RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (Full Version)

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Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 8:03:01 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

The Japs made two serious strategic errors at PH, the first being to launch the attack in the first place! The second being that the over-cautious Nagumo cancelled the 3rd strike, which was to hit the shore installations, fuel dumps, repair shops and dry dock facilities. If they'd been knocked out then the remains fo the Pacific fleet would have been in serious trouble.



With the benefit of "hindsight", you are certainly correct. But with the benefit of "hindsight" wasn't MacArthur equally wrong not to move his air assets out of range and send all his subs to sea during the many hours he had between receiving the "PH War Warning" and the actual Japanese attack? Or given "hindsight", why would "Tom Thumb" Phillips sail Force Z north from Singapore?

"Hindsight" is always going to be on the side of the game player when compared to his real-life counterpart. It's up to the game designers to keep it's exploitation to a workable minimum if they can. After that it's ""house rules" and "gentlemens agreements".



crsutton -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/28/2009 10:10:41 PM)

Simple solution. Give the Japanese carriers enough sorties for "two strikes only"

My experience as the Allied player in two pbemails is that the Japanese player usually comes away with slightly better than historical with the first strike, and pretty much prostrates the American fighter force killing many and leaving them with an average morale in the low 30 range on average. A second strike faces  ineffective fighter opposition and result in very few losses and just about sinks or severly damages all BBs. Sucessive strikes are the same as the Allied fighters are used up by then. If I were an IJN player, barring a house rule, I would stick around and pummel Pearl at least three and maybe four days in a row. As the game is now, it can be done, and the American player can do little to fight back except risk his carriers.

However, limiting the Japanese to enough sorties for two strikes and no more acutally puts a little excitment into the game and creates an element of risk for the Japanese player. The second strike can be lucrative for Japan but there is always the risk that the Allied player is a "crazy assed sumbitch" and will send his carriers after you. And, Japan will have no sorties left-only  CAP. Seems like a fair deal to me. This simple solution will force a tough decison on the IJN player just like the decisions Nagumo had to face.

"There is no off position on the genius switch."



Kull -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 1:54:19 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.



Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"

From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.


Good counter, and I left myself open to it with an insufficient comment. The Pearl opening and Force Z sortie are really one time events that are driven by the nature of the start position. If KB could show up in January or February and have the same success, THAT would be a major problem. Surprise-driven "First Day" oddities - so long as they aren't repeatable - are not destabilizing over the length of the entire game, so I don't view them as serious issues. There's plenty of other things which are truly problematic (such as the Japanese LCU dominance of China), and I'd prefer the devs focus on those issues as opposed to the annoyances. On the other hand, some of the ideas having to do with opening day limitations on KB sorties - if easy to implement - wouldn't be a bad idea. But be careful here. If KB could only fly two sorties, as has been recommended, the Allied player would KNOW that (which in RL they didn't), and could thus race his carriers in for risk-free assaults on KB. Is 4 days of camping excessive? Absolutely. Is running out of ammo after two strikes excessive? Also true.

Just beware the "law of unintended consequences".



Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 3:03:33 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.



Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"

From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.


Good counter, and I left myself open to it with an insufficient comment. The Pearl opening and Force Z sortie are really one time events that are driven by the nature of the start position. If KB could show up in January or February and have the same success, THAT would be a major problem. Surprise-driven "First Day" oddities - so long as they aren't repeatable - are not destabilizing over the length of the entire game, so I don't view them as serious issues. There's plenty of other things which are truly problematic (such as the Japanese LCU dominance of China), and I'd prefer the devs focus on those issues as opposed to the annoyances. On the other hand, some of the ideas having to do with opening day limitations on KB sorties - if easy to implement - wouldn't be a bad idea. But be careful here. If KB could only fly two sorties, as has been recommended, the Allied player would KNOW that (which in RL they didn't), and could thus race his carriers in for risk-free assaults on KB. Is 4 days of camping excessive? Absolutely. Is running out of ammo after two strikes excessive? Also true.

Just beware the "law of unintended consequences". Hey..., that's my line! [8D]



I agree. I'd like to see "control" of this problem in the form of tighter fuel supply for KB and it's support Tankers. Right now they seem to have far too much (KB can sail all the way back to Japan without refueling at all).



castor troy -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 8:53:15 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl


quote:

ORIGINAL: Kull
The amount of angst expended over the "extra days" at Pearl and the "enforced" sortie of Force Z is all out of proportion to the game impact. Does it hurt in 1941? Absolutely. Does it matter in 1943? Absolutely not.



Not trying to offend, Kull (your point has some validity). But it's also the equivalent of saying "Why were you all so upset when Allied Players sent in 150 B-17's at 1000 feet against your naval TF's? Will it matter in 1945?"

From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.


Good counter, and I left myself open to it with an insufficient comment. The Pearl opening and Force Z sortie are really one time events that are driven by the nature of the start position. If KB could show up in January or February and have the same success, THAT would be a major problem. Surprise-driven "First Day" oddities - so long as they aren't repeatable - are not destabilizing over the length of the entire game, so I don't view them as serious issues. There's plenty of other things which are truly problematic (such as the Japanese LCU dominance of China), and I'd prefer the devs focus on those issues as opposed to the annoyances. On the other hand, some of the ideas having to do with opening day limitations on KB sorties - if easy to implement - wouldn't be a bad idea. But be careful here. If KB could only fly two sorties, as has been recommended, the Allied player would KNOW that (which in RL they didn't), and could thus race his carriers in for risk-free assaults on KB. Is 4 days of camping excessive? Absolutely. Is running out of ammo after two strikes excessive? Also true.

Just beware the "law of unintended consequences".



Why should KB run out of ammo after two days? Torps yes, 800kg AP bombs yes (both would run out after the first strike). But there would be plenty of bombs left that more than represent a threat to the facilities on Hawai and every ship except a BB (but those are knocked out at Pearl anyway). Or am I completely wrong here? Bomb loads for only two strikes seems very few.



bklooste -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 9:18:58 AM)

quote:


From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.


Considering 7 of the BBs were SUNK historically and the game doesnt model raising ships ( like the ships Japan raised later in Japan) players should consider themselves very lucky to get away with the light damage they suffer. The game does not distinguish port sizes so the same BB sunk in port at Midway and could not be raised nor does it model side by side ships.



xj900uk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 2:56:40 PM)

In my game, Force 'Z' escaped with out a scratch beneath bad weather (and a patrol of NZ Buffallo's got several Nells & Beattys into the bargain whilst htey were milling around)

Hindsight was a truly wonderful thing, but this is the opportunity to look at 'what if' alternatives, and the game gives us a wonderful opportunity to look at the prospect of a more agressive Nagumo not cancelling the 3rd wave on PH,  and continuing to ride his luck and trying to hunt down & sink the US carriers.
After all, Japanese intelligence had reported the absence of the US carriers the night before, this news was passed on to both Yamamoto and also Nagumo, who was given the option to abort the attack if they were not present (he pressed on, despite his caution and reserve).  however his original no.1 priority was to attack the US carrier fleet and batttleships 2nd,  so what if he decided to follow this through and hunt them down?  He could certainly have done it until his fuel ran out (which is what Yamagushi was pressing for)



anarchyintheuk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 4:07:56 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: bklooste

quote:


From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.


Considering 7 of the BBs were SUNK historically and the game doesnt model raising ships ( like the ships Japan raised later in Japan) players should consider themselves very lucky to get away with the light damage they suffer. The game does not distinguish port sizes so the same BB sunk in port at Midway and could not be raised nor does it model side by side ships.



I guess its semantics, but I think of sunk as 'disappeared below the waves and not recoverable'. Stretching that I'd say AZ, OK, WV and CA were 'sunk' at PH in that they were either never repaired to a combat worthy condition or physically sank to the harbor floor.

Although I never kept stats in about 20 first turns my impression is that ship damage at PH is higher in AE than rl. The opposite of the how it was in WitP. Not a big deal, but I do love using those old bbs in amphib task forces.



Nikademus -> shall we go for 15 pages? (10/29/2009 4:11:49 PM)

[>:]



anarchyintheuk -> RE: shall we go for 15 pages? (10/29/2009 4:14:23 PM)

Sorry for boring you, just green button me.



Nikademus -> RE: shall we go for 15 pages? (10/29/2009 4:31:33 PM)

wasn't directed at you or anyone specifically. [;)]



GB68 -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/29/2009 4:32:17 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk


quote:

ORIGINAL: bklooste

quote:


From what I've seen in play and the forum, most players tend to get excited about what's happening to them NOW. Especially if they feel they are being abused by their opponent or the scenario or the rules.


Considering 7 of the BBs were SUNK historically and the game doesnt model raising ships ( like the ships Japan raised later in Japan) players should consider themselves very lucky to get away with the light damage they suffer. The game does not distinguish port sizes so the same BB sunk in port at Midway and could not be raised nor does it model side by side ships.



I guess its semantics, but I think of sunk as 'disappeared below the waves and not recoverable'. Stretching that I'd say AZ, OK, WV and CA were 'sunk' at PH in that they were either never repaired to a combat worthy condition or physically sank to the harbor floor.

Although I never kept stats in about 20 first turns my impression is that ship damage at PH is higher in AE than rl. The opposite of the how it was in WitP. Not a big deal, but I do love using those old bbs in amphib task forces.



Hmmm. where as I always thought in WitP, the damaged caused at Pearl was much less than reality, where as now, in AE it seems to be normally close to reality. ( with the odd exception)

I have played the 1st turn, perhaps 14 or 15 times. And I have found the usual damage, BB wise, is 2 or 3 sunk with 2 or 3 severly damaged. Very much as I would expect.

Myself personally, it is tempting to stick around at Pearl for an extra day or two, but as the Japanese you have to trade off the chance of sinking another BB or two against losing another 15 to 30 experienced naval pilots. But, In Vs AI games I stick around, but in my PBEM, I did not, because I felt it was "gamey" Although it was tempting and we did not discuss it as a House Rule.

Personally, though, I have no problem with others doing it. And if you want a totally "historical" game , then I guess as the Allies, you should not invade the Home Islands or Formosa. Perhaps even Saipan before Kwalajein? Where do you exactly draw the line between the "game" and "reality"??? If you are complaining about too many Pearl attacks, tell me where we draw the line?? Interested to know. Can the Japanese player in return ask you not to attack Iwo Jima before April 1945 even though you are fully ready to gofor it? Or no Atom Bombs before 1946? No, you would not accept that, because it constricts one of your major threats.




xj900uk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 2:57:37 PM)

Arizona was sunk (blew up) outright at PH,  Utah was no longer a front-line outfit so was never raised and broken up where she lay (unlike Arizona which has since been turned into a war memorial)
Oklahoma was eventually raised but not until '44.  She foundered under tow in bad weather on the way back to the West Coast (not sure where exactly she went down though, can anyone assist here)
California and West Virginia were evenutally raised and repaired enough to return to fleet duties, but I believe were kept on training/reserve until the end of hostilities and didn't fire many (if any) more shots in anger in WWII



ckammp -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 3:51:01 PM)

deleted



Sharkosaurus rex -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 5:23:23 PM)

I don't think that the Japanese plan for Pearl Harbour included any possiblity of a third wave strike. Nagumo and the Japs might have regretted missing the opportunity to cripple the USN through destroying the facilities at Pearl Harbour on 7th Dec and also dealing with the US carriers while he had the upper hand. All the other early war CV strikes against Allied bases had the same template. A dawn first wave followed by the second wave a couple of hours later- obviously limited by the size of the carries' flight deck and the requirement to move planes from hangers to the flight deck. All of the following attacks involved attacking ships in/around the port and also targetting airstrips and port installations.
Wake 22nd Dec 1941 (2CV)
Rabaul 20th Jan 1942 (2CV)
Kavieng 21st Jan 1942 (2CV)
Lae 21st Jan 1942 (2CV)
Rabaul 22nd Jan 1942 (2CV)
Darwin 19 Feb 1942 (6 CV)
Tjilatjap 5th March 1942 (5CV)
Colombo 5th April 1942 (5CV)
Trincomalee 9th April 1942 (5CV)
Obviously all these bases were not as large as Pearl Harbour and none had eight battleships inside, so maybe the Japanese had enough surplus bombers to attack the shipping, airbases, and port facilities. Or maybe they learnt from their earlier mistake and decided to destroy at the enemy's ability to repair and refuel. But all of them were attacked using the same two wave attack- causing enourmous damages. The same as the Pearl Habour attack, none of these strikes had the Japanese CV camping overnight to bomb away again the afternoon or the next day. Only their strike at Midway was planned to have only a single dawn wave- opting to keep the second wave as a reserve- which of course led to many problems while trying to re-arm the torpedo planes once the USN CV are sighted.



Sharkosaurus rex -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 6:47:09 PM)

The elderly USS Utah (commissioned in 1911) had been redesignated as a mobile target ship. She had her main battery guns removed before the Pearl Harbour attack, and was covered with a "deck" of wooden planks (to help reduce bomb damage). She might have looked like a carrier from the air and was one of the first ships attacked during the raid. Utah suffered two torpedo hits and capsized very quickly. Her sister ship, Florida was scrapped in 1931- so there was little chance of restoring Utah to a fighting condition. She was a BB only in name.



PawnPower -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 8:10:10 PM)

Maybe if the Japanese had taken all available carrier aircraft more strikes could have taken place. The only drawback could possibly be the speed of the other carriers.



ChezDaJez -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 9:25:00 PM)

quote:

I don't think that the Japanese plan for Pearl Harbour included any possiblity of a third wave strike. Nagumo and the Japs might have regretted missing the opportunity to cripple the USN through destroying the facilities at Pearl Harbour on 7th Dec and also dealing with the US carriers while he had the upper hand.


IRL, I think it was logistically possible for KB to launch a 3rd and 4th strike against PH, either on the 7th or on the 8th, without much fear of counter attack. I am sure that they had sufficient ordnance and fuel to do this. However, the only rational reason would have been to knock out the port repair and fuel depots.

In the game, there is no real way to target these facilities so most attacks would go against the ships again. There really is no point unless your first attacks were totally ineffective. Better to hit and run and leave the allies guessing where KB will make its presence known than to continue bombing a target for little additional gain.

Chez



Mike Scholl -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 9:25:30 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: PawnPower

Maybe if the Japanese had taken all available carrier aircraft more strikes could have taken place. The only drawback could possibly be the speed of the other carriers.


Their speed, their range, their fuel requirements, the fact that they had already been raped of their best aircrews trying to bring KB up to strength....



PawnPower -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 10:04:43 PM)

With a base like Pearl Harbour you would want to target its facilities.  For example an opponent who loses millions of gallons of oil will have to change plans.



treespider -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/30/2009 10:34:52 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

quote:

I don't think that the Japanese plan for Pearl Harbour included any possiblity of a third wave strike. Nagumo and the Japs might have regretted missing the opportunity to cripple the USN through destroying the facilities at Pearl Harbour on 7th Dec and also dealing with the US carriers while he had the upper hand.


IRL, I think it was logistically possible for KB to launch a 3rd and 4th strike against PH, either on the 7th or on the 8th, without much fear of counter attack. I am sure that they had sufficient ordnance and fuel to do this. However, the only rational reason would have been to knock out the port repair and fuel depots.

In the game, there is no real way to target these facilities so most attacks would go against the ships again. There really is no point unless your first attacks were totally ineffective. Better to hit and run and leave the allies guessing where KB will make its presence known than to continue bombing a target for little additional gain.

Chez



Wilmott has a nice little chapter that discusses this aspect as well as two other points...in terms of refueling he focusses on the refueling activities of the Akigumo. It's not that there was not enough oil, it was the refueling that would have been necessary that may have left KB vulnerable.

KB made a high speed run in on the 7th then a high speed run out the afternoon of the 7th. A third strike would have had to been launched on the 8th as there was not enough day left for a third wave on the 7th ...since it would have had to been plotted after recovery of the first two waves. As the thrid strike would have come on the 8th it would have required another full days worth of full speed running without refueling... and would have resulted in the destroyers turning to make the run back to the NW with their tanks already 2/3 empty.

Another aspect Wilmott addresses was the amount of damage incurred by the strike aircraft themselves in the first two waves...and would there have been sufficent aircraft available to launch an effective third strike while at the same time accounting for the potential appearance of the American carriers.

The third aspect is the fact that the targetting of a third wave was never discussed or planned for until after the initial 2 waves were completed.



bretg80 -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (10/31/2009 12:58:39 AM)

Well, had the KB loitered and run into the American carriers and sunk them, then it would have been a huge victory for the KB. However, I believe the Americans would have found the KB first and then who knows. It's not clear that destroying additional facilities at Pearl would have made a difference. Those facilities can be rebuilt much faster than ships. The big damage had been done in the first two waves. It is not wise to press an attack after surprise unless you can eliminate your enemy or gain ground. The KB was not going to eliminate anything at Pearl, all they could do is create a little more destruction and possibly lose a lot of planes. The Islands were never in their cross hairs for this operation, so gaining ground was not a reason to press an attack.

We can all second guess Nagumo, but in hindsight, he probably did the right thing given his objective. After all, he did succeed.



xj900uk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (11/3/2009 1:44:37 PM)

There was definitely a plan for a 3rd strike to hit PH around midday or just after, but Nagumo cancelled it and signalled the rest of the fleet that they would be leaving as soon as all of their planes were recovered.  Two of his senior officers (one was Genga or Genda I think) were amazed at this decision & tried to talk him out of it but to no avail.
I don't know if this 3rd wave though was planned all along or had been agreed to on the voyage if losses from the first wave (which would largely have to make it up) were very low.  The crews though had already been briefed to hit the oil tank farm and shore facilities which was why they were taking GP ratehr than AP bombs & no torpedos (which they would hold back the remainder of just in case any US surface forces or carriers appeared)



AcePylut -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (11/3/2009 3:01:37 PM)

Man, I salivate if the Japs wanna stick around PH for another day or two... Can you say... "Massive Sub attacks"... Cap dropping highly experienced Jap Navy aviators...

for what... some old pretty much worthless BB's?



FatR -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (11/3/2009 10:35:44 PM)

   Against AI, launching a second strike can be worthwhile, because AI takes no serious effort to get ships that took no damage/light damage in the first strike out of Pearl Harbor and disperse them. CAP is weak and easily slaughtered after the losses of the first day, and flak is not that threatening, because in WitP you can repair any damage to planes on carriers. In the campaign I've just started, the second strike finished off all remaining BBs, sank 2 CAs and a bunch of small fries - pretty good returns for a dozen lost planes. But against a living opponent, the reward is probably not worth the risk.



xj900uk -> RE: So what if the Japs want to stick around Pearl Harbor? (11/4/2009 1:48:33 PM)

Better to ignore the damaged capital ships and go after the shore installations,  dockyard and oil - hitting those hard would do the US far more harm than sinking stuff which you've already proved to be obsolete



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