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byron13 -> (7/16/2002 1:56:36 AM)
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Good to hear from you, Iaian.
Seems the thread is starting to wander a bit, and I would like to try and refocus it. The issue was specifically, I believe, the effectiveness of B-17s at low altitude. I also believe that dgaad was continuing that discussion in the first post on this thread with his reference to "level bombers."
Those voicing concern over the effectiveness of the B-17 are concerned that it is either historically inaccurate to allow this and be as effective as it is or that there is some game imbalance (ineffective flak, etc.) that allows this to be more effective that it should be.
Mdiehl has argued that B-17s [I]were[/I] used as skip-bombers or low altitude bombers, and they were effective. The relative lack of cites to this tactic indicates that it was used infrequently. So the question related to historical accuracy in allowing B-17 skip/low altitude attacks would seem to be: If they were as effective as mdiehl claims, why weren't they used more often? American (and other) commanders did not lack ingenuity, and so I for one have to believe that, if it would have been effective, they would have used it more than they apparently did. This could be due to strategic or grand tactical decisions such as "I would rather use B-17s to bomb airfields," in which case a UV game player should be able to make a different decision and use B-17s as murderously effective skip bombers. And/or the infrequent use of B-17s for these types of attacks may have been due to some other historical restraining factor that simply isn't reflected in the various game algorithms, in which case some tweaking is in order. This could be, for example, that the B-17 just was not maneuverable enough to hit fast-moving war ships so that it was only effective against transports. It seems to me that more historical research is in order.
The other question is whether the historical countermeasures to a B-17 skip bombing attack and other factors are programmed properly. Most of the players questioning this tactic have focused on flak and CAP, with the emphasis on flak. The CAP issue has been partly addressed with respect to small Betty raids against PM with overwhelming CAP airborne. A large number of people are comfortable explaining it as being small raid/big sky. Personally, I have a problem with this explanation when it comes to huge (spottable from great distance), lumbering (lots of time to react), and green B-17s not being seen against a uniformly blue or gray sea, but . . . With respect to flak, the question is whether the game properly accounts for all factors, such as size of the target, in the equation and that maybe tweaking the game would make flak more effective specifically against B-17s, thus providing a (historically accurate?) disincentive from using B-17s in this role. Could Ploesti provide any guidance (acknowledging the vast differences)?
dgaad's theorem is a good one, but it should work with respect to all LBA and, for that matter, all aircraft. The problem believed to be present by at least some players is that, when the dgaad factors are not present, B-17s seem to get a much larger benefit than any other classes or types of aircraft. The other thread on B-17s showed AARs in which Dauntlesses, which were designed and the crews trained for the sole purpose of bombing ships, were relatively ineffective while B-17s, attacking the same target at the same time, wreaked havoc. These results may be anomolous, but they are the issue. It does not appear that dgaad's theorem supplies the complete answer to the riddle, since one would expect both Dauntlesses and B-17s to be either effective or ineffective depending on the dgaad factors present.
Have we expended all that we have on the issue?
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