The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset...

The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (Full Version)

All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> Gary Grigsby's War in the East Series

Message

fbs -> The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 6:16:59 AM)
... is a little corporal that thinks he's a genius. There should be a way to reflect this in the game, otherwise the Germans will play it better than history just for the reason that Hitler will not override his generals all the time with stupid decisions. What do you guys think?

Senno -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 7:19:02 AM)
Only if the Soviet player has to wear a silly mustache at the same time.[:D]

karonagames -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 7:21:21 AM)
The only reflection of external interference, is the dismissal mechanic, that will remove generals, and cost APs to fix. So at the moment, it is attrition that is the SU's most important strategic asset, as it doesn't really matter how well the axis does, the relative manpower and industrial capacity of the 2 nations is always going to have the most strategic impact. IMHO.

Senno -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 7:22:53 AM)
BA seems to have taken the question far more seriously than I.

alfonso -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 7:42:04 AM)
To a certain degree, the image of Hitler as "the mad dictator" who spoilt the East Campaign was created by the self-serving post-war memoirs of some German generals.

ool -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 12:20:03 PM)
I agree. When the Russian offensive was a its full force the German generals wanted to keep retreating. Hitler issued the last man last bullet ultimatum. Analysts have credited that order with saving the army from dissolving. On the other hand Shicklegruber did override Guderian's wish to take Moscow right away. His statement," My generals don't understand economics" was laughable considering his generals were far better educated than he. They understood the value of taking Moscow to badly damage the Russian will to fight. That was a major blunder that cost six vital weeks. Something no human player would do.

alfonso -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 1:04:01 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: ool On the other hand Shicklegruber did override Guderian's wish to take Moscow right away. His statement," My generals don't understand economics" was laughable considering his generals were far better educated than he. They understood the value of taking Moscow to badly damage the Russian will to fight. That was a major blunder that cost six vital weeks. Something no human player would do. Probably you are aware that even that (a thesis defended notoriously by Russel Stolfi, "Hitler's Panzer East") is hotly debated today...

Commanderski -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 1:45:41 PM)
On a slightly different note.. I love the change in BigA's avatar from what he just had to this one...[:)]

Rasputitsa -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 2:06:49 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: alfonso To a certain degree, the image of Hitler as "the mad dictator" who spoilt the East Campaign was created by the self-serving post-war memoirs of some German generals. There are several instances, on both Eastern and Western Fronts, when Hitler's interventions resulted in significant damage to the German war effort. Mainly in trying to gain too many objectives at the same time and, in the end, not achieving any of them. [:)]

fbs -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 2:10:05 PM)
Well, Hitler did mess up at Stalingrad, big time... as one example. Or do you guys think that Stalingrad would have happened even without Hitler's interference? I don't know about Hitler's stupidity losing what would be an otherwise winnable war. That I don't know. But his aggressiveness seems to have hastened up Germany's demise. On a similar note, Hitler's atrocities managed to get populations that hated Stalin (Ukraine, Baltic states, Poland, the Tatars) to hate Hitler even more. That is reflected partially in the game, with the Partisans, but the other bad effects from Hitler's "genius" are not.

Lord_Martin -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 2:20:23 PM)
Actually I believe that Hitlers decisions throughout the war on the eastern front are well balanced by Stalins refusal to believe in a German attack (in this game reflected by the starting positions and German ability to destroy huge Soviet armies).

ool -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 3:53:21 PM)
Debate is inevitable through the eons!

Aurelian -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 4:57:46 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Senno Only if the Soviet player has to wear a silly mustache at the same time.[:D] Well, the German player would have to wear one too :)

Aurelian -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 5:05:40 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: alfonso quote: ORIGINAL: ool On the other hand Shicklegruber did override Guderian's wish to take Moscow right away. His statement," My generals don't understand economics" was laughable considering his generals were far better educated than he. They understood the value of taking Moscow to badly damage the Russian will to fight. That was a major blunder that cost six vital weeks. Something no human player would do. Probably you are aware that even that (a thesis defended notoriously by Russel Stolfi, "Hitler's Panzer East") is hotly debated today... Leaving 650,000 irritated Russian on your flank while driving on Mocow. Not a smart move. Not to mention how Hitler's decision allowed the infantry and rail heads to catch up. In Strategy and Ractics #244 is an interesting articke of this very thing.

pat.casey -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 5:11:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: alfonso To a certain degree, the image of Hitler as "the mad dictator" who spoilt the East Campaign was created by the self-serving post-war memoirs of some German generals. I have to agree with this. He made his share of bad decisions, but he made a lot of good ones as well, many of them over the direct wishes of the General Staff. Most of his really insane stuff dates from late 1944-45 when he was, quite possibly, literally insane. If you look at his decision make for the fist half of the war, he was generally very good. First really big error he made was probably Stalingrad, but that was 3 years into the war.

alfonso -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 5:36:19 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: fbs Well, Hitler did mess up at Stalingrad, big time... as one example. See what Weinberg says about Mansteins' role in the Stalingrad debacle: "Once arrived on the southern front, von Manstein broke with all the other German army and air force generals (NOTE from me: not Goering) and believed it was possible to hold Stalingrad and relieve the beleaguered forces there...[...]. Concerned primarily about his reputation as a daring and always successful military commander, both at the time and after the war, he reinforced Hitler's inclination then and faked the relevant portion of his memoirs after the war." "By the end of November,...., Manstein was beginning to see how unrealistic his earlier assessment of the situation had been...[...] but this made little difference now...The most favourable time for initiating a breakout had already passed." A world at arms, Cambridge University Press 1994, p450. So even that is controversial. To be fair and remark some decisions I consider to be Hitler's blunders (thence my initial "to a certain degree"): the decision to send 11th Army to Leningrad after Crimea and the premature splitting of the forces assigned to Blau, in order to conquer simultaneously the Stalingrad region and the Caucasus

Rasputitsa -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 6:35:24 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Aurelian quote: ORIGINAL: alfonso quote: ORIGINAL: ool On the other hand Shicklegruber did override Guderian's wish to take Moscow right away. His statement," My generals don't understand economics" was laughable considering his generals were far better educated than he. They understood the value of taking Moscow to badly damage the Russian will to fight. That was a major blunder that cost six vital weeks. Something no human player would do. Probably you are aware that even that (a thesis defended notoriously by Russel Stolfi, "Hitler's Panzer East") is hotly debated today... Leaving 650,000 irritated Russian on your flank while driving on Mocow. Not a smart move. Not to mention how Hitler's decision allowed the infantry and rail heads to catch up. In Strategy and Ractics #244 is an interesting articke of this very thing. Once the situation in August 1941 had developed, it was a sensible option to turn and deal with the Kiev grouping, but, consider the situation if Hitler had not meddled with the Marcks, Otto, or OKH plans, which gave more striking power to AGS. Instead of trying to grab too many objectives, in diverging directions, during the same operations, perhaps a concentrated attempt to destroy Soviet military power, if successful, would have eventually gained it all. A more powerful AGS, with an armoured pincer coming out of Romania (cancelled by Hitler), could have dealt with South-Western Front, whilst still making ground eastwards. AGS and AGC could have emerged from around the Pripyat Marshes and converged toward Moscow, concentrating their striking power, to compensate for the weakening caused by distance. Hitler's main motive seemed to be in maintaining his own power and ego, even at the expense of the progress of the war. The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)]

bevans -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 6:38:27 PM)
To be fair to Hitler (never a popular option), he got more things right than wrong well into '42. The problem was that by then he believed he was a great military genius when he wasn't, became inflexible and failed to recognize that changing circumstances require changing strategy and tactics. To be fair to WitE, not repeating Hitler's/Germany's errors is balanced by the likelihood that the Soviet player will not repeat Stalin's error of frittering away all SU mobile reserves in counterattacks in July and August '41.

fbs -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 6:39:24 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Lord_Martin Actually I believe that Hitlers decisions throughout the war on the eastern front are well balanced by Stalins refusal to believe in a German attack (in this game reflected by the starting positions and German ability to destroy huge Soviet armies). I agree, but Stalin was less proficient at overriding Zhukov by the end of '41, and the Soviet player is already charged with his two major blunders (purging his forces and distributing his forces poorly). He doesn't have a choice, although he is in a position to recover. Meanwhile the German player can avoid Hitler's madness by mid-43 onwards, where most of its ill effects would be felt. I find it hard to believe that Hitler's lunacy had no effect on Germany's demise. I find it easy to believe that Germany would have lost anyway, but that a more capable leader instead of Hitler would have been all the same, that I find suspicious.

Arkady -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 6:52:33 PM)
Well, Hitler is guilty the same way as OKH Their struggle for controll did more harm than their decisions alone, several times during summer 1941 Hitler's decisions was far better than OKH but due Halder's effort, orders for army groups commanders was changed or indifferent. "Unfortunately" when struggle was over and Hitler won the control, he stop listen to any advice at all. On the other way, Stalin was after 1941 smart enough to do not meddle with staff decisions once they issued orders

Smirfy -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 8:00:17 PM)
Agree with the earlier posters Hitler got painted very unfavourably in post war memoirs. One problem Hitler did have was because his intuition was continually right and inteligence assesments wrong a catastrophe such as Stalingrad was inevitable. My conviction is, Hitler after the initial mistake of bringing about war played his hand pretty well if not ruthlessly. The German memoirs from the Generals are in cloud cookoo land with regards to the overall strategy of the war. Arguements like stopping Barbarossa for winter when it was a one shot operation show their naievety. The diversion to Kiev is another rediculous of critisism when the whole opeartion was based on the principle of destroying Russian armies. Not attempting an offensive in 43 is another one that amuses me as a viable option.

Altaris -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 8:07:02 PM)
All I gotta say is that if Germans should be shackled by an insane unseen force, the Soviets need to have something to make them foolishly leave half a million men in a forward pocket. Soviets already get a lot of chances to better organize their forces and avoid repeating historical mistakes, how bout giving the Germans the same ability?

Rasputitsa -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 8:15:04 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Arkady Well, Hitler is guilty the same way as OKH Their struggle for controll did more harm than their decisions alone, several times during summer 1941 Hitler's decisions was far better than OKH but due Halder's effort, orders for army groups commanders was changed or indifferent. "Unfortunately" when struggle was over and Hitler won the control, he stop listen to any advice at all. On the other way, Stalin was after 1941 smart enough to do not meddle with staff decisions once they issued orders Often quoted as Hitler's big success, the 'hold fast order' is questionable, the Germans lost tactical flexibility, when Model took over 9th Armee, he insisted that the order be relaxed and, with flexibility restored, was able to cut off and destroy 2 Russian armies, despite the winter weather. The Germans ended the winter still having had to retreat anyway, still lost heavy equipment, despite the 'hold' order, but may have saved many men by not holding out everywhere, regardless of the tactical situation. The 1941 campaign was governed initially by Hitler's Directive 21, it didn't result in capturing Leningrad, or Moscow, and left the Germans with no clear descision. In this and in following decisions, Directive 32 11th June 1941, on reducing to 60 divs in Russia, moving into Turkey and Iran (wishful thinking. Later he commissioned junk AFVs from Dr. Porsche, hindered the development of the Me262 and the MP44, where in this process do you see Hitler making good decisions, apart from specifying the long 50mm gun for the Pkw III, I'm finding it hard to find any sucesses. The biggest failure of the lot is by his treatment of the people of the conquered territories, such that they would never accept German rule and thereby ensuring that Germany would never win the war, how ever long it took, we should be thankful for that [:)]

Senno -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 8:17:06 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Aurelian quote: ORIGINAL: Senno Only if the Soviet player has to wear a silly mustache at the same time.[:D] Well, the German player would have to wear one too :) True. And balanced. [;)] Unlike this suggestion..... Which is why I really didn't take it seriously.[:)] The old me would have had more to say. But in the week since I passed from my reckless and feckless youth I have mellowed and matured. Thus a tossed-off little joke sufficed.[:D] quote: ORIGINAL: Lord_Martin Actually I believe that Hitlers decisions throughout the war on the eastern front are well balanced by Stalins refusal to believe in a German attack (in this game reflected by the starting positions and German ability to destroy huge Soviet armies). I find myself in general agreement with LM, as a game design issue.

alfonso -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 8:18:45 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)] According to Macksey, "Military Errors of Word War Two", von Rundstedt, who was the Commander-in-Chief of that German Army Group, gave the "stop order", and then Hitler approved it. Weinberg ("A world at arms") says that Hitler and von Rundstedt "...agreed that the armoured forces moving north be halted..."

Rasputitsa -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 8:57:04 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: alfonso quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)] According to Macksey, "Military Errors of Word War Two", von Rundstedt, who was the Commander-in-Chief of that German Army Group, gave the "stop order", and then Hitler approved it. Weinberg ("A world at arms") says that Hitler and von Rundstedt "...agreed that the armoured forces moving north be halted..." The Blitzkrieg Legend, Karl Heinz Frieser, quotes Hitler as saying that he 'fully and entirely' agreed with Rundstedt and it was 'entirely identical to his (Hitler's) thoughts'. Guderian and the other panzer leaders had exceeded their orders and turned a much more conservative plan into a full scale blitzkrieg. Guderian instead of consolidating the bridgehead at Sedan, had immediately launched his attack toward the coast, this is not what Hitler had envisaged. I believe that the situation in August 1941, at Smolensk, had it roots in this conflict. Guderian, as in France, was trying to bounce the campaign into an advance on Moscow. He was more concerned with seizing the Elyna bridgehead as a jumping off point for the next stage of the advance, than he was in closing the pocket. He was not concerned about Russian forces escaping, because he expected to catch them in the next encirclement. However, Hitler was having no more insubordination and proceeded with his own directive in which Moscow was not the main objective. My point is that with a less interference from Hitler in the planning stage, the Kiev grouping would have been dealt with on the way to Moscow and no diversion of forces would have been necessary. I have no idea if the earlier Marcks, Otto, or OKH planning would have won the war, Hitler and German treatment of conquered populations made that very unlikely, however well the campaign had gone, surrender did not seem to be an option. [:)]

PeeDeeAitch -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 9:20:24 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa I have no idea if the earlier Macks, Otto, or OKH planning would have won the war, Hitler and German treatment of conquered populations made that very unlikely, however well the campaign had gone, surrender did not seem to be an option. [:)] This is key. It became apparant early on, and it seems hammered home by late Autumn, that the Germans were in a "culture war" and would be as ruthless as they could imagine. Any dreams of a peace or of the Germans supporting a Ukrainian uprising is as likely as the Germans holding a straight line in winter of 41 in a 1.03 game...Hitler would not have made peace anyway since he was "one battle away" from victory up until the end of Typhoon.

Smirfy -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 9:20:39 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa Often quoted as Hitler's big success, the 'hold fast order' is questionable, the Germans lost tactical flexibility, when Model took over 9th Armee, he insisted that the order be relaxed and, with flexibility restored, was able to cut off and destroy 2 Russian armies, despite the winter weather. The Germans ended the winter still having had to retreat anyway, still lost heavy equipment, despite the 'hold' order, but may have saved many men by not holding out everywhere, regardless of the tactical situation. The 1941 campaign was governed initially by Hitler's Directive 21, it didn't result in capturing Leningrad, or Moscow, and left the Germans with no clear descision. In this and in following decisions, Directive 32 11th June 1941, on reducing to 60 divs in Russia, moving into Turkey and Iran (wishful thinking. Later he commissioned junk AFVs from Dr. Porsche, hindered the development of the Me262 and the MP44, where in this process do you see Hitler making good decisions, apart from specifying the long 50mm gun for the Pkw III, I'm finding it hard to find any sucesses. The biggest failure of the lot is by his treatment of the people of the conquered territories, such that they would never accept German rule and thereby ensuring that Germany would never win the war, how ever long it took, we should be thankful for that [:)] The Me 262 is a bit of a myth. Hitler stuck in a major war had hundreds of development projects going on from duraluminum barracks (termite proof for tropical climates) to Jets he put the authority to halt projects in the hands of Keital in his capacity of head of OKW and Riechs minister for Armament. Georing who did not like interference made sure it did not apply to the Luftwaffe putting Milch and the inspector general in control of evalulating development projects. It has to be noted that in winter of 41 priority was given to replacing losses. Galland and Milch give conflicting insights into Hitlers mind on the 262 Milch states that Hitler was worried about putting it in full scale production in case it flopped whilst Galland maintains Hitler wanted full scale production. Both agree that Messerschimmitts works were "too poorly orginized to carry out the work" In the mean time the Techical office sat on the project. On 2nd November 43 Goering visited Messerschmitt on Hitlers orders to inquire about equipping it with bombs. Messerschmitt lied and informed Goering that the bomb racks were ready to go into production when this lie was found out he assured Goering that a couple of weeks would suffice to make the modifications. At this stage there was one flying Me 262 in existence. On the same day Milch was assured that the Me 262 could go into full scale production whilst the procurement department reported the Messerschmitt plant was in a "catastrophic situation.... where everything had run into a bottleneck" By the 5th December Hitler's Luftwaffe aid sends a telegram to Goering including the line "The Fuehrer feels that any delay in our jet fighter program would be tantemout to irresponsible negligence" Sure Hitler expected a bomber in April 44 but the Me 262's delay had very little to do with him personally but rather the incomptence of others and the general war situation.

Klydon -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 9:24:32 PM)
Stalin was certainly a factor after 1941 in a negative way for the Russians. He was notoriously impatient and this shows in the series of offensive attacks as the winter of 41 went along. Stavka wanted to concentrate everything in the center and wipe out AGC, but Stalin insisted on a broad front attack. Stalin sacked a lot of army commanders who were otherwise ok with his impatience and also demanded offensives go in before they were ready, sometimes with bad results. This happen throughout the war, but had less of an impact than a lot of what Hitler did. In a sense, the Germans are hamstrung with some of Hitler's bad decisions in the war. The biggest is the formation of the Luftwaffe field divisions. These units were not very combat effective and wasted first class manpower that should have been transferred to the army for proper training and used as first class replacements. This could have started as early as the fall of 41, but Goering was able to put it off until the disasters of the winter and then he got his way with keeping them away from the army. The Germans could have been far stronger in the spring of 42 had it not been for this idiotic decision. The SS field forces are another example. While they were "elite" in many cases, it was with elite moral, not skill for a long time (I have read too many accounts where the SS units may have taken something, but took very heavy casualties doing it simply because they did not have trained and experienced NCO's and junior officers. Some units were also built around themes rather than good military sense with examples like the Wiking division). In addition to all of this, the local army commander that had SS and Luftwaffe units in his area often had to ask for permission to move them or order them to do something and often if they did not like the orders, they appealed up their own chains of command, making German command and control unnecessarily complicated and unwieldy. I am sort of getting off the subject here as these things are not really represented in the game beyond the crappy Luftwaffe field forces. The other thing the Germans are stuck with are Hitler's decisions when it comes to production and he had a far more negative impact on German production than Stalin did with Russian production.

alfonso -> RE: The Soviet's Most Important Strategic Asset... (3/6/2011 9:27:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa quote: ORIGINAL: alfonso quote: ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)] According to Macksey, "Military Errors of Word War Two", von Rundstedt, who was the Commander-in-Chief of that German Army Group, gave the "stop order", and then Hitler approved it. Weinberg ("A world at arms") says that Hitler and von Rundstedt "...agreed that the armoured forces moving north be halted..." The Blitzkrieg Legend, Karl Heinz Frieser, quotes Hitler as saying that he 'fully and entirely' agreed with Rundstedt and it was 'entirely identical to his (Hitler's) thoughts'. Guderian and the other panzer leaders had exceeded their orders and turned a much more conservative plan into a full scale blitzkrieg. Guderian instead of consolidating the bridgehead at Sedan, had immediately launched his attack toward the coast, this is not what Hitler had envisaged. I do not understand you know. Are you referring to the dash to the coast (10-20 May) or the stop order before Dunkirk (24 May)? But I agree with your consideration about German planning before Barbarrosa, which was "confusing" to say the least. But it happened before the game starts, so it should not be necessarily included in the game as anything distinct from the OOB present at turn 1 (i.e. as some kind of additional "Hitler rule") And, above all, I agree with you in considering the III Reich itself (including the treatment inflicted to conquered peoples) as one enormous, huge ethical and moral blunder.

Page: [1] 2 next > >>

Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI

0.75