|
Alfred -> RE: 9 March - 16 March 1942 (5/17/2011 2:36:13 AM)
|
ChezDaJez,
Back in post #23 you asked for people to “avoid giving away Canoerebel’s past strategies”. As any advice from me would, at least subconsciously, have been framed with the knowledge of your opponent’s modus operandi, I have refrained from posting after my initial post. However following your last post, a few observations may be possible without breaching your earlier request. BTW, you should not assume this self imposed restraint of not studying your opponent’s previous play is reciprocated.
These are only a few generalised comments. Screenshots, force dispositions and your industrial situation would be necessary for more detailed comments.
Palembang
1. The first issue to consider is your observation that you cannot starve the Allied position at Palembang. That claim is actually not accurate. Palembang does generate a lot of supply and therefore it can sustain a sizeable garrison. But, in the absence of importing supply, there are most definitely limits as to:
• the size of the garrison
• ability to accept replacements and rearm both air and naval assets
• building infrastructure
2. Once you accept the proposition that Palembang can be starved, you are then faced with two quite different direct solutions to deal with Palembang, and one indirect solution. In general terms, these solutions are to:
• capture Palembang by assault
• capture Palembang by stealth via a siege
• make the Allied position at Palembang irrelevant
Taking into account your observations regarding cargo ships in the vicinity which remain in the area plus evacuation from Singapore plus the large Allied air force currently stationed at Singapore which can be easily relocated to Palembang, I would not advocate the direct capture of Palembang by assault. To attempt to do so would require the use of prodigious amounts of Japanese assets which IMHO would be more profitably used elsewhere. Accordingly my advice is to approach the Palembang test using a combination of stealth and making it irrelevant.
3. A stealth approach to Palembang contains the following elements:
• limiting Palembang’s supply generation capacity
• establishing a cordon sanitaire around Palembang
• encouraging the Allied player to over garrison Palembang
• Japan taking the appropriate actions elsewhere to allow it to last the distance of the siege
• contrary to popular myth, in scenario2 steady, intelligently targeted application of Japanese assets rather than brutal frontal application of assets is the key to success
To provide some context to these planning bullet points here are a few factors to bear in mind.
(a) Palembang itself has much more refining capacity than it does oil production. To maximise its supply generation it is dependent on continued access to the oil of Djambi. Cut that LOC and either there is a substantial reduction in Palembang supply production or troops are moved out of their fortifications to reopen the LOC, in the process weakening the Palembang defence
(b) supply production in northern Sumatra is an important secondary supply source for the Allied forces in southern Sumatra in the vicinity of Palembang. Capture that and you not only put pressure on the Allied supply depots down south, you also feed your own southern marching forces. Both Medan and Bengkalis can be captured before Singapore falls with Japanese invasion TFs entering the Strait of Malacca from the Indian Ocean
(c) Japan owning the Sumatran off shore islands plus Cocos and Christmas islands, plus the Java bases is part of establishing a cordon sanitaire. The range of your aircraft cannot be matched by the Allies so you can attack enemy resupply/reinforcement TFs well outside of range of Allied LRCAP. With good naval search you can quickly vector in the IJN.
(d) Allied players tend to over concentrate on amassing raw AV at those points they intend to defend stoutly and pay insufficient attention to firepower and the actual consumption rate of supplies needed to maintain the amassed forces (land, sea and air) at maximum combat staying power. They tend to not fully appreciate that all the mouths present still have to be fed even though the combat value of the individual units may be widely divergent. It often means that a large part of the combat force is essentially a one shot wonder, not really structured to survive attrition of their logistics.
Some of the ways to attrite the enemy logistics is to engage them in aerial combat away from their airbases so that their aircraft operational and pilot MIA losses are maximised. Southern Sumatra has no good ports, so engage in naval combat well in advance of sailing the invasion TFs so that local naval rearming and repairs is under considerable stress and not 100% combat ready to oppose an invasion. These are all actions consistent with establishing a cordon sanitaire.
(e) the rest of the DEI produces more oil than does Palembang. The fact that this campaign is in mid March 1942 and this oil has still not been captured is a serious indictment. The fact that some early Japanese convoys were wiped out is no excuse. If the original forces earmarked for the capture of Tarakan, Balikpapan etc were destroyed you should have redirected the forces you used in the south Pacific to instead capture these oil centres which would not have been strongly defended. They must be captured ASAP, even before Singapore. Some of the forces released from the end of the Luzon campaign should be immediate tasked with their capture.
Sweeps
LoBaron has posted extensively on air operations in AE. It is his considered view that sweeps cannot be co-ordinated. No amount of tinkering with heights, Air HQs, supply etc has an impact. My recommendation is to do the following:
• desist from attempting to follow up a fighter sweep with unescorted bombers
• don’t attempt to amass 200 fighters to sweep a single base, instead spread them out to sweep multiple bases simultaneously and when you have discovered enemy bases with minimum cap reinforce your success but maintain the pressure elsewhere
• concentrate on LRCAPing Singapore rather than sweeping. This has three benefits, firstly you stand a chance of getting co-ordination, secondly it provides high escort for your close escort bomber raids, and thirdy if your opponent is using airplanes to fly in supply/fly out troops, you intercept the air transports
Fuel Stocks
You state that at current usage rates, you have sufficient fuel to last through to July 1942. This is clearly a dangerous situation and IMHO is largely due to two fundamental mistakes committed by you viz failure to capture early the oil centres and misuse of the fleet.
Currently you are wasting both fuel and key strategic assets steaming the KB between Norfolk Island and Noumea waiting for the arrival of the Lord Howe Island invasion TF. Firstly, it was not that long ago that the mini KB was ambushed, by your estimate, by 6 Allied CVs off Bali. Those 6 CVs are not going to be able to intercept the Lord Howe invasion fleet, so the KB is loitering with no prospect of gainful employment. Secondly, any covering Japanese forces should be in port conserving fuel until the invasion fleet arrives. Thirdly, Lord Howe Island is far too insignificant a location to merit the presence of the KB when most of the DEI, including the vital oil centres, remains in Allied hands; when a cordon sanitaire against Palembang is yet to be instituted.
Anyway, that should be enough to get the discussion started. If you want, more informed suggestions are possible if you post screenshots and force disposition details.
Alfred
|
|
|
|
