RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (Full Version)

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cookie monster -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 3:19:14 AM)

How else do you model "Human Wave doctrine" in a war game?

The Soviets take lots of casualties whilst pushing back the Axis.

So you have a good reserve unit commitment and the odds swing in your favour, the Soviet Generals pour more men into the battle and eventually overpower you.

The Soviets took horrific casualties and gained a so called "victory".

Do I have to say again... You would have to be mad to fight at one to one odds as the Soviets. It's a real experience killer seeing your units become shredded.

It would be nice if another Soviet player could say how often they attack at 1-1 odds, it's probably not necessary as it's been said before.

--------------------------------------------
There's a very large bandwagon around here...

It revolves around.

1. Soviet 1-1 odds.

2. Excessive Soviet Rail Cap

3. First Winter

4. Forts

5. The games broke Axis can't WIN yada yada

Try getting yer butt kicked as the Soviets for 20 turns, cos it sure ain't fun playing "Supermen vs Ants".

So even though Soviets have to endure a pounding... I know lets make them even more difficult to play.[:D]




Lieste -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 3:32:36 AM)

Maybe ants is wrong too - because German losses in July/August were a hell of a lot higher than Dec/Jan. Current tempos don't match this at all.
Good tactical performance by Russian troops, but a poor strategic/operational situation, against superior tactical and operational situation of the German forces might be a closer match than inept/disgraceful tactical performance with relatively smooth running strategic options (which are largely irrelevant due to poor troops).

Supply cap enforcement also affects German movements (just slightly less so due to more efficient use of smaller numbers of weapons - the concentration of Pz formations should be tough though... they need a huge amount of rail, and large supplies of fuel and ammunition compared to an ID).




Mynok -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 4:38:50 AM)


I wouldn't mind seeing the 1-1 thing go away after 42. Trust me...the Soviets don't need it after that. Indeed I do not recall it ever being a factor in  the 43 campaign with Oleg I'm playing.




Wild -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 5:37:16 AM)

I usually find myself in agreement with you Cookie, but on this issue i guess we will have to agree to disagree.
I understand your argument, but the whole rule just seems artificial to me. Seeing as how the developers are spending time making code changes for this,there seems to be some merit to getting rid of this rule.

By the way, sure the Soviets get smashed in '41, but they have to in order for the axis to have a chance.
Just look in Q-ball vs.Tarhunnas AAR. The Germans pounded the Soviets hard in the summer but the Soviets were still able to have a deadly winter offensive.
The first 20 turns the Soviets get pounded like you say, but there are a whole lot of turns after that where it's not that way.




Baelfiin -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 6:53:22 PM)

Playing as the Soviets some of my most favorite moments in the summer of 1941 are when I get to dogpile that panzer division that is all alone out on the point of the advance. And everytime I do, the casualties are high for the Red Army even though the panzer goes flying. I don't recommend attacking at 1-1 odds, because you will run out of dudes that can attack at all very quickly. For all of the nay-sayers out there complaining about play balance, how many of you have actually played the game to a conclusion (on the map, not in your mind) of the game? I think that all of the whining about the game design can probably be summed up with a quote from a wargaming buddy of mine, " It's impossible to design and play-balance a game that will compensate for player incompetence."




hfarrish -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 6:59:50 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Wild


Just look in Q-ball vs.Tarhunnas AAR. The Germans pounded the Soviets hard in the summer but the Soviets were still able to have a deadly winter offensive.



It's worth noting on this point that Tarhunnas did launch a brilliant late summer campaign but took a lot of risks that he is now paying for. I would still maintain that the lack of any effective supply constraints on the Soviets once they flip to the aggressor is a far bigger issue than the 1-1 odds modifier. It's the scale and scope of the offensives that allow them to become overwhelming, not the modifier. This becomes doubly true in 42 and 43.




hfarrish -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 7:25:28 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Lieste

Maybe ants is wrong too - because German losses in July/August were a hell of a lot higher than Dec/Jan. Current tempos don't match this at all.
Good tactical performance by Russian troops, but a poor strategic/operational situation, against superior tactical and operational situation of the German forces might be a closer match than inept/disgraceful tactical performance with relatively smooth running strategic options (which are largely irrelevant due to poor troops).



I think this is probably onto something in terms of feel...but given that 41 is right about where it should be in terms of results (IMO) I'm afraid to revisit a lot of the thinking that went into how it gets there.




arras -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 7:33:20 PM)

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

Only place where I find Soviet doctrine of "human wave" are computer games!




TulliusDetritus -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 8:05:31 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: arras

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

Only place where I find Soviet doctrine of "human wave" are computer games!



The root of the whole thing lies in the social system of the USSR. Lenin himself had said that if the country was attacked the Red Army would be "the most agressive army of history".

In other words, the military professionals have NOTHING to do here. What they did, of course, is developing this "agressive" army theory thing. Which is why the Red Army focused on attacking, not in defending.

It's easy to see that this "agressive" thing lead to unnecessary, suicidal attacks: the waves you describe.

But again, it was about the revolutionary spirit. Not about some random military formulating this doctrine from his desk [;)]




cookie monster -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/24/2011 9:01:44 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: arras

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.

Only place where I find Soviet doctrine of "human wave" are computer games!



Anyway here's some info. I'm not gonna dig further I'm just gonna accept what was written in the manual.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_wave#Usage




Zebedee -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 1:46:33 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mynok


I wouldn't mind seeing the 1-1 thing go away after 42. Trust me...the Soviets don't need it after that. Indeed I do not recall it ever being a factor in  the 43 campaign with Oleg I'm playing.




I've been playing a fair amount of the late war campaigns and agree very much with you. It's overkill with a historical late-war Soviet army. Will be interesting to see whether it makes it through the play testing or not or if having it in place just to buttress the early to mid war Red Army would be possible.




delatbabel -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 2:04:29 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Mynok


I wouldn't mind seeing the 1-1 thing go away after 42. Trust me...the Soviets don't need it after that. Indeed I do not recall it ever being a factor in  the 43 campaign with Oleg I'm playing.



I would get rid of it as soon as the Soviets left the USSR.

As I've observed before, troops on home territory are more reluctant to retreat.




carlkay58 -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 3:48:30 AM)

I believe that the difference in the combat results for the Axis and the Soviets is meant to illustrate the difference in tactics between the two sides. Remember that the historical rule of thumb is that the attacker must have at least 3-1 odds to have a chance of victory on a reliable basis.

The Axis would gain that 3-1 odds by concentrating their troops into a smaller portion of the 10 mile hex and forcing their way through. This leads to a more efficient use of forces in a smaller space and less casualties for the attacker.

The Soviet tactics were to attack along a broad front - probably close to all 10 miles in the hex - and then reinforce success by pouring more men and equipment where the previous "wave" made a penetration. Sort of a very blunt "recon by force" technique. The Soviets usually had a minimum of 3, but preferred at least 5, "waves" of attack with each "wave" compressing down to the smaller areas where progress was made. Many more casualties, but much more likely to force the defender out of positions due to outflanking maneuvers.

Since we are talking about odds between forces across the entire 10 mile hex, this was a designer decision on how to replicate these differences.




gradenko2k -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 7:05:27 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Wild

I am very glad to here that this 1-1 odds thing might get changed.

I have to agree with Helio's first post. All the work to make things detailed, realistic and dare i say it "Historic" and it is all thrown away by some cheap gimmick of play balancing.
This is really my biggest complaint about the game.

In my opinion we just need to model the small things correctly and the big things will take care of themselves. No need for artificial play balancing.

I think the issue is not so much that there's a consideration for the differences in Soviet operational doctrine, but rather that the consideration is done via an abstracted mechanic in a game that prides itself on explicit simulation rather than abstraction.

That is, if you're going to do a +1 odds rule anyway, did you really step back from the concept of a CRT?




Uxbridge -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 9:15:27 AM)

Having re-read the retreat rules, it suddenly struck me that I have overlooked (or rather, never understood) a major factor on this issue. When the German or Soviet attacker gains the magic 2-1 or 1-1 needed, the defender withdraws. I was always under the impression that once the prescribed odds level was reached, there would be a probability of a retreat, whereas I now see that it is indeed a certainty. Cookie, Flavio or anybody else who knows this for sure, can you confirm it?

If this is the case, then the issue must be regarded in a totally different light, and I will take back my earlier view that both sides should have 1-1 as a requisite for retreat. Surely, it would be impossible that a defender would retreat as soon as the attacker gains 1-1. The only question, unless the provisions for a retreat could be changed entirely, is therefore, in my view, if the Soviets should also have 2-1 as condition.




Wild -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 9:22:02 AM)

"Having re-read the retreat rules, it suddenly struck me that I have overlooked (or rather, never understood) a major factor on this issue. When the German or Soviet attacker gains the magic 2-1 or 1-1 needed, the defender withdraws. I was always under the impression that once the prescribed odds level was reached, there would be a probability of a retreat, whereas I now see that it is indeed a certainty. Cookie, Flavio or anybody else who knows this for sure, can you confirm it?"

From what i have seen, it's a certainty.




Speedysteve -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 10:05:00 AM)

I can confirm this. When the final odds are 2:1> then they'll retreat




Uxbridge -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 12:09:45 PM)

Well, then I finally understand some coments on this that I earlier thought rather odd. [:)]

This is probably much more complicated, then, and likely to be difficult to change even if the programmers were to show a desire for it. The 2-1/1-1 tilt is more understandable seen from this new perspective.















Joel Billings -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 6:13:14 PM)

The variability in results does not come from the chance of a unit retreating at a given after combat CV odds, it comes from all the factors that have major randomness added to them when calculating the final CV values. That is, units that survive combat and are not damaged or disrupted count into the CV totals for determining which side retreats, but their CV is modified by many factors that include some major die rolls. From the manual:

There are many factors that go into determining the modified combat values used in deciding
the winner and loser in a ground battle. One of the most critical is the leader combat (mech
or infantry) rating check. A successful check can result in the CV of the combat unit being
doubled. Several failed checks can result in the CV being halved. As with other leader checks,
a failed check by one leader will allow the next leader in the chain of command to attempt
a combat rating check, albeit at a reduced chance of success. Other factors that impact
the modified combat value include battle losses, the fortification defense modifier (possibly
reduced due to attacking engineers), type of attack (hasty attacks halve the overall CV),
command battle modifier, leader and unit morale, leader initiative and admin ratings, ground
element experience and fatigue, supply status (severe penalty possible if units are isolated),
vehicle shortages for attackers and defending reserve units, and effect on fighting in an urban
hex for AFV/combat vehicles (halved) and infantry (doubled).




Uxbridge -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/25/2011 7:32:03 PM)

Yes, I see. Thanks. Although still a bit wary, I'm much more relaxed in regard to the retreats now.

Only wish that it was also possible to affect the likelihood of retreats by giving the defending units general orders of stance. Deafault would be as it is now. But I would like to be able to order a unit to either stand fast or retreat quickly if opposed by a superior attacker. This should be done either unit by unit or corps by corps. If given a stand fast order, the CV would be higher, but losses also more severe should the unit/stack fail its defense. If given a retreat early order, the defending unit/units would scurry off quickly when attacked in force, with less losses. In the latter case, the attacker should not expend operational points at the same scale as if the defence would have been default or stand fast.




Ron -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 1:48:21 PM)

Playing halfway through the '42 season now, I am coming to the realization, perhaps mistaken, that the 1:1 forces the German player to create static lines and extensive Forts ala WWI just to make their CVs competitive, and this all in '42 mind you. Realistic? Historical?




gradenko2k -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 2:13:32 PM)

quote:

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.


Just as WITE's "morale" concept can be more accurately termed as "force proficiency" (to borrow from the Operational Art of War), the concept of "human wave tactics" can probably be more accurately termed as "Soviet deep battle", wherein the Red Army attacks all across the line until one part breaks*, then hurls the second echelon into the break to hold it open, then a third echelon would exploit the break into the enemy's rear areas.

It then follows (and was historically demonstrated) that such a doctrine will be very costly in terms of casualties and resources, as you're amassing forces to attack everywhere, then doing so and hoping for a break somewhere.

* To provide a contrast, German operational doctrine was more about identifying a specific point along the line where you wanted to create a break, and concentrating your heavy forces along that point: The schwerpunkt. The key difference is in how the break is created in the first place.




herwin -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 3:09:35 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

quote:

Can somebody point me to war or prewar time Soviet army manual, political manifesto or any other primary source which orders Soviet commanders perform "human wave" attacks? Or something which can be described as such? Newer ever in my life I saw such "doctrine" been defined in any relevant literature.


Just as WITE's "morale" concept can be more accurately termed as "force proficiency" (to borrow from the Operational Art of War), the concept of "human wave tactics" can probably be more accurately termed as "Soviet deep battle", wherein the Red Army attacks all across the line until one part breaks*, then hurls the second echelon into the break to hold it open, then a third echelon would exploit the break into the enemy's rear areas.

It then follows (and was historically demonstrated) that such a doctrine will be very costly in terms of casualties and resources, as you're amassing forces to attack everywhere, then doing so and hoping for a break somewhere.

* To provide a contrast, German operational doctrine was more about identifying a specific point along the line where you wanted to create a break, and concentrating your heavy forces along that point: The schwerpunkt. The key difference is in how the break is created in the first place.


For background, read Dick Simpkin's Deep Battle : The Brainchild of Marshall Tukhachevski or Colonel Glanz's work.




arras -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 6:40:38 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

The root of the whole thing lies in the social system of the USSR. Lenin himself had said that if the country was attacked the Red Army would be "the most agressive army of history".

In other words, the military professionals have NOTHING to do here. What they did, of course, is developing this "agressive" army theory thing. Which is why the Red Army focused on attacking, not in defending.

It's easy to see that this "agressive" thing lead to unnecessary, suicidal attacks: the waves you describe.

But again, it was about the revolutionary spirit. Not about some random military formulating this doctrine from his desk [;)]

Emphasize on attack and aggressiveness doesn't automatically lead in to "human wave". Germans were pretty aggressive themselves, yet nobody think that lead in to "human wave". there are about dozen different concepts of attack. So why wave?

quote:

ORIGINAL: cookie monster

Anyway here's some info. I'm not gonna dig further I'm just gonna accept what was written in the manual.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_wave#Usage

That wiki article claims single book by Paul Davis from 2001. Do anybody know what primary sources he uses? There must be order or manual which articulate such tactics. Red army was using military regulations just like any army from time of Napoleon. And there is plenty of military literature from Soviet Union, they had pretty developed military education system, just like any other modern army.

If Soviets were using human wave tactics, there must be plethora of military manuals and textbooks which define such tactics. So where is it? Idea of human wave imply itself that Red Army fought according to strict and rigid rules ...so where those rules, orders are???

quote:

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

Just as WITE's "morale" concept can be more accurately termed as "force proficiency" (to borrow from the Operational Art of War), the concept of "human wave tactics" can probably be more accurately termed as "Soviet deep battle", wherein the Red Army attacks all across the line until one part breaks*, then hurls the second echelon into the break to hold it open, then a third echelon would exploit the break into the enemy's rear areas.

It then follows (and was historically demonstrated) that such a doctrine will be very costly in terms of casualties and resources, as you're amassing forces to attack everywhere, then doing so and hoping for a break somewhere.

Deep battle is about engaging enemy in depth -tactical, operational, even strategical. There is nothing in it about throwing waves of humans on enemy lines. In fact "human wave" looks outright ridiculous from point of "deep battle". That theory was developed in USSR because WWI tactic was found insufficient.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_battle

Unless you can provide me with quotations from relevant Soviet military writers and theoreticians of course.

My impression so far is that famous soviet "human wave" tactics is just another of those Western stereotypes about Eastern front like another famous kliche of NKVD or barrier troops marching behind such "human wave" and shooting in to their backs to bolster courage.

There were of course occasions when Soviet commanders used unimaginative frontal attacks, often without support. But those are and where considered by Russians themselves as results of insufficient experience and faults of commanders doing it. Along with deficiencies in equipment and supply. It other worlds, such tactics was considered wrong! Exact opposite to it been part of established doctrine.

quote:

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

* To provide a contrast, German operational doctrine was more about identifying a specific point along the line where you wanted to create a break, and concentrating your heavy forces along that point: The schwerpunkt. The key difference is in how the break is created in the first place.

Germans did not develop operational doctrine until 1970.




arras -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 6:52:36 PM)

This is referencing to Soviet military art of war from approximately breakup of Soviet Union. But that art was based during that time heavily on WWII experiences:

quote:

2) Battle Drill & Initiative

Probably the most enduring stereotype of the Soviet way of war is that of rigidity - attacks at all costs, orders followed slavishly, tactics by the exact diagram in the manual regardless of the situation. This is also one of the stereotypes most likely to cause heartburn - or death - in an enemy facing a Soviet-style opponent executing the doctrine properly.

Remember this: A Soviet officer is expected to display initiative. When executing a Battle Drill or a superior's order, the orders given must be altered as necessary to fit the specific situation and mission. The drills are a route to speedy communication & execution in accordance with Patton's belief that "a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week".

Thus, the expectation of an officer runs in this manner: A situation arises. The officer arrives at a decision, with the help of those norms of conduct the officer belives to be applicable. The order is given as one or more battle drills, each modified as far as necessary to meet the needs of the mission. The Soviets would not consider an officer who did something stupid by following the letter of the book to have acted properly - they would consider the officer stupid.


A Report on Soviet tactics, by James Sterrett




gradenko2k -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 7:26:32 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: arras

Deep battle is about engaging enemy in depth -tactical, operational, even strategical. There is nothing in it about throwing waves of humans on enemy lines. In fact "human wave" looks outright ridiculous from point of "deep battle". That theory was developed in USSR because WWI tactic was found insufficient.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_battle

Unless you can provide me with quotations from relevant Soviet military writers and theoreticians of course.

My impression so far is that famous soviet "human wave" tactics is just another of those Western stereotypes about Eastern front like another famous kliche of NKVD or barrier troops marching behind such "human wave" and shooting in to their backs to bolster courage.

There were of course occasions when Soviet commanders used unimaginative frontal attacks, often without support. But those are and where considered by Russians themselves as results of insufficient experience and faults of commanders doing it. Along with deficiencies in equipment and supply. It other worlds, such tactics was considered wrong! Exact opposite to it been part of established doctrine.

If you're looking for a quotation or a statement that definitively classifies the Soviets as deliberately attacking in "human waves" as a matter of course, you probably aren't going to find any.

If the original question is that "Where did the extra Soviet casualties and +1 modifier come from?", the answer would be that the devs looked at how the Soviets waged war/executed their operations and found that the way they did it, by their estimation, always yielded higher casualties. This does not imply that any of that was was done deliberately, but rather looking at it from a practical POV, as in it happened anyway despite the best of intentions.

The manual, when explaining the higher casualties and +1 modifier, itself does not mention the phrase "human wave". It just mentions that it's caused by how the Soviets did things relative to how the Germans did things.

Yes, in a pedantic sense, we probably shouldn't be saying "human wave" at all, and maybe the reasons of the devs for making these specific rules are not strong enough, but they did have their reasons to begin with.




herwin -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 8:28:36 PM)

I'd suggest reading the English-language materials on Soviet Military Doctrine. The Scotts published some interesting books on the subject. If you wonder where I get some of the ideas I have about the Red Army, they date to the days when I was reading the primary Russian sources.

I beg to differ about German operational art. In that case, you probably need to read the German primary sources. Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin authored a number of relevant books. I remember a German-language handbook on armoured operations by him that I acquired and learned a lot from.




arras -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 8:38:10 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: gradenko_2000

If the original question is that "Where did the extra Soviet casualties and +1 modifier come from?", the answer would be that the devs looked at how the Soviets waged war/executed their operations and found that the way they did it, by their estimation, always yielded higher casualties.

No, devs of course have their own ideas about what to represent and how. I may often disagree but that is that. I was asking about idea of "human wave" doctrine as referenced in this thread by various posters. And as commonly used in computer games.




arras -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 9:09:32 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

I'd suggest reading the English-language materials on Soviet Military Doctrine. The Scotts published some interesting books on the subject. If you wonder where I get some of the ideas I have about the Red Army, they date to the days when I was reading the primary Russian sources.

English sources is something I would like to avoid. Because they are often second hand source. Unless those are translated documents. In fact they are mostly third hand source since they usually used German sources for reference. Germans sources look at their Soviet opponents with despect mostly. But lets face it, Germans lost. They must have done something wrong.

In non of the Russian sources I saw something which can be interpreted as some deliberate application of anything which can be characterized as "human wave". Regardless of its name.

Eastern front saw its share of frontal infantry attacks. But they were done by Germans as well. I see them as either necessity, when there was no other, better mean of accomplishing objective or simply as lack of skill if there was. Soviets did not wage war very skilfully at the beginning. But that does not count with me been equal to deliberate use of "human wave" attack doctrine. Especially when later in war, they did not lack neither mobility, neither firepower to execute attack in better way. In such conditions idea of "human wave" must have looked idiotic to even stupid ones. And they did not win war by stupidity...

quote:

ORIGINAL: herwin

I beg to differ about German operational art. In that case, you probably need to read the German primary sources. Ferdinand von Senger und Etterlin authored a number of relevant books. I remember a German-language handbook on armoured operations by him that I acquired and learned a lot from.

I was not reading those two authors, however fact that Western countries, including Germany recognized operational level of military art only after war is something which can be found in different sources commonly. Look at references I posted already.

Anyway thanks for your tip, I look at those authors if I get my hands on their works.




Ketza -> RE: what is the opinion on this 1 to 1 retreat result for the Russian's (6/27/2011 9:26:46 PM)

My problem with the 1-1 retreat shift is the added casualties from the Axis retreat. When added to the actual casualties from battles in 1942 I am finding the Axis typically lose more troops and equipment then the Soviets in almost even odds encounters. From all I have read this is not how it was on the eastern front. This is a distinct advantage to the Soviets that in 1942 and beyond is very imbalancing.




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