(Full Version)

All Forums >> [Current Games From Matrix.] >> [World War II] >> War In The Pacific - Struggle Against Japan 1941 - 1945



Message


IChristie -> (8/14/2002 1:42:52 AM)

Well, part of my motivation for starting this thread was to get exactly these kinds of informed opinions to ensure that they are accounted for as the game develops.

You can rest assured that I, for one, will be looking at the India strategy as the game proceeds through testing. I had a feeling that it might have been a neglected part of the game until now and I wanted to see if that can be corrected.




mdiehl -> (8/14/2002 2:07:01 AM)

LOL! Shows you how often I don't look at the User Profile stuff. I missed the Matrix Staff logo... ;)




Ranger-75 -> Re: 3 gambles (8/15/2002 11:59:43 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by brisd
[B]
Other considerations:

1. A national liberation (Pro-Axis) India Army that might have rose up given the chance?

2. Axis concentration in Mediterranean, possible conquest of Med/Eqypt/Arabian oil fields would have made a strategic difference in Allies defense options in Indian/Pacific oceans.

3. Possible Auto-victory conditions reflecting India or Commonwealth suing for peace, to include Australia/New Zealand?

There are many strategic possibilities if the designer give us the maps and OOB we will make the scenarios. :) [/B][/QUOTE]

1. The Indian Army was very loyal and was not part oh the British concern regarding any revolt or unrest. Remember the "INA" was formed from captured prisoners and most "joined" it only to escape the cruel treatment that they received as Jaspanese prisoners.

2. Hitler, who you might recall as being in charge in Europe, did not understand the sea, and refused to commit anything to Africa that would weaken his to the death struggle with the Soviets. Even sane minds were against additional forces being sent across the Med, Kesselring himself told Rommell that the existng units couldn't be adequately supplied. Lastly there was no global axis "cooperation" not even much German-Italian cooperation. Britain's supply line was extremely secure by comparison, even if meant going the long way around Africa and up through the Gulf of Suez.

3. Are you for real? The British weren't giving up even as London was being bombed daily. What makes you think they get all soft if India was threatened. They had a large RAF force in India along with large (and slowly improving) Indian Army. Units in England could Canada would have been sent if needed as well as US units. Australia and New Zealand were concerned, but they would not have sought any separate peace with the Japanese, especially since any move on India would have meant abandoning any drive on Aus/NZ. The Japanese Army refused to support any attempt at capturing Australia because it would have required more forces than they had.

Also note: the first larege air to air losses that the Japanese navy sufferred was at the hands of the RAF in Ceylon when Nagumo tried to repeat the Pearl Harbour raid against Columbo. No more chinese pilots in old russian fighters here. Tough Hurricanes with experience RAF pilots.

The Japanese only tried 2 opposed landings in the entire war. Their first attempt was thrown back into the sea by US Marines at Wake Is. The second was also at Wake, with a much larger Japanese element still being roughly handled.

Supply by ground was VERY difficult. Burma is not like anything you or I have ever seen. there were NO paved roads, the few dirt roads turned to mush in the rain. There was only one major rail line. and there was a strong lack of motor transport in the Jspanese Army. I don't need toremind everyone (but I will since I'm leaving for 3 weeks) of the fact that there were only 2 armies that were fully motorized for WWII the US and British armies. Japan built some 40,000 trucks in 1940, that would have equipped about 3 US or British divisions. Only 2 divisions in the Japanese army were motorized, 1 in Malaysia and 1 in China. (Later they raised 2 armoured divisions for homeland defence in 1945). The US built what some 4,000,000 in the same year.

The main allied problem was not in getting forces into India for its defence, but rather getting them moved about and positioned to effect events outside of India, like re-capturing Burma, and re-opening the land route to China. The Indian railway system was a mess until the US esentially took it over. That was where they failed for many and varied reasons for 2 years, until the Japanese obliged and attacked thereby self destructing their army in Burma.




John Carney -> (8/16/2002 9:06:38 PM)

The rapid conquest of Allied British forces in Hong Kong (25 December 1941), Siam, Malaya (15 February 1942), and Dutch East Indies (9 March 1942) by IJA forces encouraged the IJN to commit to offensive action in the Bay of Bengal. The IJN with Admiral Ozawa’s Malayan Fleet (2CVL’s, and 5CA’s) and Admiral Nagumo’s First Air Fleet (5CV’s, 4BB’s, and 2CA’s) commenced offensive operations April 1942 to coincide with IJA attack from Ragoon under General Ioda’s 15th Army (18th Div, 56th Div, 33rd Div, and 55th Div) to occupy Burma. The raid was not the success the IJN hoped for, Somerville had warning and withdrew his inferior force of 2 CV’s, 1 CVL (Hermes Sunk), 5 BB’s, and 9 Cruisers (two Sunk). Without surprise the British fleet survived, and the IJA made no further commitment to the Burma Campaign in as far as only to assist in the conquest of China.

The question of Australian invasion was not a serious one since offensive operations in China continued and British units were available in India.

Had the raid on Admiral Somerville been a success, with the possible losses of the CV Formidable CV Indomitable CVL Hermes BB Resolution BB Warspite BB Ramilles BB Royal Sovereign BB Revenge CA Cornwall CA Dorsetshire CL Durban CL Dauntless CL Emerald CL Colombo CL Ceres CL Enterprise CL Mauritius, due to the British Admiralty not releasing the intercept of Nagumo’s First Air Fleet movement to the Bay of Bengal. This was a distinct possibility, since Japan might determine that the codes had been compromised from an intercepted transmission to the fleet to retire. The IJN also found the operation unsuccessful due to the high pilot loss from planes not returning because of getting lost in the open ocean searching for the British Fleet. If the raid on Tricomalee would have found the British Eastern Fleet at home, the attack could be a great success and First Fleet would return to the Pacific to deal with the US. While Ozawa’s Malayan Fleet ruled the Bay of Bengal.

Then the IJA would have had a real choice to suspend the Offensive in China and mount a serious invasion of India. In April India had seven under strength Indian Divisions (7, 14, 19, 20, 23, 25, & 26) and two combat ready Divisions (9 & 17) with the British 18 Infantry Division and 7th Armor Brigade.

This choice of operations is a must for the diversity of the game. If your are locked into the historical choices then a grand game is nothing more than a string of smaller games together.

I agree that the IJA must be limited and forced to garrison conquests to move supplies to the forward area. But clearly early in 1942 it might have been possible for the IJA to attack and conquer India, for if not why did Britain wait until late 44 to commence offensive operations. I also agree that other than the 8th Army Area the rest of the Pacific (not China) would be unaffected by this strategy. Also if Coral Sea opportunity is missed and the IJN succeeds in invasion of Port Moresby. 8th Army Area is Secure and the battle is for the New Hibrides.

If Britain Capitulates in India, China withers on the vine and an Invasion or Isolation of Australia becomes a real concern for the Allies. Depending on losses and supplies a possible blockade of Australia and total commitment of forces against US. Remember that it is very unlikely that your Midway will occur until late 1943, if at all.

I also would like to see the ability to invade Hawaii and raid West Coast of US.




mdiehl -> (8/16/2002 10:35:45 PM)

Apart from Eastern Fleet (with or without a Japanese victory and substantial losses to eastern fleet), the problem with invading India is that it is (a) The World's Most Populated Unsinkable CV, (b) Rife with suiatble terrain for Allied airstrips of all kinds, and (c) primarily beyond the range of Japanese LBA except, perhaps, northeast India from Rangoon. So you need to keep the IJN CVs there, or, alternatively, you risk having your entire invasion TF involuntarily scuttled by Havocs, Bostons, Hurricrates, Vildebeests, Buffaloes, SBDs, Swordfishes, Martlets, cider, gravy, fruit bats, orangoutans, spam, and very small rocks.

Sure, you can try unescorted raids by Betties and Nells to suppress allied airfields. Imagine *every* Japanese raid turning out for the Japanese like 2nd Schweinfurt turned out for 8th AF.

Then there's the problem of (a) finding the troops to invade India (the IJA was hard pressed to scrape up the divisions for Burma), and (b) supplying same (the IJA was unable to maintain adequate supply for the divisions sent to Burma).




John Carney -> (8/17/2002 3:33:14 AM)

Yes,
Those statements are true, but it was not a lack of manpower that limited the Burma offense. It was the political decision to hold Burma as the flank and commence operations in China. The Army felt the China question needed to be resolved to end the war. They thought that if China surrendered peace could be won.
We know this to be a false ideal. So if Britain can be illuminated can you fight the US to a draw?
That is the possible scenario. Since we know the answers to the political questions, they could only guess at. What if the IJN formed policy vice IJA, since the China incident percipitated the war.
Unfortunately I do not know how to factor this in to the UV, without altering historical deployments. Unlike A3R, there is not a way to effect political restrictions except by mutual house rules. I am eager to see how they deal with these side theaters.




mdiehl -> (8/17/2002 4:20:16 AM)

Interesting about the Burma divisions. I'll have to go back and take a closer look at Burma:The Longest War by Allen. Matrix must by now have an OOB about which divisions were available and when. I guess the India Invasion question comes down to:

(1) How much the Japanese can send, and whether it has any effective armor.
(2) Whether the Japanese can suppress the RAF/RAAF/RIAF/USAF airfields in India.
(3) Whether the supply train to support a sustained operation in India could be made available and properly protected.




John Carney -> (8/17/2002 9:37:16 AM)

If you can make time to read John Costello "The Pacific War" he has two good chapters on political IJA decisions and available armies (uncommited in March 1942). Unfortunatly I am still looking for a good source other than VG Pacific War for possible British OOB response.




Caranorn -> (8/21/2002 8:42:15 PM)

For OOB matters.

1) 18 Infantry Division (British) had been destroyed at Singapore, I expect mention of the British division before was meant to be 70 (formed from RA forces in Egypt and Palestine, all those components fought in Egypt and were veteran even if formed from former 2nd line units).

2) 5 Infantry Division (British) also was in the India area in 1942 iirc (can look it up). This is also a RA unit with combat experience (France and iirc Norway).

3) In addition to units listed in most wargames, a number of Indian Army units of varying quality existed in India itself and would have been mobilised uppon invasion. Those units would have been weaker then their older cousins.

4) Some 5 Indian divisions were garrisoning Iraq at the time and would I am certain have been returned to India. Several of those units were veteran.

5) Several Indian and African (South, West and East, also North Rhodesian iirc) divisions were in East Africa and could have been used to relieve other units in the Mid East.

6) 56 Infantry Division (British) was also in the general area before it was shifted to Egypt (iirc). That unit was an unexperienced but well trained 1st Line territorial force.

7) Australian units returning ffrom Egypt might have been shifted to India instead if Australia itself was not threatened. Those units were among the best the Allies ever fielded.

8) In addition to regular Indian Army forces, uncountable State forces existed. Those seem to have varried from abominable to good in quality. They would have been of little use as front line troops, but garrison duty might have been an option (to free additional units from the IA).

I can look up exact formations of the British army (British and Colonial mostly drawn from Joslen's) in the general area. Unfortunatelly I have no good material on the Indian Army (maybe someone has a copy of the British official history for that war effort, if it's anything like Victory in the West for Europe its info would be very useful).

The Commonwealth had quite a few reserves left which would have been adequate for combat duty in India (vs. North Africa or Europe). In my list above I forgot to mention British forces used in Madagaskar (though I think they might have been drawn from other units I counted). I also did not list Indian units in Egypt (3+ divisions of highest quality). If the JA could shift forces to India, the Commonwealth could as well.

Marc aka Caran... really more of an ETO and MTO person

P.S.: Reducing US buildup in Europe on the other hand would have pissed Stalin of. I don't think it was ever an option, Torch at least had to happen to keep Stalin happy.




Drongo -> (8/21/2002 9:59:03 PM)

Posted by Caranorn
[QUOTE]7) Australian units returning ffrom Egypt might have been shifted to India instead if Australia itself was not threatened. Those units were among the best the Allies ever fielded. [/QUOTE]

If Singapore was threatened as part of a Japanese sweep through Asia, the Australian government of the time would have demanded (as they did) that all Australian troops be released for the direct defence of Australia. Singapore was considered the British bastion that would defend against any Japanese drive south towards Australia (WRONG!!!). Thats why an Australian Division was part of its defence.

Its hard to see any Japanese move on India that would not at least indirectly threaten Singapore (unless they took China first and then somehow moved into India from there). The reality of the game though, if its anything like UV, would mean allied units can be freely deployed anywhere (unless they can't leave their own country - ie Northern Command).




Caranorn -> (8/22/2002 1:18:21 AM)

Drongo, I think the presumption was that Singapore would already have fallen before a Japanese advance on India. I did not know the Australian withdrawal from North Africa was due to the fall of Singapore and always related it to the advances in Indonesia and New Guinea as well as the raid against Darwin. I still think Australia could have been persuaded to divert some forces to India at least temporarily (while Japanese advances in the SW Pacific were slow or nill).

Marc aka Caran...

P.S.: After my earlier post I went to look up some of the data I talked about. I made a mistake when I mentionned several Indian divisions in Iraq in 1942, the OOB I remembered was for 1943 (but included some 9 Indian divisions in Iraq Persia, plus 1 British and 2 Polish).




John Carney -> (8/22/2002 1:40:55 AM)

The problem would seem to be making India strong enough to make conquest very difficult without overloading it with Units that could be unrealistically deployed else where.




wpurdom -> Aussies not available for India (8/22/2002 3:58:42 AM)

Read just the correspondence Churchill quotes in his WWII history between the Aussie PM (Curtin?) and himself and I think you will readily conclude that the Aussie divisions were no longer available to other fronts once Singapore fell if not before.




Drongo -> (8/22/2002 10:48:26 AM)

Posted by Caranorn
[QUOTE]Drongo, I think the presumption was that Singapore would already have fallen before a Japanese advance on India. I did not know the Australian withdrawal from North Africa was due to the fall of Singapore and always related it to the advances in Indonesia and New Guinea as well as the raid against Darwin. I still think Australia could have been persuaded to divert some forces to India at least temporarily (while Japanese advances in the SW Pacific were slow or nill). [/QUOTE]

I don't want to sidetrack a thread on India so I'll just make a few points.

1) Even now, historians over here still actively debate the what, when, why questions concerning the lead up to 'The Battle for Australia' (We just had the 60th anniversary of it this year - considered to have begun Feb, 1942 with the fall of Singapore).

2) Pressure was already mounting in Australia in mid 1941 for the 3 Australian Divisions (6th, 7th, 9th) fighting in the Middle East to return to the Pacific to meet the growing Japanese threat. The only other Australian "regular" (volunteer) division (8th) had already deployed 2/3 of its troops to Malaya in Feb 1941 as part of the British defence of Singapore.

3) The "Fall of Singapore" was not the main reason for the withdrawl of the Australian Troops from North Africa (I should have been clearer with what I said). 2 of 3 divisions from Mid East(6th and 7th) were already en route to support British efforts to defend the Dutch East Indies (IIRC) when Singapore fell. The final division (9th) arrived back in Australia in Feb '43. The return of the Australian troops was brought about by a combination of Australian government pressure (John Curtin) to release the troops to aid in the defence of Australia and the British need to increase their ability to defend against a Japanese push south.

4) Until it fell, Singapore was considered the "Bastion" (since the 30's) that would defend Australia. When I mentioned that Australia demanded the return of her troops for the direct defence of Australia, Singapore would be part of that (that is, returned Australian Divisions from Middle East could well have been sent to Malaya while still meeting the demands of the Australian government). It's fall in Feb '42 led to the famous (over here anyway) "cable war" between Curtin and Churchill over Churchill's attempts to re-route the 2 returning divisions to Rangoon. Interestingly, President Roosevelt also pressured Curtin to give in to Churchill's demands to defend the British Far East.

5) As mentioned above, only 4 Australian Divisions (raised as the "2nd AIF") were available around this time. As they were volunteers, they could be used for deployment away from Australia. Their volunteer nature meant that they would be considered high quality (this was borne out in operations in the Middle East). On the other hand, this could also count for nothing if they were poorly led and motivated (the 8th Division's performance at Singapore has been widely criticised).

6) It is difficult to analyse under what circumstances that Australia would allow any of her four divisions to be used in operations to defend India around this time. You would probably find that even if the military opinion was that there was no direct threat to Singapore (Australia), public perception in Australia of the situation would still be the main influence on whether troops would be contributed. The Australian public did feel directly threatened during that period (from journals, newspapers, etc). John Curtin was also ideologically opposed to war (he was a pacifist) other than what was neccesary for Australia's defence. The initial unequivocal support for the British situation with Germany (and the sending of troops) had been made by the previous "conservative" Australian Government. Curtin took power in late 1941 into a situation not to his liking.




TIMJOT -> (8/24/2002 2:15:26 AM)

IMHO, Although it would be certainly logistically difficult, it was feasible for the Japanese mount an invasion of India in early 42, say, April/May. The British only had one understrength regular division ,five very poorly trained and equiped Indian divisions, that were little more than irregulars with uniforms and an armored bgd. equipt with only light tanks. The airforces were even worse off. With most of the evailalbe reserves from N.Afrika thrown away, in the attempt to hold the Malaya Barrier. You have to remember this time period coencides with Rommels big offensive. So Britain would be extremely hard pressed to send any significant rienforcements during this critical period. If they had done so, maybe Rommel reaches Suez.

Also, keep in mind it probabley would not have been neccessary to occupy the whole sub-continent. It might have been sufficient to simply occupy key bases and spark off a general revolt against the Raj. Thats not to say that the Indians would welcome the Japanese with open arms, but with the interior in open revolt and with the Japanese in control of key costal bases. The British position would be untenable. China would be effectively cut off from the outside world. And the flank of SE Asia would be secured

Another side benefit of an India strategy is that it might have actually taken off pressure from the Pacific front. With Britian forced into committing more of its resources to the Indian ocean front. The US would likely have to pick up the slack in the Atlantic and the Med. leaving even less resources available for the Pacific front than was historically.




Caranorn -> (8/24/2002 5:20:56 AM)

Just to state it again, British reserves were not as short as it might seem. A number of well trained divisions existed in the Middle East and Africa that were considered inapt for service against Germany, but that could (and I expect would) have been comitted in India.

That of course doesn't mean that those efforts would have been sufficient to fend off a serious Japanese attack. But it would have made such an attack much harder then it may seem from current game orders of battle. Don't forget that most games and even books simply ignore areas and forces which were not comitted in conflict. That does not mean those forces did not exist and would not have been used under the correct circumstances.

Marc aka Caran...

P.S.: Anyone know for what purpouse East and West African brigades of long standing were returned to their home countries in 1942 by the way? From what I can tell they did not undergo great reorganisation and allmost all were later sent to India (as divisions, no longer brigade groups, but that reorganisation happened for allmost all Commonwealth forces). I am not aware of any serious revolts in those areas at the time either.




TIMJOT -> (8/27/2002 3:59:20 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Caranorn
[B]Just to state it again, British reserves were not as short as it might seem. A number of well trained divisions existed in the Middle East and Africa that were considered inapt for service against Germany, but that could (and I expect would) have been comitted in India.

That of course doesn't mean that those efforts would have been sufficient to fend off a serious Japanese attack. But it would have made such an attack much harder then it may seem from current game orders of battle. Don't forget that most games and even books simply ignore areas and forces which were not comitted in conflict. That does not mean those forces did not exist and would not have been used under the correct circumstances.

Marc aka Caran...

P.S.: Anyone know for what purpouse East and West African brigades of long standing were returned to their home countries in 1942 by the way? From what I can tell they did not undergo great reorganisation and allmost all were later sent to India (as divisions, no longer brigade groups, but that reorganisation happened for allmost all Commonwealth forces). I am not aware of any serious revolts in those areas at the time either. [/B][/QUOTE]


I think that British reserves were actually less than you seem to believe. First, the African 11 and 12 Divisions were considered only suitible for garrison duty. I dont know if this was due to racism or not, but the only time they were deployed in a combat role was against similar Italian colonial levies in East Africa. The lack of confidence in these formations is evident when you consider that the British deemed it neccessary to divert the 5th Div. on its way to reinforce India for the Madagascar operation.

The 3 Indian Divisions in Iraq (6th, 8th and 10th) were no better trained or equiped than the Indian divisions that melted away from the Japanese onslaught in Malaya. In any event in early 42 the British could not risk withdrawing from Iraq just at the time when the axis seemed to be convergeing on the mideast oilfields from both Afrika and Russia.

In N. Africa, the 8th army had already lost the 18 Division to the disaster at Singapore The Australian 6th and 7th to the Pacific, The 70th inf Div. and 7th Arm. Bgd. to the defence of India. Consequently in the Spring of 42 the 8th Army simply couldnt spare anymore troops at a time when Axis forces in Africa was at there strongest.

I suppose the 3 Canadian Divisions languishing in Britain could have been sent, but for some reason or another historically the British didnt seem to want to commit them to combat. Until they threw them away at Dieppe. Does anyone know why the Canadians were not committed earlier?

So IMO Britian's position in India was indeed very percarious in early 42.




Jeremy Pritchard -> (8/27/2002 9:04:23 AM)

Canadians, in fact the bulk of the British Army, was not deployed oversees until Normandy. The Canadian forces were important for Island Defence, as well as taking part in any emergency invasion of France should Russia show signs of collapsing.

So, even though 2/3 of British forces were on the British Isles, they were needed there for defence and future offense.


I was going to be getting some information back at the end of July, with important information regarding the Indian Army, but have yet to hear back about it (for Pacific War).

However, from all of my readings I have been able to see that the British were VERY worried about losing India, but could not spare the troops to defend it should the Japanese attack in force.

The troops in the Middle East were required as they were guarding hostile territory (Syria and Iraq were invaded, although Syria was pacified, Iraq could rebel again).

At the time of Pearl Harbour, Operation Crusader was winding down in North Africa. The British lost about 13 000 troops in a relatively indecisive battle, which did relieve Tobruk, but did not defeat the Afrika Korps. Soon they would be faced with massive defeat at Gazala (lost 1 complete South African division, and probably equivalents of 2 others). Then there were the many battles of El Alemain, which required the use of all of the availible British Armoured formations.

It would not be until 1943 when the British would have sufficient forces to send to India, at the expense of operations in Sicily (which would either be cancelled, or completely American and French).

The British India Army was sorely lacking in replacements. Its airforce received comparatively obsolete planes until the arrival of the Spitfire VIII. The Hurricane II was used as the frontline fighter in Burma not because it could handle itself very well against Japanese fighters, but because it was the only aircraft avalible to spare. Most of the Armoured formations did not recieve vehicles until early 1943.

The best that the British could do was attempt at containing the Japanese advance until 1943-44 when sufficient forces could be spared for a counter attack.

Had the Japanese actually attacked Imphal in 1942 or 1943 instead of 1944 they might have succeeded. The British forces in late 1944 had sufficient armour and infantry in the Indian army to win a defensive attrition war against the Japanese. However, the Japanese and British were relatively equals in equipment and manpower in 1942-43 in Burma.


In 1944 the Japanese removed many Divisions from China and Manchuria to be deployed in the Central Pacific, Philippines, Okinawa and Burma. In order to make up for these forces, many numerous Independent Mixed Brigades were upgraded to Divisional status and gained an extra regiment and artillery. This was done because the Japanese Army High Command realized it required more commitment in the Pacific theatre. Had this commitment been realized earlier, i.e., in an attack on India, these divisions could have been freed up earlier through replacements doing the garrison work in Manchuria and China instead of those veteran formations guarding bases while a fighting war was going on in the Pacific.


The main problem for commitment is the Air Force. The IJAAF was already streched pretty thin, and might have trouble getting enough aircraft to keep the RAF at bay. This would probably be the only stumbling block to an invasion of India. However, if this attack was designed to cut off and destroy China, forces could be withdrawn from this theatre, and should ground be lost, it would not matter much if success in India means success in China.

Many people stated the high requirement of the IJN in the region, however, the RN in the Pacific in no position to interrupt. The IJN carriers were not required, as sufficient airbases existed in India to meet all requirements (kind of like what happened in Malaya). In order to intercept transports and cargo vessels the RN will have to get really close to the coast, and they could not afford another Medeterranean style war. IJN Commitment in the Bay of Bengal would be minimum, to that of trade protection, which would be pretty much what the RN would be doing.


Should the Japanese either neutralize China, or India, they could afford to send land more land forces to garrison Pacific Islands before the US had the shipping to perform its offensive in the Central Pacific (1944).




John Carney -> (8/27/2002 6:54:18 PM)

Since we or the IA will control 100% of the IJA and IJN, the question of what you want to commit to the Indian Theater is up to the player, and the benifits of India's conquest is up to 2by3.

The questions I have are;

What are the British reserves allowed to enter the Pacific Theater (if any) in addition to what they commited, and can the program change this based on Japan's conquests (2by3).
Can British reinforcments be triggered by an Invasion of India.

What are the available Indian Divisions, and how do we restricted them so that they are not offensive until late 43.
(VG Pacific War Does this by starting the Five India Defense Divisions at half strength, while limiting their reinforcments to prevent them from reaching full strength until 1943. I have not found a book that solely covers the Indian Army for the period, to find the specifics of what they could have done if IJA invaded in 42.)
Can we limit Indian replacment rate and alter it if India Invaded.
Can we limit Indian Divisions like Australian Northern Command, then lift this restriction later in the war to allow Offense into Burma and Southeast Asia.

This will strongly effect possible plans of Japan.
I believe a strong raid which cripples the British along with the conquest of North West India (Impalh and Ledo) in early 42 will isolate China and hopfully lead to its compitulation, and thus the Southeast Asian Front.




Caranorn -> (8/27/2002 7:41:09 PM)

June – July 1942
21 (EA) Inf. Bde Grp – Ceylon, (Burma and India in 1944-45)
22 (EA) Inf. Bde Grp – Madagaskar, (Burma in 1944-45)
(25 (EA) Inf. Bde – seems to have been far under strength starting june july, (Burma and India 1944-45))
26 (EA) Infatry Bde – Abyssinia, (Ceylon, India and Burma in 1943-45)
27 (NR) Inf. Bde Grp – East and South Africa, (Madagaskar in 1942-44)
28 (EA) Inf. Bde – Abyssinia, (Ceylon, India and Burma in 1944-45)
(29-31 (EA) Inf. Bdes – formed too late, (never served outside Africa))
1 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1944-45)
2 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1944-45)
3 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1943-45)
4 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1944-45)
(5 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – formed too late, (Burma and India in 1943-45))
6 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (Burma and India in 1943-45)
(7 (WA) Inf. Bde – formed too late, (never served outside Africa))

So from my accounting, 10 Infantry Brigadess or Brigade Groups of East or West African origin were potentially available for service in mid 1942. 2 of them were already in the general vicinity. 2 others have battle honors for 1941 and I assume can be considered veteran. All but 1 of those 10 Brigades later served in Burma and India (the 10th served on Madagaskar). Of the 6 Brigades not operational in mid 1942, 2 later served in Burma and India. The others took up training and garrison duties.

Few if any of these Brigade Groups were at the same establishment level as British Brigade Groups. They generally had only 1 LT Artillery Battery. All seem have had their full RE and even recon contingents. But it seems the same was true for most Indian Army units.

What concerns quality levels, Japanese troups could at no time be compared to German troops, so service in India did not require the same qualifications as service in North Africa.

For the rest, African troops performed well in both East Africa and later Burma, whether their quality was sufficiently appreciated is another question. But then I feel the danger of losing India would have waranted using these African units, even if War Office deemed them of lesser quality.

Concerning required garrisons in Africa, many of the old brigades I feel could have been relieved earlier by the newly formed or forming brigades (they seem to have done so starting in early 1943).

For the Indian units in Iraq I can’t really say anything as to their level of training, iirc at least one of those divisions was later transferred to North Africa and Italy doing good front line service there. From all I can see, Indian unit quality seems to have been fairly underestimated. The Indian troops themselves were good combatants. So were the British regiments making up roughly 1/3rd of all Indian brigades and divisions. If there was any problem it was British command over those units (though it seems to have been better then in WWI). Just remember, he British also never fully estimated the qualities of their ANZAC units. Finally, I can try and trace the identity of Indian brigades and divisions not used in North Africa and Europe by looking up the attachments of British units on the Indian establishment, but that would tell little of the actual strength and quality of the Indian units. I wish Joslen or someone else had worked on a complete Commonwealth Order of Battle after WWII and not just Britain and the African collonies.

Marc aka Caran…

P.S. : EA stands for East African, NR for North Rhodesian, WA for West African. The difference between a brigade group and a brigade is that the brigade group has support elements permanently attached and is expected to operate independently. Technically, all African brigades were at least at one time brigade groups. Most of the brigades and brigade groups listed above were later incorporated into new Colonial divisions.

P.P.S.: I never count Commonwealth units in either Britain or Egypt-Palestine-Jordan-Syria-Lebanon for possible releases. Commonwealth forces in Britain were substantial, but I doubt much would or could have been transferred to India. Concerning 18 Infantry, that unit was a second line division, I never heard of it being aimed for North Africa originally, certainly not for 1st line duties.




TIMJOT -> (8/27/2002 10:42:36 PM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Caranorn
[B]June – July 1942
21 (EA) Inf. Bde Grp – Ceylon, (Burma and India in 1944-45)
22 (EA) Inf. Bde Grp – Madagaskar, (Burma in 1944-45)
(25 (EA) Inf. Bde – seems to have been far under strength starting june july, (Burma and India 1944-45))
26 (EA) Infatry Bde – Abyssinia, (Ceylon, India and Burma in 1943-45)
27 (NR) Inf. Bde Grp – East and South Africa, (Madagaskar in 1942-44)
28 (EA) Inf. Bde – Abyssinia, (Ceylon, India and Burma in 1944-45)
(29-31 (EA) Inf. Bdes – formed too late, (never served outside Africa))
1 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1944-45)
2 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1944-45)
3 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1943-45)
4 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (India and Burma in 1944-45)
(5 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – formed too late, (Burma and India in 1943-45))
6 (WA) Inf. Bde Grp – West Africa, (Burma and India in 1943-45)
(7 (WA) Inf. Bde – formed too late, (never served outside Africa))

So from my accounting, 10 Infantry Brigadess or Brigade Groups of East or West African origin were potentially available for service in mid 1942. 2 of them were already in the general vicinity. 2 others have battle honors for 1941 and I assume can be considered veteran. All but 1 of those 10 Brigades later served in Burma and India (the 10th served on Madagaskar). Of the 6 Brigades not operational in mid 1942, 2 later served in Burma and India. The others took up training and garrison duties.

Few if any of these Brigade Groups were at the same establishment level as British Brigade Groups. They generally had only 1 LT Artillery Battery. All seem have had their full RE and even recon contingents. But it seems the same was true for most Indian Army units.

What concerns quality levels, Japanese troups could at no time be compared to German troops, so service in India did not require the same qualifications as service in North Africa.

For the rest, African troops performed well in both East Africa and later Burma, whether their quality was sufficiently appreciated is another question. But then I feel the danger of losing India would have waranted using these African units, even if War Office deemed them of lesser quality.

Concerning required garrisons in Africa, many of the old brigades I feel could have been relieved earlier by the newly formed or forming brigades (they seem to have done so starting in early 1943).

For the Indian units in Iraq I can’t really say anything as to their level of training, iirc at least one of those divisions was later transferred to North Africa and Italy doing good front line service there. From all I can see, Indian unit quality seems to have been fairly underestimated. The Indian troops themselves were good combatants. So were the British regiments making up roughly 1/3rd of all Indian brigades and divisions. If there was any problem it was British command over those units (though it seems to have been better then in WWI). Just remember, he British also never fully estimated the qualities of their ANZAC units. Finally, I can try and trace the identity of Indian brigades and divisions not used in North Africa and Europe by looking up the attachments of British units on the Indian establishment, but that would tell little of the actual strength and quality of the Indian units. I wish Joslen or someone else had worked on a complete Commonwealth Order of Battle after WWII and not just Britain and the African collonies.

Marc aka Caran…

P.S. : EA stands for East African, NR for North Rhodesian, WA for West African. The difference between a brigade group and a brigade is that the brigade group has support elements permanently attached and is expected to operate independently. Technically, all African brigades were at least at one time brigade groups. Most of the brigades and brigade groups listed above were later incorporated into new Colonial divisions.

P.P.S.: I never count Commonwealth units in either Britain or Egypt-Palestine-Jordan-Syria-Lebanon for possible releases. Commonwealth forces in Britain were substantial, but I doubt much would or could have been transferred to India. Concerning 18 Infantry, that unit was a second line division, I never heard of it being aimed for North Africa originally, certainly not for 1st line duties. [/B][/QUOTE]


If you look at your deployment schedule closely. You will notice that its almost entirely garrison duty. Yes the EA units recieved battle honors for there contribution in the Ethopia campaign, but from what I read this was pretty much a walk over against mostly native colonial levies. even so the 4th Indian division did the bulk of the actual fighting. In Madascar the 5th British division made the inititial landing. The EA units made up the follow-up occupation force. Then they were sent to Ceylon to relieve British units from garrison duty there, so they could be sent to India. Even in Burma/India, I think the EA units were mainly used as line of communication troops. I dont believe they took part in any of the major battles in that theater.

Re: Indian divisions. The problem was that the Indian army become the largest volunteer army in the world in a very short time. Which consequently caused an extreme shortage of quailified offers and NCOs. The quaility of an Indian division was dependent the "hand crafting" of these officers and NCOs. This was particulary the case with the higher newer high numbered divisions. Where it is true that the regular Indian divisions were generally 1/3 British. The newer divisions garrisoning India at this time were almost entirely Indian raw recruits and where nowhere near the quality of the units fighting in Africa.

PS. The British 18th Division was a fully equiped front line division. It was at sea on its way for deployment to N.Africa. when Japan attacked Malaya. It was quickly diverted to Singapore, just in time to be captured. As part the reinforcements to make up for the losses in Crusader. It had been trained in desert warfare and was expected to take up front line combat duty.

PPS. RE: the quality of those Japanese troops. They were good enough to rout a numerically superior force in Malaya. Which by the way were superior in quality to any of the troops garrisoning India and E.Africa at this time.

Finally. All you need to know about how lowly the African divisions were regarded is to ask this question. Why at a time when the British had been routed in Malaya, kicked out of Burma, the IJN roamed freely in the Indian Ocean, and there was a real threat in their eyes of an invasion of both Ceylon and India. Did the British strip away from the 8th army the sorely needed 70th Div and 7 Arm Bgd. and chose to send all the way from England the 5th Division as reinforcement to India. When all the while some 10 African Brigades were sitting on their asses in East Africa????




Jeremy Pritchard -> (8/27/2002 11:05:20 PM)

When thinking about British possible deployment you also have to realize the situations outside of the Pacific.

Troop reinforcements could not come from England, as they were needed for home defense and possible invasion.

Troops throughout Africa were needed primarily because a significant amount of Africa was controlled by Vichy France. Those 10 Brigades were needed for local garrison duty, in case the Germans decided to expand their charter with Vichy France and send attack forces to Central Africa (and there were significant numbers of Vichy troops in the region as well).

The British needed just about every unit in North Africa, especially after many were stripped as emergency units in Malaya/Burma.

The Middle East was still hostile, and should the Germans either break through in North Africa, or the Caucasus, these formations would be needed to guard the strategically critical oil.

The best the British could do was to strip their defenses on other theatres to the bone, prilarily in an attempt at ending the crisis (i.e., holding actions until more troops/equipment were availible).


There were reasons why these forces had to be in China, and why they were not removed until 1944. I feel that the human players should get some control over troop deployment, including that of China/Manchuria. Most games reflecting this era have supercficial reasons or practices that keep these forces where they are (for example "Pacific War" does not allow you to have these troops board ships). To me, this does not seem to be logical, as why would these troops be there if they were not needed in the game?

This might add an interesting option to the game. Should a Japanese division get severely mauled in the Pacific, it could be sent to China to free up for a fresh unit to be sent to the Pacific. Possibly one could send a Division to China and free up 2 IMB's for use in the Pacific to give the player operational control of the types of units to be used. There should be garrison requirements, with the possibility of breaking these requirements (like WIR), but significant possibilities of consequences.


To Japan China was very important, and would never give up conquered territory, and it would be extremely unhistoric to allow the Japanese to scale back to all but a few isolated bases and remove the bulk of forces for service in the Pacific. What would probably happen should this situation be initiated, would be either mass resignings, suicides or a coup by the top Army brass. I guess this is the same problem experienced with those who want full control irregardless of historic restrictions (like those who want 100% control of production). Now, to me, the best wargames put the player into the historic situation of their counterparts and try to affect different strategies within the limitations of the historic situation. There should be some historic options for the player, but within the established doctrine. The difficulty is determining what this doctrine would limit.



So, the Japanese could free up troops, and the British could respond with probably enough troops to keep the Indian Army in fighting strength. China should be set up as a stalemate, with the current forces avalible by both sides generally equal in position that at this point an offensive by either would end up in defeat (the Japanese were streched relatively thin, and the Chinese did not have the training to crack Japanese defenses). Should one side weaken (Japanese or Chinese withdraw troops to Burma/Pacific) then the other should gain the ability to attack with a reasonable chance of victory. Modelling China and Manchuria effectively is the key to having a successful game of WitP. When I got "Pacific War" back in 1995, I was really dissappointed in seeing all of those IJA Divisions in China up against, maybe 14 innefective Chinese Armies, and all those Divisions in Manchuria defending against nothing (since the USSR is not modelled). I would like to see a WitP with an active (yet not obsessively demanding) China and Manchuria theatre, and you to have a good reason to keep these troops there instead of moving them to the Pacific.




Caranorn -> (8/28/2002 3:28:32 AM)

I think there already is a misunderstanding. Of the 10 brigades I named, 1 was already on Ceylon, another on Madagaskar. Several more were moved to either of those locations within a year. In addition to the 10 listed, at least 2 others had been recently raised and could have been used in garrisons before completion, freeing other units. This is exactly what happened in early 1943. I am not saying all 10 brigades could have been released from duties in Africa right away, but some could have been released very fast.

The units I mentionned with east African battle honours were WA brigades (the EA show no such honors in Joslen's, but I expect at least some received them as well, Joslen doesn't seem to have spent quite as much time on Colonial troops as he did on British).

The 18th Infantry was the 2nd line duplicate of 54th Infantry. Very few divisions of that type were sent on active duty outside the UK. Even the 54th was never used on front line duty. Concerning 70th Infantry, while in North Africa that division was never raised to full strength and was on LOC operations most of the time (sad fate for a regular division), this changed once it was moved to India until it was finally disbanded (it's brigades being turned into LRP groups for roughly a year, then reverted to Infantry or Airlanding). Technically, 2nd Infantry Division was never on Madagaskar (it detached 2 brigades and divisional units to Foirce 121

Finally, most Indian divisions listed in current game OOB's had their British contingents or received them during the campaigns. Some confusion may arise due to some games listing British units on Indian establishment separately (29th Infantry Brigade for instance was on Indian establishment until the 36th Indian Infantry Division was converted to teh 36th British). Slim's habit of creating segregated brigades in Burma probably adds to that confusion.

But now to the game issues at hand.

1) If things in India go worse then historically for the Commonwealth, then certain Commonwealth units should become available earlier then historical (possibly at some Victory Point cost, or equivalent). Some units that were never committed in Asia and the Pacific should become available as well.

2) Give the Japanese some leeway as to which units are available for use (like Jeremy said, switching garrison units, but also units on active duty in China).

3) Generally get a concept of garrisons into the game.
a) That is that certain countries/provinces require a number of units (brigade/regiment equivalents) to receive VPs for control and industrial production (factories, oil fields, resources etc.).
b) Alternatively create a system that can cause uprisings by country/province etc., sufficient garrisons lowering the risk, too little raising it. But in that case there should be no 0% risk.
All of that would allow the player or ai to decide what risks to take etc. Strip garrisons to a minimum for a time for some special operation. Forming units should generally count for garrisons (as they were used that way, so were training and holding units etc.)

4) Hey and why not the slim chance of an early war with the Soviet Union to keep those troops in Manchuria worrying. And of course give the Soviets the chance to show how well they can roll across Manchuria and the Northern isles in 1945.

Marc aka Caran... hopefully with the last post on African units, I will try not to respond on any of those unless someone comes up with the precise duties of those units in the second half of 1942.




Blackhorse -> (8/28/2002 4:02:34 AM)

I agree with Jeremy that successfully modelling China and Manchuria is key if the Japanese player is going to be allowed to reallocate divisions to other theatres.

Re: India.

The forces available to the British to defend India from invasion were breathtakingly inadequate, untrained and ill-equipped. If the Japanese wanted to invade they could have landed, and the British were not going to push them back into the sea. Once ashore, the Japanese could have ferried land-based fighters and bombers in, so the carrier fleet did not have to stick around permanently.

But then what? The 4 or 5 divisions that the IJA/IJN could have supplied by sea would be barely adequate to hold enclaves on the east coast. Even if you (generously) assume that the Japanese could have supplied as many as 9 divisions, that would be nowhere near enough to conquer a country with the size and population of India.

The only successful scenario is if a Japanese invasion touched off a general uprising against the British in India. But how likely was this? The British had subdued rebellions in India before, with far fewer men under arms than it had in country in 1942. Most importantly, the Japanese were their own worst enemies -- their occupation record in Korea, China, the Philippines and Indochina quickly turned the local populace against them. It's possible to imagine the war with a less virulent form of Japanese nationalism, but this would be like playing a European Theater variant where Hitler is nice to the Jews, Poles, Ukrainians et. al -- it seems beyond the scope of this kind of a game.

If the Japanese did invade India, the best they could hope for was a China-style standoff for a few years -- the Japanese would control the eastern coastal cities, and could roam at will on (foot!) raids into the interior for a while, but the British/Indian forces would constantly be growing, and by sometime in 1943 the Allied forces would be strong enough to throw the Japanese off of the subcontinent.




Jeremy Pritchard -> (8/28/2002 5:19:19 AM)

I think we are all basically forming up similar positions in regards to India and its possibilities, with mainly variations of the same theme. We all know that it will be a crap-shoot for any invasion of India (let alone for the Pacific!), and the British would not just let it fall. It would get troops from somewhere, and most likely these guys will be ill trained and equipped to wipe out the Japanese bridgehead, but could most likely contain it. It would possibly be Japan's 2nd Russia (China being its 1st) and unless they are successful enough in removing China from the war (as the British/US would be too worried about defending India to try and supply, let alone have the bases to supply China). Undoubtedly the British will become stronger then the Japanese by around 1943. This could be both a good or bad thing for the Japanese.

GOOD

There would be more territory for the British to take back before they can launch an assault on the strategically important Malaya Peninsula (which would cut off the East Indies from the Home Islands)

BAD

The British could outflank the Japanese much easier by landing in Rangoon. Invasion of India leaves their left flank wide open to amphibious assault, and should they lose control of the Bay of Bengal they face the prospect of having their entire army cut off unless they do not effectively garrison every major port.



Garrison requirements are another important detail that should be added (as was stated by many people before me here). Most other games just have units defending a base purely against organized military attack. However, units had to be at certain bases even if no organized military attack was forseen in the near or distant future. Garrisons are required for administrative, local policing and security reasons.

I am remined of a relatively crude game "Star Wars: Rebellion" where every single one of your planets required a garrison to ward off acts of sabotage, let alone military invasion. Most wargames see conquered territory as completely pacified (WIR being a slight exception with the inclusion of Partisans).

Possibly each base, even those that were friendly to begin with, require some form of minimum garrison, even if this was batallion or company sized, or even just base units? Should a base fall below its garrison requirements, operations could suffer, and even damage could be exeperienced (due to neglect and/or sabotage). The Japanese actually had a lot of 'garrison' formations throughout the Pacific and China, whose specific duty was maintaining order (many of these forces became the core of later Independent Mixed Brigades), while the Allies tended to use Regular Battalions resting from combat duty, or those that are recently raised.




mdiehl -> (8/28/2002 10:16:15 PM)

Barrier and the Javelin mentioned the release of elements of 1 Aussie division to Burma when in March 1942 Roosevelt offered 1 US division to secure Australia, should it have come to that. In the event, the US within 3 days found enough surplus tranpsort to send two US divisions.

The way to solve the "India problem" as a game, IMO, is to make it very difficult for the Japanese to occupy and to get their supply train modeled correctly. It should be the worst sort of "Tiger by the Tail" problem imaginable, with the Japanese taking on the RAF in a suite of combat and logistical circumstances that greatly favor the UK. If, despite all that, Japan can take India, more power to 'em.

On the other hand, if the model is to throw a whole bunch of crappy low EXP India divisions into the UK OOB as straw men for the Japanese to knock down (the GGPW model), then if by some miracle the UK successfully defends India, the Allied player should have complete flexibility to deploy them elsewhere to the detriment of Japan. The worst imaginable game is one in which one player is given substantial counterfactual (ahistorical) flexibility while the other player is saddled with a bag of old cliches.




John Carney -> (8/29/2002 1:19:21 AM)

Using the UV system, is it possible for the British to be given under strength Indian Divisions which are limited to India (like Northern Command) until reaching full strength say in 1944, or if Japan invades India then they are released immediately and the replacement rate is increased, along with maybe some of those other British garrison units being released to the PTO early.




TIMJOT -> (8/29/2002 3:56:01 AM)

Just to clarify a bit. When I say IMO that it was historically feasible for Japan to invade India. I am speaking of a narrow window of opportunity from say; March 42 to July 42. Britian was severly limited in the ability to commit substantial land forces or airforces at that time. After July 42 an successful invasion would become increasingly unlikey due to mounting US pressure in the south pacific and the strengthing of the British postition in India (particularly in airforces).

That being said, As far as the game is concerned. I think Jeremy is right on the money with a need for some sort of garrisoning requirement for WITP. This shouldnt be limited to the Japanese in China and other posessions, but should also be required for UK troops in India and Australia. I think there also should be a certain minimum troop level requirement for China. To prevent an an Allied player from unrealistically transfering large number Chinese troops to Burma or India. The garrisoning requirement should be based on the number of troops not to particular units. This would allow a player to rotate troops or redeploy forces at his own risk.

I also agree that the game should include some sort of event trigger that models potential revolts or uprisings. If triggered maybe it could simulate partisan activity by lowering troop moral, fatigue, strength, ect...




mdiehl -> (8/29/2002 4:25:37 AM)

Thing is, you get no India invasion unless you cancel any campaigns in the other theaters. There is no "Mounting US pressure in the South Pacific." Instead, there's "Mounting Allied presure from Wake, the PI, New Guinea, and the Indonesian Barrier." To get the ships for the India op in March you basically don't supply the garrisons elsewhere. To get the a/c to shift to support an India campaign you shift all the IJN land based air flotillas for the post Kido-Butai follow-up from Burma and "newly acquired" airfields in India. You leave the IJN trying to defend in CenPac sans any viable means of protection from USN CVs. If it's modeled right, a Japanese invasion of India should give the US plenty of leeway to launch CV raids deep into Japanese "Home waters" with relative impunity, while allowing PI based B25s to operate against the Japanese line of supply.

Of course, you could wait to start the invasion until the end of May.. the historical end date for the PI campaign and the date when the IJN became *serious* about its planning for the New Guinea campaign. (Not the silly, unsustainable, shoestring offensive represented by the PM invasion fiasco). That'd just leave the 4 USN CVs, and you'd still have all of 7 weeks or so to conquer all of India.




TIMJOT -> (8/29/2002 5:38:49 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Thing is, you get no India invasion unless you cancel any campaigns in the other theaters. There is no "Mounting US pressure in the South Pacific." Instead, there's "Mounting Allied presure from Wake, the PI, New Guinea, and the Indonesian Barrier." To get the ships for the India op in March you basically don't supply the garrisons elsewhere. To get the a/c to shift to support an India campaign you shift all the IJN land based air flotillas for the post Kido-Butai follow-up from Burma and "newly acquired" airfields in India. You leave the IJN trying to defend in CenPac sans any viable means of protection from USN CVs. If it's modeled right, a Japanese invasion of India should give the US plenty of leeway to launch CV raids deep into Japanese "Home waters" with relative impunity, while allowing PI based B25s to operate against the Japanese line of supply.

Of course, you could wait to start the invasion until the end of May.. the historical end date for the PI campaign and the date when the IJN became *serious* about its planning for the New Guinea campaign. (Not the silly, unsustainable, shoestring offensive represented by the PM invasion fiasco). That'd just leave the 4 USN CVs, and you'd still have all of 7 weeks or so to conquer all of India. [/B][/QUOTE]

Mdhiel

I was speaking historically. What other major campaign were the Japanese involved between mid-March and May that would have to been cancelled? Malaya and NEI had been conquered. The PI campaign was essentially over with US forces bottled up at Bataan and at any rate only tied down about the equivalent of 2 Divs.

I think you over estimate the ability of the US to counter attack during this period. First, historically the major part of the Kido Bhutai raiding in the Indian ocean in March and April yet the US didnt try to retake a weakly defended Wake, let alone the PI. Where are these PI B-25s comming from? Where are they going to be based Battaan? Maybe Mindanao, but how are they going to be supplied?

The US had 3 Carriers available at this time. There was no way they were going to risk them on "deep pentration raids", because it would expose them to what they thought was substantial LBA strength in the Central Pac.

True the IJN, would have to put on hold indefinitely the Midway operation and shelve any notion of a drive south toward Fiji and New Caledonia, but I think they probably could have stilled musterd enough for what you correctly described shoestring PM operation.

Besides the Indian ocean campaign doesnt require the entire combined fleet. It could problably make due with Nagumos 4 carries, Ozawas 1 CVL, the 4 Kongos, 1 CA div. and severl DesFlots. You have to remember that Japan had aquired airbases in Burma by this time and the RAF presence in India was eneffectivley minuscule, as demostrated by its complete inability to interfere IJN raiding in the bay of Bengal.

Finally an invasion of India doesnt necesserly require the occupation of the entire sub-continent. IMO I think that the occupation of the Northeast corner and the major east costal cities like Calcutta and Madras along with Ceylon would sufficently cut China off from the outside word. I dont believe the Raj could sustain such a blow. Under these circumstances I can see a real possibility of a general uprising. Leaving the interior in a state of anarchy while the various factions vied for power. The Brits could probalby retain control of the west coast. Particularly the ports of Bombay and Karachi, but the mass of the subcontinents interior would act as an effective buffer to a counter attack. Granted a revolt is pure conjecture but it was a real possibilty and its what the Japanese were hopeing for even in 44.




Page: <<   < prev  1 [2] 3   next >   >>

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
1.234375