Early US CV TF commanders (and tactics) discussion (Full Version)

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Oleg Mastruko -> Early US CV TF commanders (and tactics) discussion (7/26/2002 6:25:24 AM)

Well, it seems that "agressiveness" is univocally taken to be a desired quality of carrier fleet commander, but is it really always a good thing?

Most of guys here (when playing the US) prefer admirals like Spruance, Lee, Clark, Fitch and other "agressive" types, but lets see it from the different perspective.

Take early US CV TFs. In real war they were very eager to take on the Japs in open battle etc. They did so, and - regardless of what historians make of Coral Sea battle (strategic US win blah blah) they basically lost that battle big time, and may only thank over-cautious Jap commander that PM invasion was stopped (I believe Jap invasion commander was relieved because of this, not because he lost Shoho, but because he stopped the invasion).

With "historical" results from CV battle in UV (Lex sunk, York crippled), most of human PBEM Jap commanders would celebrate their win, and go on pressing their plans (whatever they may be, PM invasion included). With perhaps only a slight delay, and maybe even straight away.

Aren't the US CVs better used as subtle threat early in the game, and not commited too easily? Easiest and quickest way for US player to lose the game is to commit his CVs early and - lose the battle (and keep in mind that the odds in CV vs CV duel are definitely against him early on). Spruance's will for battle may spell an early defeat for US player in UV game.

The question: has anyone tried applying cautious commanders and "Retreat from enemy" orders to early US CV TFs and with what results? Any cautious US commanders you recommend?

Comments?

Oleg



Raverdave -> (7/26/2002 7:03:22 AM)

I play PBEM only as Allied, and am currenty playing 2 Scen#17 and 1 Scen#15. In the Scen#17 I am doing my best to protect my carriers from tha IJN as they are just to strong in the early stages....only using them to cover troop transports when I am invading.....so far with mixed results. In one encounter the IJN was just out of PBY range and fell upon my carriers when they came into range....scratch two flat tops!
With Scen#15 I am being a tad more aggressive, simply because things are so tight at the start, but still try to keep the carriers under the unbrella of LRB.

Force preservation is a big factor for the USN in the first few months until you start to get more carriers from PH.

Generally I don't both with who is in command, simply because I can over-ride them with "Retreat from enemy/allow retire" commands and plus the fact that they have little influence over the actual airbattle.....well to my mind anyway.



Raverdave -> (7/26/2002 11:56:31 AM)

Another thing that I have been testing is to hold all the bulk of my fighters back for CAP rather than escort...say around 80% rather than the default 60%.

The up side of this tactic is that it bleeds the incoming IJN squdrons......something that they have a hard time replacing, secondly it gives the carriers a greater level of protection, and thirdly, the fighter jocks get a lot more kills quickly, and so up goes the experiance points!

The down side is that the SBD and TBD suffer......a REAL lot....minimum of 50% sometimes as high as 80% fail to return. So far this has seemed to work well against the AI, only loosing one out of 4 carriers (depending on the SCEN# and remember...we are talking about real early in the game here, like the first few months of a long campaign)...now to try it in a PBEM game!



Caltone -> (7/26/2002 12:48:10 PM)

I'm also playing US in my current PBEM games but in scen 19. I take a cautious approach early in the game with my CV assets.

I don't even sortie the opening AC TF until enough F4F's come in to fill out one sqaudron and throw its old F3F's to the other CV.

A larger early problem for the US is the shorter range, especially from its LBA. It is hard to menace the IJN with your LBA early on, as they can attack bases outside of escort range. I have a difficult time getting level bombers to strike any TF that has CAP or LRCAP unless it's within 5 hexes.

Japanese LBA seem to launch naval attacks more frequently, I think it is because of the Zero and Betty's/Nell's carrying torps.



denisonh -> (7/28/2002 7:53:14 AM)

Caution is important for the USN at the beginning, although I would not back away from engaging IJN carriers within range of my LBA.

In games against the computer and a current PBEM game, I have deployed the Carrier TF early and really made the IJN pay for deploying troops to New Guinea.

The most surprising result in my current PBEM game was a 15 MAY 1942 USN vs IJN Carrier battle, with the results being 2 IJN CVs sunk vs 1 US CL damaged. LBA played no role. I generally believe that that kind of engagement is in the IJN players benefit.

The fact that I had sailed with that TF immediatley and had only the understrength F4F-3 sqns made it unusual.

But the point is you can't let the Carriers stay in port early and give IJN an open hand. Make it difficult and you may catch him short and extract a higher price, whether in CVs, AP and/or troops. Just stay outside the range of the IJN LBA.



bradfordkay -> (8/7/2002 12:54:55 PM)

So far I like to play a cat and mouse game with my US carrier task forces. They have to stay out of Betty/Nell range - well, really it's Zero range that matters. The AI will not, and few human players will be able to get their bombers to try unescorted strikes. Any Japanese attempts on Gili Gili, Guadalcanal and Tulagi offer excellent for hit and run type attacks. Just don't keep your CVs there long, unless you have at least three in a TF.

I prefer to try to tempt the Japanese CVs into my own LBA range. The AI certainly will when it tries to go after Port Moresby.



Kavik Kang -> (8/14/2002 6:32:43 AM)

I send my US carriers out on the 3rd day of the long campaign. I send them to a point about half-way between PM and Lunga, and just barly south of the islands. By the time they get there I have either spotted the Jap carriers, or will on the next turn or two. Which ever side the Jap carriers are on, I send mine to the other and sink as many transports as possible.

So if the Jap carriers are comming to support New Guenie landings I go and sink the Lunga transports, if none I go east of Shortland Island to find transports there. If the Jap Carriers come to Lunga I sink the transports coming to Lea and Buna. I don't even consider a carrier battle until I have 4 carriers, and I usually wait for 6. Up until that point, my carriers are commerce raiders. The moment my carriers establish domminance, it becomes an all out war on transports with the entire carrier fleet making runs around Rabaul to Truk and back to base until there are no more jap transports.

My whole strategy in this game revolves around controlling the sea and sinking transports. I wage a relentless war on transports starting from day 1 and I never let up. Carriers and transports are almost all I am interested in. If you maintain a significant carrier advantage, and reduce the enemy transport fleet to a flotilla, you just sit back and wait until you win. I place far less emphasis on ground forces in this game than most seem too. The way I look at it, the carriers exist to protect the transports. The moment you have carrier supremacy, the enemy transport fleet is at your mercy. Once the transport are gone, the ground forces are useless and any enemy gains are then easily undone. This game doesn't revolve around bases, it revolves around transports.



Possum -> (8/14/2002 9:55:26 AM)

Hello All
My observations.....
Use Aggressive commanders if you want your Carriers to attack anything that wanders into range.
Use Cautious Commanders if you'r just using your carriers to provide cover for another force/base.
I find that setting the CV TF to "Do not react to the Enemy" usally ends up with my carriers being whacked by his carriers, or being caught by a surface combat TF.
So you need to let the CV TF have the ability to react; But by using a cautious commander, you can be reasonably sure that it will not react to anything short of a serious threat to it's existance, or it's just been declared duck season......
(ie it's a target rich environment and they (the enemy in general)don't have the ability shoot back.)
I have had a cautious commander decide that the 15 AP's that just wandered into range was fair game for a reaction move. As the Japanese at the time had nothing in range, that could harm my CV TF, or the Troop convoy it was escorting.
BTW the commander that did this was J McCain.



Q-Ball -> (8/15/2002 3:12:40 AM)

I think Kavik Kang's take on UV is very interesting, and has merit. Making transports the focus is pretty important. As the Allies, I find lack of transports a critical limiting factor in making advances; in many ways, the availability of LST's and LCI's in '43 is as important as the availability of additional carriers, in terms of their ability to get the allied offensive really going. And of course, as the Japanese supplying your defensive garrisons becomes increasingly difficult, and a key factor for starting to lose those outposts. The whole point is to control bases. You can't capture and supply bases without transports. You can do that without carriers, but not without transports.



Oleg Mastruko -> AI and humans (8/15/2002 5:02:50 AM)

I think Kavik plays a lot against AI, and not very much against humans :) (no offense Kavik!)

There's no way you'd be able to raid Jap Truk-Rabaul conwoys unmolested with CVs against a fairly decent human player - he'd rip your CVs to shreds. Of course, unless you somehow managed to put them all Jap CVs to bottom before, but that's another story. If you destroyed all the Jap CVs you don't need any special tactics :)

O.



ltoot -> Agressive use of CV's (8/15/2002 6:44:13 AM)

Keep in mind that the idea at Coral Sea was not to sink IJN Carriers but to halt expansion into Papua and prevent the fall of Port Moresby. I try to keep the US carriers in range of the landing force at Milne Bay (Gili Gili ) and out of range of the IJN task forces. If they want to turn the corner at Milne and steam south they are playing poker with Yamamoto's $. Hit the invaison force then step back, hit 'em step back. Try it.



boomboom -> Other side of coin (8/15/2002 7:47:39 AM)

I have only played japan in the long campain,against the AI.I try to bring the U.s to battle as soon as I can.How?Port Morseby has to be defended.I send a bombardment tf their.Cover them with fighters from lea and carriers.U.S has to react,or bombartment tf will put airfield out of action.Invasion tf dosen't leave port till airfield is out of action,U.S carriers are out of action.I don't want to give away any secreats.After a couple years,I want to try pbem.Are you lisenning Mogimi



Kavik Kang -> (8/15/2002 8:23:15 AM)

Yes, you are right. I have only played against a human once and he disappeared after a few turns. I have played the AI. I wouldn't try to go around Rabaul against a human:-) But sinking transports would still be my main focus. A human would be much better at keeping them alive, the AI does stupid things with it's transports. Even a moderate transport advantage gives that player a huge edge. And it's exponential, the more time goes by the worse things will get.

I'd love to play against a human who will play at least for a long time, I tried a few times but never got farther than 3 or 4 turns. I can only play one turn a day, and I'll can be either side. I am very busy right now and it would be cool to have one turn of UV to play every night when I get home.



battle -> Re: Early US CV TF commanders (and tactics) discussion (8/17/2002 9:13:12 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by Oleg Mastruko
[B]Well, it seems that "agressiveness" is univocally taken to be a desired quality of carrier fleet commander, but is it really always a good thing?

Most of guys here (when playing the US) prefer admirals like Spruance, Lee, Clark, Fitch and other "agressive" types, but lets see it from the different perspective.

Take early US CV TFs. In real war they were very eager to take on the Japs in open battle etc. They did so, and - regardless of what historians make of Coral Sea battle (strategic US win blah blah) they basically lost that battle big time, and may only thank over-cautious Jap commander that PM invasion was stopped (I believe Jap invasion commander was relieved because of this, not because he lost Shoho, but because he stopped the invasion).

With "historical" results from CV battle in UV (Lex sunk, York crippled), most of human PBEM Jap commanders would celebrate their win, and go on pressing their plans (whatever they may be, PM invasion included). With perhaps only a slight delay, and maybe even straight away.

Aren't the US CVs better used as subtle threat early in the game, and not commited too easily? Easiest and quickest way for US player to lose the game is to commit his CVs early and - lose the battle (and keep in mind that the odds in CV vs CV duel are definitely against him early on). Spruance's will for battle may spell an early defeat for US player in UV game.

The question: has anyone tried applying cautious commanders and "Retreat from enemy" orders to early US CV TFs and with what results? Any cautious US commanders you recommend?

Comments?

Oleg [/B][/QUOTE]

Not to get off the real subject but, I have an armed services edition of the history of WWII, and it has the only historical reference I've ever come across, about a full size Jap flattop that was supposed to have been sunk outright by I think, carrier planes during the Coral Sea battle named the Ryukaku. All other references to that battle never mention such a carrier. Just references to the Shokaku (or was it the Zuikaku) that was heavily damaged besides the little Shoho being sunk. I could dig up the dusty old book if you find this at all intriguing.



XPav -> (8/17/2002 11:08:22 AM)

[URL=http://navymars.org/national/publicity/NMNS/1999/NAVCOM%2083-92.html]Ryukaku sunk[/URL]

quote:

6. On May 7th Admiral Fletcher’s aircraft struck the main body the Japanese force in the Louisiade Archipelago off Misima. The new Japanese aircraft carrier, Ryukaku, and a heavy cruiser were sunk. Fifteen bomb hits and 10 torpedo hits were reported scored on Ryukaku which was turning into the wind, to launch her aircraft thus blasted. She sank in a few minutes with most of her planes on board.


Shokaku was often misidentified as Ryukaku.



battle -> (8/17/2002 2:00:22 PM)

I don't know if you've taken notice of this, but many historical accounts of the The Coral Sea Battle, don't even mention that. In fact most of the historical war game scenarios depicting The Battle of The Coral Sea only give reference to the Shoho, Shokaku and Zuikaku as the only Jap Carriers involved in the battle. I can't think of one Pacific War Game Sim that had a CV Ryukaku in it's database belonging to the Japs. I could rattle off all the Jap carriers that were historically represented, but that one is not mentioned. Even the brand new Shinano, a giant Jap flattop converted from a hull of the third Musashi class super BB later in the war, which didn't last any longer than the Ryukaku is represented. I find that extremely ironic.



XPav -> (8/18/2002 2:23:08 AM)

Well yeah, that's because there was no such carrier as Ryukaku.

Fog of war, and all that. But the fact of the matter was that in 1942, the US claimed that they sunk the Ryukaku.



battle -> (8/18/2002 6:31:21 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by XPav
[B]Well yeah, that's because there was no such carrier as Ryukaku.

Fog of war, and all that. But the fact of the matter was that in 1942, the US claimed that they sunk the Ryukaku. [/B][/QUOTE]


:confused: That explanation makes no sense at all. Why would the US dream up an imaginary Jap CV and claim to sink it? Certainly the Japs would know if there was a Ryukaku to be sunk or not. So it doesn't even make sense from a propaganda stand point. They had enough real Jap flattops to worry about sinking without making up extra CV's. If it was just an imaginary Jap carrier that the US claimed, it wouldn't have gone done in the history books as fact. If it's in the history books than it must have taken place.



denisonh -> (8/18/2002 8:37:46 AM)

Depends who wrote the book, and when they wrote it.

People have written histories that have been proven to be incorrect.



ltoot -> Gost Ship RYUKAKU (8/18/2002 9:41:18 PM)

Ref: "Japanese Warships of WWII", by A.J. Watts, ISBN 0-385-09189-3, printed 1966 - reprinted 1973.

As noted by others, ain't no RYUKAKU. Just like there wasn't any US Carrier Shangri La.



XPav -> (8/19/2002 5:05:15 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by battle
[B]


:confused: That explanation makes no sense at all. Why would the US dream up an imaginary Jap CV and claim to sink it? Certainly the Japs would know if there was a Ryukaku to be sunk or not. So it doesn't even make sense from a propaganda stand point. They had enough real Jap flattops to worry about sinking without making up extra CV's. If it was just an imaginary Jap carrier that the US claimed, it wouldn't have gone done in the history books as fact. If it's in the history books than it must have taken place. [/B][/QUOTE]
They had faulty intelligence that led them to believe that Ryukaku existed. Then, standard pilot overexggeration led them to believe that they had sunk it.

Later, it was found out that no such carrier existed and was indeed, not sunk.

Its not like today, where, with the exception of China & North Korea, I can find a detailed ships listing online.



Q-Ball -> (8/21/2002 7:37:09 AM)

[QUOTE]As noted by others, ain't no RYUKAKU. Just like there wasn't any US Carrier Shangri La.[/QUOTE]

.....a reference to FDR's answer to where Doolittle's B25 strike came from, but you may already know my smartass answer.....

CV 38 was the Essex-class carrier USS Shangri-La, commissioned 9/14/44.:)

But IJN Ryukaku, that is a figment of the imagination.



ltoot -> History and Fog of war (8/21/2002 10:04:01 AM)

My father threw Samuel Elliot Morrison's volume describing the Bismark sea battle at me when I quoted Morrisons account of how many ships the 5th AF sunk . Dad's point being Mr. Morrison wasn't there and he was.
IJN SHOHO is listed as sunk on 5/8/42 that is the day after the USN AAR described the sinking of that other nonexistant carrier.

Rosevelt referred to the Shangri La as the source of the Dolittle Raid rather than to name the Hornet. That ocurred in the spring of 42 a couple of years prior to launch of CV-38. I wonder how BuShips came up with the name of Shangri La..........hmmmm?:D



eMonticello -> (8/28/2002 9:53:53 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by XPav
[B]
They had faulty intelligence that led them to believe that Ryukaku existed. Then, standard pilot overexggeration led them to believe that they had sunk it.

Later, it was found out that no such carrier existed and was indeed, not sunk.

[/B][/QUOTE]

Technically, Ryukaku did exist since Hypo mistakenly used that name for Shoho (the carrier was still relatively new). Only after her sinking was she correctly identified as the Shoho.

reference: John Prados, "Combined Fleet Decoded".

On the note about Shangri-La... the name originated from James Hilton's 1933 novel, "Lost Horizon" that Frank Capra later made into a film in 1937. In the book, it was a fabled secret valley in the Himalayas that was untouched by the modern world.

When FDR mentioned that the Doolittle Raid originated from Shangri-La, he had this novel in mind. On the other hand, FDR might have been thinking about his "secret" presidential retreat in the Catoctin Mountains that was to be named Shangri-La when it opened a few months later in July 1942 (Eisenhower later renamed it Camp David).

reference: A variety of online sources (use google search "Roosevelt and Shangri-La").



battle -> RYUKAKU, who and what to believe? (8/28/2002 2:10:43 PM)

The history book I have which refers to the sinking of the Ryukaku, speaks of it as the "big new Jap flat top Ryukaku" sinking with all 1800 men aboard. Since the Shoho was just a CVL with no superstructure, I still can't conceive of the idea that US pilots couldn't tell the difference between a a full size Jap carrier and essentially a 'jeep' carrier like the Shoho class with a crew complement of alot less then 1800 men. This debate could go on forever. It seems everyone who has put in their 2 cents worth about the Ryukaku subject, has a different reference origin with conflicting info about the Ryukaku. It's getting difficult to know exactly what the historical truth is.:confused:



eMonticello -> Re: RYUKAKU, who and what to believe? (8/29/2002 8:34:40 AM)

[QUOTE]Originally posted by battle
[B]The history book I have which refers to the sinking of the Ryukaku, speaks of it as the "big new Jap flat top Ryukaku" sinking with all 1800 men aboard. Since the Shoho was just a CVL with no superstructure, I still can't conceive of the idea that US pilots couldn't tell the difference between a a full size Jap carrier and essentially a 'jeep' carrier like the Shoho class with a crew complement of alot less then 1800 men. This debate could go on forever. It seems everyone who has put in their 2 cents worth about the Ryukaku subject, has a different reference origin with conflicting info about the Ryukaku. It's getting difficult to know exactly what the historical truth is.:confused: [/B][/QUOTE]

Prados used recent declassified intelligence material (1992) to write his book. If the book that you referenced was prior to the release of the intelligence, then it may be out-of-date or the authors may have been misinterpreted their sources since Ryukaku was the name assigned to Shoho and was never recognized as a different ship. Even without Hypo, traffic analysis would be able to determine if there were two carriers named Shoho and Ryukaku (there would be double the amount of radio traffic as well as separate codes for the ships).

Besides, if Japanese scout plane can mis-identify the Neosho and Sims as being a carrier and three destroyers, it's quite possible for American airmen to exaggerate the size of the Shoho.



Drongo -> (8/29/2002 8:45:20 PM)

To Battle

From
[url]www.geocities.com/japanesecarriers/[/url] Shokaku_Class/Ryukaku.html

[QUOTE]There have been several websites and USN submarine logs showing the existence of a third Shokaku Class carrier, the Ryukaku. However, the Ryukaku does not exist. During WWII, the Shokaku was often mistakenly logged as the Ryukaku, and therefore records exist of the Ryukaku being hit by torpedoes by USN submarines. Errors have been possibly due to mistaken visual contacts of the Shokaku and Zuikaku, as they often served together, or as a result of misreading Japanese records on the Shokaku.
Rumors of a fourth Shokaku class aircraft are also false. Only two Shokaku class ships were planned and built.
[/QUOTE]

You be the judge.

Apparently, the the CVL Shoho was misreported as the CV Ryukaku at Coral Sea due to confusion relating from a Ryukaku/Shokaku translation mix up when preparing some official communiques. The US airmen knew they had sunk a light carrier but after the battle, the name Ryukaku ("Dragon Horn") was incorrectly reported to the public (which probably was used in your book). Due to extreme Japanese national security before the war, the US wrongly suspected that there was a third Shokaku Class CV but could never confirm it till the wars end.

By the way, I don't believe the Ryukaku was sunk at Coral Sea. I saw the PT-73 sink the Ryukaku in an episode of McHales Navy. It had to still be around after May '42.;)



battle -> (8/30/2002 12:17:48 PM)

The WWII history book I have is an Armed Forces Service edition published in 1945. I guess it's not too much of a stretch of the imagination to assume that there might be some erroneous information written about the war, but I would expect historical sources that were written closer to when things actually happened, to be more accurate than alot of 'revisionist' history sources that like to claim such nonsensical things like President Roosevelt knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before it happened and junk like that. I know that there are fools out there that probably believe that kind of stuff. In any event, just about everyone who responded to the Ryukaku debate had a different slant/angle on the subject, and I must admit it sure brought out some interesting lurker's opinions. :rolleyes:



Yamamoto -> (9/6/2002 4:35:08 AM)

It's funny. I've never heard of that but when I added four more Shokaku carriers in one of my fictional scenarios, I named one of them Ryukaku.

Yamamoto



marc420 -> Shoho = Ryukaku (9/25/2002 12:32:02 PM)

Since I'm anxiously awaiting the mules at UPS Ground to deliver my copy of UV, I've been reading both this forum plus other WWII Pacific War history websites.

A website called HYPERWAR has a posting of some of the Combat Narratives prepared by US Naval Intelligence during the war. The CN for Coral Sea is posted. It was written in 1943. The following is an excerpt.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-CN-Coral/USN-CN-Coral-3.html#C



The Yorktown group.

The estimate of the part played by the Yorktown group in attacking the enemy carrier, as reported by Captain Buckmaster, commanding officer, follows:

Yorktown planes first sighted the enemy at 1130, at a point about 20 miles northeast of Misima. As mentioned previously, the Japanese force observed included a carrier, a very large cruiser or battleship, 3 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser. As our planes approached they saw part of the Lexington group attack. The enemy ships maneuvered violently at high speed. After the Lexington planes departed, the enemy carrier ceased maneuvering and turned into the wind, "a perfect target." At 1147 Scouting Squadron FIVE, followed closely by Bombing Squadron FIVE, made their dives down wind from an altitude of 18,000 feet. There were 24 SBD's, all armed with 1,000-pound bombs, in the 2 squadrons, and they clairned 14 direct hits. So great was the destruction that the last bomber pulled away and released his bomb at the light cruiser. He made a direct hit on the stern, and the ship sank rapidly.

Torpedo Squadron FIVE, coming in low, found the enemy carrier listing to starboard and burning fiercely. Only a small section of the bow was visible through the smoke, and only 2 light guns were seen to be firing. Utilizing the smoke, the torpedo planes approached very close and scored 10 hits out of as many drops. Within 3 minutes after the last torpedo had struck, the enemy carrier disappeared beneath the surface. She subsequently was identified as the Shoho, but was erroneously called the Ryukaku for some time.

No fighter opposition was encountered during the Yorktown's attack.



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