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Grfin Zeppelin -> RE: Does someone really understand IJA's dumb decisions? (4/19/2010 1:54:31 AM)
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People seem to be operating under a mistaken impression that Japan wanted to conquer China militarily. This was never their plan nor was it ideal. Similarly, there was never an option for peace with China
In the 1930’s, Japan was pursuing a strategy of divide and conquer towards China. Japan was like England in that it was a highly industrialized country that depended on overseas markets for its manufactured goods. Japan had been quietly exploiting the Chinese market the same as the rest of Europe since the end of the 19th century. The devastation of the Great Depression had added urgency to the Japanese goal of turning China into their exclusive economic sphere. This ran counter to a rising tide of Anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism that had been growing ever since the end of World War 1 when Shandong had been transferred from Germany to Japan despite the fact that China was part of the Allies along with Japan.
Japan’s model for it’s mission in China was British India. Like Britain, they didn’t have the manpower or money to directly rule such a vast territory or large population so they were intent on setting up compliant local governments that would be subordinate to Japan’s political and economic interests. Unfortunately for Japan and China, the Rising Sun had begun setting up its empire 50 years too late. Like British India, China in the 20’s and 30’s had no shortage of local despots who were willing to suborn themselves to an outside power in return for money and influence. If the strongman proved hostile, the Japanese military would kill and replace him.
As part of this policy, Japan started splitting parts of China away from any Chinese central authority. In 1931, they created Manchukuo. Over the next six years, Japan had successfully fought in “incidents” all across north China and effectively placed most of Northern China in their sphere of influence. There was resistance, but it was local and sporadic, and not supported by the Chinese central government in Nanjing.
Zhang Xueliang, had been deposed from Manchuria by the Japanese along with his army after they killed his father. He kidnapped Chiang Kai Shek in December of 1936 and forced him to stop his war with the communists focus on fighting the Japanese. Eight months later, another “incident” happened in Beijing. A local dispute between Japanese and Chinese forces gradually escalated. Neither the Japanese nor the Chinese central government wanted a full scale war and the Japanese weren’t deployed for one.
For the nationalist government in the south, it was a nightmare. Officially, the Chinese forces in theater outnumbered the Japanese ten to one, but they were all of questionable quality and loyalty. The Japanese were more than capable of winning the local battles and detaching yet another small part of China. This was their plan (or the plan of the generals in Manchuria) in 1937. Total war was not desired nor were the Japanese prepared for it.
The Japanese had been nibbling away China’s sovereignty successfully for six years. Except now, Chiang was bound by domestic political pressure resist. He decided to launch a massive and fatal gamble to try to make the Japanese choke by forcing them to go to war with the whole country. Chinese forces moved into Shanghai threatening the Japanese concession. The Chinese forces around Shanghai were loyal, well armed and German trained. Unlike the North, this was a battle that the Chiang thought he could win.
For two weeks, the Chinese did just that, pushing the Japanese almost into the river. But massive Japanese reinforcements and flanking maneuvers doomed the Chinese position and the best troops that the Chinese army had were destroyed in the first three months of the war. Had the Chinese won in Shanghai, the whole war would have been different. It’s a turning point comparable to the initial German push through Ardennes. Without Shanghai, and forced to rely on local forces, the Chinese defence collapsed and the Northern half of the country and most of the coastal cities were seized by the end of 1938. Without them, the Japanese were confident that Chiang and the KMT would be forced into a peace favorable to Japan.
Then Chiang didn't surrender. He couldn't surrender. Politics meant that the KMT had to keep resisting, at least on paper.
The Japanese campaign in China shouldn't be described as "conquest." It should be described as "punitive occupation." All of their campaigns were intended to force the Chinese government to the negotiating table. At no time was total occupation and lebensraum style border expansion strategic goals.
An occupied China with no native Chinese government and 2 million Japanese troops on the ground was worse than losing, so Japan chose not to pursue the total conquest of China and instead launched punitive campaigns and economic blockades. It was within Japan's capabilities to occupy most of China in 1941 (or at least a lot more than they did） if they had wanted to, but they knew that the occupation would be so costly, so incomplete, so rife with partisans that their only hope of victory was a settlement with the Chinese government. When a settlement wasn't achieved, they created a new puppet government, but official Japanese administration of the occupied areas was never contemplated.
The only way for Japan to have peace in China was to withdraw to the 1937 borders. Total conquest would not bring peace. Think of the problems the US had in Iraq after achieving "victory." Now add in the fact that the Japanese are orders of magnitude more brutal, much less well equipped, not really mobile, and vastly more outnumbered.
The Japanese were the kid with the hand caught in the cookie jar. They weren't willing to let go of the cookies, but they didn't want to break the cookie jar either.
Their only hope was to outlast the Chinese and wait for the Chinese government to negotiate. The US could do enormous damage to Japan economically without firing a shot. The war in China was already way too expensive for Japan and their economy was getting worse. Attacking the British and the Dutch was their only option.
If they had decided not to hit the Americans at the same time, they would have given up the strategic initiative and given the Americans time to build a bigger fleet. Even without a declaration of war, America could still go on war footing and the opportunity for a Pearl Harbor blow to the American Navy might not come again. Furthermore, the cost of the war would be even higher because the eventual war with the US would now have be fought subsequent to the war with the Europeans which would drive the price tag up.
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