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TIMJOT -> (9/5/2002 1:10:55 AM)
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl
[B]Source for all on Savo that follows: Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal.
The Allied disposition at Savo was neither criminal nor negligent. The Allies were deployed in two groups with separate DD pickets, spaced 10-15 miles apart, to cover two invasion groups (Tulagi and opposite Henderson), roughly 12 miles apart, with transports still unloading cargo and men at both locations.
The first two USN DDs to oberve the IJN ships launched torpedoes without opening up with guns. These were pickets, and their attack was entirely consistent with torpedo doctrine. The initial IJN attack was semi-torp doctrine: the initial Type 93 salvo was launched, but the IJN opened up with batteries before the first torps struck. Understandable, given that by *that* time it was clear to the IJN vessels that they'd been spotted. The IJN attack on the northern group was entirely gun-doctrine, despite the availability of half salvos of Type 93s in most of the IJN ships (IIRC, one of them had lost their torp mount to shellfire).
What went wrong at Savo is well known. It had nothing to do with night training or Allied gun doctrine. It had everything to do with your point #4. Crutchley was absent at the start fo the engagement without informing Turner or Riefkohl. Crutchley also failed to provide copies of the northern Allied groups patrol plan and disposition to the southern group, and of the southern group's to teh northern group. As a result, there was considerable confusion, initially, about the identity of the strange vessels. To make matters worse, the northern group was screened from the southern group by a heavy squall and did not observe gun flashes. They heard the some torp detonations, which they presumed to be the southern group engaging subs. (Shades of the IJN at Balikpapan there. At Bppn, the IJN CL/DD group failed to observe the Allies after the IJN group cleared the harbor. That had nothing to do with smoke, and everything to do with ASW fixation leading to, IMO, lax visual observation for surface vessels.)
Balikpapan:
Your response to my observation about Bppn is non-sequitur. I brought it up because it shows that USN DDs had a very good torp doctrine when not attached to a CA gun-line, which is basically where this discussion started (how to provide a "Tassafaronga" engine to UV). Whether or not the attempt succeeded to your standards is another question entirely. The fact remains that the USN DDs at Bpp worked as a cohesive group and launched a textbook torpedo doctrine attack.
That said:
Say what you want. The USN hit rate was 12% that night. Comparable to the IJN's better night actions, but not their two best. (One a statistical outlier in 1943, 4 torps fired at extreme range with 1 hit. The other: Tassafaronga, IIRC, about 16%). At Savo, one IJN CA launched a full volley of torps range 13K yards at the flare-illuminated, completely visible, parked transport group near Tulagi. Guess what: no hits. The explanation for the USN DDs initial misses at Bppn and the parting IJN shots at Savo/Tulagi is the same. It is not especially easy to hit ships with torps even with textbook firing conditions.
Now try a simple experiment. Riding a bicycle on undulating sand, hit two trash cans with two rocks each in no more than three passes at a distance of sixty feet. The trash cans will be intermittantly obscured by smoke, and there are deflectors positioned such that there are limited angles from which the trash cans may be hit. You may presume to have sixty seconds to accomplish the job, after which the trash cans may start hurling lids at you at 50 mph.
You have drawn the conclusion from Bppn that the Allies were inferior based on your assessment that 12% isn't good enough. By that standard, one would conclude (erroneously) likewise that the IJN was inferior with torps, since 12% is about their hit rate for Savo/Tulagi (despite Allied laxity, personnel exhaustion, background illumination, and complete tactical surprise -- i.e. a textbook firing condition), and since by *your* standards the IJN miss at Tulagi implies they could not hit a barn door from inside the barn (if we evaluate IJN performance by the same standards that you set for evaluating the USN performance). [/B][/QUOTE]
Mdiehl
I dont think anyone on this thread has said that US DDs lack a good torpedo doctorine. If you mean by good doctorine that a USN DD only force would attempt to launch a torp attack before a gun attack. My point on Balikapan is that you claimed it was text book. My point was the execution was not textbook. Texbook would have been makeing the run at a proper speed to allow for accurate aiming. Text book would have been if the 4 DDs launched there salvos in concerted effective spreads.
Cant say that I know of the IJN CA vs Tuligi transports thing, but 13,000 yrds is a far cry from 1000yrds and a Furataka class CA full spread was only for torps.
My expirement simply explains how obects that are backlite can be seen through an opaque screen. While objects backed by darkness remain unseen behind the same opaque screen. Its a perfectly legitimate explanation to your query on how did the IJN miss the US DDs.
Regarding your expirement. I say my chances were pretty good if I practiced throwing rocks at cans over and over again; year after year. I say my chances would not be so good if I only practiced throwing rocks a couple times a year and when I did; I usually didnt actually throw rocks, but instead just went through the arm motion.
Just curious though. Why the deflectors? I wasnt aware of any intervening land masses, reefs, torps nets at Balikapan. Can you enlighten me?
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