fcharton -> RE: Fortress Palembang: The Third Rail of Witp:AE? (5/30/2011 8:36:28 AM)
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Defending an important, and well defensible hex, is not gamey, this is the way the game is supposed to be played. The system rewards a lot defenses concentrated over a small number of bases, as opposed to weaker strengths over a large perimeter (somehow, I believe replacements/fatigue recovery work a bit too well, for both sides), and once you accept this, Fortress XXX strategies become quite logical. The disturbing aspect of Fortress Palembang is the destruction of resources that inevitably follows. This stems from the fact that we know (from hindsight) that oil is very important, and "must" be seized intact and early, that oilfields are very concentrated (compared to resources), notably in Palembang, and that they are very brittle and costly to repair (a badly trashed Palembang would take two years, and three quarter of a million supply points to repair). By defending Palembang (and a few other bases, eg Magwe), the Allies can almost guarantee that a significant fraction of oilfields accessible to Japan are wrecked on capture. Another strange thing is that damage to facilities only seem to be dealt at base capture. In other words, two months of heavy fighting over the base would not deprive the allies of one refinery or oil point, but capture of the base would magically take a thousand points away... Now, is this historical? We do know oil was important, but could it be destroyed so easily? My impression is that most players would agree there is something wrong with the resource damage model: just look at the number of home rules forbidding strategic bombing of resources. If we agree that the damage model is a bit too harsh, then FP strategies could be contrived as exploits of the game system. This said, Fortress Palembang is not the Allied panacea some seem to believe. It does limit Japanese access to oil, but costs a fair number of allied troops to implement, and once the Empire realizes the base won't fall easily, it becomes sensible to try and bomb its facilities... (since they will be wrecked in the end, why let the Allies use them?) Right now, this means air bombing (why?). If Japan can isolate, and slowly reduce, southern Sumatra, Fortress Palembang means more allies unit destroyed in late 42, and therefore a delayed schedule for reconquest... Personally, I think my main problem with this strategy is that it has somehow become the "dish of the day". I suspect many players now starting a game as the Allies try it. It does not ruin the game, even with low access to fuel, Japan can play (just don't complain, then, that China gets too much interest: the less fuel Japan has, the more continental the war becomes...), but it does force the early game into ruts, a bit like stereotyped chess openings, which you play because "they're in the book". Francois
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