Ascended -> RE: CV and Combat Modeling (12/5/2010 7:50:54 PM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Flaviusx the organizational challenges are at the operational, not tactical level. It takes a good year for the Soviet Union to straighten out its leadership and command and control issues. Ok, but the basic units I'm seeing in the previews are between regimental and corps size. Those are the basic units of operations, not tactics. IOW - the tactical capability is given by the representation of the unit counter. The player takes it at face value. Player skill subs in for operational moves, while computer abstraction subs in for tactical moves. It is how the computer is abstracting the tactical side that I am concerned with. Obviously if there is something missing or fudged in the tactical abstraction, what happens operationally or what units are capable of doing in the hands of the player will be changed accordingly. What happens operationally, the movement and supply of divisions, has to do with how the player commands and maneuvers his formations. The inputs to what the formations can actually do (Combat Value, Movement Allowance, etc.) are tactical and don't depend on player skill. Yet tactical realities often dominate operational wishes or plans in real life, in wargames they often get glossed over, allowing for some strange stuff (like my OP example.) In a simulation of war, like an operational wargame being done to predict results of matchups and moves in real life, it is important that all of the inputs that makes up what the unit counter is by the time it reaches the player's fingertips are accurate. If only organizational deficiencies at the division level (and below) are reflected in the CV, for example, while significant tactical order of battle issues (such as given in my OP example) are not, you get unrealistic results. This plagues all the strategy games, it's not something I expect would be particular to War in the East. I suspect it is easier to understand and probably easier to model something like inflexibility into a chit by lowering it's combat value and movement allowance, but it is much harder to recognize (and teach the computer to recognize) tactical complexities which *are the cornerstones of operational results*. So you get this problem, where the player essentially doesn't need to know anymore what goes into his formation, he only needs to move the formations around and know their total combat values. The combat values, or the battles that take place during the operations (i.e., player decisions) have nothing to do with reality. The game is the thing in itself, in a "WW2 theme wrapping". It's actual basis in WW2 reality becomes only thematic. In many strategy games based on WW2 for the PC the problem manifests itself as a stacking problem. Players can achieve unrealistic success by simply stacking up, if not in a tile/hex than in a sector. Whereas, in actual WW2 operational history, tactical problems dominate even operational "stacking" by a great deal. It had nothing to do with organizational problems, but tactical problems presented at the level of companies and battalions holding up entire divisions, or tank formations being stripped of their infantry support early on (often by just outrunning them.) Do those ever get reflected in war strategy games on the PC? No. Some basic strategic problems do get attention -- industry outputs, major supply routing and pocketing, and a kind of abstract technological modifier. But operations almost always reduce to stacking CV, because tactical problems are simply not there.
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