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brhugo -> War Career of the USS Seal (8/13/2010 7:01:04 PM)
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President Roosevelt’s fears concerning the midterm elections were validated when the Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives by a small margin (208 to the Republicans’ 223 with four seats being held by minor parties). Concern over World War II and American losses in it was one factor in majority party decline. Polls showed that had the presidential election had also been at stake in November, Roosevelt would have lost by about 4 percentage points. Hoping to turn public opinion, Roosevelt opened the spigot of combat citations and flooded state and local newspapers with press releases for these. The residents of LCDR Hurd’s home town of Metamora Michigan learned that he had received the Navy Cross:
“The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross to Commander Kenneth Charles Hurd, United States Navy, for extraordinary heroism in combat and meritorious conduct in offensive engagements with enemy Japanese forces as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. SEAL (SS-183), in action on the night of 17 October 1942, during the SIXTH War Patrol of that submarine in Japanese controlled waters. While patrolling the Yeloow Sea, Lieutenant Commander Hurd’s ship was severely damaged in an engagement with overwhelming enemy forces. Without regard for his own safety, Commander Hurd refused to give up the ship and led his crew in a 3000 mile transit to a safe port. Commander Hurd’s determination and nautical skills are reminiscent of those of John Paul Jones’ and reflects great credit upon his command and the United States Naval Service.
SECNAV’s staff had gotten the war patrol number wrong and a mine hardly constitutes “overwhelming enemy forces” but LCDR Hurd had in fact been promoted. Notification of the citation and the promotion did not reach the Seal until 1/28/43, two days before she left Perth following completion of repairs.
While the Seal recovered from her battle damage, the allied offensive in the Pacific and Burma theaters was beginning to pick up. Magwe was recaptured by British, Australian, and Indian forces on 12/6/42 with about 50% of that city’s oil wells and refineries still operational. The US was able to exert enough control over the Solomons/New Britain airspace to support occasional battleship bombardments of Rabaul and with Japanese defensives so blunted, the Shortlands were captured on 12/9/42.
The poor performance of the Mk-14 torpedo was not the only factor hampering US submarine effectiveness. Expansion of the Japanese base network and the neutralization of Australia’s northern ports by air bombardments were resulting in long, non-productive transits for submarines based at Brisbane and Pearl Harbor. The well developed base at Shortlands was on the target list both to support the later offensive against Rabaul and to provide a forward base for submarines operating against the Japanese sea lanes from the Dutch East Indies to Japan. A second operation to recover the port of Darwin was also being developed -- code name “Popcorn”. Operation Popcorn was audacious given the balance of forces at the time: a transport force defended by CVEs and escorted by a second CV task force would force its way to Darwin and provide badly needed supplies and additional fighter air groups for the air base there. The CVs would continue to provide temporary air cover until the airfields could be returned to operation. The hope was that once Darwin could defend itself against enemy air attacks, Submarines could be re-based there from Perth and Brisbane.
Operation Popcorn was “placed on the back burner” when the Japanese navy sortied on 12/12/42. Attacking from an initially undetected position, the Saratoga was hit by a bomb and the CLAA San Juan torpedoed. The Japanese strikes were substantially blunted by a heavy CAP that included land based fighters operating from the Shortlands. The US counterstrike (reportedly) scored three bomb hits on the Hiryu, four on the Kaga, and four on the Hiei. The returning aviators excitedly reported that the Hiryu had “definitely been sunk”. But the Japanese carriers were still capable of launching a late afternoon strike; despite a few close calls, no hits were scored. A second US strike hit the “sunk” Hiryu with 5 more bombs, put another bong and a torpedo into the Kaga, and hammered the Hiei with 5 bombs and a torpedo. Combat continued sporadically over the next three days with the BB Maryland chasing down the damaged Hiei and sinking an escorting destroyer, and another Japanese carrier strike hitting a transport group and torpedoing the escorting CVE Nassau. By this point, Naval Intelligence could not determine if there were more Japanese carriers in the action beyond the Hiryu and the Kaga, or if the damage to the Hiryu and the Kaga had been significantly over reported, or both. Accordingly, the undamaged US carriers remained within range of land based fighter support until the situation could be sorted out.
The Japanese tried to take advantage of the confusion by racing in a small cruiser task force to engage and sink transports at Lunga. Lunga was being covered by battleships, but in a night action still dominated by superior Japanese training, the Nevada and Tennessee were torpedoed in exchange for heavy damage to the CA Ashigara. The Japanese were slow to clear the area and were intercepted by undamaged forces the next day: Two Japanese destroyers were sunk and the CA Furutaka took two 14” hits in her superstructure. The BB Tennessee was torpedoed; this was attributed to a Japanese submarine but in reality it was the work of one of the Japanese destroyers (the capabilities of the pure oxygen-using Long Lance torpedo were still not fully understood). Another Japanese carrier strike was made against the damaged US BB’s with no hits being scored and finally one additional opponent was identified: the CVL Ryujo.
The allies and the Japanese continued to throw clumsy blows at each other like two punch-drunk boxers: the task force containing the CVL Ryujo was encountered at night by an allied task force that included an undamaged BB, 3 CAs, 4 CLs, and 3DDs. In an engagement similar to the June 1940 sinking of the Glorious by the Scharnhorst, One CVL was hit by a 16” shell and a second CVL by two. The second CVL suffered an obvious magazine explosion. The CA Chikuma, CA Kinugasa and CL Tenryu were also damaged in exchange for damage to three US destroyers. Naval Intel determined that that the CVL Ryuho had been sunk along with the Kinugasa and Tenryu, but all three of these ships were sighted within a few days (alive if not well).
And yet the days-long battle that would be known as the "Battle of the Solomon Islands" was far from over ...
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