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Adnan Meshuggi -> (11/1/2002 2:01:13 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard [B]I think you are stepping too far in by saying his theory is stupid. He does tend to always support the United States, but that does not mean that he is wrong. While I don't believe that trainig can replace combat experience, no matter how well done the training is, I do believe it can better prepare pilots for combat. I am personally against using numerical representations for experience that grow over time/combat experience (although I will buy the game if this is how experience is rated). They really are too abstract, and too unrealistic. Pilots did not 'grow' in experience during combat. Even in training, they did not 'grow' but rather 'jumped'. Your first few flights really get you used to the basisics. You are not necessarily '2 points' better after your 2nd flight, as you possibly learned nothing, or learned a lot. It takes about 100 hours for you to become aquainted to flying, you can do just about anything with your aircraft a civilian pilot should. Combat training is what you learn for the 100+ hours of pilot training. Here would my ranking be. Raw (representation of 0-80 flying hours) Green (representation of 80-150 flying hours) Regular (representation of 200-300 flying hours) Highly Trained (however many hours Advanced Tactical Training) Veteran (X many missions) Elite (X many missions) The value of the experience levels may follow off this 'crude' system. (not much thought has gone into these numbers) Raw (old experience level of 30) Green (old experience level of 50) Regular (old experience level of 65) Highly Trained (old experience level of 75 or 80) (only for US) Veteran (old experience level of 80) Elite (old experience level of 95) A similar system like this was used in the game "Carriers at War II". where when you looked at your pilots, you just saw what their experience title was (Ace, Veteran, Regular, Green, etc...). That is all you really need. So, instead of having pilot values ranging anywhere between 1-99, you would just have them being 30, 50, 65, 75, 80 or 95. Elite pilots would ALWAYS have an experience level of 95, veterans 85, etc... This gets rid of the possibility for EVERY Raw pilot of 30 experience to gain enough experience to all become elite (i.e., 95 experience) which never happened. It also removes the cloud of wondering what a 68 experience valued pilot is, compared to a 65 experience valued pilot (there is not much actual difference) The disparity between raw, Green and Regular is high, but you note that the experience between highly trained and veteran is not. Realistically, they were given a big chance of survival in being taught what to look out for, however, I still think that veterans have one up on even the highest trained pilot, that being practical experience. Realistically, once the pilots were deployed in their operational squadrons, especially for the Japanese, not much fuel was avalible for anything other then combat missions. I think that 'on the field training options', like there is in Pacific War, should not exist. It is assumed that a Regular Pilot has been taught just about as much as their IJNAF/IJAAF possibly can, so they only way they can increase in experience is to get 'bloodied'. So, when you get a squadron of 'raw' pilots, and you send them out to combat, you should see the following happen. X number DIE Y number remain raw (not everyone learns something on every combat mission) Z number increase to Veteran status A number increase to Elite Due to them being raw... X > Y > Z > A Should the group be highly trained: X number DIE Y number remain regular Z number increase to Veteran status A number increase to Elite Y > Z > X > A (the position of X really does depend on the number of casualties, while the position of Z and A depend on the scale of surviors who actually engaged in successful combat) It is much simpler then a 1-99 system, plus, in my opinion, seems more logical as to what happened to pilots during wartime. [/B][/QUOTE] hm, maybe you are right, but mdiehl allways have a (interesting) story way the americans are better as X... so i tend to ignore the still good aspects of his post :D His comment about the 95% IS stupid, because everbody else agree, that a pilot without combt experience hardly can have a "elite" status... maybe in his dreams, but beside this, it can´t happen... But your "jump" system, that sounds good for me, but even in the difference cat´s we should have more differences, because a great ace like the very best pilots in history ARE much better as everything else, they could kill a lot enemies in inferior planes in hopless situations and survive... in history this happened quite often and i wish that my WitP-Aces are truely superior to anything the enemy can launch against me (if i "developted" such an ace), and because in a game everything is fiction, it should be possible to have american aces with 100 kills, if i don´t withdraw them, and these guys should be superior to a trained newbe... i don´t look through a "axis" glasses... even if a axis ultimate elite ace is more possibile as an allied ultimate ace... for many things... I think also, we should be more strict with "elite".... i think the japanese carrier pilots at the beginning of the war should be veterans, with maybe one or to elite pilots, and the allieds with max. some vets, many average pilots.... but i never want to say that an average pilot can´t shot down an elite ace... just the chance in a one to one combat with NO surprise should be very very low.... i think no game will ever be exactly in this, because to many parameters have influence... like fatigute, moral, personal problems (like the loss of a good friend, shot down by the enemy a few hours ago, etc...) but we defintly shouldn´t listen to mdiehl, as long as he want elite newbies for his personal complex (i have give up to think about his behaviour..)

angus -> (11/1/2002 2:07:07 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Adnan Meshuggi [B]my opinion about experience levels is, that they never can model a pilot.... if they are so simple like in UV....[/B] Of course it's simple. It's a model. When I asked the question I wasn't looking for a redesign, just some consideration of the idea that Allied pilots should be withdrawn after a period of time. But the argument that people who had flown 3X missions were inevitably better than people who had flown X is wrong. Even for 20X it's wrong. Japanese and German policy produced a few aces like Hartmann and a lot of pilots dead from making stupid mistakes because they couldn't eat soup with a spoon. And the fact that you think the best Japanese aces were any better than the best US (or Italian or Soviet or Canadian or ..) ones suggests to me that you really don't know what you're talking about here. As I understand it modern research into what makes a fighter pilot suggests that the edge that makes a well-trained pilot into a great one is in the way his brain is wired. Reflexes, situational awareness, good shooting, those are what count in combat and they can only be learned so much. After some missions the guys who will be a Hartmann, a Bong or a Beurling are already superb whereas Joe Blow could fly hundreds of missions and still be just average or worse. There is absolutely no reason to think that the Japanese had any more naturally skillful pilots than the Americans (etc) and there are good reasons for suspecting that a system that washed out so many trainees pre-war wasn't necessarily looking at their flying skill. So they may have had fewer natural talents ... Experience is important but too much of it is just as bad as too little. Training is important but it can only develop the abilities the trainee has. The UV system as it stands seems as good as anything else for representing this complex state of affairs without too much needless complication. Adding a routine to count how long an Allied pilot has been with a squadron and withdraw him after X days seems to me to be feasible. Creating a completely different system, and one which doesn't represent reality any better, is unlikely to be feasible and wouldn't be an improvement even if it was. There are other problems with UV's pilot ratings. The absurd skill levels given to the crews of the Zuikaku and Shokaku for sarters. And the levels on the other four carriers are too high as well, just not absurdly so. But these are easily fixed if we get a decent editor with WitP [hint, hint]. I'm happy enough with the system as it is, it just needs tweaking IMO. Angus

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/1/2002 2:15:29 AM)
I don't think that he said American's produced fewer aces, just that they were withdrawn for training before they could get numbers of victories as high as Japanese and German aces. US Ace B might have 30 kills. IJA Ace C might have 70 kills. US Ace B flew for a year, and then became a pilot trainer. IJA Ace C flew for 3 years. This is what he was getting to, not that the Germans/Japanese produced aces with higher kills because they were better, but they stayed in the front lines more. However, we all know that battles are won and lost not by the aces, but by the regular pilots, who get the lion share of the kills, but are individually insignificant.

angus -> (11/1/2002 6:06:58 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by Jeremy Pritchard [B]I don't think that he said American's produced fewer aces, just that they were withdrawn for training before they could get numbers of victories as high as Japanese and German aces. [/B][/QUOTE] No, he said [I]"so if we have a max of 99, the best historical us aces should have 50 to 55, the best japanese should have 80 (just 2 or 3 of them) and maybe 20 to 30 german aces"[/I] That's that Japanese and German ace pilots are [B]better[/B] not just that they have more kills. And I simply do not believe that. They did have more kills, but as you said that's because they flew more missions and because (in the case of the German experten) the wingmen surrendered opportunities for kills to the ace. Angus

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/1/2002 8:35:24 AM)
You still are missing the point. He started his levelling of experience bases on the PacWar sequential system (not an absolute system where veterans are veterans after their first few missions) , where you gain experience after every combat mission. Realistically US veteran pilots SHOULD have lower experience levels, based on a system that determines experience by NUMBER of combat missions by the fact that they were rotated after X many missions, while Japanese pilots were not. Lets say that both pilots start off at 40 experience. After 5 missions, they move up to 50 experience (2 experience points per mission). The US pilot is then rotated back to the training area, while the Japanese aces keep flying. So, by the time they are done (if they survive until 1945, like the two he gave credit for) they have 80 experience. The US Pilots never got past 50 experience, because they were rotated back, while the IJ pilot kept on fighting, and using the PacWar experience system, got more experience from it. I understand his logic, and it is based off of an old system of experience in PacWar. Invariably, experience based off of number of missions a pilot flies WILL give IJ pilots higher experience over the US who rotates their pilots back to rear areas when they reach a certain experience level. REALISTICALLY, veteran is veteran. Once you get there, you don't really get any better. REALISTICALLY, the Allied pilot who became a trainer had the same 'experience' as the Japanese pilot who kept on fighting for years. HOWEVER, we are not basing this off of realistic factors, but how the game represents them, from 1-99. His basis on experience is based off of the PacWar model, where you perpetually gain combat experience (i.e., aces are made over time) vs. the concept that combat experience is gained over a relatively short time (i.e., aces are aces due to some ability, not formed through lengthy combat experience).

mogami -> abstract model (11/1/2002 8:50:07 AM)
Greetings, There are two differing systems. One tracks pilots and awards points/skill level to each pilot in a group. The other system tracks the group and assigns skill after each mission (or subtracts) In the first system you could have 1 pilot with exp 99 and another with exp 50. In the second system you resolve combat based on group rating group 1 rated 50 will defeat enemy group rated below 50. In first system new pilots come and go but the old exp/high rated ones still allow group to preform missions (they slowly get killed but it takes a while) In second system it is simply a case of hoping your group has equal or higher rating then enemy. (since only missions where you suffer little or no loss increase rating) What happens in second system is side that throws the most groups into battle achives the better ratings over time. In this system aircraft type and number of them is more important then simple rating. ( 2 40's are better then 1 80)(this seems to out weigh result from even odds battle (where group 50 always defeats group below 50) There are two differing training questions. First is training on map group and second is what level a pilot has when he first moveds into a on map airgroup. (I can send an on map airgroup to a base and assign training mission. I can keep it there intill I am happy with level. But what rating does brand new pilot have when he gets to group. What effect does new pilots have on old group (really important in system 2 where it might in fact be better to keep group small and trained rather then large and rookie) Both systems work. Both have merits and problems. I agree the rating by "title" is easier to justify then rating by number. (number really only works if each and every pilot tracked. Title better defines a group the way an operational commander would "The 305th is a veteran outfit" versus "The 305 has several 80's and a bunch of 50s" the ideal training routine for new pilots would allow player to decide how many to add to group and when (in quiet period I would let new pilots train to higher level before leaving off map "school" and being added to on map group. The player could simply keep new pilots in school as long as he wanted before adding them. The main issue as I see it is off map pilots not on map pilots. (combat will assign the ultimate level) the real question is what is bottom line. The player should be able to decide "I will make a group of untrained pilots" or "I will keep the boys in training intill they are _____(insert number) this much trained" So in short if game track group I would like to have input into traing level, I might want fewer/better trained new pilots If game tracks each pilot then I would like to say only place pilots that achive this point rating in new pilot pool. Long time readers of Matrix forums will know I can never post an idea in one shot. I need to edit each post many times or make new "expansions" to prior posts. What I am trying to get at is the question how should airgroups be rated? By pilot or by group? There are then two questions. First "entry level" rating second "effect of missions" Entry Level is the skill of an off map pilot when he joins on map group. If tracking pilots then it is not as large as issue then if tracking group A group allowed 27 aircraft/pilots that has 18 Pilot tracking method you add 9 new pilots the "old" 18 are uneffected and will preform to their rating. The 9 new pilots come it at what ever level of pilot skill the training program produces. Group method the 9 new pilots drop the group rating to reflect the new pilot skill 18x60 group +9x30(just example) results in 1/3 under strength 60 group becoming a full strength 50 group. In combat the under strength 60 group (or several of them) would preform better then the full size 50 group (unless the new size made the differance in combat) In single pilot tracking the rating of each pilot is used for each aircombat so one pilot might score victories while the rest ofgroup was shot down. By using group rating the whole group wins or loses. (is this making sense?)

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/1/2002 11:43:20 AM)
I agree with Mogami, there is a big difference between pilot and squadron/group experience. The Japanese were also keen in putting all of their top pilots in a few Sentai's. It would be interesting to have the ability to transfer pilots around, making these uber-elite formations. However, to throw another bone into the equation, should every pilot be able to attain the highest level of ability? Should the game allow for every pilot to be an elite? Not every pilot was, nor could they be. To only limit pilot experience by their death/retirement is basically saying that anyone can become a Richtofen, and it takes years of fighting to become one, when not everyone can, and it happens over a short period of time. It would be interesting to allow a fluxuating pool of pilot replacements. Many factors would have to be taken consideration of, basically just for the Japanese. #1. Number of trainer aircraft avalible. A lower number of these mean that if you increase the number of pilots, their flying time/month will be less as there would be more pilots to planes. #2. Fuel expendatures. If your fuel pool is large, you can either save it for a rainy day, or spend it training more troops (whatever trainer planes will be used more often). If you want to increase your pilot pool you could do many things. A) Lower the number of hours required for a released pilot (therefore it takes shorter time to get these guys in the battlefield). B) Increase fuel use for training (increases numbers of pilots without sacrificing time/quality). If you want to have quality over quantity you could just do option B), and/or increase the training time. I also do not think that Japanese training can match US training, primarily due to the lack of combat trainers (there were plenty of pilot trainers, just not combat pilot trainers). I guess this will depend on wether or not the game will allow the Japanese player to send their vets back to become pilot trainers. I don't think it will speed up pilot training, just make whatever pilots there are 'better' at surviving their first rounds of combat. I am still not comfortable about using a 1-100 system for experience. Experience really does change in forms of jumps when it comes to combat. Either you are green/trained, or you are veteran/elite. There is no real inbetween. Pilots don't win in combat because they are 3 points more experienced then their opponent, they win due to factors such as the attributes of their aircraft, numerical superiority, early warning. However, if a 1-100 point system is still used I think it is still workable.

mdiehl -> (11/1/2002 10:08:21 PM)
[QUOTE]but i never want to say that an average pilot can´t shot down an elite ace... just the chance in a one to one combat with NO surprise should be very very low.... [/QUOTE] The vast majority of WW2 combat aces, including the German, Italian (yes, there were several), Japanese, and Soviet ones, and many of the UK ones prior to 1942 died in combat. Of these, the vast majority were shot down by people who were not aces at the time. In almost every case the blame may be laid to an ambush situation, or target fixation (ace lines up on a target but is blindsided by some other a/c). The "one to one combat" thing gives you an excuse to waffle. Fact is, there were almost no one to one combats in the war. Pretty much all combats involved multiple a/c on both sides, although the total number of a/c involved "locally" was often in the area of 1:1. So, if you imagine one fantastic veteran Japanese ace in the sky flying any variant of the A6M, and one adequately trained, rookie USN/USMC pilot flying an F4U or F6F with which he is very familiar, the smart money bets that the Japanese pilot dies. If the Allied pilot is flying an F4F it's anybody's game. The results from 1942 prove it, and all the ininformed wack wack make-believe fanciful bulls__t about air combat based on what you think ought to happen rather than what really does happen won't make your wishes come true. By the way, the last time an American pilot shot down an enemy ace that I can recall from the books, wa sin Viet Nam. The USN pilot had combat time but one or no kills. The Chinese pilot, a major, with something like 11 vicitories, was flying a faster, more maneuverable plane (a MiG 19, IIRC, vs. a Douglas F4). The two were engaged in a vertical climbing scissors, when the MiG attempted to roll out. The F4 pilot took him out with an AIM missile. Anyone familiar with the engagement feel free to fill in the details that I overlooked or got wrong.

mdiehl -> (11/1/2002 10:21:15 PM)
I found a link. The engagement was Cunningham (pilot) & Driscoll (radar intercept officer. Note to AM: that means he was in the back seat, not in another plane) in an F4J based out of USS Constellation, vs. Col. Toom, in a MiG-21. http://www.aerosphere.com/Magazine/HISTORY/Randy_Cunningham/randy_cunningham.html [This is not a plug for Cunningham, by the way, it's an anecdote about GOOD TRAINING.]

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/1/2002 11:12:38 PM)
Invariably, there are individuals, irregardless of training, that are very good at something. They are not perfect, but they are good enough that after (at least) 11 contacts with the enemy, they were victorious. Possibly this US pilot flying the F4 was an 'ace' but had yet to get there by this point? Was it necessarily the training that got him the kill? Possibly, but it was also possibly due to his ability. You can list off the aces of everything, tanks, aircraft, submarines, etc... It does not matter that they die (nobody is PERFECT), but rather that the CHANCE of them killing an opponent over being killed is much higher. Training does increase the chance that a 'new' pilot will survive (not necessarily get a combat kill) their first engagements. Cunningham's training did help him survive, but he also said it was his own "discipline", which may be one of the key elements of becoming an ace. Whittman, an undisputed tank ace, had fantastic disipline, as well as a good eye for spotting concieled AT positions. He was well trained, but so too were many other tank commanders, who lived as long, and fought in as many battles, but never came close to the number of victories. Many "potential aces" were killed in their first few missions, before they became aces. Training increases the chance for these "potential aces", like Cunningham, to survive to become aces. Training alone does not make aces.

mdiehl -> (11/1/2002 11:39:32 PM)
[QUOTE]Invariably, there are individuals, irregardless of training, that are very good at something. ... Possibly this US pilot flying the F4 was an 'ace' but had yet to get there by this point? Was it necessarily the training that got him the kill? Possibly, but it was also possibly due to his ability.[/QUOTE] I agree. But you always have to reinsert the question as to how one designs a wargame/simulation in light of real phenomena. Using UV's system, Toom would have a better chance of taking out Cunningham than the reverse. Perhaps correctly. Using the absurd crap that I've heard (not from you, this is not an attack)about the overwhelming determinism of "Experience" suppressing all other factors (like tech and training), well, in AM's world Cunningham would never win. Thing is, even with UV's system, Cunningham, even though he may in fact have been an exceptional pilot (the "right stuff" and all that), possessing all the abilities and instincts to be an ace, would not perform like an ace in the game until he'd been through many combats. That's awkwardly worded but I hope you see what I'm driving at. If your point is that ace-like abilities are partly a personal character/discipline thing, what does EXP have to do with it at all? [QUOTE]Cunningham's training did help him survive, but he also said it was his own "discipline", which may be one of the key elements of becoming an ace. [/QUOTE] Read it again, because he also said that he really improved after going through the Top Gun program. Some kinds of training, as I've said many times, are for all detectable purposes just as good as combat missions for honing skills. Top Gun school and its forerunner were specifically designed to give pilots the knowledge they need to fight like aces, including improving discipline and situational awareness. [QUOTE]Many "potential aces" were killed in their first few missions, before they became aces. Training increases the chance for these "potential aces", like Cunningham, to survive to become aces. Training alone does not make aces.[/QUOTE] Training can make one fly like an ace. That's the point of Top Gun. That was the point of its forerunner. That was the point (wee, one of them) of US Pilot rotation. If it didn't work, there'd be no point in pulling your best pilots into training duties in the rear area, because survivability of green pilots would not be affected by training. Being credited with victories makes one an ace. UV does not have a away to model ace-like instincts or ace-like training. It only "discovers" aces by virtue of probabilitically determined combat results. PW of course knows nothing of aces in any fashion.

Adnan Meshuggi -> (11/3/2002 3:15:25 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by angus [B] No, he said [I]"so if we have a max of 99, the best historical us aces should have 50 to 55, the best japanese should have 80 (just 2 or 3 of them) and maybe 20 to 30 german aces"[/I] That's that Japanese and German ace pilots are [B]better[/B] not just that they have more kills. And I simply do not believe that. They did have more kills, but as you said that's because they flew more missions and because (in the case of the German experten) the wingmen surrendered opportunities for kills to the ace. Angus [/B][/QUOTE] Hm, if you speak about me, it could be better if you speak with me...:D anyway, i said, that for the "historical" aces, with 99 as the maximum, maybe hartmann, rudel (if you count him too), baumbach, schnaufer, lent, nowotney, barkhorn and est. 30 - 50 more should be in the 90ties, maybe barkhorn, rudel, hartmann and schnaufer at 99, because they had so may combat missions and so many kills, many in inferior planes against odds you can´t count, they had the "experiences" as experten. The "best" allied aces hadn´t so many combat missions and not these results... so they never should have this experiences... but this was a try to explain the HISTORICAL guys.... if i play a computer game and use hartmann, and he is shot down in Nov. 1942, nobody will know him, because he had at this time around 20 or 30 kills..., if the americans had more combat missions, they could have achieved more as the laughable 34 kills (compared to german kill records), because i don´t think that the germans had better fighting cromosomes as americans..., but no american had 1400 missions and 850 fights in his war time.... the only exception i would make is schnaufer, he killed 121 night bombers (mostly 4 mots) in around 140 missions (or 150)... he was superior to anybody else (so a german could be the best fighter pilot, but hell, it could have been an italian (by the way, the italians had good pilots)...

mogami -> Dick Bong (11/3/2002 3:28:23 AM)
Greetings the top american ace in the pacific was Richard Bong with 40 aerial victories, in approx 200 combat missions. While there is no way to state with certain what he would have done in 1400 missions his rate would equal 280 aerial victories.

Adnan Meshuggi -> (11/3/2002 3:30:02 AM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B] The vast majority of WW2 combat aces, including the German, Italian (yes, there were several), Japanese, and Soviet ones, and many of the UK ones prior to 1942 died in combat. Of these, the vast majority were shot down by people who were not aces at the time. In almost every case the blame may be laid to an ambush situation, or target fixation (ace lines up on a target but is blindsided by some other a/c). The "one to one combat" thing gives you an excuse to waffle. Fact is, there were almost no one to one combats in the war. Pretty much all combats involved multiple a/c on both sides, although the total number of a/c involved "locally" was often in the area of 1:1. So, if you imagine one fantastic veteran Japanese ace in the sky flying any variant of the A6M, and one adequately trained, rookie USN/USMC pilot flying an F4U or F6F with which he is very familiar, the smart money bets that the Japanese pilot dies. If the Allied pilot is flying an F4F it's anybody's game. The results from 1942 prove it, and all the ininformed wack wack make-believe fanciful bulls__t about air combat based on what you think ought to happen rather than what really does happen won't make your wishes come true. By the way, the last time an American pilot shot down an enemy ace that I can recall from the books, wa sin Viet Nam. The USN pilot had combat time but one or no kills. The Chinese pilot, a major, with something like 11 vicitories, was flying a faster, more maneuverable plane (a MiG 19, IIRC, vs. a Douglas F4). The two were engaged in a vertical climbing scissors, when the MiG attempted to roll out. The F4 pilot took him out with an AIM missile. Anyone familiar with the engagement feel free to fill in the details that I overlooked or got wrong. [/B][/QUOTE] Again we are in mdiehl wonderland..... honey, the most fightings ended in an one to one combat in ww2.... because 30 brits fight against 20 germans and then the ** hit the fan.... and the quality of an ace helps him a lot to survive and to pick one or two enemies he could kill, escape and hunt the next ones.... i never said something against training experiences, just that 95 (from 99) is a typical mdiehl wonderland talk, caused by mdiehl complexes.... we agree that american pilots of the second half of ww2 were much better trained as the axis pilots, so they should have better experience, but training has nothing to do with combat... like some people said, the plane, the moral of the pilot, the tactics, the fatigue etc. are important, too. So i wrote that the training bonus should be high, but say 5 - 10 % (japanese) to maybe 25% of an american, the rest is war experience.... of the pilot... we allways have the superiority in numbers and planes, but to say that the average trained american newbe should be better as a veteran ace is bull1, because then both in the same plane should be equal (and this is wrong).... because i never said that the 90% ace in an inferior plane allways win against the 50% newbe in a better plane.... but to give the newbe 95% and the better plane is mdiehl wonderland story of minority complexes.... and i want a realistic model of the planes, the pilots etc., and this means, too, that some great aces in a squadron with some newbies and a quite front should improve the newbies a lot, and a ty squadron with high losses, no moral surplus and the same **ty newbies should get extra losses (because the vets aren´t in to help the newbies...) for the historical numbers, the axis aces were much better as the allied aces, but this comes from the different tactic (fly untill dead against fly and retire to train).... but to discuss the facts would be wrong

mogami -> Aces (11/3/2002 3:34:58 AM)
Hi, Aces are nice to have, but most aircraft are shot down by pilots who finsih the war with less then 5 victories. Aces account for a very small number of the total. It is for this reason the debate exists between "group" rating and "pilot" rating. Most games tend to modify pilot/group skill by combat rather then assign a somewhat constant rating for "trained" or "untrained" pilots. The questions are 1 where do the differing countries/services start 2. how much does/should combat modify the starting numbers pilot rotation into a system where all the pilots know the routine does not have that large an impact on the group as a whole (unless the new pilots are "untrained" and react/fly on the own. in groups where Aces remain the whole period (or intill they die) if the new pilots are untrained they serve as bait/fodder with the Ace having to carry the mission load (leading to their burnout)

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/3/2002 7:09:48 AM)
http://64.124.221.191/ijnaf.htm It talks about the importance of training, but does not say that training is everything. Possibly US Rookies had a better chance at survival late in the war because they were trained, but the vast number of their opponents could only fly a plane (100 hours is enough for a pilot to become comfortable in flying an aircraft). Problems with the IJAAF ran not because of poorer quality (they had a better system of training pilots then the IJNAF), but due to problems of heirarchy. When seasoned officers were killed, they were replaced not by experienced lower officers, but higher ranked Land commanders. This was the system commonly used by all sides in WWI, promoting from the Land military to Air. Many IJAAF operations were hampered by poor commanders, not poor pilots HERE IS THE ARTICLE Flight and Combat Training At an early stage in the Pacific War, the IJNAF had made a decision about the conduct of the war which was to have far reaching consequences. Training of new pilots was cut back. This put all of its aerial strength "up front" and enabled it to compete with the Americans and their allies on more even basis. The U.S. embargo on petroleum had been the most immediate cause of the war for the Japanese and they remained short of it for the rest of the war--even after the capture of Dutch oilfields in Indonesia. (The gasoline was not where it was needed. American submarine captains understood this situation and deliberately sought out oil tankers as high-priority targets.) The Americans, by contrast, chose exactly the opposite strategy after the war was just a few months old. After a short period of trying to put their own stength "up front", they deliberately retained their best pilots as flight instructors for future waves of candidate pilots. They invested large quantities of gasoline in the training of new pilots. They built large numbers of training aircraft and retained increasing numbers of less capable combat planes in the continental U.S. for training purposes as more advanced types became available. To be sure, this meant that during the first year or so of the war, that the U.S. Navy and USAAF would have fewer men and fewer planes "up front". On the other hand, once this much larger system began to deliver newly trained pilots and new aircraft to the theaters of war, the IJNAF would have no hope of fighting them off. From being sworn in, put through boot camp, put into primary flight training and then into advanced flight training, it took about one year for the U.S. Navy or USAAF to train a pilot and assign him to an operational unit. Significantly, a little over a year after the start of the Pacific War, the pilots of the Imperial Navy began to find themselves outnumbered. It seemed to the front line pilots as if the Americans had inexhaustible sources of warplanes and pilots. And this was somewhat before the Americans were able to introduce newer aircraft types. Alleged American racial superiority was dangerous nonsense in the life and death situations of aerial combat, but there was an area in which the USA did have a human or manpower advantage. The USA, at that time, had a population of about 150 million, versus Japan's population of about 90 million. However, the age composition of the American population favored young men, so the actual pool of them was substantially larger than the comparable Japanese pool. Of course, the output of American pilots would have to be divided between the Pacific War (South Pacific Theater, South West Pacific Theater), the CBI Theater and the European Theater of Operations (the ETO). Bad as this situation might have seemed to be from the Japanese side, it was actually worse. To be sure, this didn't quite make them qualified aviation mechanics or pilots, but most young American men of that generation had driven or maintained an automobile and many of them had also handled guns. In pre-war Japan, individually owned automobiles were a rarity and so were private firearms. In training aviation mechanics and pilots, American instructors could take many things for granted. In the pre-war years, the IJNAF had chosen to train a very small number of pilots to a very high degree. The modern air force which most closely follows this path is the Israeli Air Force. Note how seriously the Israelis were affected by the loss of about 100 aircraft and pilots in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The Japanese were at least equally vulnerable to attrition prior to the Pacific War. How could the Japanese have compensated for the loss of 300 pilots at Midway by pre-war standards? If they had had no further losses at all, it would have taken them two or three years to train that many pilots at pre-war rates. By the middle of 1943, the IJNAF was frantically attempting to overcome all of these disadvantages with tools wholly inadequate to the purpose. The training of pilots was pushed as high as it could be, but there were serious problems. Instructor pilots were still scarce and many potential flight instructors had died at the Battle of Midway, in the Solomon Islands or elsewhere. In the United States, comparable experienced pilots were alive and instructing other pilots. Shortening the amount of training was tried and, by the last year of the war, Japanese pilots were being pushed into combat missions with as little as 100 hours of flight time. (By contrast, American pilots at that stage of the war[1944] would have had more than 300 hours of flight time.) When these pilots entered combat they were terrified novices, easy marks for American pilots. Even rookie American pilots were better off than this. As for experienced Japanese pilots, those who were still alive were also gradually being killed off in combat. Nor did a Japanese student pilot have to die in combat--many of them died in flying accidents, particularly when they were pushed into the cockpits of fast, unforgiving fighters. Flying accidents and training fatalities were common enough in the continental United States, but anecdotes give the impression that they were much more common in Japan.

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/3/2002 7:24:27 AM)
Aces are insiginificant in a wargame this scale, but there is a realization that most IJAAF and IJNAF air groups were highly trained and had significant combat experience (combined upwards of 3000 hours). Generally, IJNAF and IJAAF air groups had a lot of experience, and were veterans as well as highly trained, while their Allied counterparts may have been just very well trained. By the time the advanced pilots arrived in the frontlines, attrition had knocked down most of the IJNAF that they were not fighting the pilots of 1941-42, but their comparable replacement classes. IJNAF and USAAC/USN/USMC forces were even at the beginning of the war, with the edge on Japan's side because of high training + combat. However, the US did not fight many battles in the first 6 months of the war, and used up significantly small numbers of their pilots. By the time the war heated up in the South Pacific, the IJNAF was stretched thin, so it could not get regional air superiority, but managed to keep offensive operations going as late as 1943. High Training + Combat is better then any Traning simulation that very good pilots can put together. Most pre-war IJNAF and IJAAF pilots had training and combat experience more extensive then the US Advanced Tactical Training program. Stating that US training is actually better then 'the real thing' is going too far with the US training success.

mdiehl -> (11/4/2002 9:56:54 PM)
Again, Japanese combat experience was the wrong kind of experience. Almost irrelevant against a foe flying different planes and using different tactics. Moreover, most of the Japanese combat experience in China was in ground attack, as the CNAF basically did not exist after 1938. [QUOTE] Most pre-war IJNAF and IJAAF pilots had training and combat experience more extensive then the US Advanced Tactical Training program.[/QUOTE] Training in the wrong tactics. Brief experience in a foe with less training and also using the wrong tactics and flying inferior a/c. Then plenty of experience strafing ground targets. Japanese training for all it's air time was not particularly better than USN/USMC training, and not as good as the US advanced tac program. [QUOTE]Stating that US training is actually better then 'the real thing' is going too far with the US training success.[/QUOTE] Only "better" in the sense that when the judge rules you dead and the trainers explain your errors, you're not really dead, and you learn not to make (as many, as often) fatal errors.

TIMJOT -> (11/4/2002 10:28:21 PM)
[QUOTE]Originally posted by mdiehl [B]Again, Japanese combat experience was the wrong kind of experience. Almost irrelevant against a foe flying different planes and using different tactics. Moreover, most of the Japanese combat experience in China was in ground attack, as the CNAF basically did not exist after 1938. [/B][/QUOTE] Wrong! the Chinese airforce was alive and kicking up to 1941 and it was exacting a toll on unescorted bombers. That is why the IJN was compelled to deploy its zeros to that theater. By the summer of 41 the zero's had pretty much cleared the skies and they were withdrawn. Once again you are confusing combat expirence with combat tactics. The value of combat expirence has more to do with being able to handle the pyshological pressures and stress of life or death situations. Ask any combat vetran and to a man they will say that no training can actually substitute for real combat. Certainly it can help to prepare you, but Im sure there are many cases were pilots have been hotshot world beaters at AFT, but ended up pissing there pants in combat. No combat expirence is irrelevant, The IJN pilots learned to use they planes to the best of its abilities. Regardless who they fought it was arobatic skill that was going to make a zero pilot successful. Boom and zoom was never going to be a zeros strength it would just get them killed. So did it matter that they opponent flew different tactics?

mdiehl -> (11/4/2002 10:49:41 PM)
If the opponent flies boom and zoom, there are mvr tactics that will not allow you to engage them. If your opponent flies boom and zoom and is better trained in deflection shooting (which tends to be a common situation faced by pilots closing at high speed), then the opponent will hit more on deflection than you will. If an opponent is highly trained in mutual support, as the Chinese weren't, then you will find the target of your affection attempting to disengage (which US a/c could do far more effectively than Japanese ones) while his support rips up your a/c. [QUOTE]So did it matter that they opponent flew different tactics?[/QUOTE] The answer is a huge and resounding, "Yes it really hugely-well matters a huge freaking lot." For a guy who is fond of dropping Sakai's name, it's odd to me that you ask, since many IJN vets including the icon mention their consternation at the difference in tactics.

mdiehl -> (11/4/2002 11:57:45 PM)
I find no evidence of frequent CNAF engagements vs the IAJAF in 1941, although I'll take your word for it that a few fighters were put up against unescorted bombers. Perhaps you can provide a link or reference that supports the idea of significant CNAF opposition in 1941? Here's a link I found that mentions the ease with which the CNAF was destroyed, twice, prior to the addition of the AVG. The blurb seems to be from a wargame so it's credibility (since it lacks cites) is probably questionable, but it jibes with everything I've read about the CNAF. Note that crummy a/c and badly trained pilots are typical of the 1937 CNAF trained largely by Italy, and the reconstituted CNAF built up by the USSR in 1940. Even with good planes and pilots, few CNAF a/c (including those used by the AVG) lasted very long, primarily because of maintenance/logistics problems: http://uncleted.jinak.cz/minorafp.htm Here's an afterthought on claimed and confirmed kills, and the Allies as well. Note that IJN sources typically overestimated kills by 400%. This includes Sakai's claimed kills... where the author credits him with only about 20. The AVG overclaimed by about 200%. The other Allies in the rest of the PTO by about 150%. While it is the author's opine, he does cite some of the sources, including Lundstrom's 1st Team. http://www.danford.net/loss.htm

Drongo -> (11/5/2002 1:11:33 AM)
Mdiehl, I don't understand your arguements about Japanese training and experience being wasted. A large part of training is how to get the most out of your aircraft. The intense Japanese training achieved that. Combat Experience would only improve this. Given the way that air battles tend to degenerate often into one on one encounters, how would the experience and solid training of a Japanese pilot be wasted? The Japanese certainly trained in tactics. Lundstrom particularly singled out the JNAF for its excellent tactical cohesion in combat during '42. That would indicate that early war Japanese pilots seem to have the do's and don'ts of multiple a/c combat combat understood. Since you keep mentioning it, what was actually wrong with their tactics? They had no need for a Thatch weave. For the aircraft they flew, why weren't their tactics suitable? I do accept the fact that as a lot of their early aircraft rarely had functioning radio's and that they used the outdated vic formation would restrict their options. You state that the Japanese combat experience was wasted as it wasn't against pilots using energy (boom 'n' zoom) tactics. IIRC, the soviets used that style of fighting with their I-16 in Mongolia and the Japanese used it themselves against the more nimble Russian fighters. The Japanese not only fought the Chinese in China, but also the Russians in Mongolia in '38-39 (where they ran into the Russian veterans from the Spanish Civil War). Even if they had never encountered it before, pilots adjust (just as the allied pilots began to do after getting to know the strengths of the zero and oscar). The failure of the JAAF and JNAF to counter the allied energy tactics was heavily influenced by the limitations of the zeros and oscars that they flew . Have you read of the way the Japanese pilots used aircraft like the Jack, Tojo and Tony? You seem to put a lot of faith in US training and tactics. I've read plenty of accounts indicating a tendency for new US squadrons to tend to go for dogfighting rather than energy fights (especially the USAAF). My understanding was that the USAAF were still training their pilots with an emphasis in dogfighting until '43. Experienced combat leaders often had trouble stopping their new charges from doing it. Even the USN/USMC in late '42 had a lot of trouble with their new pilots (despite energy training) doing the same thing. Finally, could you also explain the actual details of the US Advanced Fighter Training (and when it came into common practice). Was it the same thing as OTU? What was so special about it?

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/5/2002 1:11:45 AM)
Going back to the 1940 Luftwaffe comparison, I don't think training/experience means that you will kill your enemy better. The Luftwaffe had #1. More training #2. More combat experience #3. Better tactics #4. Equal-Better aircraft (many say Me 109E was superior to Spitfire I) #5. Greater numbers But they still lost. In 1940, new RAF pilots (which made the bulk of the RAF in 1940) had around 150 hours of training time, comparable to IJNAF and IJAAF early/mid-war training. The Germans tactically had everything going for them, better pilots, more pilots, good equipment, morale of 1+ years of victory. What the RAF had going for them: #1. Defender in a Static Air War. #2. Good early warning system. The Luftwaffe did very well in its air war when it was a part of a massive mobile invasion. Utilization of the air force was very good when they were on the move, as their opponent lacked the advantages of a static defender. The IJNAF in 1941-42 was much like the Luftwaffe in 1939-40. It had the benefit of Land/Sea forces advancing, requiring your opponent to keep on switching the location of their air crews, from base to base (tiring out the pilots). An early warning system won't work, as there was no 'frontier' barrier to put it on (as the line was continually advancing). The static air war gave the defender a stable range of interception and a long time to form up interception groups. The RAF in 1940 and USAAC/USN/USMC in 1942 had the benefit of being at static bases of operation, where the 'attacker' is only attacking with one element and the defender has the benefit of shorter individual flying time, as well as ample warining. However, what Japan lacked was: #1. Numbers (it never had the 4:1 superiority in the South Pacific that the Luftwaffe had in Western Europe). #2. Tactics (up for dispute) #3. Better aircraft (A6M was not suited for this type of battle, it had everything that the Me 109 needed, range, but lacked what the Me 109 had, durability). Yet, they were still able to keep the region relatively stable for approximately 1 year. When the United States attacked in 1943-44, they attained much the same effect as the Luftwaffe in 1939/early 1940, as they benefitted from 'shock' air attacks with larger numbers in company with land and sea assaults, throwing off the defenders. In regards to individual pilots: The Luftwaffe loast approximately 1300 planes, with the RAF losing around 750. The Luftwaffe was also larger then the RAF. So, reaistically, the average Luftwaffe pilot had less individual kills in relation to their numbers vs. RAF casualties, while the RAF had high individual kills in relations to their numbers vs. Luftwaffe casualties. RAF pilots had less training, less experience, fewer numbers, etc..., yet they came out with positive results. Based on these numbers, RAF pilots should come out of their 150 hours of training with a greater experience level then German pilots who served in Spain, Poland and France.

mdiehl -> (11/5/2002 2:45:49 AM)
Nice summary Jeremy. The point where all this gets back to "the point" is where you apply it to a wargame. If the combat engine takes insufficient account of these non-training, non-exp factors and if EXP becomes deterministic despite other circumstances, it's a crappy model. So, the alternatives are to totally rewrite the combat resolution system or to fudge it by setting the EXP (whatever that is supposed to be) levels in a way that it produces realistic attrition ratios. [QUOTE]Mdiehl, I don't understand your arguements about Japanese training and experience being wasted. [/QUOTE] Not "wasted" per say. Just really overrated in wargames and in many histories, in light of evidence to the point that the USN consistently out-won the IJN in the first six months of the war. Look at the basic elements of The Myth: The A6M was a more combat worthy a/c than anything fielded by the Allies. The IJN had more training. The IJN had more experience. At Coral Sea and Midway, in direct engagements between A6Ms and F4Fs, at ranges that (if any bias was introduced) favored the IJN, with comparable numbers of a/c engaged, lost more a/c than they shot down, against pilots who were, according to the myth, less well trained, flying inferior a/c, and (and this is partially true), less "experienced." At some point you have to confront the basic facts and ask yourself which of the assumptions of The Myth is not correct. [QUOTE]A large part of training is how to get the most out of your aircraft. The intense Japanese training achieved that.[/QUOTE] As Jeremy and others have pointed out, the question is not (probably) one of linear relationships. 10,000 hours of training and flying familiarity is not necessarily better than 1,000 hours. So, the Japanese pilots were intensively trained, as were USN/USMC pilots. Both were sufficiently trained as to be quite knowledgable and familiar with the a/c that they flew, for the most part. There's nothing about Japanese air time or intensity of training that would necessarily make an IJN pilot better than a USMC/USN one. [QUOTE]Experience would only improve this.[/QUOTE] Quite so. The question is how great an improvement is combat experience relative to intensive training? Seems to me from the many accounts that I have read that most pilots in retrospect felt that particular dogfights were won or lost more or less before they began: initial conditions dominated the outcome. One can train pilots to recognize adverse initial conditions and to avoid engagements on those terms. In general, the pilots with the faster or more rugged planes (that allow them to disengage at will and that give them a slightly longer initial grace period by a few seconds when "bounced") are the ones that win. [QUOTE]iven the way that air battles tend to degenerate often into one on one encounters [/QUOTE] I disagree with the premise. You've read at least one of Lundstrom's books. Please read it again. Look at all the instances where two or three USN or IJN pilots made siultaneous approaches on a single plane, each claiming the kill. (Never mind the instances where they all claimed a kill when in fact the target escaped!!!) [QUOTE] how would the experience and solid training of a Japanese pilot be wasted? [/QUOTE] It's a matter of expectations. If you expect your opponent's machine to perform like the ones you've previously engaged, then tactics developed for use against a different machine may not work as well in the novel situation. Likewise if you expect the next pilot to fly the same way as the last one, and he does not (but instead follows a tactical doctrine that is a radical departure from anything you've met before), much of what you learned about dealing with enemy a/c and their tactics is out the window. It does not mean you've forgotten how to fly your A6M, it just means that the ways you deal with the novel situation may be radically different from your prior experiences. [QUOTE]The Japanese certainly trained in tactics.[/QUOTE] Of course they did. As did the Allies. USN tactics were different, however. [QUOTE]Lundstrom particularly singled out the JNAF for its excellent tactical cohesion in combat during '42. That would indicate that early war Japanese pilots seem to have the do's and don'ts of multiple a/c combat combat understood.[/QUOTE] Which Lundstrom? In The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign he notes that Japanese cohesion was mixed. Sometimes Japanese sections were very cohesive and some times they were not. [QUOTE]Since you keep mentioning it, what was actually wrong with their tactics? They had no need for a Thatch weave. For the aircraft they flew, why weren't their tactics suitable? I do accept the fact that as a lot of their early aircraft rarely had functioning radio's and that they used the outdated vic formation would restrict their options. [/QUOTE] Ah. I won't argue the point as to whether their tactics were suited to their a/c. I will note that Japanese attacks by a single section tended to involve planes making a linear series of passes at the target. You can read this in Sakai, for example, in the attack on Kelly's B17. For a rugged monster like a B17E this meant minimizing the concentration of firepower and allowing your target to engage you in detail. For fighters like the F4 and P40 it meant that the American pilot was able to use his extensive knowledge of his a/c to thwart the approach run of each IJN a/c in detail, presenting them with deflection shots at higher speeds (something to which the IJN pilots were not used, because the CNAF pilots were not up to the same level of training as the Allied ones). Since the Japanese were manifestly worse at deflection shooting (they were much less rigorous in training at that skill), the novel situation reduced their effectiveness. The Japanese also lost several veteran pilots around cactus using maneuvers that worked against Polkarpovs and Curtiss Hawks flown by the CNAF: one of these was common if an IJN pilot overshot its target. Easy to do even for veterans. Pulling up in front of your target and using superior speed and climb to get above around and behind a Pk or P36 is not so dangerous because the CNAF pilots were not very well trained (lousy deflection shooting skills among these) and the a/c had popgun armament using standard rifle caliber guns. The same maneuver used against an F4F could easily get your plane shot out because the USMC/USN pilots were outstanding deflection shooters and because the .50 has longer range and much more hitting power. [QUOTE]The failure of the JAAF and JNAF to counter the allied energy tactics was heavily influenced by the limitations of the zeros and oscars that they flew.[/QUOTE] Quite so. Indeed, mvr was the only way to fight in an Oscar because it was the only card in the Oscar's hand. [QUOTE]Have you read of the way the Japanese pilots used aircraft like the Jack, Tojo and Tony?[/QUOTE] Through the first half of 1943 they used them for the most part the same way the mvr fighters were used. Seeking out solo turning engagements. The IJAAF seems to have been less reluctant to shift tactics (read in Lundstrom ~@Guadalcanal the final ch in which one of the interviewed IJNAF pilots laments that in 1943 group commanders were still downplaying team tactics). Of course, because the Tony was basically an ME109 with more service problems, its best play was boom and zoom. [QUOTE]You seem to put a lot of faith in US training and tactics. I've read plenty of accounts indicating a tendency for new US squadrons to tend to go for dogfighting rather than energy fights (especially the USAAF). [/QUOTE] I've read plenty of histories, mostly dating through until about 1980 where this was asserted to be correct. Lundstrom's research substantially eliminated this claim for the USN/USMC. Put it quite to rest, really, and the point is not worth debating for teh USN/USMC. [QUOTE]My understanding was that the USAAF were still training their pilots with an emphasis in dogfighting until '43. [/QUOTE] I'm not aware of that claim in detail. I believe it may be correct for USAAF pilots trained through mid 1941. The USAAF began training pilots in mutual support largely because of analyses of the Battle of Britain. It may have taken a year for better advice to filter down through the knottiest points in the bureaucracy. Undoubtedly some USAAF pilots trained in 1941 (and veterans) had got the word via Chennault and the analyses of the BOB and had changed their style. The USN revised its doctrine earlier, although the "Thach Weave" as a specific maneuver (one of many mutual support maneuvers) did not gain doctrinal importance until June 1942. [QUOTE]Experienced combat leaders often had trouble stopping their new charges from doing it. Even the USN/USMC in late '42 had a lot of trouble with their new pilots (despite energy training) doing the same thing.[/QUOTE] No training program was perfect. Undoubtedly there were many late war 1944-45 Japanese pilots flying better a/c, including IJAAF veterans (whose attrition rates had not been as egregious as the IJNs) who were flying to the wrong tactics. For me what is important is the central tendency. [QUOTE]Finally, could you also explain the actual details of the US Advanced Fighter Training (and when it came into common practice).[/QUOTE] Mid 1942. It was (ironically) instituted as a response to "high" loss rates among USN/USMC pilots. This says, I think, more about sensitivity to casualties and initial expectations than it does about loss rates. The USN/USMC expected an easy time of it, and found the reality different from their expectation. Of course, it was not until mid-1942 that the US was able to field combat vets to training programs that could really enhance the training program. Moreover, the Allies constantly strove to reduce loss rates, whatever the cause. IMO the Japanese were a bit more fatalistic about losses or perhaps merely nonplussed. They certainly were very slow to react to novel contexts. Of course, if you really believed you were shooting down 4 hostiles for each of your own pilots that you lost (rather than 1:1 and later 1:2 or worse) then you might not even know you had a problem.

mogami -> The Japanese problem (11/5/2002 3:08:51 AM)
"if you really believed you were shooting down 4 hostiles for each enemy you lost (rather than 1:1 and later 1:2 or worse) then you might not even know you had a problem." Hi, I think that says miles. Land combat tactics did not change because there were no survivors to Island Assaults to teach the next batch. The pilots did not change because they were "winning"

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/5/2002 5:02:38 AM)
Actually, Island defense tactics DID change over time. The defense of Tarawa, and the defense of Iwo Jima (the first and last small island assaults) were completely different in the concept and scope of defense. Tarawa relied on throwing back the defenders on the beaches. Virtually nothing was done to prepare inland defenses. Gradually, Japanese islands were defended better, with greater in-depth defenses and better planned coast defense. By the Iwo Jima landing the IJA was pretty 'effective' in maximizing what they had to work with. They still lost, but each Allied Assault required more and more resources, men and equipment.

mdiehl -> (11/5/2002 5:13:50 AM)
True. Of course one can not be too critical for the lack of defense in depth at Tarawa. There's hardly any depth there to defend.

mogami -> OK (11/5/2002 9:21:51 AM)
Hi, OK OK lets not get overly picky. Land combat did not change all that much. The Japanese were very slow in recognizing the need for weapon changes. Climate effects, Even though the large plan changed between Tarawa and Iwo, the squad level operations remained the same. And the troops behaved the same. (without strict control they would revert to frontal assault mode) My point with out trying to write a novel was simply the Japanese believed there was no problem withiground combat doctrine . And their aircraft were scoring victories at an acceptable ratio so there was no need for change (just increase production). For a Japanese perception of the war. One must see the movie "Zero" made by the same people who brought "Godzilla" It was not intended as a comedy. It might be the all time worst war movie except it does show what the Japanese thought then.

Jeremy Pritchard -> (11/5/2002 10:05:16 AM)
The main problem with the IJN Land Forces was the lack of a mass produced SMG. They did have an adequate SMG in the Type 100 series (copied Swiss design) and used some early German SMG's, but did not use them in mass, althoug the Infantry was demanding more of them! http://home.wanadoo.nl/thomas.kolley/smg.htm http://member.nifty.ne.jp/takixxx/smg.htm Curiously, after 1941 Japan did not pursue major changes in weapon, weapon systems, tactics, or, for the most part, doctrine. No new tanks were designed. Aircraft and ships saw few design changes. Until 1944 Japanese infantry tactics remained the same. They used coordinated attacks to develop a position, banzai charges to reduce or eliminate defensive lines, and infiltration to reduce strong points or cut off retreats. On the defence the banzai charge was overemployed and resulted in many, many Japanese casualties. In 1944, especially at Peleliu, and Okinawa, the Japanese replaced the banzai charge with a determined defensive doctrine to make their opponents fight for every inch of ground.=20 Curiously, during the course of the war the minor countries like Finland, Hungary, and Rumania showed more apparent improvements in their art of war than did Japan. One can only speculate that after 1941 Japan lacked the resources or the necessary foresight for advancing their tools of war, or that the AFV and aerial superiority werefar more important in driving technical developments between warring countries. http://www.coastalfortress.com/Media/aslml6-8.txt HOWEVER, I have read a lot into tactics deployed in New Guinea in 1942, and they do directly contrast a lot of those used in Guadalcanal. The South Seas Detachment used some brilliant tactics in attacking and withdrawing down the Kokoda trail. Major General Horii set up some brilliant ambushes, and used his forces intelligently and with the goal of keeping his men alive vs. stand and die. I have read up on some of his defensive positions and operations where one of his battalions held up a Brigade of Australian Infantry long enough for the main force to escape, and even the rearguard battalion escaped! The main problem he faced was lack of supplies, and that he died while trying to ford across a river. Realistically, tactics did vary from commander to commander. Some used very effective tactics during their attacks/defences, while others were wreckless. Yamashita absolutely refused to allow his forces to attack US formations durign the Luzon landing. The IJN forces were not under his command, and refused to follow instructions, along with Lt.Gen Yokoyama who commanded Shimbu Group who counterattacked when he 'felt he might succeed'. Had Yamashita put his 100 000 man direct force in Bataan, where it would keep Manila Harbour closed, his defense would have been much more potent. Also, IJA tactics remained farily effective in Burma until troops were spent on the 1944 offensive. The many engagements in the Arakan met with tactical and strategic success against fairly well trained, equipped and led troops. I guess it depends what commander is in command as to what tactics were to be used. Although weapons did not change much (until 1944, when SMG's, Assault Guns, etc. started appearing), tactics were not similar accross the board. Possibly Japanese troop effectiveness against entrenched and strong forces should be determined by the leader in command? Some might use effective and responsive tactics, while others remain solidly traditional.

msvknight -> (11/5/2002 10:09:19 AM)
Of course guys, all of these arguments are a little verbose and possibly need to be summarised. 1) All countries trained their own pilots to an identical standard, and yet even the ones with inferior tactics threw up ace pilots. 2) Only the Commonwealth and the US were able to have the luxury of withdrawing pilots. Hence these nations were able to enhance their training programmes. From a game point of view, it could be seen as swapping 95 points of experience for 100 replacement pilots at 3-5 points of experience extra. It is a trade-off. 3) Virtually everybody else flew their pilots until they lost them. These pilots probably did get slightly (and I mean slightly) better than their Allied equivalents due to pure experience. Common sense would seem to suggest this. Unfortunately an infinite amount of historical anecdotes can never prove this one way or the other. 4) It seems that a larger difference is the aircraft. The pilot rating is only there to indicate that given identical aircraft, the pilot with the higher rating should win in the majority of cases. We have ample evidence where supposedly superior pilots were defeated by a pilot flying a superior machine. I still believe that the way to fix it is to place allied training at a higher level than Japanese, but that the Allied pilots get withdrawn to the pilot pool after a certain number of missions. I have noticed that the Allied squadrons tend to fly their aces to death anyway, so they would get withdrawn at say 50 missions. They could still reappear from the pilot form, but with a reset mission total. As to Sakai; so he made a mistake. Every dead ace and probably most of the live ones probably made a mistake at one stage or another. Don't worry about it. Remember Hartmann got shot down 16 (or was it 17) times. Luck has a lot to do with survival. Who would remember Galland if some lucky Russian pilot had bounced him in 1936?

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