



fbs -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 2:58:36 PM)

By the way, there is only an AM attack on PH on Dec 7, with all my games. Can't carriers send a PM attack too with the current engine? Any limitation with that?

Thanks,
fbs



EUBanana -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 3:04:39 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kadrin
I honestly don't know why you would bother sticking around, every run of the PH Strike I've seen results in a minimum of 6 battleships sunk along with a number of other ships. Far more than the Japanese actually accomplished with fewer losses to boot.


In fairness in my current GC pbem I didn't lose a single BB at Pearl.

However every single BB there was left on heavy damage, none of them will be sailing before 1943.



Joe D. -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 4:19:58 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: fbs

Quite a bit of criticism about Nagumo camping Pearl Harbor for a week.

But... is that such an outrageous option for the Japs to stay around? Say that Nagumo took the gamble and preyed around PH for a few more days - either by attacking PH again, or by keeping distance from PH and looking for incoming/fleeing ships. How much of that was actually possible? ...


Possible, but didn't Nagumo and his KB have other errands to run in the Pacific?

The only reason PH was attacked was so that Japan would have a free hand to expand into her neighbor's seas w/o any US interference.



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