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Nikademus -> Re: myth of superior IJN pilot training (7/14/2002 10:42:07 AM)
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]"There should be a greater difference between an experienced pilot (90+) and a mediocre one (60-70's). My best Zero pilots haven't even mustered 8 kills in four months of constant fighting, on the contrary, most of the top pilots have been killed or wounded already. The Jap air losses started to rise in Sep/Oct 42 after the US had made the landings in Guadalcanal and received lots of reinforcements (P38 etc). Now, my Tainan regiment is comprised of replacement with a few surviving top pilots in their ranks. The guys with 90+ exp should really k i c k a s s. Now they are too easily killed."
Matrix and Grigsby were once particularly wedded to the myth that Japanese pilots were better trained than their American opponents, or that extensive experience allows a pilot in an inferior a/c to hold its own against an adequately trained pilot in a superior a/c. Neither are true, and the issue of adequate training vs. extensive experience has been dealt with many times before. Poor training is almost always fatal. Adequate training gives the the pilot in the better plane the edge over any ace. It sounds as though maybe Matrix is finally getting the a/c model correct.
As to your claim that IJN attrition rate was only negative after Guadalcanal and only after P38s were delivered there, both are manifestly false. From 1 February 1942 to 1 June 1942, in direct combats between F4Fs flown by USN pilots and A6M2s flown by IJN pilots, the F4Fs shot down 16 Zekes losing only 10 F4Fs (Lundstrom, 1994, The First Team at Guadalacanal, p4). At Guadalcanal, F4Fs were 1 plane shy of a 1:1 kill ratio through November 1942 (see the data appendix in Frank's "Guadalcanal"). It has been rumoured that IJN pilot tactics evolved only in response to assumed superiority of A6M. While it is true that pilots evolved an increased situational awareness, USN naval pilots interviewed by Lundstrom wrote that the emphasis on teamwork *in training* (i.e. in 1940 and 1941), and at accurate deflection shooting, gave them the edge.
In contrast, Japanese a/c consistantly exhibited poor skills in deflection shooting, and poor coordination within sections where wingmates did not consistently support each other when in duress. Undoubtedly the latter was due in part to the notion of heroic individualism instilled in Japanese pilots, to the absence of effective radios in their a/c to coordinate between planes, and the use of an outdated 3-plane section (rather than finger 4) long after (1943, IIRC) the Allies adopted the finger 4 (in late 1940).
I'd rate IJN naval pilots at start as EXP 65 and USN pilots at start as EXP 65.
I've not been able to verify yet the loss rates of Allied army fighter a/c in the early part of the war. AFAICT, the really poor performance seems to be limited to RAF pilots in F2A3s and F2A4s in Malaya/Burma TO. There is one account of a group of Dutch pilots who lost 6 planes when they were bounced in their landing pattern in February 1942.... something that could happen to anyone as the Japanese later learned to their detriment. [/B][/QUOTE]
Its no myth though it is a subject that is exploitable by those who wish to argue differently due to there being a propensity of US sources and US based sources of info vs Japanese sources.
Many of the IJN carrier pilots (and those of the land based contingents) had many hundreds to thousands of flight hours and the Japanese system in general for training was harsher and conducted under more realistic (and dangerous) conditions as the cultural ethos of the time stressed duty to one's country(or Emperor) vs the more safety minded US.
As for the kill ratios. It is true that F4F pilots maintained a good kill ratio against zeros after (and during) Midway.
The reason was not because of the pilots were as a whole "as good" but largely because an innovative American pilot named Jimmy Thatch, aware of the Zero's superior *individual* stats (excepting durability) developed the team tactic that allowed a Wildcat "division" to hold it's own against a "Division" of Zeros.
One on one.....a good IJN pilot in an A6M will win against a good or medocre (conscript) F4F pilot, or an F4F pilot who isn't fully aware of the characteristics of his enemy's mount. Unfortunatly for the Japanese, this wasn't WWI but WWII where "squadrons" and "flights" of aircraft tended to tangle.....thus the story could be far different when a gaggle of Zero's and Wildcats tangle
Guadalcanal added to this problem for the Zero in that the land based contingents had first to traverse many hundreds of miles before engaging their opponents only then to face an equally long trek back.
American pilots had a far less transit time and could rest up. Thus the kill ratios by themselves do not tell the whole story. While not nearly as extreme, this post reminds me of the time on the PacWar thread when someone presented these "facts" (kill ratios) and submitted to Matrix that this proved clearly that the "Best Japanese pilots were only as good as the greenest American ones" and that the air to air combat routines should be altered so that the Japanese can never score better than a 1 to 1 kill ratio against American fighters.
Hoo!
As for UV.....attempting to factor in this in the game....good luck. How would one determine a fair way to implement it? This "rule" would not be valid in every situation. Best one can do is use the classic pilot exp system to help determine things. I dont think it works badly considering that exp is but one component that determines victories.....fatique, disruption, positioning at the time of attack, "advantage" during the dogfight....all factor in. I have seen no examples of PacWar like "invincibleness on the part of Japanese Zero's in UV
So in general i agree with Saburo Sakai's asertation that "in general, at the beginning of the war, while Japanese pilots tended to be better, the Americans in turn were better at "team tactics" which could often negate any individual pool of Japanese pilot superiority, even in inferior planes. The ability to work as a team was one of the great secrets of the German airforces's success (having excellent fighters helped too) but i have read that the Japanese fighter pilots tended to work independantly which could lead to trouble. Add that to the fragility of their mounts, the "warrior ethic" present in many (like not wearing parachutes) and the Japanese military's general view that individual men were but cogs to be used and expended (thus no serious effort to effect a rescue/recovery system like the Americans developed) led to a quick and steady degreation of pilot quality once the war turned into an attrition fight.
I think the pilot ratings are fine. In fact if anything the Japanese ratings "have" been toned down. I see far less "90"s then PacWar had. That should make USN fans happy....especially with the "training" bug (as i see it) which kills more pilots than it trains since there's no saftey in place to prevent training missions during adverse weather (forcing the player to micro manage the settings each turn.....oh my aching fingers)
IJN replacement pilots also start off at way lower exp than American concripts.....on average a difference of 20-40 points worth. I think that balances things out very nicely. Big difference between a IJN conscript who joins the Akagi with an exp level of *20* and a USN conscript who joins the Enterprise with an exp rating of *50*
Zeros i would add are not the only example. IJN attack pilots in their Vals and Kates tended, in general to display a lesser tendancey to become disrupted and disjointed when forming and following up on carrier attacks. Their attacks over the US carriers tended to be more coordinated as a result (torp and dive bombers going in together or close together) while the zeros provided cover.
Ironically this tendancy for US air attacks to become disjointed and seperated was a factor in the Japanese defeat at Midway, where the fighters became seperated from the dive bombers who became seperated from the torp bombers. The torp bombers ended up going in first and alone and got slaughtered as a result.
It might have been useless sacrifice except at the miracle moment, a flight of SBD's spotted the Japnanese carriers and roared into the attack while the IJN CAP was still at low level.
The rest was history.
There are more examples......a great one where a very small flight of B5N's escorted by a few Zero's attacked the damaged but operational Yorktown, steaming at 22-24 knots.....the Zeros kept most of the Wildcats at bay, and in a supreme feat of markmenship, four attacking Kates scored a 50% hit ratio (2 out of 4 torps hitting the Yorktown) which crippled the carrier.
This success, esp in terms of torpedo runs is a stark contrast to the American success rate....one which the Devestator and it's torp do not alone explain (and in fact recent arguments at Warships1 have done much to "exonerate" the reputation of the oft maligned "Devastator" aircraft)
In short (again) i think the Japanese earned their pilot skill ratings for the first half of the war. USN proponents though, not satisfied with the war's ending or the metamorphasis of the USN into the best fighting force of the time after graduating from the school of hard knocks, dont appear to want to give the Japanese any slack in any area.......its simply not acceptable for the Japanese to have been better at anything then us, however temporarily.......Maybe its due to the fact that the war in the Pacific was very much a "race war" with no love lost between the two opponents....maybe its just nationalistic pride.....i dont know, dont care. but i get sick of seeing it.
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