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Montbrun -> RE: Sort of OT: National Morale of Western Allies (3/26/2011 4:37:40 PM)
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I've been researching the ToEs for the Allied units in the West, 1943 to 1945.
Here’s a very brief summary of what I’m finding:
I'm not as concerned about Morale as I am about Experience. There were masses of inexperienced troops seeing combat for the first time in Italy as well as NWE. Experience for most units in NWE should initially be below-average, but rise rapidly. Also, during the Winter of 1944, the British ordered that all men with five or more years of service overseas, were to be returned to England, and assigned other duties. This stripped the 21st Army Group of many of it’s senior NCOs, and alot of the desert veterans. This would reduce WitW unit “Experience.”
Replacement problems for all of the Allied units were severe, excepting the Poles, who eventually set up a system for integrating ex-Heer personnel into their units, actually being able to expand their units in Italy.
In late-1944, the British and Canadians reduced their Rifle Battalions from four to three Rifle Companies, and converted two of their divisonal Antiaircraft and Antitank Regiments batteries (each) to Rifle Companies. These Reserve Rifle Companies were not just disbanded, and the troops sent to the Rifle Battalions as needed, but maintained intact. In the Royal Artillery, lineage lies at battery-level, so this arrangement would keep the battery itself intact.
In late 1944, to alleviate some of the manpower shortages, the British decided to "disband" two of the standing Infantry Divisions in NWE. The 59th Infantry Division was the junior formation in the 21st Army Group, and was “stood down” on 10/18/44, with the divisional HQ going into “suspended animation,” and it’s units being distributed as various GHQ units. The 50th Infantry Division was "stood down" on 12/16/44, and returned to England as a "Reserve Division." The British unit and replacement system was region-based. Recruitment for a specific unit could only take place in that region. The 50th was recruited from the northeast of the UK, and replacements were becoming scarce in this region. Most of the infantry of the 59th Infantry Division went to the general replacement pool, but the units and troops of the 50th Infantry Division, which was an experienced unit, were distributed more carefully. This division was “stood down” more because of catastophic losses, and the remote possibility of obtaining replacements, than to benefit the rest of the army by distributing it’s assets. Keep in mind that the expedient of “disbanding“ these two divisions was to keep from having to feed them with future replacements, rather than being able to distribute their existing personnel and assets to other divisions.
During 1945, several Royal Artillery AA Brigades serving in England were converted to Infantry for line of communications and garrison duties, in order to relieve “regular” units from these duties, and to occupy Germany. Again, these units were not just “disbanded” and sent to the general pool. The British Regimental Tradition system was a definate deterrent to aquiring replacements.
Once initial contact was made, British infantry-type units were reduced to the 50-65% of ToE range. Arms and equipment were not a problem. Because of the efficiency of the equipment-replacement system, there seemd to be an almost infinite supply of these items. The Armoured units had delivery units that maintained at least operational strength, even in combat, with tanks and crews ready to replace damaged or destroyed tanks, and wounded crew members, almost immediately. Infantry-type and artillery equipment was plentiful. The only issue was personnel. All of the “ground-pounder” types suffered from chronic personnel shortages, throughout the war.
US forces also suffered from chronic personnel shortages. The average Infantry Division rifle personnel strength was about two-thirds of ToE. This persisted until the end of the war in Europe. As an example, in October, 1944, the 3rd Army was short the equivalent of 55 Rifle Companies in combat personnel. The US started to disband superfluous AA units to provide rifle company replacements, with very mixed results. The replacements were only given scant rifleman training in-theater, and the results were heavy casualties among these replacements. There were not enough replacements passing through the training organization in the US to meet demand.
The other major shortage that occurred was fuel. By early September, 1944, the Allied armies in northwest Europe were, essentially, “dry.” There were several reasons for this – the lack of ports, damage to the ports that were captured, lack of transport, the inability to use rail, etc. Over 90% of fuel delivered to the continent was still coming over the Normandy beaches. This problem was not truly alleviated until several ports could be repaired, and a more organized system of delivery could be created. The period from June, 1944 to September, 1944 was termed the time of “Frantic Supply” by the US Logistics folks. The fuel shortage needs to be modelled in some way in WitW.
Artillery
In action reports after the war, the Germans considered the British to be superior to any other Western army in their employment of artillery. The British had perfected their system of use of artillery during the First World War. Also, British FOs were given much more lattitude in ordering fire missions than in other armies. These FOs were able to call in fire missions, including hundreds of tubes at once, from many diverse formations, including divisional artillery, and the AGRAs – all at once.
There was a temporary shortage of ammo in late 1944, and several US Artillery Battalions were equipped with captured German guns and ammo until this shortage was alleviated.
Brad
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