Ultra and the eastern front- a question.

Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (Full Version)

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Muzrub -> Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 8:03:23 AM)
I was chatting with a mate about Ultra- the cracking of enigma etc etc and what it meant to the war effort, '43 onwards. Of course the battle of Kursk came into the discussion, the delays and the use of the German code being broken- this led to a discussion of Army Group Centre in '44, how it was smashed- the generals involved and essentially the end to any chance the Germans had in the East. There has been discussion on these boards about the Soviet all-star team of Generals, and the inevitability of a German loss in the East at least. But before the Soviet use of broken German code the Germans had won a victory in the South at Kharkov- but by the time Kursk had came about the Soviets knew of German plans and countered. They then moved on with numbers, and with knowledge of German dispositions until the end of the war. My question to you guys is: Without the breaking of the German codes, the delays at Kursk (possible victory- along with Kharkov to boost morale)- could the Soviets had beaten the Allies to Berlin? Another question is: Without this knowledge of German plans through Ultra- were the Soviet Generals of '43 onwards the true article? Anyhow people say we play with hindsight- its almost cheating, we know the weather, we know the tech etc etc. But what if you could know your enemies plans on a PBEM game? Through Ultra they did! On a game level we'd all cry CHEATER! But that's history.

vinnie71 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 9:10:33 AM)
I'm not sure that the Allies actually mentioned ULTRA to the Soviets and they were wary of telling them everything. Besides most of the times they Allies only accessed Luftwaffe signals since the Army had several ways of delivering messages. To be sure, the Soviets had their own spies as well - the Lucy spy ring, I believe that's what it was called, actually told the Soviets on German plans for Stalingrad and Kursk. But it seems it had nothing to do with code breaking but was essentially HUMINT. Interestingly you mentioned Kharkov battle. It should be noted that one reason for its success was that decisions taken were at a local level - ie within Manstein's HQ and thus were immune to espionage. Interestingly the Soviets didn't even know of the arrival of the SS Panzer Korps which was instrumental in stopping the Soviet offensive and in the counterattack. Also Zitadelle was essentially drawn up locally, but it seems that it was leaked out when it was 'escalated' to Fuhrer HQ. The Germans were ill served (and severely outdated) by Abwehr and other agencies. As to the Soviet generals, well by '43, the really crappy ones had been removed and except for Stalin's cronies, the good ones were in command positions. Zhukov despite post war 'revisions' was the premier general whose near equivalent in western parlance would be Grant. Ok it may sound weird but they shared the belief that casualties, however brutal, served a purpose, and they never looked back. They were also cool heads in times of crisis. Rokossovsky and Vatutin will probably rank just below Zhukov as competent operational commanders. Malinovsky (that's for Anorak! [;)]) was also a good general though he had the misfortune of being placed in many tight positions by Stalin - though his campaign in the Manchuria was almost Mongol like in dispersal of initial deployment and concentration for the crucial battles. One last thing that had a great effect by '43 is that commanders were not hamstrung by Commissars that could veto their decisions and nor were they subject to NKVD oversight. In a way Stalin shot himself in the foot by creating a lot of 'heroes of the Soviet Union' to boost morale, but found out that 'liqidating' them would be a royal pain. the fact that they survived even after the war and that there was no purge post war speaks of both the stature these guys had in the people's (if not Stalin's) eyes and the confidence and clout that the army enjoyed in the ruling circles of the SU post war...

Apollo11 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 9:57:28 AM)
Hi all, I have several books about deciphering including the huge "The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet" by David Kahn. The Soviet knowledge about Ultra is still, IIRC, secret and no public info is available! Also the Western Allies didn't share the data with Stalin IIRC... Leo "Apolo11"

micha1100 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 10:30:31 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Muzrub My question to you guys is: Without the breaking of the German codes, the delays at Kursk (possible victory- along with Kharkov to boost morale)- could the Soviets had beaten the Allies to Berlin? Of course, another question would be: Would the Western Allies have invaded France in 1944 if the Soviets had NOT achieved those victories? I'm not convinced that the invasion would have taken place at the same time if things had been looking better for the Germans on the Eastern Front.

paullus99 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 11:08:38 AM)
The allies were committed to the invasion (at least the US was) - and if the Russians were still against the wall in 1943 & even into 1944, there would have been even more pressure on the Western Allies to invade and take some of the pressure off of the Red Army. I don't think there is much doubt that the Allies would have been able to successfully invade Western Europe (too much coastline for the Germans to adequately defend), it would hinge on whether or not the Germans would be able to successfully defend against the drive inland. The Allies were going to have complete superiority on land & air, so unless Hitler allowed his generals some flexibility, it was probably a forgone conclusion (and the Germans were much happier to surrender to the WA anyway).

micha1100 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 11:42:37 AM)
I think the Western Allies committed to the invasion only when it became obvious that Germany could not beat the Soviets and would always have their hands full in the East. I just cannot believe that the WA would have dared to invade if a strong Germany could have decided to shift focus from the Eastern front to France for a significant time. In summer 1944 the war was already decided. The invasion certainly shortened it, but was not decisive for Germany's defeat. Concerning the race to Berlin it should be noted that Germany always kept the bulk of their forces in the East and especially in the final months offered only token resistance against the WA compared to the fierce defence against the Red Army.

Rasputitsa -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 11:48:14 AM)
I think that if there was any chance of the Germans winning in the East it would have to be in 1941, or 1942, resulting in the overthrow of Stalin and a new regime that might negotiate, or live in peace east of the Urals. After 1942 the chance had gone, the Russians were going to win, unless some other major event intervened, Hitler did not declare war on the US, or the Japanese decided to join in the attack on the USSR. Even with the loss of Moscow, if Stalin had stayed in power, there is no guarantee that the war in the East would have ended. Stalin was never likely to negotiate with Hitler ever again after the failure of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact. Stalin had no problem with breaking agreements, as long as it was him doing the breaking. However, a more successful German campaign in 1941/42 may have delayed Russian recovery enough to allow the Allies a head start to Berlin. I don't think that Ultra information was given to the Russians in anything other than the very broadest terms, although Soviet spies in the Allied camp provided more detail and confirmed the accuracy of information passed through official channels, however, it is unlikely that Russian generals had much direct Ultra knowledge. Even Allied generals knew little, or nothing, about Ultra. Up until 1942 the Germans had the offensive power to gain strategic surprise, by being able to mount attacks on large parts of the front. By 1943 the Germans only had the power to mount a limited offensive, which could only be effective if launched quickly, with the minimum of preparation, giving little time for the Russians to react. Kursk was an example of how not to launch a limited offensive, the Russians did not need Ultra to see it coming. The Germans were operating on Soviet home ground and it would be impossible to hide military preparations from prying eyes. After the way that the Germans had treated the populations of invaded territories it is not surprising that the Soviets had a ready source of information on German activities. The 'Lucy' spy ring reportedly provided the content of Hitler's directive on Zitadelle for Stalin, confirmed by Zhukov's warning of the likelihood of an attack at Kursk as early as April 1943, based on observation of German dispositions and movement of reserves. Ultra becomes part of a much larger jig-saw of intelligence. After Kursk the German army was mainly static, with the Russians having the initiative and it was merely a matter of time in finishing them off. The main question is who had the political will to take Berlin. Stalin certainly had the will to spend the lives required, the Allies probably didn't. After it had been agreed that Berlin would fall into the Soviet sector of Germany after the war, it would have been almost impossible for the Allies to endure the casualties of an assault on the city, only to give it up later. I would have thought that the only way that the Allies could have got to Berlin first would have been to act like Stalin. Hold back on lend-lease materials (500,000 trucks and jeeps mobilised the Russian army), let the East front bleed both the Germans and Russians even more than it did. Launch an invasion timed to reach Berlin before the Russians and don't agree to split the spoils of war with Stalin. Not a likely scenario for the democracies. [:)]

Rasputitsa -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 12:06:23 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Apollo11 Hi all, I have several books about deciphering including the huge "The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet" by David Kahn. The Soviet knowledge about Ultra is still, IIRC, secret and no public info is available! Also the Western Allies didn't share the data with Stalin IIRC... Leo "Apolo11" From a talk given by Sir Harry Hinsley (wartime assistant to Alan Turing's group of mathematicians) about the activities of code breaking (Ultra) at Bletchley Park. The answer to your question is with all those difficulties we couldn't have so close a collaboration with the Russians as we had with Washington, but we started sending them a summary of signal intelligence a week after they were attacked by the Germans in '41. We sent it via the British Military Mission in Moscow where there were people to hand it over to the Russian General Staff. We had to have a cover for it, had to explain to them that this is the horse's mouth but it is coming to us (this is the kind of cover we used) it is coming to us from very high ranking German officers who are slipping the news to us through Berne or somewhere like that, and we are getting it quickly because we have got pretty direct connections with Switzerland. A steady stream of information about German intentions and dispositions - Airforce and Army on the Eastern Front - were sent to them. They were interrupted from time to time when the Russians were being particularly beastly. For example at the top of Russia, Murmansk at the Kola Inlet where all the convoys taking arms to Russia and supplies were going, we had to keep seamen, sailors, both to man the Allied facilities, unloading facilities - of course the Russians were there too but we had to keep some British sailors there. And then we persuaded the Russians to let us have an Intercept station there because half of the traffic around the top of the North Cape was difficult to intercept even in Northern Scotland. And of course we covered the risk that they would suspect that we were reading Enigma or that they would do more than suspect that, by saying that the value of the traffic to us was that it enabled us, by traffic analysis, to judge the German reactions to the movements of the convoys. So we had this little intercept station and then the Russians locked them all up because they thought we were spying on them, so you had all sorts of little rows with them like that. From time to time when it wasn't vital we did say if you don't behave better than this we wont send you your daily summary. And we stopped it for a short time, then we started again. But it had to be of that character - the collaboration. There was a regular transfer of information, subject to political problems, from time to time. Additionally, a member of the Bletchley Park staff (a spy) passing information direct to the Soviets, during the lead-up to and during the Kursk offensive, which would have confirmed the official data that Stalin was getting. [:)]

Apollo11 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 12:08:48 PM)
Hi all, Something just come to my mind... Since Soviets had high ranking spies in UK establishment since 1930's it is not inconceivable that, possibly, some of them knew of ULTRA and gave that info to Stalin. Again IIRC officially Western Allies didn't give Soviets info about their breakthroughs into both German and Japan secret codes! What is least known is actual Soviet deciphering of ENIGMA - what they did and if they did it is still secret... also the Soviet spies in high ranking Nazi establishment played quite a big role in gathering German secrets... Leo "Apollo11"

Rasputitsa -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 12:24:48 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Apollo11 Hi all, Something just come to my mind... Since Soviets had high ranking spies in UK establishment since 1930's it is not inconceivable that, possibly, some of them knew of ULTRA and gave that info to Stalin. Again IIRC officially Western Allies didn't give Soviets info about their breakthroughs into both German and Japan secret codes! What is least known is actual Soviet deciphering of ENIGMA - what they did and if they did it is still secret... also the Soviet spies in high ranking Nazi establishment played quite a big role in gathering German secrets... Leo "Apollo11" The story is not that this was high ranking spies, though these might have existed, but a member of the Bletchley Park team, able to provide detailed raw material, which would have confirmed the more generalised information which was passed through official channels. The following text from the Q+A session after the talk on Bletchley Park quoted in earlier post. Q. How closely did Bletchley work with the Russians on decryption? A. It couldn't be as close as the collaboration I have described with the Americans for a variety of reasons. One is of course that there just hadn't been the close relationship between the two countries that existed historically between the British and the Americans. The other was that when we actually broke the ciphers - Enigma in the first instance, but Fish later - that were relevant to the Eastern Front, they were coming in to us at a time when it was uncertain whether Russia would survive. And then later on when Russia had survived and we were reading more ciphers both Fish and Enigma from the Eastern Front, there was the problem that we knew from the Enigma that the Germans were reading Russian ciphers, so that if they had too much Enigma intelligence in their ciphers you see the security risk was extremely high. Then fourthly the Russians were not collaborative. They wanted any intelligence we supplied but they wouldn't give any in return. Not that they had much Sigint, but they had a lot of other Intelligence. The answer to your question is with all those difficulties we couldn't have so close a collaboration with the Russians as we had with Washington, but we started sending them a summary of signal intelligence a week after they were attacked by the Germans in '41. We sent it via the British Military Mission in Moscow where there were people to hand it over to the Russian General Staff. We had to have a cover for it, had to explain to them that this is the horse's mouth but it is coming to us (this is the kind of cover we used) it is coming to us from very high ranking German officers who are slipping the news to us through Berne or somewhere like that, and we are getting it quickly because we have got pretty direct connections with Switzerland. A steady stream of information about German intentions and dispositions - Airforce and Army on the Eastern Front - were sent to them. They were interrupted from time to time when the Russians were being particularly beastly. For example at the top of Russia, Murmansk at the Kola Inlet where all the convoys taking arms to Russia and supplies were going, we had to keep seamen, sailors, both to man the Allied facilities, unloading facilities - of course the Russians were there too but we had to keep some British sailors there. And then we persuaded the Russians to let us have an Intercept station there because half of the traffic around the top of the North Cape was difficult to intercept even in Northern Scotland. And of course we covered the risk that they would suspect that we were reading Enigma or that they would do more than suspect that, by saying that the value of the traffic to us was that it enabled us, by traffic analysis, to judge the German reactions to the movements of the convoys. So we had this little intercept station and then the Russians locked them all up because they thought we were spying on them, so you had all sorts of little rows with them like that. From time to time when it wasn't vital we did say if you don't behave better than this we wont send you your daily summary. And we stopped it for a short time, then we started again. But it had to be of that character - the collaboration. Q. Is there scope for counter-factual historians studying the siege of Leningrad - if they had had access to the Ultra information that you could have given them. A. Again you have to bear in mind that there were problems. For example, one of the areas in which we found it extremely difficult to intercept German signals because of radio conditions or atmosphere conditions or whatever it is, was the North Cape; and the other was the Leningrad area. It was very difficult to intercept from the Leningrad area because whatever frequency they were using relative to the distances and the ionosphere we never could cover the Leningrad area properly. Caucaucus on the other hand, Central Front, we could hear then as clear as a bell. Q. If the collaboration had been as close as with the Americans . . . A. It would have been an advantage if it had been as close as with the Americans, it is quite true. But on the other hand the risks which I briefly portrayed were quite considerable. And we did our best to make sure that they knew about all the important forthcoming development. Don't forget they had very good intelligence of their own, not primarily Sigint but they had very good air reconnaissance and air superiority after a certain time, and they had an enormous espionage system behind the German lines. So they weren't without information. But we did do our best to make sure that they got crucial early notice whenever we got it ourselves. It was a big dilemma and one that was fought about. Churchill wanted to risk it and let them have more. Naturally the Ultra authorities didn't want to risk it because everything hangs on it you see, so there was a tussle all the time about how much to send. Q. The was a programme recently on Kursk - one might say that a Russian counter-factual historian would say that if we didn't have the Ultra which we got in various ways, then we wouldn't have been able to win the battle of Kursk and Hitler would have been able to carve up Russia. This is perhaps another case . . . A. Another case. Stalingrad of course is another one. Those two battles were crucial, especially Stalingrad. Again it wasn't only through us they were getting . . . we did give them the central facts in advance of Kursk. But as we now know, we didn't know at the time, the one single Russian agent in Bletchley was at that time (just that short period of time before and after Kursk in '43) actually giving them decrypts through the Russian Embassy in London. So all sorts of complications about the story. He didn't know that they were getting the supply from London officially, and we didn't know that he was sending the decrypts unofficially. Quite a complex problem! This is not information from a book, but from someone who was there at the time. [:)]

bwheatley -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 2:50:59 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Apollo11 Hi all, I have several books about deciphering including the huge "The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet" by David Kahn. The Soviet knowledge about Ultra is still, IIRC, secret and no public info is available! Also the Western Allies didn't share the data with Stalin IIRC... Leo "Apolo11" The spy ring helped stalin but the allies did give soviets "credible" information from ultra. But never gave enough to tip the soviets off that the allies basically knew most things were going to happen before they did. The thing that is really interesting at least is that stalin through the beginning of the war unto the mid point really treated all this intel with a big ass grain of salt. He never believed it much it seems. Though you can see by kursk he had finally started to realize he needed to let his leaders lead and he needed to listen to "credible" intel.

bwheatley -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 2:58:19 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa quote: ORIGINAL: Apollo11 Hi all, Something just come to my mind... Since Soviets had high ranking spies in UK establishment since 1930's it is not inconceivable that, possibly, some of them knew of ULTRA and gave that info to Stalin. Again IIRC officially Western Allies didn't give Soviets info about their breakthroughs into both German and Japan secret codes! What is least known is actual Soviet deciphering of ENIGMA - what they did and if they did it is still secret... also the Soviet spies in high ranking Nazi establishment played quite a big role in gathering German secrets... Leo "Apollo11" The story is not that this was high ranking spies, though these might have existed, but a member of the Bletchley Park team, able to provide detailed raw material, which would have confirmed the more generalised information which was passed through official channels. The following text from the Q+A session after the talk on Bletchley Park quoted in earlier post. Q. How closely did Bletchley work with the Russians on decryption? A. It couldn't be as close as the collaboration I have described with the Americans for a variety of reasons. One is of course that there just hadn't been the close relationship between the two countries that existed historically between the British and the Americans. The other was that when we actually broke the ciphers - Enigma in the first instance, but Fish later - that were relevant to the Eastern Front, they were coming in to us at a time when it was uncertain whether Russia would survive. And then later on when Russia had survived and we were reading more ciphers both Fish and Enigma from the Eastern Front, there was the problem that we knew from the Enigma that the Germans were reading Russian ciphers, so that if they had too much Enigma intelligence in their ciphers you see the security risk was extremely high. Then fourthly the Russians were not collaborative. They wanted any intelligence we supplied but they wouldn't give any in return. Not that they had much Sigint, but they had a lot of other Intelligence. The answer to your question is with all those difficulties we couldn't have so close a collaboration with the Russians as we had with Washington, but we started sending them a summary of signal intelligence a week after they were attacked by the Germans in '41. We sent it via the British Military Mission in Moscow where there were people to hand it over to the Russian General Staff. We had to have a cover for it, had to explain to them that this is the horse's mouth but it is coming to us (this is the kind of cover we used) it is coming to us from very high ranking German officers who are slipping the news to us through Berne or somewhere like that, and we are getting it quickly because we have got pretty direct connections with Switzerland. A steady stream of information about German intentions and dispositions - Airforce and Army on the Eastern Front - were sent to them. They were interrupted from time to time when the Russians were being particularly beastly. For example at the top of Russia, Murmansk at the Kola Inlet where all the convoys taking arms to Russia and supplies were going, we had to keep seamen, sailors, both to man the Allied facilities, unloading facilities - of course the Russians were there too but we had to keep some British sailors there. And then we persuaded the Russians to let us have an Intercept station there because half of the traffic around the top of the North Cape was difficult to intercept even in Northern Scotland. And of course we covered the risk that they would suspect that we were reading Enigma or that they would do more than suspect that, by saying that the value of the traffic to us was that it enabled us, by traffic analysis, to judge the German reactions to the movements of the convoys. So we had this little intercept station and then the Russians locked them all up because they thought we were spying on them, so you had all sorts of little rows with them like that. From time to time when it wasn't vital we did say if you don't behave better than this we wont send you your daily summary. And we stopped it for a short time, then we started again. But it had to be of that character - the collaboration. Q. Is there scope for counter-factual historians studying the siege of Leningrad - if they had had access to the Ultra information that you could have given them. A. Again you have to bear in mind that there were problems. For example, one of the areas in which we found it extremely difficult to intercept German signals because of radio conditions or atmosphere conditions or whatever it is, was the North Cape; and the other was the Leningrad area. It was very difficult to intercept from the Leningrad area because whatever frequency they were using relative to the distances and the ionosphere we never could cover the Leningrad area properly. Caucaucus on the other hand, Central Front, we could hear then as clear as a bell. Q. If the collaboration had been as close as with the Americans . . . A. It would have been an advantage if it had been as close as with the Americans, it is quite true. But on the other hand the risks which I briefly portrayed were quite considerable. And we did our best to make sure that they knew about all the important forthcoming development. Don't forget they had very good intelligence of their own, not primarily Sigint but they had very good air reconnaissance and air superiority after a certain time, and they had an enormous espionage system behind the German lines. So they weren't without information. But we did do our best to make sure that they got crucial early notice whenever we got it ourselves. It was a big dilemma and one that was fought about. Churchill wanted to risk it and let them have more. Naturally the Ultra authorities didn't want to risk it because everything hangs on it you see, so there was a tussle all the time about how much to send. Q. The was a programme recently on Kursk - one might say that a Russian counter-factual historian would say that if we didn't have the Ultra which we got in various ways, then we wouldn't have been able to win the battle of Kursk and Hitler would have been able to carve up Russia. This is perhaps another case . . . A. Another case. Stalingrad of course is another one. Those two battles were crucial, especially Stalingrad. Again it wasn't only through us they were getting . . . we did give them the central facts in advance of Kursk. But as we now know, we didn't know at the time, the one single Russian agent in Bletchley was at that time (just that short period of time before and after Kursk in '43) actually giving them decrypts through the Russian Embassy in London. So all sorts of complications about the story. He didn't know that they were getting the supply from London officially, and we didn't know that he was sending the decrypts unofficially. Quite a complex problem! This is not information from a book, but from someone who was there at the time. [:)] nice where can we find that talk? Looks like a really good read.

Rasputitsa -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 4:44:47 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: bwheatley nice where can we find that talk? Looks like a really good read. This is the web address - www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/Historical/hinsley.html It was the first item up in a google search. [:)]

Skanvak -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 9:01:31 PM)
Ah, the difficulty to simulate spying. The problem in WitE is that we don't use an order system so how do you want the computer to know in advance what you are going to do and send it to the other player? I Wego game it is possible. In more complex game may be. But in straight forward game it is not. You can only simulate intelligence by less FOG, which might or might not give signal to the other player. Though I 'd like to have spying describe correctly in wargame, it does play a vital role.

Rasputitsa -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 10:47:11 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Skanvak Ah, the difficulty to simulate spying. The problem in WitE is that we don't use an order system so how do you want the computer to know in advance what you are going to do and send it to the other player? I Wego game it is possible. In more complex game may be. But in straight forward game it is not. You can only simulate intelligence by less FOG, which might or might not give signal to the other player. Though I 'd like to have spying describe correctly in wargame, it does play a vital role. I suppose games do simulate spying, in as much as we can read so much detail that historical generals couldn't have, even the fact that we are using computer data to play the game, gives us easy access to information that an old military HQ filing system would find too difficult to handle. [:)]

Q-Ball -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/4/2011 11:22:36 PM)
The Road to Berlin was open to the Western Allies. They could have beaten the Russians to it as it is. They didn't take it, because of the Yalta agreement. Granted, part of the reason is that many Germans that last couple weeks were trying to surrender to the Western Allies and not the Russians. I am surprised no one has started a thread asking the question: Could the Russians have won the war without the Western Allies?

Aurelian -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/5/2011 12:08:19 AM)
IIRC, in his book Slaughterhouse, Glantz wrote that they would of. Taken six months longer, but the Russians would of reached the Atlantic. Quoting from memory as I don't have the book handy.

micha1100 -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/5/2011 9:04:51 AM)
quote: Could the Russians have won the war without the Western Allies? In my opinion the only question is whether it would have made a difference if in 1941 all the German units fighting or guarding against the Western Allies (not that those were THAT many) had been available for the Eastern front. Perhaps with those additional units they could have struck a more decisive blow, but I doubt it. After the successful Soviet counter-offensive in the first winter I don't see how Russia could have failed to eventually win the war even without the Western Allies, it just would have taken longer (and perhaps Stalin would have been more ready to accept a favourable peace instead of paying the price to march all the way to Berlin).

JeffroK -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/5/2011 10:16:46 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Q-Ball The Road to Berlin was open to the Western Allies. They could have beaten the Russians to it as it is. They didn't take it, because of the Yalta agreement. Granted, part of the reason is that many Germans that last couple weeks were trying to surrender to the Western Allies and not the Russians. I am surprised no one has started a thread asking the question: Could the Russians have won the war without the Western Allies? HMMMMMM. No need for the 50 odd Divisions to garrison the West. Similar for the Luftwaffe, no 24 hour bombing campaign to fight off so all of those defensive aircraft,AAA and men can head east. Complete concentration on one front. The japanese empire free to concentrate on Siberia. No Lend Lease. I reckon the Wermacht just might have enough to take Leningrad, Moscow & Stalingrad and that an isolated Stalin would seek a settlement.

Skanvak -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/5/2011 10:22:25 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa quote: ORIGINAL: Skanvak Ah, the difficulty to simulate spying. The problem in WitE is that we don't use an order system so how do you want the computer to know in advance what you are going to do and send it to the other player? I Wego game it is possible. In more complex game may be. But in straight forward game it is not. You can only simulate intelligence by less FOG, which might or might not give signal to the other player. Though I 'd like to have spying describe correctly in wargame, it does play a vital role. I suppose games do simulate spying, in as much as we can read so much detail that historical generals couldn't have, even the fact that we are using computer data to play the game, gives us easy access to information that an old military HQ filing system would find too difficult to handle. [:)] Not sure, first we play alone where as an HQ is plenty of staff that equal a computer for file management (I know from experience in non-military field). Second, 1st programmable computer was 1941 and US does used then for there planning (I need to findquotation, and I reckon they were not nearly as powerful as a PC). Third and most important, the spying is about planning or intention. To know where the ennemy army is I don't need spy, recon airplane and spotter are somewhat enough, even a spy sattelite don't spy, it just recon. The spy or Ultra (ultra does locate too) manage to do something more : they are able to tell the plan of the ennemy, when they will attack and where. Because everything has be decided at high level, discuted then transmitted before the attack. The Manstein at Kharkov is a good example of how spying can be defeated, it is the situation in which we are playing BUT it is the exception. So no, spying is not simulated, only Reconnaissance.

Skanvak -> RE: Ultra and the eastern front- a question. (2/5/2011 10:36:26 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK quote: ORIGINAL: Q-Ball The Road to Berlin was open to the Western Allies. They could have beaten the Russians to it as it is. They didn't take it, because of the Yalta agreement. Granted, part of the reason is that many Germans that last couple weeks were trying to surrender to the Western Allies and not the Russians. I am surprised no one has started a thread asking the question: Could the Russians have won the war without the Western Allies? HMMMMMM. No need for the 50 odd Divisions to garrison the West. Similar for the Luftwaffe, no 24 hour bombing campaign to fight off so all of those defensive aircraft,AAA and men can head east. Complete concentration on one front. The japanese empire free to concentrate on Siberia. No Lend Lease. I reckon the Wermacht just might have enough to take Leningrad, Moscow & Stalingrad and that an isolated Stalin would seek a settlement. quote: I reckon the Wermacht just might have enough to take Leningrad, Moscow & Stalingrad and that an isolated Stalin would seek a settlement. The real Question is what do we consider a Victory? In 1941, Stalin was ready to sign Peace if only Hilter have asked him to surrender. So if we consider that both side cannot communicate and settled peace as it seems to be the case. Then I don't know. It depends if you consider that France is conquer or not. Without France, the Reich lost a lot of industrial power. Of course, without lend lease and Western Threat, I don't see Soviet winning (but I don't see the western power let Russia totally annihilated at some point they would have attack as with the Crimean war). They would have lost there ueropean part but then the Reich would be in a situation far worse. As the Roman Empire it would have barbairan at its gates, a population less and less willing to go into the army because war is won and a territory to occupied with lot of insurgency (like Vietnam). Good luck... I thing Hitler could not have won WWII because he had no plan for peace in the East so without end of game no winner.

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