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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: Who Cares

You can get a pilot from 20 experience to 70 in 2-3 months as is in the game.

I haven't seen that with even a single pilot. You can train them up in a skill to about 70 in a few months, but not experience. Or is the skill what you mean?

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ORIGINAL: che200

If you read who cares posts you will find a very negative attitude regarding this game and how it is programmed, Personally i think he is a troll. Quite a pity i missed this thread would have been fun. Regarding the air model if you are interested in knowing how it was historically I would recommend to read Samurai by Saburo Sakai and you will see the problems the Japanese had with 4 engined bombers.

Devs like ELF and the others got a raw game AI wise and made it playable.

Quite a pity i missed the beginning of this thread.


P.S. If any trolls does not know who Saburo Sakai is there is Wikipedia enjoy !

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ORIGINAL: CV Zuikaku

So far nobody gave me the answer why are 4es able to shot fast and heavily armed fighters to hell over and over again, while those same fighters get only 2 or 3 oportunities to shoot back... On the other hand, I rarely see any jap bomber to drive off allied fighter (yes, I know they are slower, and with light guns, but... ). The way things are now in my game- B-25s and 4Es are the main fighter killers... when there comes an escorted raid- P-38s got chewed up by N1K1s with ease, but 4Es just blast them away.... And again, I'm not talking about Oscars or Zeroes here, but Georges... Oscars seem to be main $Es killers in my game.... [8|] [X(]

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ORIGINAL: Misconduct

Does anyone have actual accounts of Japanese Pilots taking down huge numbers of B-17's and B-24s?

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ORIGINAL: Misconduct
I mean I never remember hearing any after action reports on american sides suggesting the japanese had any success at any part of the war in taking down 4 engine bombers.

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ORIGINAL: Misconduct
Some creditable claims I have read that further disprove every Japanese Fan boy here, are aces like Saburo Sakai who sat behind an F4F and put almost 1,000 rounds of 7.7mm into it and the plane wouldn't drop, were talking F4F here not a B-17.

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ORIGINAL: Misconduct
The ki-43's in Burma, what level of success were they having? How many were being brought down 1-2? or typical japanese over-excelled combat reports with hundreds of "B24's shot down".

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ORIGINAL: Misconduct
My biggest problem with the whole "American 4 Engines are overpowering" argument is fact I don't see proof Japan had any success.

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ORIGINAL: FatR

Even the most cursory examination of actual combat episodes reveals that unescorted 4E raids against major and active Japanese bases weren't even contemplated until the advent of B-29s. Yet in AE you can get away with this regularly.

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Revenge of the Red Raiders is the most thorough account of this important US Army Air Corp bombardment group. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor the 22nd BG was rushed to Australia and went into action over Rabaul in April of 1942 with the B-26 Marauder in a series of daring unescorted raids. In mid-1943, it partially converted to the B-25 Mitchell before changing to the B-24 Liberator during the spring of 1944. The unit was stationed on Okinawa at the end of the war.

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435TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON
The 435th Bombardment Squadron (heavy), a unit of the 19th Bombardment Group (heavy), between 10 September 1942 and 10 October 1942, fulfilled frequent reconnaissance and photographic missions with unescorted Flying Fortresses, inflicting severe damage on the enemy over a wide area including New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland and the Solomon Islands. Hampered by adverse weather which necessitated low flying for observation, and by hostile anti-aircraft fire and fighter attacks, the 435th secured and transmitted accurate information on enemy shipping, made valuable photographs of important enemy-held bases and areas, and damaged enemy aircraft, ground installations and shipping. Notwithstanding many hours of flight and repeated combat damage, the ground echelon maintained 80% of the aircraft in combat condition at all times. (The 435th was also cited as a unit of the 19th Group for action 1 August 1942 until 12 August 1942, and as a unit of the U.S. Papuan Forces.)

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Just been looking up a few things last night. The IJAAF standard tactic for attacking bombers (whether two engined or four) was to fly in single file one behind the other up under the tail (6 o'clock low) and pump loads of mg rounds into its belly. This was the correct tactic in WWI against two-seaters, and the IJAAF had a lot of success with it in China in the 30's (mainly because the Chinese bombers were crap and had no defensive armament to cover their 6 o'clock low position) so never saw any need to change it or official training prior to '44.

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea

So there were no unescorted bombing raids against Rebaul in 1942?

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ORIGINAL: FatR

Yet they clearly had. You know when Allies sent unescorted Liberators against Rabaul at the first time? 9 March of 1944. As late as January of 1944 Allies lost 8 B-24s per 263 sorties over Rabaul area (note, that in RL 1 loss per 33 sorties is a rather high figure). As about the battles where Allies didn't have overwhelming material superiority, their air offensive against Rangoon from 11/25 to 12/6 of 1943 resulted in loss of 12 B-24s and 3 Wellingtons out of 222 bomber sorties.

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ORIGINAL: Misconduct

Does anyone have actual accounts of Japanese Pilots taking down huge numbers of B-17's and B-24s? I mean I never remember hearing any after action reports on american sides suggesting the japanese had any success at any part of the war in taking down 4 engine bombers. Some creditable claims I have read that further disprove every Japanese Fan boy here, are aces like Saburo Sakai who sat behind an F4F and put almost 1,000 rounds of 7.7mm into it and the plane wouldn't drop, were talking F4F here not a B-17.

The ki-43's in Burma, what level of success were they having? How many were being brought down 1-2? or typical japanese over-excelled combat reports with hundreds of "B24's shot down".

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ORIGINAL: FatR

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ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Just been looking up a few things last night. The IJAAF standard tactic for attacking bombers (whether two engined or four) was to fly in single file one behind the other up under the tail (6 o'clock low) and pump loads of mg rounds into its belly. This was the correct tactic in WWI against two-seaters, and the IJAAF had a lot of success with it in China in the 30's (mainly because the Chinese bombers were crap and had no defensive armament to cover their 6 o'clock low position) so never saw any need to change it or official training prior to '44.

This is so very untrue. The tactic of head-on passes concentrated on a 4E bomber at the edge of formation was developed in summer of 1942 and taught widely, as evidenced by IJAAF pilots employing it in just about every large engagement from then on. Some, like 64th Sentai, even practiced it in mock fights against an actual captured B-17.

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ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
FatR, can you refer me to your sources? I find this very interesting.

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I guess it depends on  the definition of a "major or active base".

I see goal posts starting to move here.

I'll move on knowing the Allies not only contiplated but carried out  successful unescorted bombing attacks against fighter opposition long before the B-29.

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The obtainment of long range escorts was a major priority of air commanders like Kenney. Loss of a bomber (and crew) was only one part of the equation (and the worst case scenario). Damage to plane, wounding and death of crewmembers and disruption or aborting entirely of a mission were all factors that could occur if enemy defenses were strong.

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ORIGINAL: FatR

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea

I guess it depends on  the definition of a "major or active base".

I see goal posts starting to move here.

I'll move on knowing the Allies not only contiplated but carried out  successful unescorted bombing attacks against fighter opposition long before the B-29.

Well, then you surely can provide, you know, actual examples? And, as you're concerned about goalposts, these attacks should actually be a)against fighter opposition, i.e., engaged by fighters; and b)successful, i.e. with noticeable damage to the enemy.

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The next offensive mission came on 25 January 1943, when six B-24's of the 371st Bombardment Squadron staged through Midway for daylight reconnaissance and incidental bombing of Wake. The bombers flushed six to eight interceptors, but their reaction was tardy and the damage to the heavies slight.17 Again, on 15 May, seven out of eighteen planes dispatched by the 371st and 372d Squadrons struck Wake during daylight. The enemy intercepted with nineteen Zekes and three Hamps, trading four of the interceptors for a B-24, the first B-24 lost to enemy action by the Seventh Air Force.18 Finally, on 24 and 26 July the reconstituted 11th Group, now flying B-24's, sent two missions of squadron strength against the former American outpost. Diversionary in nature, these attacks had been ordered by the Navy in the hope of confusing the enemy as to our intentions in the Pacific. Japanese defenses seemed to have been greatly improved, but the returning crews claimed a total of twenty interceptors destroyed. One B-24 had crashed into the ocean after a mid-air collision with an enemy fighter falling out of control.19 Wake would not be hit again by the Seventh Air Force until March 1944. These early raids, though small and scattered, had been generally well executed and effective.20

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By staging down through Funafuti in the Ellice Islands, for a total distance of well over 2,000 miles via Canton, Palmyra, or Christmas Islands, it had also been possible to strike twice against enemy positions in the Gilberts during April 1943. After the Japanese had seized the Gilberts early in 1942, they had constructed a two-strip airfield and elaborate fortifications on Tarawa. In addition, they had occupied Apamama and Makin and the outlying atoll of Nauru, to the west. These atolls carried a potential threat to the Allied line of communications joining the South and Central Pacific, and as with the coming of 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave some thought to the possibility of a Central Pacific offensive,* the islands acquired a new importance. After sending two reconnaissance missions in small force over the Gilberts in January and one in February,21 General Hale got the green light from Admiral Nimitz for a quick one-two jab at Tarawa and Nauru. Nimitz designated for the mission the 371st and 372d Bombardment Squadrons, joining them together as Task Force 12 under the personal command of General Hale. Reconnaissance of all the Gilberts, for the purpose of determining the airfield potentials for either Japan or the Allies, was to be combined with the bomber strikes. The task force would return from its temporary base at Funafuti upon completion of its mission.22
Having dispatched a small boat two weeks in advance with necessary supplies and equipment, General Hale reached Funafuti with the B-24's on 18 April. Two days later at high noon twenty-two of the B-24's droned over Nauru. Since an early morning take-off, they had carried their bomb loads more than a thousand miles, which crowded the tactical radius of the B-24D to the limit. The weather over the target was excellent for the bombing with 28 x 1,000-pound and 45 x 500-pound GP bombs plus 45 frag clusters. Despite heavy interception and antiaircraft fire, direct hits on the runway, dispersal area, and a near-by phosphate plant were achieved. An oil dump at the north end of the runway went up in flames.23 General Hale, who had gone on the mission, returned to Funafuti in high spirits over the performance of his inexperienced crews. The heavy damage sustained by five of the B-24's forced postponement of the Tarawa strike, originally scheduled for the 21st. As it happened, this delay proved fortunate, for the enemy promptly struck back in a predawn raid on the strip at Funafuti that would have caught the American bombers just as they assembled for the take-off. Even so, the B-24's parked along the narrow runway suffered serious damage when a hit on a bomb-loaded plane resulted in its destruction and in damage to five other planes.24

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The transition to B-24's for all Pacific heavy bombardment units, a transition begun late in 1942, greatly enhanced the importance of modification as a depot function. The B-24D was sadly lacking in firepower, particularly in the nose of the plane. Japanese pilots soon discovered this defensive weakness, with the result that General Landon reported that approximately half of all early enemy fighter attacks on B-24's were made front ally.37 After Lt. Col. Marion D. Unruh, of the VII Bomber Command, had designed a nose turret to correct the weakness,* it was installed by the Hawaiian Air Depot in more than 200 B-24's during 1943.

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1 February 1944. CATCHPOLE, as operations for the occupation of Eniwetok Atoll had been coded, would take place three months later.100 The ease with which Kwajalein and Majuro were occupied, however, prompted a speed-up in timing which resulted in a decision to mount CATCHPOLE immediately, and by 19 February, Eniwetok, northwesternmost of the Marshalls, also had been captured against light enemy resistance.
So far as air operations were concerned, the campaigns in the Gilberts and Marshalls were continuous. On 21 November 1943 (D plus 1 on Tarawa), B-24's of the 38th Bombardment Squadron escorted Navy PB4Y photo planes over Nauru, while Liberators of the 431st and 42d Bombardment Squadrons conducted daylight bombing raids on the same target.101 During the remainder of November and most of December, Seventh Air Force Liberators, staging through Baker and Nanomea from their bases at Canton and in the Ellices, continued to pound Nauru, Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap, in tactical support of the base-development phase of GALVANIC and in preparation for CATCHPOLE. Beginning on 16 December, Wotje, site of a strongly fortified and well-defended airfield and extensive seaplane facilities, came under the sights of the B-24's.102

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ORIGINAL: FatR

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ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace
FatR, can you refer me to your sources? I find this very interesting.

The information about IJAAF tactics and the battles over Burma is from "Ki-43 'Oscar' Aces of WW II" by Hiroshi Ichimura ("Oscars in CBI Theatre" would have been a more correct name for the book, but whatever). Information about Allied operations in SWPac I took from "13th Fighter Command in World War II - Air Combat over Guadalcanal and the Solomons" by William Wolf (this book rarely bothers to verify American claims, but information about Allied own losses should be reasonably accurate, I presume).

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea

Shall I tell you whether they wore boxers or briefs as well?
[8|]

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ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

Thanks. How is Ichimura's book? I did not enjoy Sakai's as much as I had hoped, though it was better than Galland's "First and Last"--that went straight back to the used book store.

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As it takes A2A claims at face value

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea
but japanese claims seem the gospel

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea
revise to your hearts content

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Operating thus at extreme range and through the use of an intervening staging point, Seventh Air Force bombers over the long period between the Battle of Midway and the actions preliminary to invasion of the Gilberts had been able to get in an occasional blow at Wake, Tarawa, or Nauru. Such missions served to break the tedium of routine reconnaissance, but they could have little cumulative effect on the enemy's strength and served chiefly to provide for the crews valuable experience and for headquarters no less valuable intelligence.

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Postwar investigation of enemy sources has revealed that the Japanese were in no position to make a serious effort to hold either the Gilberts or Marshalls. A serious shortage of air strength, a shortage imposed by the heavy losses sustained in the Solomons and New Guinea operations, together with the continuing demand of operations in those two areas, limited the Japanese effort to making the U.S. advance as costly as possible. Reinforcements sent into the Gilberts and Marshalls in advance of GALVANIC were chiefly ground forces. At the beginning of the operation, the Japanese apparently disposed only about 100 aircraft in the entire Marshalls-Gilberts area. Reinforcements up to 135 planes were sent in during November and December,134 but the continuing attrition suffered over Rabaul and in the Solomons made it impossible to send significant reinforcements thereafter. Against this meager strength, the occupation of the Gilberts was supported by ap proximately 900 carrier-based aircraft, the Marshalls by approximately 700. By D-day on Kwajalein, there was not an operational Japanese aircraft east of Eniwetok.135 Throughout the operation the US. Navy dominated the air over the Gilberts and Marshalls. The planes of the Seventh Air Force, flying long overwater missions, maintained the neutralization of bases initially knocked out by planes from the fast carriers. Continued bombardment from the air reduced the by-passed atolls to impotence; their garrisons, cut off even from communication with other positions, were occupied in a struggle merely to keep alive.

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ORIGINAL: FatR

Even the most cursory examination of actual combat episodes reveals that unescorted 4E raids against major and active Japanese bases weren't even contemplated until the advent of B-29s.

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ORIGINAL: castor troy

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ORIGINAL: witpqs

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ORIGINAL: Who Cares

You can get a pilot from 20 experience to 70 in 2-3 months as is in the game.

I haven't seen that with even a single pilot. You can train them up in a skill to about 70 in a few months, but not experience. Or is the skill what you mean?

like Iīve said earlier, heīs mixing up skill and experience. He means skill and is correct that you can train from (below) 20 to 70 in 2-3 months. You canīt get their experience from 20 to 70 with training in 2 months though.

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ORIGINAL: SuluSea

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ORIGINAL: FatR

Even the most cursory examination of actual combat episodes reveals that unescorted 4E raids against major and active Japanese bases weren't even contemplated until the advent of B-29s.

This has been refuted numerous times already, my work here is done.