If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (Full Version)

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Dobey455 -> If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 10:50:43 AM)

On 7 May 1940, the U.S. fleet moved its headquarters from San Pedro, California, to Pearl Harbor. This was not a popular move amongst senior naval commanders including Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

So what if the moved had never taken place and the Pacific fleet had remained on the west coast of CONUS? A few questions I've been pondering:

1)What would the Japanese have done assuming that they were still committed to a push into the DEI? Try to avoid war with the US, go with the WPO scenario and hit only the Phillipines or something else?

2)Did the attack on PH actually save the US from its own pre-war planning? Had the Pacific fleet been untouched would the US have had any option but to at least attempt to try to relieve the Philippines with the resultant "Decisive Battle"?

3) Is the assumption in question 2 flawed? (that a decisive naval battle in DEC 41/ Jan 42 to relieve the Philippines would have been a disaster or at least failure for the US). In the WITP world any such attempt would be folly, but historically whenever the allies met the Japanese with modern equipment, war ready forces and anything like equal numbers it was actually a very even fight.




herwin -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 11:24:03 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dobey

On 7 May 1940, the U.S. fleet moved its headquarters from San Pedro, California, to Pearl Harbor. This was not a popular move amongst senior naval commanders including Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

So what if the moved had never taken place and the Pacific fleet had remained on the west coast of CONUS? A few questions I've been pondering:

1)What would the Japanese have done assuming that they were still committed to a push into the DEI? Try to avoid war with the US, go with the WPO scenario and hit only the Phillipines or something else?


The push into the DEI was part of the plan from 1926. It means they would have been free to do as they pleased for a lot longer.

quote:



2)Did the attack on PH actually save the US from its own pre-war planning? Had the Pacific fleet been untouched would the US have had any option but to at least attempt to try to relieve the Philippines with the resultant "Decisive Battle"?


I'm fairly certain it did. There would have been a bonfire of the old Battleships sometime in February-April 1942 as the US Fleet attempted to take a major base in the Marshalls. My opponent in the current AAR gave me a scare but not a decisive loss, which is the most likely outcome in my opinion.

quote:



3) Is the assumption in question 2 flawed? (that a decisive naval battle in DEC 41/ Jan 42 to relieve the Philippines would have been a disaster or at least failure for the US). In the WITP world any such attempt would be folly, but historically whenever the allies met the Japanese with modern equipment, war ready forces and anything like equal numbers it was actually a very even fight.



The decisive battle would have been delayed until the US Fleet tried to take its first en-route base.




topeverest -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 1:06:29 PM)

Dobey,

Let me offer 2 cents...

Without a PH style air raid to severely damage the US surface / carrier fleet, the American war machine would have got going much faster.  IMHO, when I review the known alternate / non PH attack AAR's, it is clear those extra undamaged warships make a large difference.  I will venture a guess at 6 to 9 months on the war length barring a spectacular series of early Japanese naval victories.  we all assume that the empire would whip the Americans. while this can happen in the game to be sure, there is little evidence that such a resounding historical victory would occur with anything close to certainty.  Also, if there were an air raid at SF, LA, or SD to star the war, the allied combined LBA available would have both greatly reduced the empire follow-on raid capabilities and reduced the number of ships sunk / quicker repairs...which also speeds up the war in most cases.  On the bright side for the empire, PH could be taken in the initial plunge.

Its worth a scenario mod for the enthusiasts, because you are trading off PH for lower naval losses...probably still a bad thing for the empire, but interesting to be sure.

As far as if PH was a good or bad thing for the Americans...whole books have been written on that subject.  IMHO, it galvanized allied resolve such that no negotiated peace could ever be attained.  That has to be the top or second allied benefit.  Obviously the CV's were not there.  The naval crews of sunk ships on the whole survived since they were sunk in port, and the first and most painful lesson on airpower against ships was learned relatively cheaply.  Anyway, all that could be debated at finitum.




wdolson -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 2:25:28 PM)

I just finished reading _All The Factors of Victory_ which was a biography of Joseph Reeves who was the pre-war admiral who's crystal ball worked almost perfectly.  When he was in charge of carrier aircraft, his pilots pioneered dive bombing.  He proved in the late 1920s that carriers could be used as potent weapons on strikes against key bases. 

He also shredded War Plan Orange when the update was presented to him in the early 1930s.  He made a pretty good case that the plan to island hop through the Central Pacific was doomed without a forward base with dry docks and other ship services.  He argued that after the first couple of islands most of the fleet would need overhaul and going all the way to San Pedro would slow down the pace of operations significantly.  His critique probably contributed to the plan to move the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor.

He was an early adopter of air power and recognized, like Billy Mitchell that air power trumps battleships.  One of the officers who served under him when he was a carrier commander was Ernest King.  The gun club probably would have been lobbying for an advance into the Central Pac if the BBs had still been afloat, but I'm not sure the senior admirals would have gone for it.  There were more gun club officers, but the airdales had some of the top positions in the Navy.

Bill




Dobey455 -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 2:38:40 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: topeverest

Dobey,

Let me offer 2 cents...

Without a PH style air raid to severely damage the US surface / carrier fleet, the American war machine would have got going much faster.......


Faster, but with far less freedom of action I suspect. After the losses at Pearl Harbor the US Military was able to adopt a more defensive plan, initially, and was not expected for example to rush to the aid of Macarthur. It was basically accepted that, as tragic as it was, the US no longer had the assets needed to immediately "race to the rescue" of the Philippines by trying either to reinforce or evacuate.

Would an untouched and unblooded US military be allowed to do such a thing, even if it was militarily expedient? I suspect the Public and Political pressure would be intense to push for at least a rescue of the US servicemen.
Not to mention many in the forces themselves who would be loath to abandon fellow servicemen to their fate.




Shark7 -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 3:48:46 PM)

I have a feeling that the 'Decisive Battle' of WPO would have been an unmitigated disaster for the US. Too little air cover, by aging or obsolete aircraft, coupled with Japan's superior carrier force and the ever present Betty/Nell squadrons. It would have been Force Z on steroids. And the carriers would have been scouting for the fleet, putting them very much in harm's way.

The Japanese counter plan for WPO was to sit in home waters and wait for the USN to show up. WPO played right into the script.




Terminus -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 6:10:29 PM)

Precisely. National morale would also have been an issue; without the stab in the back of Pearl Harbor, the will to fight would have run out much faster. If Hitler hadn't been dumb enough to declare war on the US as well...




herwin -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 9:47:00 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7

I have a feeling that the 'Decisive Battle' of WPO would have been an unmitigated disaster for the US. Too little air cover, by aging or obsolete aircraft, coupled with Japan's superior carrier force and the ever present Betty/Nell squadrons. It would have been Force Z on steroids. And the carriers would have been scouting for the fleet, putting them very much in harm's way.

The Japanese counter plan for WPO was to sit in home waters and wait for the USN to show up. WPO played right into the script.


Amen, brother. I've seen nothing in my current command post exercise to convince me the Japanese gained anything from the Pearl Harbor attack.




Cribtop -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 10:21:17 PM)

To pose a slightly different hypothetical, what if two USN CVs are in port and go down on 12/7?




herwin -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/16/2010 10:36:46 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

To pose a slightly different hypothetical, what if two USN CVs are in port and go down on 12/7?



I think you would find the USN was trying to keep the CVs at sea as much as possible in the run-up to war.

And, oh, yes, the IJN expected to lose a couple of carriers in the operation.




Shark7 -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 12:45:04 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin


quote:

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

To pose a slightly different hypothetical, what if two USN CVs are in port and go down on 12/7?



I think you would find the USN was trying to keep the CVs at sea as much as possible in the run-up to war.

And, oh, yes, the IJN expected to lose a couple of carriers in the operation.


IIRC, the original plan called for the scuttling of the 2 with the shortest range due to them not having the fuel to get there and back again.




topeverest -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 2:06:51 AM)

This gets me thinking more about this mod.  PH not a military base, and the fleet spread out among Seattle, SF, LA, and SD.  Empire moves to take Hawaii with Philippines.

Very interesting indeed.  I am curious for playability purposes if you want to setup / concentrate the allied fleet as per PH to allow for the 'ph' blow.




oldman45 -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 4:22:58 AM)

I still believe that if there was no attack on US territories, and Japan simply neutralized the British and then took the DEI, Roosevelt would not have been able to get the US into the war in 41. Simply put, the worst thing the Japanese could have done was attack the US, especially the way they did. As hard as Roosevelt was trying to get us into the war in Europe the American people were not interested and we were losing ships in the Atlantic. If the KB went into the DEI and wiped out the Dutch and British, worst we would have done was wrote a nasty note to the Japanese embassy.

I understand that scenerio is impossible because the Japanese HQ was convinced we were the biggest threat, what they didn't get was how our republic operated and how much the American people were against a foreign war.

I have to disagree with Topeverest, I don't think we could have changed over to a war footing any faster than we did.




YankeeAirRat -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 7:10:03 AM)

First the USN was keeping the fleet carriers out to sea both on the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic Coast. If the rumors are to be believed portions of the Atlantic fleet were sortied to screen convoys on the American side of the line from German Raiders. Plus the aggressive nature of the push against the German fleet, tween the U-boats attacking a couple of the destroyers (Reuben James, Keanry, and the Niblack) and the open secret that the US was supplying most of European defense needs. Though Hitler had forbidden his U-boats from attacking any USN ships, there again were rumors that a couple of times some of the pre-war carriers ran across some of the German U-boats during their neutrality patrols tween Norfolk and the Caribbean bases, and their escorts attacked them, or their aircraft forced those U-boats under the water.

The whole idea of pushing the Pacific Fleet itself to Hawaii was as close as the fleet could get without putting undo risk to it, let alone not violate some of the current arms control treaties and tact understandings the US and Japan had at the time. Remember we couldn't upgrade Agna Harbor and Guam defense iaw the Washington Naval Treaty. The same was true of the Cavitie Naval facilities. The most we could do was replace outdated defenses or cosmetic upgrades (like replacing older buildings with newer ones). In turn the most that we did was basically let those bases atrophy until the war started in Europe. At which there was a slow review of what we could and needed to do to turn those bases into forward operating bases. From what I have read in some trade journals, is that most of senior leadership had accepted that Guam was going to be a loss and that the fight was going to happen in the Philippines. Take a look at this book, this ship along with three other sail schooner were going to spy on the Japanese fleet. There was a belief that the Japanese were going to make a move against someone in the near time. With the belief they were going to push towards the DEI fields, along with the mineral fields in British control lands. This was cause their four year old war in China hadn't being going the way they were use to. Also since most of the European nations were up against the ropes cause of the Germans, the Japanese didn't expect that much of a fight.

I would also suggest that some of us have gotten tunnel visioned with the reasons behind PH. Just as the UK and US were starting to get chummy in 1940. There was a nationalist movement starting to make its rise in India and while Mohandas Gandhi believed in non-violent support, some of the others in Indian National Congress were pushing for a strong statement against the British. The British earlier in the year had lost the war for the Balkans and retreated to Egypt. While doing that they had also fought the major battle around Tobruk, gone into Ethiopia to push out the Italians, and though holding their own with the war at sea in the Mediterranean just on a whole the theater wasn't looking good for them. Rommel had switched from France to become the general officer supporting the Italians and German army in the Desert. Charles Lindbergh testified in front of Congress in February of that year about neutrality with Germany, then in April the America First Committee had chosen Lindbergh to be their public face. May 24, the German battleship Bismark was able to sink the HMS Hood. The British and Free French Forces invade Syria to prevent the Vichy forces stationed there to prevent the Vichy and Germans from invading British Trans-Jordan (now Israel and Jordan), the fear was that the German forces would go out of Greece into Syria and push from through Jordan into Saudi/Iraqi/and Iranian oil fields. Just earlier in 1941 both Iran and Iraq had shown possibilities to fall with in the German sphere of influence.
Basically if you look at it from the Japanese point of view, they could get their gains of economic needs for their wartime economy. Crush the Europeans in their colonies. Sue for a treaty on their terms and since the Europeans were basically stretched to the breaking point with their forces. So a quickie war in the Pacific was what the Japanese looked for. As to the US, the Japanese knew that any push against the Europeans would lead to the US getting involved. In turn the PH raid (which no one on the US/European side believe the Japanese were capable of) was an attempt to bloody our nose, get their gains. Then basically tell the US that nothing more then what we had of US land, IE Guam and the PI which protected their trade routes from DEI to the home islands, and we will become your trading partner again. Just look at the American population at the time in 1941 as well, although there was a growing feeling that we needed to get into the war. Most of the troops were still training with mock-ups, the AFC was making big news (that was until Lindbergh's Des Moines speech). Heck, even the German-American Bund was pushing for neutrality and let the Germans do their thing. Along with an attempt at a secessionist movement in the Western US. So how could the Japanese not think that the US wouldn't go to war?




wdolson -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 7:38:04 AM)

If Japan hadn't started a war with the US and left the US alone, that would have allowed the US to continue to build up the Philippines and attack the Japanese whenever Roosevelt was able to convince Americans that it was necessary.  Most people knew that it was only a matter of time until the US was in the war.  Public opinion began shifting dramatically after the Battle of Britain and on the eve of PH, it was close to 50/50 whether the US should get into the war or not.

If Japan had let the US choose when to enter the war, they would have had a very fortified and well supplied Philippines to deal with that was in easy striking range of all shipping routes out of the DEI.  The Philippines was a critical piece of territory they needed to control to keep their supply routes safe.  Japan needed to start a war with the US to get control of the PI.

The Japanese miscalculated US will to fight and had wishful thinking that if they gave the US a big enough bloody nose the Americans would run home crying.  Historically, most wars have been won this way.  The US doesn't have a history of this, but then few people have ever tried to start a war with the US.

Bill




herwin -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 8:13:03 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7


quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin


quote:

ORIGINAL: Cribtop

To pose a slightly different hypothetical, what if two USN CVs are in port and go down on 12/7?



I think you would find the USN was trying to keep the CVs at sea as much as possible in the run-up to war.

And, oh, yes, the IJN expected to lose a couple of carriers in the operation.


IIRC, the original plan called for the scuttling of the 2 with the shortest range due to them not having the fuel to get there and back again.


The actual plan still assumed the loss of two due a more awake American response.




topeverest -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 1:36:46 PM)

I was only suggesting that a scenario mod where PACFLEET was still HQ'd on east coast AND Empire still goes to war in a PH style attack sparked my interest as something I might want to start Modding.  It would essentially cede Hawaii to Empire and create a whole new dynamic of war.  Anyway, interesting discussion to be sure.




Joe D. -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 2:30:44 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Dobey

On 7 May 1940, the U.S. fleet moved its headquarters from San Pedro, California, to Pearl Harbor. This was not a popular move amongst senior naval commanders ...


It was even less popular with IJN commanders who saw the move as a deterrent to their national ambitions elsewhere in the Pacific.

But if Imperial Japan was to fullfill that national ambition, wouldn't it have to strike at the US Pacific fleet where ever it was anchored, even in Cali?





Cap Mandrake -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 4:53:16 PM)

I think it was obvious even by Dec 8 that there was going to be no relief of the PI.

There was a loss of will even on the Wake Is. relief, which might have worked.




Cap Mandrake -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 4:58:56 PM)

As for the US prewar BB's, they are indeed of value. They can't operate with the carriers directly but they are useful for bombardment or in surface engagements if the carriers are elsewhere or incapacitated. A few of the Jap BB's are nearly as old.

Even worse, the damaged BB's from a PH raid can clog up the drydocks at Pearl for a year.

What would REALLY constrain the USN in the early war would be to mod down the repair facilities at Pearl.




Cap Mandrake -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 5:07:40 PM)

Also, the thread title, as it suggests a conditional or hypothetical situation with the use of "If" calls for the subjunctive tense....."weren't"*



* Sorry, I couldn't help myself as I have been grammar Nazied hundreds of times. [:'(]




Shark7 -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 5:46:56 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

I think it was obvious even by Dec 8 that there was going to be no relief of the PI.

There was a loss of will even on the Wake Is. relief, which might have worked.


But given the state of the USN command structure, Dominated by the Battleship Admirals, and no strike to take out the Battleships, they likely would have proceeded with WPO despite the reality we know.

1. In 1941, the Allies were not aware that the Betty/Nell could carry torpedoes. This can be very well seen by the fact that when told by a subordinate officer that the Betty's appeared to be making a torpedo attack, Admiral Phillips replied "There are no torpedo aircraft about." From eyewitness/survivor report. Source: http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/

2. During the 1930s and through 1941, the US and Britian had severely underestimated Japan's war machine. An article from a period magazine basically assumed that Japan's carriers were too small, and carried antiquated aircraft.

3. MacArthur would certainly have pressured for relief without a sinking of the fleet in PH...given his personality. And being that WPO did assume reinforcing PI it might well have been tried.

Now, granted no plan survives contact with the enemy, but before PH, the Allies did not have a healthy respect of Japan's combat abilities. And in fact, did not have good intel on their technological capabilities.




Pascal_slith -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 6:51:10 PM)

IIRC the senior Navy leadership had already rejected WPO as feasible BEFORE PH. Stark, King, Leahy etc. were aware of all this enough that they would not have bowled headlong into this trap.




ChezDaJez -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 8:20:07 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7


quote:

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

I think it was obvious even by Dec 8 that there was going to be no relief of the PI.

There was a loss of will even on the Wake Is. relief, which might have worked.


But given the state of the USN command structure, Dominated by the Battleship Admirals, and no strike to take out the Battleships, they likely would have proceeded with WPO despite the reality we know.

1. In 1941, the Allies were not aware that the Betty/Nell could carry torpedoes. This can be very well seen by the fact that when told by a subordinate officer that the Betty's appeared to be making a torpedo attack, Admiral Phillips replied "There are no torpedo aircraft about." From eyewitness/survivor report. Source: http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/

2. During the 1930s and through 1941, the US and Britian had severely underestimated Japan's war machine. An article from a period magazine basically assumed that Japan's carriers were too small, and carried antiquated aircraft.

3. MacArthur would certainly have pressured for relief without a sinking of the fleet in PH...given his personality. And being that WPO did assume reinforcing PI it might well have been tried.

Now, granted no plan survives contact with the enemy, but before PH, the Allies did not have a healthy respect of Japan's combat abilities. And in fact, did not have good intel on their technological capabilities.



To reinforce what Shark7 said, here is a link to an article published in January 1941.

Japan is not an Airpower

Chez




Cap Mandrake -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 8:21:10 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Shark7


quote:

ORIGINAL: Cap Mandrake

I think it was obvious even by Dec 8 that there was going to be no relief of the PI.

There was a loss of will even on the Wake Is. relief, which might have worked.


But given the state of the USN command structure, Dominated by the Battleship Admirals, and no strike to take out the Battleships, they likely would have proceeded with WPO despite the reality we know.

1. In 1941, the Allies were not aware that the Betty/Nell could carry torpedoes. This can be very well seen by the fact that when told by a subordinate officer that the Betty's appeared to be making a torpedo attack, Admiral Phillips replied "There are no torpedo aircraft about." From eyewitness/survivor report. Source: http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/

2. During the 1930s and through 1941, the US and Britian had severely underestimated Japan's war machine. An article from a period magazine basically assumed that Japan's carriers were too small, and carried antiquated aircraft.

3. MacArthur would certainly have pressured for relief without a sinking of the fleet in PH...given his personality. And being that WPO did assume reinforcing PI it might well have been tried.

Now, granted no plan survives contact with the enemy, but before PH, the Allies did not have a healthy respect of Japan's combat abilities. And in fact, did not have good intel on their technological capabilities.


I didn't know that about poor intel on the Betty and torpedoes...but still it is hard to imagine that no lesson would be drawn from the fate of Repulse and Prince of Wales.


And then there is the nasty business about the utter defeat of the USAAF on Luzon within days. Forget about the battleships. How would they hope to get 100-200 transports unloaded at Manila? Surely, someone would have raised an objection?




YankeeAirRat -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 8:58:28 PM)

Even if the fleet had stayed near 32nd street and San Pedro, the Japanese wouldn't have gone that far east. The PH op was pegged at an max+5 on risk meter. Going into the west coast? Oh heck, they still would have waited for the fleet to have come to PH before dropping the bomb on them. Think about the West Coast of the US at the time. There were a ton of air fields (both major and small grass fields), all sorts of fishing fields, and a very, very active trade route between all the major cities on the west coast of the US (let alone the west coast of the all the Americas).
The IJN wasn't a power projection force. It was a bunch of work and took up a large amount of thier oil tankers to help them get from the home islands to PH. So what, destroy thier economy just to power project to the US? Risk the same or worst losses to thier fleet? Just wasn't going to happen. The IJN would have started their ops and when the fleet sortied to PH they would have struck then if not whne the fleet was trying to get to Guam or the PI.




Canoerebel -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 9:02:17 PM)

In AE, we players tend to feed our naval ships into the meatgrinder, taking massive losses that bear no resemblance to reality. In the real war, how many capital ships did the USA lose during the war - no BBs and four fleet carriers, if memory serves (and not counting Pearl Harbor). The USN was very careful in sending ships into harm's way.

It's interesting to note that all four fleet carriers were lost in 1942, showing that the U.S. took early war chances that resulted in losses. It's just that we can't use AE to draw comparisons to what might have happened in a "No Pearl Harbor/WPO" hypothetical.




Joe D. -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 9:13:33 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

Even if the fleet had stayed near 32nd street and San Pedro, the Japanese wouldn't have gone that far east ... Think about the West Coast of the US at the time. There were a ton of air fields (both major and small grass fields), all sorts of fishing fields, and a very, very active trade route between all the major cities on the west coast of the US ...


The kido butai wouldn't have to go into US shipping lanes to launch an air strike, and if it attacked on a Sunday morning, IMO, all those air and fishing fields would still have been as asleep as those on PH.




Cap Mandrake -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 9:25:18 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

Even if the fleet had stayed near 32nd street and San Pedro, the Japanese wouldn't have gone that far east. The PH op was pegged at an max+5 on risk meter. Going into the west coast? Oh heck, they still would have waited for the fleet to have come to PH before dropping the bomb on them. Think about the West Coast of the US at the time. There were a ton of air fields (both major and small grass fields), all sorts of fishing fields, and a very, very active trade route between all the major cities on the west coast of the US (let alone the west coast of the all the Americas).
The IJN wasn't a power projection force. It was a bunch of work and took up a large amount of thier oil tankers to help them get from the home islands to PH. So what, destroy thier economy just to power project to the US? Risk the same or worst losses to thier fleet? Just wasn't going to happen. The IJN would have started their ops and when the fleet sortied to PH they would have struck then if not whne the fleet was trying to get to Guam or the PI.


Not to mention an attack on Los Angeles might have changed the "Europe First" strategy to "Japan First" [:)]




Cap Mandrake -> RE: If Pearl Harbour.....wasn't (10/17/2010 9:26:29 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

quote:

ORIGINAL: YankeeAirRat

Even if the fleet had stayed near 32nd street and San Pedro, the Japanese wouldn't have gone that far east ... Think about the West Coast of the US at the time. There were a ton of air fields (both major and small grass fields), all sorts of fishing fields, and a very, very active trade route between all the major cities on the west coast of the US ...


The kido butai wouldn't have to go into US shipping lanes to launch an air strike, and if it attacked on a Sunday morning, IMO, all those air and fishing fields would still have been as asleep as those on PH.


Not ALL of the USAAF would have been asleep.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vVR2pPFnkDU&feature=related




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