RE: Intel reports

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War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 2:15:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso The incident in Kiska could easily be explained by a couple of recon flights (this would reveal the size, speed and arrival times of a large invasion fleet which would be easy enough to spot). The Yap incident reflects the poor intel of the Japanese (reporting a division wiped out that hadn't even landed.) It is QUITE possible (indeed, even likely) that you can derive the entire OOB from just traffic analysis. This was done by both sides (and not reflected in the game). And, of course, anyone unfortunate enough to fall into Japanese hands (i.e., fliers, shipwreck survivors, POWs from whatever source) were going to give up information. Picking up uncoded low-powered radio transmissions is an artform (amateur radio operators that are QRP buffs will know about this.) Lastly, there are spies... not necessarily in the US, but also in foreign neutral countries. For instance, it was a neutral nation (USSR) that supplied a lot of information about what was going on in Japan (well, until August 1945). Places like Lisbon were hot-spots for espionage, and embassies were favorite targets. EDIT: The penetration of the US diplomatic codes is not real news, since David Kahn wrote about it in The Codebreakers in the 1960s. Exactly my point. What are the Japanese intell reports in the game? "Radio traffic at XXX". That's it. They deserve MORE than that. And in the case of Yap, all that reflects is the fact that the propaganda ministry wasn't updated that the division didn't land. Clearly they knew it was SUPPOSED to land. And air recon isn't going to give the Japanese info on what units and their strengths on board ship well out of their recon range. The Japs pulled off Kiska because they knew what was coming and they clearly felt it wasn't worth it to try to hold it.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 2:41:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History quote: ORIGINAL: mike scholl 1 quote: ORIGINAL: War History Nice of you to focus on 1 part and totally ignore the first paragraph. Guess its easier to make your point by ignoring other facts that stand in the way of that point. "In contrast to the allied side of the Pacific war the fact is widely unknown to historians that also Japan since the early 1930s was able to read the military and diplomatic ciphers of the United States as well as of Great Britain, though to a lesser degree than their enemies, and exchanged cryptographic information with the Axis partners, including captured code books." The problem with this assertion is that there is absolutely NO combat evidence to support the claim. The history of the Pacific campaign is overrun with examples of the Allies using decoded information to bedevil the Japs. Midway is only the most famous incident..., there are hundreds of others. But where are the Japanese intelligence coups? Name the engagements the Japanese won by reading Allied Codes. No evidence? how about the 2 Tokyo Rose reports cited already BEFORE the troops even knew where they were going? I think that is pretty good "evidence" and how many dozens or hundreds more? How many Japanese troops were on Chi-Chi Jima or Ha-Ha Jima? Not nearly the 27,000 on Iwo I suspect. Why would that be the case if the Japanese didn't know they were going to Iwo? Well known that the Japanese knew the allied invasion was coming to Kyushu. With the allies holding Iwo and Halsey pounding airbases from Tokyo north, why would the Japanese suspect Kyushu if not for intercepts et al? I could go on but if you refuse to believe then there is probably very little I can say that would convince you, since you seem to want to live in your little bliss of ignorance of the real situation instead of actually finding out the truth. None of this is exactly firm evidence that the Japanese decoded a single message... all the intel could be (and from what i have read) be derived from other sources. There is considerable evidence that the Japanese FAILED to decode much of anything during the war, including testimony from the Japanese "code breakers" themselves. Again, if you are really interested, i refer you to David Kahn's excellent The Codebreakers, a history cryptanalysis. Despite the recent "news" that the Japanese had broken the diplomatic codes (in the 1930s), this fact was widely known. US diplomatic codes were something of a farce. The Codebreakers pp 490-491 "... by the time the United States entered the war, every major European power must have had one or more American diplomatic codes." The US KNEW that Japan had penetrated the "Gray Code" (one of the standard US diplomatic codes), and in fact when FDR sent his last minute peace proposal to Emperor Hirohito on December 6, 1941, he scrawled a message (shown in the book) with it "Dear Cordell, shoot this to Grew [the US ambassador to Japan] -- I think can go in gray code -- saves time -- I don't mind if it gets picked up FDR". I.e. Roosevelt KNEW the diplomatic code had been penetrated, and was hoping that the Japanese codebreakers would get the message. Unfortunately for the efforts of peace, the Hirohito government DID get the message and sat on it, since the Pearl Harbor attack was already in motion. Operational use of these codes (i.e., the manner in which they were used) changed abruptly on December 7. However, the US would occasionally use the penetrated codes, using them "only for messages which we were willing or even anxious to have the Germans read, and over the months we discarded it entirely. To have stopped using it immediately would have told the Germans that we knew they had broken it." )pp 498-499. The high US MILITARY codes were generally "one time pads", which were machine generated, and theoretically unbreakable (it can be deciphered if someone captures the "pad", but this would be limited to a single message.) Both the lower level Russian and US codes were apparently never broken during the war. While based on something like the ENIGMA machine, supposedly there was a minor but important difference in construction which i can go into if people are interested. The US and Brits could and did break ENIGMA and (similar) IJ codes with a HUGE amount of effort, including developing electronic computers. The Japanese and Germans never mounted anything like the resources the Allies did to break codes.

mike scholl 1 -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 2:52:35 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History No evidence? how about the 2 Tokyo Rose reports cited already BEFORE the troops even knew where they were going? I think that is pretty good "evidence" and how many dozens or hundreds more? These were propaganda broadcasts. Unsettling, but hardly militarily effective. How many Japanese troops were on Chi-Chi Jima or Ha-Ha Jima? Not nearly the 27,000 on Iwo I suspect. And how many airbases were on the others? Were either large enough to support B-29's? Why would that be the case if the Japanese didn't know they were going to Iwo? Well known that the Japanese knew the allied invasion was coming to Kyushu. With the allies holding Iwo and Halsey pounding airbases from Tokyo north, why would the Japanese suspect Kyushu if not for intercepts et al? Because only Kyushu was in air support range from Okinawa? Which also provided an emergency repair facility for any ships damaged in the invasion. I could go on but if you refuse to believe then there is probably very little I can say that would convince you, since you seem to want to live in your little bliss of ignorance of the real situation instead of actually finding out the truth. I KNOW the truth. You are the one who insists on turning wisps of smoke into thunderstorms. "Show me the car fax." Did any of the Japanese naval forces involved in trying to stop the invasion of the Marianas leave port BEFORE the landings began? Must have had some great "intel" there. How about Letye Gulf? Any sign of the reaction forces having any advanced intel? Nope. Even the IJA had to ship troops to Letye after the landings. After the first few well-planned months of the war, the Japanese were continually caught "flat footed" by Allied operations. Sometimes (Savo Island) they reacted decisively and achieved success anyway...., but never on the basis of code breaking intel. When Rochefort wanted to confirm Midway was "AF", he had them send a phony message "in the clear", not in code. Then he and his code breakers read the coded Japanese message saying that "AF was short of fresh water." Kenney KNEW from his code breakers that the Japanese were going to try and reinforce New Guinea from Rabaul, what ships would be used, and when they were coming. Result? "The Battle of the Bismarck Sea" and the total destruction of the convoy. Show me the reverse of that coin? You can't.., because there never was one.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 2:56:55 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso The incident in Kiska could easily be explained by a couple of recon flights (this would reveal the size, speed and arrival times of a large invasion fleet which would be easy enough to spot). The Yap incident reflects the poor intel of the Japanese (reporting a division wiped out that hadn't even landed.) It is QUITE possible (indeed, even likely) that you can derive the entire OOB from just traffic analysis. This was done by both sides (and not reflected in the game). And, of course, anyone unfortunate enough to fall into Japanese hands (i.e., fliers, shipwreck survivors, POWs from whatever source) were going to give up information. Picking up uncoded low-powered radio transmissions is an artform (amateur radio operators that are QRP buffs will know about this.) Lastly, there are spies... not necessarily in the US, but also in foreign neutral countries. For instance, it was a neutral nation (USSR) that supplied a lot of information about what was going on in Japan (well, until August 1945). Places like Lisbon were hot-spots for espionage, and embassies were favorite targets. EDIT: The penetration of the US diplomatic codes is not real news, since David Kahn wrote about it in The Codebreakers in the 1960s. Exactly my point. What are the Japanese intell reports in the game? "Radio traffic at XXX". That's it. They deserve MORE than that. And in the case of Yap, all that reflects is the fact that the propaganda ministry wasn't updated that the division didn't land. Clearly they knew it was SUPPOSED to land. And air recon isn't going to give the Japanese info on what units and their strengths on board ship well out of their recon range. The Japs pulled off Kiska because they knew what was coming and they clearly felt it wasn't worth it to try to hold it. If you see a few hundred ships sailing in your direction at 10 knots and they are 450 miles away, it is a simple task to send out a message that "we know you are coming and when you will arrive", and give time and date. If the message is incorrect, no one remembers. How many times did Tokyo Rose broadcast incorrect messages during the war? If we are to believe that one correct broadcast indicates good intel, then by the same logic every incorrect broadcast indicates BAD intel. So, you could have Japanese intel reports laced with, say, 10 INCORRECT messages for every 1 good one. As the game is played now, you pretty much know all the intel you get is accurate. Imagine if you DIDN'T know that. As for the "they knew what unit was coming", i would think that if anyone on the island was listening to US radio broadcasts, they might (fairly easily) deduce the OOB based on traffic analysis. If you know that Division X is going to be involved in an operation, and then the (say) 37th Division shows up in the operation, and later you know that the same division is going to show up in a different operation based on traffic analysis you can make predictions. The fact that the Japanese made INCORRECT predictions doesn't speak highly of their efforts.

War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:07:30 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso If you see a few hundred ships sailing in your direction at 10 knots and they are 450 miles away, it is a simple task to send out a message that "we know you are coming and when you will arrive", and give time and date. If the message is incorrect, no one remembers. How many times did Tokyo Rose broadcast incorrect messages during the war? If we are to believe that one correct broadcast indicates good intel, then by the same logic every incorrect broadcast indicates BAD intel. So, you could have Japanese intel reports laced with, say, 10 INCORRECT messages for every 1 good one. As the game is played now, you pretty much know all the intel you get is accurate. Imagine if you DIDN'T know that. As for the "they knew what unit was coming", i would think that if anyone on the island was listening to US radio broadcasts, they might (fairly easily) deduce the OOB based on traffic analysis. If you know that Division X is going to be involved in an operation, and then the (say) 37th Division shows up in the operation, and later you know that the same division is going to show up in a different operation based on traffic analysis you can make predictions. The fact that the Japanese made INCORRECT predictions doesn't speak highly of their efforts. The allied intel reports (in the game) are not 100% accurate are they? If they are then would you agree that they shouldn't be? So if the allied reports are not 100% accurate, then the Japanese reports shouldn't be either. All I am saying is the Japanese ploayer deserves MORE than "radio traffic at Winnepeg". Do you agree or disagree with that statement? Ed: The allied player gets plenty of "this unit at this location" reports. From what you said the Japanese player should also get SOME of these type of reports, correct? Isn't that what you just said? In the case of the Kiska landings, according to Canadian reports, Tokyo Rose knew the UNIT STRENGTHS of the units aboard ship that were not even within air recon range of any Japanese base. They got that information how? Frankly, it doesn't matter HOW they got it, the fact is, they had it. The game should reflect that.

Canoerebel -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:12:22 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: SuluSea War History has a point the Japanese knew AF was short of water. [:D]�[:D]�[:'(] Do you realize that 99.999% of the population has no idea what this means? Today, just a handful of historians, a few in the military, and a bunch of history buffs and AE (and similar games) people know.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:16:57 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso If you see a few hundred ships sailing in your direction at 10 knots and they are 450 miles away, it is a simple task to send out a message that "we know you are coming and when you will arrive", and give time and date. If the message is incorrect, no one remembers. How many times did Tokyo Rose broadcast incorrect messages during the war? If we are to believe that one correct broadcast indicates good intel, then by the same logic every incorrect broadcast indicates BAD intel. So, you could have Japanese intel reports laced with, say, 10 INCORRECT messages for every 1 good one. As the game is played now, you pretty much know all the intel you get is accurate. Imagine if you DIDN'T know that. As for the "they knew what unit was coming", i would think that if anyone on the island was listening to US radio broadcasts, they might (fairly easily) deduce the OOB based on traffic analysis. If you know that Division X is going to be involved in an operation, and then the (say) 37th Division shows up in the operation, and later you know that the same division is going to show up in a different operation based on traffic analysis you can make predictions. The fact that the Japanese made INCORRECT predictions doesn't speak highly of their efforts. The allied intel reports (in the game) are not 100% accurate are they? If they are then would you agree that they shouldn't be? So if the allied reports are not 100% accurate, then the Japanese reports shouldn't be either. All I am saying is the Japanese ploayer deserves MORE than "radio traffic at Winnepeg". Do you agree or disagree with that statement? AFAIK - the reports in the game are accurate when they are given, but i am sure i will be corrected if i am wrong. (i.e. - if the player is told the destination of a ship, it is accurate when the information is given, but it doesn't mean that the other side can't change the orders the next turn). Given the amount of information the Allies get from their reports, no, the Japanese do NOT deserve more information. If the Allies get the amount of information that approached something like what really happened, then, yes, they (the Japanese) should get more information. From what i can read, unfortunately for the Allies, the US codebreaking was pretty mismanaged after Midway due to, well, let's not get into it. The Allies had broken essentially every code the Japanese had except one - and that code was so messed up the JAPANESE couldn't decipher it (and it was discontinued in 1942-1943). Codebreaking EASILY shortened the war by 1 year, and it is my belief (as well as others who have studied it more carefully) it could have shortened the war by at least another year had it been properly used.

War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:20:06 PM)
So you are saying that all the stuff you said before is bunk and has no weight. So by default, this too should be considered bunk and have no weight. Just wanted you to admit your hypocrisy. Which you have now done.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:20:47 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History So you are saying that all the stuff you said before is bunk and has no weight. So by default, this too should be considered bunk and have no weight. Just wanted you to admit your hypocrisy. Which you have now done. What are you talking about??? [&:] EDIT: If you are saying the Japanese knew more than what the game gives them, yes, it is true. But the Allies knew FAR FAR more than what the game gives them as well. So, given the relative strengths of the intel reports IN THE GAME, no, the Japanese do not deserve more.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:24:26 PM)
quote: Just wanted you to admit your hypocrisy. Which you have now done. i do NOT take kindly to people calling me names, nor attributing motives to me which are not true.

Canoerebel -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:31:09 PM)
During the war the Allies often - not always, but often - knew either the precise or general location of the Japanese carriers. As you can imagine, this gave the Allies a comfort level in planning and proceeding with operations, knowing that Allied TFs wouldn't get pounced upon by the KB. The Allied player doesn't often have this luxury in AE (unless his opponent is inexperienced enough to frequently reveal the KB's location).

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 3:36:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Canoerebel During the war the Allies often - not always, but often - knew either the precise or general location of the Japanese carriers.� As you can imagine, this gave the Allies a comfort level in planning and proceeding with operations, knowing that Allied TFs wouldn't get pounced upon by the KB. The Allied player doesn't�often have this luxury in AE (unless his opponent is inexperienced enough to frequently reveal the KB's location). Exactly... even when the KB was sailing under radio silence, the USN had penetrated the (low-level) Harbormaster code which told them when and where a TF was due to leave/show up. Imagine if the Allied player knew when any TF left a harbor and when it was expected to show up to the next harbor (and where the harbors in question were). Then you might get an idea of why i think the war could have been shortened by a LOT had the intel been used more wisely. Generally, the Harbormaster code would routinely mention escort names, and since the same escorts tended to sail with the same "big boys", the picture becomes even more complete.

mike scholl 1 -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 4:05:14 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso quote: ORIGINAL: War History So you are saying that all the stuff you said before is bunk and has no weight. So by default, this too should be considered bunk and have no weight. Just wanted you to admit your hypocrisy. Which you have now done. What are you talking about??? [&:] EDIT: If you are saying the Japanese knew more than what the game gives them, yes, it is true. But the Allies knew FAR FAR more than what the game gives them as well. So, given the relative strengths of the intel reports IN THE GAME, no, the Japanese do not deserve more. It's not what he's talking about..., it's what he's talking out of.[:D] 37 posts, and he thinks he knows everything because he once read a book. We're engaged in a waste of our time trying to introduce this fellow to rational thought, research, and how the game works. [8\|]

Dobey455 -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 5:42:36 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History In the case of the Kiska landings, according to Canadian reports, Tokyo Rose knew the UNIT STRENGTHS of the units aboard ship that were not even within air recon range of any Japanese base. They got that information how? Frankly, it doesn't matter HOW they got it, the fact is, they had it. The game should reflect that. I could give you the TO&E and disposition of pretty much any unit and it's nominal strength given 5 minutes on wikipedia. No code breaking required. For most of the war it would be a pretty safe bet that most allied units that had not been heavily engaged recently would be at or near full strength.

Bullwinkle58 -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 6:21:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Canoerebel quote: ORIGINAL: SuluSea War History has a point the Japanese knew AF was short of water. [:D]�[:D]�[:'(] Do you realize that 99.999% of the population has no idea what this means? Today, just a handful of historians, a few in the military, and a bunch of history buffs and AE (and similar games) people know. I'm more worried that 80% or so don't know the name of their congressman.

FatR -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 6:37:25 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: PaxMondo I think the difference is that while IJ had the intel, they did not use it as effectively as the allies and in particular the USN.� We can conjecture as to why until the cows come home, but the historical fact is already in place.� Being on the defensive for the most of the war. And I'm dead serious. Correct and timely (i.e., leaving enough time to actually react) prediction of major moves of the enemy that held strategic initiative in WW II by intelligence was exception, rather than the rule. Even when the overall intent was obvious, such as before Operation Citadel, key details were misread or unclear until the last moment. This was also a major reason, why most strategic defensive successes in WW II are associated with the attacker deciding to be very predictable and straightforward (Italian front), or the defender having the advantage of superior mobility and more robust logistics (Wehrmacht on Eastern front in 1942 and, to an extent, in 1943), i.e., situatios where faults of intelligence weren't as critical. That said, Japanese intelligence in the game is goddamn useless. While Allied one is very good and is almost guaranteed to give away any Japanese strategic plan, unless the Japanese player deliberately cripples his fighting chances by fake preparation/launching preparation lately.

War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 8:24:54 PM)
Back in the late 70s was a game by Victory Games called "Pacific War". This game was in part researched by Al Nofi. Many of you will know who he is but in case you dont, here is a link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Nofi (Nofi has been considered to be one of the best researchers for games in the business). The rules to that game included "Strategic Intell" (by both sides). Here is a link to the rules of that game: http://markherman.tripod.com/PacificWar.html Here is a cut and paste screen shot of the designer rules from that section (page 41-42): [image]local://upfiles/34959/31AE983ED4DB4292B7D5AFD56C6F6FC8.jpg[/image] I would HIGHLY recommend people read how this worked before they write off the notion. Now in a nutshell how it worked is this: Each player made a roll and compared that roll to the strat intel chart for that side by month/year. There there times when Jap intel was VERY good (getting into level 4) and other times that allied intel was very good. The chart varied according to the HISTORICAL abilities of each side during that month in the real war. Yes there were many times the Japanese could only achieve level 2 with the best roll on the chart. But there were also times where the allies could only achieve level 2 as well (if memory serves, June/July 42 is one of those times because of the changing of the Japanese codes - Midway operation actually began in May 42 which the allies had a very good chance of getting level 4). (Personal to Mike: Your responses are always pro-allied. Allied player can't do something they could you whine about it, but if a similar Japanese position is raised you fight it tooth and nail. This is historical fact. So frankly it isn't worth anyones time to respond to you because you have a completely closed mind. I am not an allied fan boy. I am not a Japanese fan boy. I am a HISTORY fan boy. I, unlike you, have no agenda on the game.)

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:00:07 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History Back in the late 70s was a game by Victory Games called "Pacific War". This game was in part researched by Al Nofi. Many of you will know who he is but in case you dont, here is a link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Nofi (Nofi has been considered to be one of the best researchers for games in the business). The rules to that game included "Strategic Intell" (by both sides). Here is a link to the rules of that game: http://markherman.tripod.com/PacificWar.html Here is a cut and paste screen shot of the designer rules from that section (page 41-42): [image]local://upfiles/34959/31AE983ED4DB4292B7D5AFD56C6F6FC8.jpg[/image] I would HIGHLY recommend people read how this worked before they write off the notion. Now in a nutshell how it worked is this: Each player made a roll and compared that roll to the strat intel chart for that side by month/year. There there times when Jap intel was VERY good (getting into level 4) and other times that allied intel was very good. The chart varied according to the HISTORICAL abilities of each side during that month in the real war. Yes there were many times the Japanese could only achieve level 2 with the best roll on the chart. But there were also times where the allies could only achieve level 2 as well (if memory serves, June/July 42 is one of those times because of the changing of the Japanese codes - Midway operation actually began in May 42 which the allies had a very good chance of getting level 4). (Personal to Mike: Your responses are always pro-allied. Allied player can't do something they could you whine about it, but if a similar Japanese position is raised you fight it tooth and nail. This is historical fact. So frankly it isn't worth anyones time to respond to you because you have a completely closed mind. I am not an allied fan boy. I am not a Japanese fan boy. I am a HISTORY fan boy. I, unlike you, have no agenda on the game.) Most of the information about the MAGIC decrypts, etc. was only starting to be released after about 1976 or so, with the bulk of it coming much later (early 1990s) It would appear that any gaming system from the 1970's would woefully underestimate the discrepancy between the intel capabilities of the two sides.

Puhis -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:25:43 PM)
It's easy to denigrade japanese intelligence, when most of the war time documents are lost and western historians can't read them anyway...

anarchyintheuk -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:29:24 PM)
It might not be as easy if the best examples of IJN intel use are those provided above.

War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:39:12 PM)
Well 2 things Nofi had going for him back in the 70s is first off, a lot of the people that were there were still alive, and he did interview hundreds if not thousands of WWII vets (from all sides). He was also a defense analyst which gave him access to classified documents (BEFORE they were blacked out and released under the freedom of information act).

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:41:58 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Puhis It's easy to denigrade japanese intelligence, when most of the war time documents are lost and western historians can't read them anyway... The Japanese claimed/admitted they only partially broke one low-level US code during the entire war. They also admitted that they did not have a well-developed, systematic system for analyzing/distributing information. What they DID like is spies, and they had a good radio-direction finding service from most accounts. However, their spy service (Nakano) turned out relatively low numbers of folk, numbering in the 100's during the war. Compare that to say, the OSS and the number of folk they had, not to mention the other countries (Britain, Australia, etc).

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:46:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History Well 2 things Nofi had going for him back in the 70s is first off, a lot of the people that were there were still alive, and he did interview hundreds if not thousands of WWII vets (from all sides). He was also a defense analyst which gave him access to classified documents (BEFORE they were blacked out and released under the freedom of information act). To quote a GAME as a source is really not a good idea. By analogy, you could then claim that most queens were more powerful then their kings (from chess). The idea of a game is to have some sort of play balance, not necessarily to present history accurately (and yes, WITP is a GAME, not a simulation.) EDIT: i will also point out that being a defense analyst does NOT give one unlimited access to classified files.

War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 9:59:01 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso quote: ORIGINAL: War History Well 2 things Nofi had going for him back in the 70s is first off, a lot of the people that were there were still alive, and he did interview hundreds if not thousands of WWII vets (from all sides). He was also a defense analyst which gave him access to classified documents (BEFORE they were blacked out and released under the freedom of information act). To quote a GAME as a source is really not a good idea. By analogy, you could then claim that most queens were more powerful then their kings (from chess). The idea of a game is to have some sort of play balance, not necessarily to present history accurately (and yes, WITP is a GAME, not a simulation.) EDIT: i will also point out that being a defense analyst does NOT give one unlimited access to classified files. Where did I say unlimited? Re-read it 4 times and I can't see where I said unlimited. But I will also note that you haven't provided 1 source to justify NOT putting it in. In fact no one has. You have a source that says the Japanese got no intell from any means during the war?

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 10:27:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: War History quote: ORIGINAL: rtrapasso quote: ORIGINAL: War History Well 2 things Nofi had going for him back in the 70s is first off, a lot of the people that were there were still alive, and he did interview hundreds if not thousands of WWII vets (from all sides). He was also a defense analyst which gave him access to classified documents (BEFORE they were blacked out and released under the freedom of information act). To quote a GAME as a source is really not a good idea. By analogy, you could then claim that most queens were more powerful then their kings (from chess). The idea of a game is to have some sort of play balance, not necessarily to present history accurately (and yes, WITP is a GAME, not a simulation.) EDIT: i will also point out that being a defense analyst does NOT give one unlimited access to classified files. Where did I say unlimited? Re-read it 4 times and I can't see where I said unlimited. But I will also note that you haven't provided 1 source to justify NOT putting it in. In fact no one has. You have a source that says the Japanese got no intell from any means during the war? i have sources that say that got essentially ZIP from codebreaking, i.e. - no intelligence that was of any use. Your use of two "hits" from Tokyo Rose out of the thousands of misses as a "proof" of great intel is, well, strange. As for your using a game designer as a source: i was trying to be nice, but now if will say: just because you are a defense analyst does not necessarily mean that you have ANY access to classified WW2 documents. You say he did, i say maybe not. Despite several posts i have made pointing out Japanese intel capabilities, you continue to insist i claim they had none. And despite the fact that you claim to be a fan of history, you are apparently unaware of the well-established history, bringing up recent web articles that "show that historians were unaware of the facts". It only shows that the writer of the article was unaware of the facts that had been written on for the last 50 years, since it was WELL KNOWN that the Japanese had penetrated some codes in the 1930s. Penetrating some codes in the 1930s does not equate to having penetrated them during the war. If there is good proof that they did, i would be very interested to see that proof. Since the original assertation is demonstrably untrue (i.e. - historians DID know about code penetrations in the 1930s), your whole premise is now suspect, the "proof" of Tokyo Rose notwithstanding.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 10:43:45 PM)
quote: But I will also note that you haven't provided 1 source to justify NOT putting it in. In fact no one has. You have a source that says the Japanese got no intell from any means during the war? i have made at least 2 posts now stating that the game does not accurately represent neither the Allied NOR the Japanese intel capabilities, but the relative strengths of the intel reports are shown by the game are more than fair to the Japanese side. Since you have continued to misrepresent my position, as well as insulting me and attributing bad motives, i see little point in my further discussing the issue with you. You are the first person i've greenbuttoned in about 2 years, iirc, but i think it is well deserved.

Barb -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 10:58:57 PM)
Well intel isnt only about breaking codes. It is also based on traffic analysis, spies, clues, hints and other things. When there is big number of messages coming from and to one point, there will be HQ, if there is big activity in radio communications, something is cooking up, if there is quietness, its already cooked, or nothing is cooking up there. Also reading voice communications of pilots, knowing call signs and other things can make up a nice picture about the enemy without codebreaking messages. You probably wont know the details to intercept a particular ship or convoy, but you can get the bigger picture about enemy and his intentions. The Japs are deprived of many usefull things with their intel.

rtrapasso -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 11:08:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Barb Well intel isnt only about breaking codes. It is also based on traffic analysis, spies, clues, hints and other things. When there is big number of messages coming from and to one point, there will be HQ, if there is big activity in radio communications, something is cooking up, if there is quietness, its already cooked, or nothing is cooking up there. Also reading voice communications of pilots, knowing call signs and other things can make up a nice picture about the enemy without codebreaking messages. You probably wont know the details to intercept a particular ship or convoy, but you can get the bigger picture about enemy and his intentions. The Japs are deprived of many usefull things with their intel. True (as i have mentioned several times above), and the Allies are deprived of many things that would have been of far more use, i.e. - the (at least general) whereabouts of the CVs at virtually any time during the war, not to mention sailing times and arrivals of all escorts leaving Japanese harbors, etc. What do you think was more useful? As an aside: one of the things complained about bitterly in the old WITP was in fact, historically accurate: the appearance of aircraft at a base. The Allies usually (almost always?) knew about impending transfers of Japanese aircraft into a base, and if they were within range they could (and did) bomb or strafe the airfield synchronized for the time that the time the aircraft would be arriving low on fuel.

spence -> RE: Intel reports (10/28/2010 11:20:27 PM)
quote: It's easy to denigrade japanese intelligence, when most of the war time documents are lost and western historians can't read them anyway... Frankly I am quite tired of hearing this as an excuse for almost everything. Enough of the Japanese records survived (in spite of their efforts to the contrary) to adequately reconstruct the Japanese side of things for virtually the entire war. As far as Japanese Intelligence the Japanese Player NEVER has to deal with his own troops/commanders blatantly lying about how the battle turned out. I'm not talking about Petty Officer Takahashi saying he scored a bomb hit when he really missed by a country mile: I'm talking about Admiral Yamamoto and his staff telling the IJ Army that they had won the Battle of Midway. I'm talking about the air commanders on Guam failing to mention that just about every plane that survived their encounters with TF58 at the Battle of the Philippine Sea was shot down when they tried to land on Guam and that most of those who did manage to land would never take off again. American intelligence was far more operationally useful. Midway is a famous instance but the Brits cleared their fleet or most of it out of Ceylon because they were aware that the KB was coming to call. Ship sailings and routings frequently resulted in IJN convoys and ships being set upon by US/Allied submarines with dire consequences for the IJ ships: Shinano comes to mind. USS England proceeded straight from one patrol station to the next and cleaned up a whole IJN submarine patrol line based on SIGINT. No doubt the Japanese selectively destroyed all the records of their own corresponding successes.[8\|]

War History -> RE: Intel reports (10/29/2010 12:16:46 AM)
I would say, at the very least, the Japanese player should get the same "signals intel" (although I will admit not the same amount clearly a lesser amount than the allies) meaning occasional unit location and prepping target (including units aboard ships). In times of heavy allied activity perhaps slightly more info should be revealed (or rather a chance of it) such as ship movements (which the Japanese knew as attested to by "Tokyo Roses" criminal conviction). I will concede that going the whole 9 yards that Nofi did with a month by month breakdown of the entire war is probably impractical with this game engine. An "average" such as it is currently for the allies I think is reasonable. I think it also reasonable the Japanese should receive at least half the allied ability.

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