quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady

IJA/IJN cooperation, or their perceived lack thereof is a myth, at least to the extent it seams to be commonly perceived. Their are many many examples of the two services working very well together on many different levels, and very few examples of them not getting along well, and those tend to be at very high levels.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl



1It might be many things Brady, but it isn't a Myth. Japanese War production was continually hampered by the squabbles of the IJN/IJA. Both had many similarities in their needs, yet each produced it's own version of everything. They couldn't agree on a common voltage for A/C electrical systems, or a common version of the 7.7mm mg used in those aircraft. Each took over and operated it's own merchant marine..., and refused to carry cargoes for the other. The IJA even launched it's own A/C carriers.

2Gen. Yamashita ended up being executed after the war for the actions of Naval troops who refused his orders to abandon Manila and instead fought it out in the city while committing endless atrocities against the populace. The IJN refused to tell the IJA about Midway for over a year after the Battle. Much of what little radar the Japanese had in the Home Islands at war's end was wasted with suitable positions being occupied by TWO installations..., one Army and one Navy.

At the lowest levels, the Army's privates and the Navy's ratings may have gotten along OK, but above that it was a constant struggle, and given Japan's other weaknesses not one she could afford.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl



1It might be many things Brady, but it isn't a Myth. Japanese War production was continually hampered by the squabbles of the IJN/IJA. Both had many similarities in their needs, yet each produced it's own version of everything. They couldn't agree on a common voltage for A/C electrical systems, or a common version of the 7.7mm mg used in those aircraft. Each took over and operated it's own merchant marine..., and refused to carry cargoes for the other. The IJA even launched it's own A/C carriers.

2Gen. Yamashita ended up being executed after the war for the actions of Naval troops who refused his orders to abandon Manila and instead fought it out in the city while committing endless atrocities against the populace. The IJN refused to tell the IJA about Midway for over a year after the Battle. Much of what little radar the Japanese had in the Home Islands at war's end was wasted with suitable positions being occupied by TWO installations..., one Army and one Navy.

At the lowest levels, the Army's privates and the Navy's ratings may have gotten along OK, but above that it was a constant struggle, and given Japan's other weaknesses not one she could afford.

1- Realy this is not any diferent than the US Navy or the US Army, The IJA and IJN used the same engines in many of their planes. IJA and IJN Shiping neads differed do largely to the fact that the IJA was the Primary Land Fighting force and operated the Main Amphibious assests, IJA Aircraft carriers were actualy Amphibious warfare Ships.

2- Both the IJA and the IJN had radar sets, from mid 42 on in increasing numbers, just like the US Army and Navy did for their respective bases.

Thier were as I mentioned above Examples (Notable ones) whear the two servies did not get along. But for the most part operationaly they worked well together.

The Myth is the extent that this riverly went, all one nead do is read through somejoint operations reports to see how well they did often work together.

I posted this before, and if you read through this you can get a feal for how well the two services did work together during a magor operation, and did so on numiours ocashions:

quote:

IJA/IJN cooperation, or their precaved lack theirof is a myth, at least to the extent it seams to be comomly preceaved. Their are many many examples of the two services working very well together on many diferent levals, and very few examples of them not getting along well, and those tend to be at very high levals.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady


How were Torpedoes political?

quote:

ORIGINAL: Mynok

quote:

ORIGINAL: Brady


How were Torpedoes political?

Easy. The reports from the front by the captains that the torpedoes didn't work were ignored. That's nothing more than bigwigs saving their asses after they had approved the weapon. Politics. It ain't just a civilian thing.

The IJA/IJN issue was different from the US situation because in the latter there was a supreme commander-in-chief who could arbitrate the issues if needed. Japan had nothing of the sort. Tojo was in charge and he was Army.