Coordinated Carrier Strikes

Coordinated Carrier Strikes (Full Version)

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Kingfish -> Coordinated Carrier Strikes (6/27/2002 3:28:49 AM)
While playing Coral Sea for the millionth time I noticed something odd about how the two carrier TFs launch airstrikes. My own forces would launch multiple strikes of 10-20 planes, then the AI would respond with one big strike of 60-70 planes. While my guys managed to install a sun roof on both Shoukaku and Shoho, the Japanese swamped my cap, and Yorktown was soon added to Robert Ballard's list of wrecks to visit. Question: how does one launch these big, multi carrier strikes? Is there a setting I should be clicking on, or am I asking for too much micromanaging? It would be nice if my boys could blot out the sun once in a while and force the other guys to fight in the shade. ;)

Grognerd -> (6/27/2002 3:34:46 AM)
All I can figure out from the manual is that to have coordinated strikes from TF's located in different hexes, the range to the target hex must be equal in distance, and even so, the strikes may be piece-mealed due to other factors anyway (i.e... commander experience, weather etc...)...

Admiral DadMan -> (6/27/2002 4:01:36 AM)
As USN, I generally run away from IJN CVs unless I outumber them.

Armorer -> (6/27/2002 6:27:18 AM)
Greetings, I haven't seen anything in the manual or from Matrix/2by3, but this is probably just reflecting reality. In the first year or so of the war, the USN was fairly bad at coordinating its carrier strikes. Instead of one large strike, the individual squadrons tended to end up over the target at different times. Coral Sea ( the strike on the fleet carriers, not the [I]Shoho[/I] ), Midway, Eastern Solomons, etc, the Japanese were fortunate ( well, not at Midway :D, it actually probably aided the US there ), to not have to face a single large, coordinated strike from the entire US carrier force present. The game may just be modeling this tendency on the USN's part. Again, I don't think I've seen this officially anywhere, just a hunch. Regards, Randy

von Murrin -> Coordinating strikes. (6/27/2002 6:49:18 AM)
Keep your CV TF's in the same hex. This way, they will also pool their CAP. Assign a commander with a high air combat rating to command. Spruance, McCain, and Montgomery all have better than 70. I personally also like Clark, as his hyper-aggressive approach tends to flog every possible AG on his CV's into the action.

RevRick -> The Dribble Down factor (6/27/2002 8:53:39 AM)
I've got Spruance, three CV's in one TF, the best squadron commanders on the naval attack settings, and they still send in the planes like kids spitting watermelon seeds - one here, two there, another over yonder - all to be picked apart by the CAP. In the meantime, like the man says, the IJN sends their folks in all in a huge gaggle with a plethora of A6M3 - real early for that bird I think (Aug. 42) - and swamp virtually any CAP up and shred anything underneath. I guess we HAVE to fight with USN carrier doctrine - it must be hardwired somewhere. I hate having to learn how to counter-punch a game - especially one as good as this.

Raverdave -> (6/27/2002 9:12:26 AM)
I always play as allies and also used to be frustrated by the "liitle bit here and there" way in whicg the airgroups would attack. I have found that by getting the carrier TF's to do some attacks on a land target, at least two to three times, then retire the TF back to port. I find that this tends to give them the fire in their bellys and the next time that I sortie the TF they committ the airgroups in larger numbers. Hope this helps.

bradfordkay -> (6/27/2002 11:17:57 AM)
So far as the allied player I have found that with my CV TFs occuppying the same location their morning strikes will be uncoordinated and their afternoon ones tend to be coordinated (especially if they had a morning strike that day). I don't know why... but that's been my experience so far.

Admiral DadMan -> Re: Coordinating strikes. (6/27/2002 8:18:20 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by von Murrin [B]... I personally also like Clark, as his hyper-aggressive approach tends to flog every possible AG on his CV's into the action. [/B][/QUOTE]LMAO! Thanks for today's AM chuckle. It seems to me that people don't often consider a Commander's Aggresiveness rating in relation to how his TF performs. There is a major difference between a TF Commander who is Very Competent and Aggressive (Spruance) and one who is Competent and Cautious/Careful (Fletcher/Fitch).

jww60 -> (6/27/2002 9:52:56 PM)
Historically (there's that word again) coordinated strikes with multiple carrier air groups were a problem for USN carriers. Prior to the Battle of the Coral Sea USN carriers operated independently and didn't have to worry about it. Even as late os October 1942 at the Battle of Santa Cruz the coordination was poor. Hornet launched a full strike while Enterprise launched a very small one (she had most of her SBDs in the search pattern being responsible for the morning search) yet both strikes proceeded independently. In fact, the Enterprise strike never found the enemy carriers. The IJN on the other hand had been using multiple carriers per TF for some years and were better coordinated at this point in the war and yet even they had occasional problems keeping strikes together. So, the IJN had plenty of practice at coordinated, multiple AG strikes. The USN simply hadn't practiced it much, if at all. I don't know if this is a deliberate feature in the game but it isn't too far off historical conditions. --Jeff

mdiehl -> (6/27/2002 10:11:38 PM)
"I haven't seen anything in the manual or from Matrix/2by3, but this is probably just reflecting reality. In the first year or so of the war, the USN was fairly bad at coordinating its carrier strikes." It is not mirroring reality much. The IJN coordinated only two large multi CV raids.. the one at PH and the attack against the land facilities at Midway. In both cases tehy had the luxury of taking their time because American CVs were "known" not to be in the area and opposition was expected to be minimal-nonexistant. At Coreal Sea, Eastern Solomans and Santa Cruz Japanese strikes were considerably more piecemeal. In contrast the only point of reference for a large US strike attempt is Midway, which was so uncoordinated that it has become archetypical. Rumours of American inability to coordinate strikes are based entirely on that one data point. At no other point were three US CVs simultaneously committed in 1942, so we can't say much from that. Turning to doctrine, we see that the US tended to operate its CVs in 1-CV groups within "mutual supporting distance." This made it harder for the US to coordinate strikes but easier to get a strike off quickly. The IJN tended to work in pairs (4 at Midway), which made coordination a little easier except when weather, crummy radios, or just too many a/c filling the sky trying to find their section leaders frigged the whole thing up into a hopeless snarl. Both sides tended to maintain inadequate numbers of CAP throughout 1942. So... if you're hitting the Japanese with a 30 plane strike you should expect based on reality multiple hits that severely damage or sink a CV. If Japanese CAP is ripping a 30 plane strike to shreds, then the model is greatly exaggerating the effectiveness of Japanese CAP and the model is flawed.

Spooky -> (6/27/2002 10:29:19 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B] Both sides tended to maintain inadequate numbers of CAP throughout 1942. So... if you're hitting the Japanese with a 30 plane strike you should expect based on reality multiple hits that severely damage or sink a CV. If Japanese CAP is ripping a 30 plane strike to shreds, then the model is greatly exaggerating the effectiveness of Japanese CAP and the model is flawed. [/B][/QUOTE] I don't understand your point about Japanese CAP effectiveness. Maybe you should take a closer look at the 45+ TBD attack during Midway :)

U2 -> (6/27/2002 10:44:20 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Spooky [B Maybe you should take a closer look at the 45+ TBD attack during Midway :) [/B][/QUOTE] Great point Spooky:) Dan

mogami -> only 2 (6/27/2002 11:04:00 PM)
Hi, Only 2 multi CV raids?.......Ceylon and Darwin also come to mind and I think Broome also had a large CV strike conducted against it. And the 4 birdfarms sank at Midway were preparing to launch a large co-ordinated strike. (can you imagine what would have happened had it already been launched when our strikes arrived?)

jww60 -> (6/27/2002 11:20:29 PM)
Coordinating multiple strikes is extremely difficult under the best of conditions. When you are launching strikes at maximum range the aircraft don't have time to assemble into large formations. Also, radio silence was often in effect so the enemy wouldn't know a strike was in the air or at least would be a little vague about the strike's range and bearing. I have found that most of my strikes in the game consist of just F4Fs and SBDs, since the TBDs have very short legs (I'm just in July '42 of #17, so no TBFs yet). If you are exchanging strikes with an IJN TF then they are well within their max range and have time to assemble. This also means that they can loiter and wait for additional formations to arrive if the CAP is so poorly coordinated as to let this happen. The US CAP at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons was a real mess due to many factors not the least of which was lousy radio disciplne. --Jeff

mdiehl -> (6/28/2002 12:47:14 AM)
"I don't understand your point about Japanese CAP effectiveness. Maybe you should take a closer look at the 45+ TBD attack during Midway." I have. The TBD waves arrived separately and piecemeal. See my comment about Midway being as botched up an attack, with respect to coordination, that the US ever made. At no time were more than 14 TBDs engaged at once. Without escort, they were easy pickings for the 15 or 20 A6Ms flying CAP. When the second wave arrived it drew all remaining Japanese CAP to sea level, thus giving a free hand to the attacking (and also unescorted) SBDs. It was, thus, both a botched American coordination attempt and a bothced Japanese coordination attempt at CAP. The problem for the Japanese is that bad CAP was typical, hence near loss of two other CVs at Coral sea, to what were, for the time, very small US airstrikes. "Hi, Only 2 multi CV raids?......." No. Only two CV raids in which the Japanese successfully attempted to coordinate air strikes from more than two fleet carriers simultaneously. In both cases no opposition was anticipated, so they had the luxury of time to form up properly. "The US CAP at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons was a real mess due to many factors not the least of which was lousy radio disciplne." That's not entirely correct. Opinions about the radio discipline were mixed. Since the radio "chatter" did allow pilots to communicate effectively with each other, allowing USN section teams to cooperate at such minor tasks as brushing that A6M off your wingmate's tail, it was concluded that the communication was reasonable. The problem was the need for separate frequencies for plane-plane and ship-plane communiques... a policy established in late 1942. One major problem for the IJN was the damned near absence or unservicability of their radios. It strikes me as one of the supreme ironies of the war that American pilots raised in a culture of individualism were trained and flew as cooperative, mutually supporting teams. The Japanese, a culture that tended to subordinate the individual to the group (yeah, a big simplification I know), tended to train to a doctrine of heroic individualism, markedly reducing their ability to fight as teams.

Joel Billings -> (6/28/2002 4:40:40 AM)
I can confirm that UV does indeed give the Japanese an advantage in forming up coordinated strikes. I can't tell you how much of an advantage, but Gary intentionally made it harder for the Allies to form up coordinated strikes. I'm not sure, but it is possible that this advantage only exists during 1942.

dgaad -> (6/28/2002 4:48:40 AM)
Mdiehl : an excellent response to a complaint about game mechanics that reflected history accurately. People forget the details of the Midway operation, like the scattered TBD waves that were mostly wiped out, and the single wing of 18 DBs under C. Wade McClusky that sank 3 flattops. Indeed, it was the very expectation of the Japanese that the American strike would be coordinated that led to the disaster of not having any cap up top when the DBs arrived.

U2 -> (6/28/2002 5:02:50 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Joel Billings [B]I can confirm that UV does indeed give the Japanese an advantage in forming up coordinated strikes. I can't tell you how much of an advantage, but Gary intentionally made it harder for the Allies to form up coordinated strikes. I'm not sure, but it is possible that this advantage only exists during 1942. [/B][/QUOTE] Hi This is why I rarely use Lady Lex and Yorktown at the very start of scen 17 because 9/10 times they have been slaughtered and my strikes......well they barely touched the paint:) Sort of had a feeling something was about. Thanks Joel for the info. Dan

entemedor -> CAP efficiency and FDOs (6/29/2002 4:08:06 AM)
I mostly agree with mdiehl and dgaad. Let me further comment on the Eastern Solomons CAP problem: the two Fighter Direction Officers of ENTERPRISE (Dow and Rowe) were specially critical of the lack of radio discipline, which resulted in "intolerable confusion". The flying commanders would have none of that, and sternly defended their men; it was, they said, unreasonable to expect radio silence from sixty-odd embattled fighter pilots. Roy Simpler, CO of VF-5, criticized the FDOs for not massing the CAP prior to the enemy's approach, for using the generic term "bomber" without distinction for level and dive bombers, and for attempting to overcontrol the many small flights. That was the second time in a row that bolts were crossed between flying commanders and FDOs (the first was after the 7th August attacks on the landing fleet). Apparently that led to some tension, for just before Santa Cruz the chief FDO on ENTERPRISE, Leonard Dow, was sent to Noumea to take charge of SoPac communications. But at Santa Cruz things went worse than ever. John Griffin, the head of the Fighter Director School on Oahu and who had replaced Rowe aboard ENTERPRISE, was the direct target of some of the pilots worse critics, and in January 1943 he was sent back to Oahu. At least after Santa Cruz the main problems had been identified, and improved understanding between flyers and FDOs culminated in the superb display of mutual skill at the Marianas Turkey Shoot.

FM_Freyland -> (6/29/2002 4:17:44 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by dgaad [B]Mdiehl : an excellent response to a complaint about game mechanics that reflected history accurately. [/B][/QUOTE] I really don't think it was a complaint, dgaad. More of a simple question. Some fine responses here, thank you gents. However, I doubt Kingfish (the original poster) will benefit.... already all of his historic commanders have jumped ship when he took command. Serg, pretty sad when 50 yr old men would rather brave sharks than your Command! :eek: :eek: :D Jonathan

Spooky -> (6/29/2002 5:09:21 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]"I don't understand your point about Japanese CAP effectiveness. Maybe you should take a closer look at the 45+ TBD attack during Midway." I have. The TBD waves arrived separately and piecemeal. See my comment about Midway being as botched up an attack, with respect to coordination, that the US ever made. At no time were more than 14 TBDs engaged at once. Without escort, they were easy pickings for the 15 or 20 A6Ms flying CAP. When the second wave arrived it drew all remaining Japanese CAP to sea level, thus giving a free hand to the attacking (and also unescorted) SBDs. It was, thus, both a botched American coordination attempt and a bothced Japanese coordination attempt at CAP. The problem for the Japanese is that bad CAP was typical, hence near loss of two other CVs at Coral sea, to what were, for the time, very small US airstrikes. [/B][/QUOTE] There were 2 TBD waves : * 09h20 - 15 TBD (Hornet) - all lost * 10h20 - 26 TBD (Enterprise + Yorktown) - 20 TBD lost http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid1.htm So a 30 aircrafts wave CAN be annihilated by Japanese CAP. What the Japanese did not take in account was the 50 SBD arriving 2 mn later Spooky

mdiehl -> (6/29/2002 5:22:51 AM)
It begs the defintion of "wave" to call two flights of TBDs that arrived quite asynchronously (IIRC, about 15 minutes apart) a "30 plane wave." And you're missing the most important point. Midway shows just how crappy IJN CAP coordination could be, since there was nothing on hand to deal with the threat from the SBDs. If a fellow is routinely having his 30+ plane USN strike chewed up by IJN cap, the model is wrong. Doubly so if the inbound strike includes escorting fighters.

Spooky -> (6/29/2002 5:39:37 AM)
15mn apart - it is not what is indicated in the official US Navy AAR ... but you must have some more accurate informations :)

Kingfish -> (6/29/2002 6:10:30 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by FM_Freyland [B] I really don't think it was a complaint, dgaad. More of a simple question. Some fine responses here, thank you gents. However, I doubt Kingfish (the original poster) will benefit.... already all of his historic commanders have jumped ship when he took command. Serg, pretty sad when 50 yr old men would rather brave sharks than your Command! :eek: :eek: :D Jonathan [/B][/QUOTE] Ooooh, this coming from a guy who spends ten minutes trying to launch a sub on patrol. Maybe I should adopt your strategy, that of scuttling the fleet in port. That should save my guys from the sharks! ;) [I]Kingfish.........sharpening the knives to a razor's edge[/I]

FM_Freyland -> (6/29/2002 6:40:53 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Kingfish [B] [I]Kingfish.........sharpening the knives to a razor's edge[/I] [/B][/QUOTE] And what is your wife going to say about all those plastic butterknife shavings on the living room floor?

Admiral DadMan -> (6/29/2002 7:36:47 AM)
"Have you been clipping your toenails in here again?!?!?!

dgaad -> (6/29/2002 8:01:11 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]It begs the defintion of "wave" to call two flights of TBDs that arrived quite asynchronously (IIRC, about 15 minutes apart) a "30 plane wave." And you're missing the most important point. Midway shows just how crappy IJN CAP coordination could be, since there was nothing on hand to deal with the threat from the SBDs. If a fellow is routinely having his 30+ plane USN strike chewed up by IJN cap, the model is wrong. Doubly so if the inbound strike includes escorting fighters. [/B][/QUOTE] CAP coordination was an endemic problem for both sides. The Americans took two years to develop effective CAP coordination, and were helped by : 2 years of experience, a functioning radio in every plane with separate channels for plane to plane and plane to ship traffic, long range radar, and a number of new officer positions dedicated to the coordination of carrier air operations.

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