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mdiehl -> (7/26/2002 1:45:11 AM)
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Almost no chance of success. The Type 93a torpedo had the longest legs of any torpedo and with good speed. It was nevertheless largely ineffective beyond 10K yards, even though that was well-within its maximum range. The basic problem is time to target and target predictability. Any ship that is alerted to the presence of the enemy is going to be moving at flank or better, and maneuvering in unpredictable ways. So even with the Long Lance you had to get pretty close.
The mean hit rate with the LL was about 6%. The mode was zero, meaning that on any given engagement the most frequent outcome was no hits. The mean for daylight-only engagements is naturally lower, around 1% to 3%. The mean for night shots at less than 8000 yards was about 8%. The best Japanese successes occurred at less than 6000 yards, with rates often in the 12% range. Still, some nights were better than others. More than 20 shots were fired at Wash and Sodak, but no hits were obtained despite close range, *huge* target, and night conditions. At Sunda Strait, 86 torps were fired at Perth and Houston, scoring 6-8 hits (one of which was after Perth was dead in water). Considering that the IJN got more hits on friendly vessels than on enemy ones that night, and sank more tonnage of their own ships (measured either long tons or displacement), it was not a night that speaks well for IJN torpedo accuracy or doctrine.
Despite their superiority as a torpedo weapon system, the Japanese won few battles with it. The only clear-cut Japanese victories in which the Type 93a played a prominant role were Tassafaronga and Savo Island. In both cases, Allied bungling seems to have given the Japanese what I would call an "unpredictably advantageous situational modifier." By 1943, American torps with radar shots were holding their own against the Type 93, and US gunfire was proving to be too accurate for Japan to make up the difference with the Type 93's range advantage.
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