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John Carney -> (9/1/2002 7:18:18 AM)
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Mdiehl,
If you want to know from a bubble-head, I spent ten years at sea on submarines. I often may side with the idea that USN results were more luck and command than military doctrine in early WWII.
The first sub that I was attached to was in new construction at Groton Connecticut Electric Boat Shipyard, the USS West Virginia SSBN 736. When she was launched, I was a Second Class PO in Engineering. The Captain invited the survivors of WWII submarine veterans association VFW 1 (located in West Virginia and the source of more submariners than any other state in the Union during the late thirties to mid forties). After the ceremony, much alcohol, and the wives sent home, they began to tell their stories of patrols in the China Sea and South West Pacific.
There are thirty-nine boats on eternal patrol in the Pacific 42-45, most due to IJN. Those who were caught by DDs and DEs and were able to come home, did so with stained drawers and bitter frighting stories. A common point was the ending, thank god for a truly silent service. During WWII even our allies were not told the actual operating and crush depths of our subs. The operational depth and area were sealed in the subs safe along with her alternate numbers, issued by a code in your daily traffic.
Thus one evasion tactic was to sit below accepted IJN crush limit while the explosions above caused flooding every where. Not desired, but unfortunately often required when pickled. The men, Commanding Officer to seamen, were trained how to isolate a seawater leak or patch the leak in the dark, a lesson from the early days when mother nature killed more of us then the enemy. Sleep was optional, until you served a useful purpose on board, that is the ability to save the men around you.
Another evasion tactic was to place the target between you and the ASW. Our sonar-men were by far superior to the task, a status that still exists today, even if they are weird little geeks.
Tactics and execution of orders was left to the officers, while operation and combat was left to the enlisted, this is found only in the US Submarine Service. I would say that this doctrine often is what allowed our boats to come home while the enemy was sunk, not solely due to some inferior ASW tactics. There is credence to the fact that our submarines became quieter and faster underwater than IJN, which increased evaded detection. The crew often made changes that increased performance of the boat, one example is the problem of flooding from the equalizing header and pressurization header of the Porpoise, Shark, and Perch class torpedo tubes. Corrected by isolating the tubes from the headers unless firing, this did require stationing an extra forward watch to allow for quick reaction firing. Our sonar ability grew quickly, helping our ASW efforts. Air ASW contributed largely to the US ASW tactics and target acquisition.
But, ASW DD to ASW DD the IJN harden doctrine made them better at group maneuvers and USN better at single bout prosecution (one on one). A single IJN DD was a target; two were a task force. The USN often relies on the balls factor at the beginning of a war. Our promotion and peace time training in the officer ranks often allows for the best organizer (Administrative officer) to advance while the fighter has a spot on his recorder and is slow to move up.
American ingenuity and guts often determined early war doctrine in the Pacific (on a Shoestring) in my opinion.
I do agree that ASW should be a seperate rating and should be considered as an add/multiplier with the units day/night rating, which would include their profitiancy with multiply unit maneuvering in the dark (a complicated issue),
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