|
wosung -> RE: Couple of questions, importance of Leningrad etc (9/14/2010 9:15:25 AM)
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: janh
quote:
ORIGINAL: wosung
All this is based on serious archive research in Russia and Germany. See: Jörg Ganzenmüller: Das belagerte Leningrad 1941-1944: Die Stadt in den Strategien von Angreifern und Verteidigern.
Thanks for the reference, every day one learns something new. Too bad the crucial chapters around p.20 are not accessible. High Command, with Hitler of course at its the head, accounts for its decisions, whatever they may have decided in the case of LG, and whatever later on became public of that information. It would seem quite inconsistent why Hitler would basically decide to eliminate the population of LG, but spare for example those left in Sevastopol, Rostov, Kharkov, Smolensk etc upon occupation of these centers.
Maybe the author, with the information he could dig out, arrived at this conclusion, but it leaves me wonder about its significance. Even illogical and crazy as Hitler was, he and his staff would probably have acted more consistently. I would bet that if the opportunity to take LG had arisen in late 41, or 42, without the need of distracting assets from other, more important operations, Hitler would not have hesitated to seize it.
Maybe it is one of the opinions that so often spring in historical science and require much more effort to correct than to spread. Or maybe those, that cannot be proven or disproved due to lack of evidence. Anyway, an interesting discussion.
Nazi Regime, in this case, acted not without a certain consistence and logic. Many party, military and scientific institutions planned the geopolitical-racial future of "the East". They did so in a non-coordinated, contesting way. They produced a series of documents known as the "Generalplan Ost". Its technocratic rationale was, there won't be more people in the East (including German settlers), than the remaining ressources there can feed.
About German consistence and the urban Russian population in Leningrad, Sevastopol, Rostov, Kharkov, Smolensk:
Without having all the data at hand, I'd think 1. Leningrad had the biggest pop. of all those cities. 2. Leningrad was quickly reached and besieged by the Wehrmacht in the very first weeks of the war. Not so the other cities. 3. Symbolically and economically Leningrad was a special place for both sides.
And most important: According to "General Plan Ost", the very Leningrad region was envisioned as living space for German settlers. Thus, the millions of slavic urban population would have been a lialibity, which, even in case of deportation, would have to be fed elsewhere. Thus no acceptance of capitulation.
To be fully understood: It's not the Wehrmacht didn't continuously assault Leningrad, because it just wanted the population to die from hunger in a long siege. Wehrmacht did try assaults when it reached Leningrad 1941. It planned further assaults on Leningrad in summer 1942 when it moved Manstein's 11th Army, the conquerers of Sevastopol, some 3.000 kilometers North to Leningrad. When Stalingrad and the Caucasus were the next targets. Without avail, because of Soviet counter-offensives in the Leningrad-Volkov sector.
Wehrmacht militarily just wasn't capable, or willing, to amass the needed forces for the conquest of Leningrad. Thus the siege.
But if Wehrmacht would have conquered Leningrad, it probably wouldn't have accepted any capitulation - until nobody would have been left to capitulate.
Regards
|
|
|
|
