RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision?

RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (Full Version)

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FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/13/2011 9:17:56 PM)
Mike scholl's post in the sister thread (and browsing other alternatives available on the net, I must admit) made me think that I might be overlooking Allied reaction on various Japanese shenanigans, primarily tonnage manipulations. More on that when we'll return to cruisers later. So far, just checking in the destroyer proposal, modified for new 120/45 Type 90 and 120/55 Type 98 guns. Modification of old DDs - as described previously, but 120/45 Type 90 replaces 127/40 Type 89. Otori-class TBs are not built. Building of modern DDs until Hatsuharu - as RL. 6 Hatsuharus - modify as DDAA as decribed above. Unshielded mounts probably need to be used. 10 Shiratsuyus - 3x2 120/45 Type 90 in properly enclosed turrets, 2x4 610mm TTs. Size and design as RL. 10 Asashios - main armament is the same as on the previous class, the main differences are turret positioning and powerplant. Hull is smaller compared to RL, allowing to save materials and achieve greater speed (36-37 knots) with the same power. 20 Kageros - slighly bigger, main armament is the same, but the number of depth charges on board is slightly increased. The main differences, as IRL, are lighter engine and greater cruise speed. Savings achieved by building smaller ships start to tell here, allowing to build 2 more DDs (and probably even have extra materials and money left for other projects). Yugumos - war emergency measures will start to kick in here, and design of these ships will be adjusted according to reports on the war in Europe from the start. They will be bigger and slower than Kageros, albeit smaller than RL Yugumos, and will carry a larger number of 25mm guns from the start (their depth charge load was improved already IRL). 3 will be available at the beginning of hostilities, and thereafter I think about 7 per year for 1942-44, owing to their smaller size, is not impossible. Akizuki - a super-Yugumo with 3x2 new 120/55 guns. Between RL Akizuki and Yugumo classes in size, and, like RL Akizuki, still using the same powerplant as Yugumo. Between being smaller, being more similar to Yugumos and not building extremely expensive Shimakaze, building at least 16 of these, with the first available in autumn of 1942, is not a stretch, I think. Matsu - I'm actually not very fond of this ship, for the reasons I'm not very fond of the opposite side of Japanese DD spectrum, RL Akizuki - in a desperate war they too will be used exactly as normal DDs, except if RL Akizukis were too expensive to lose, RL Matsus were too easy to lose - IIRC 3 out of 7 lost DDs of this class were destroyed in surface actions, for which they were poorly suited (Take managed to sink an american DD in return, though). While building an emergency design like this is probably inevitable, I'd propose making them slightly bigger, to house at least 2x2 120/45 Type 89 guns. APDs - a dozen of faster named APDs, as described by mikemike above in 1941-42, with 3-4 available at the beginning, start building Type 1 from late 1942, with avalability in 1943. I'm yet undecided where the main investment should be made during the war, that's why I'm not posted numbers on Matsus and only APD building really takes into account the postulated industry boost.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/13/2011 9:42:32 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: John 3rd B. World War One: Several officers who serve with the ASW Detachment in the Med realize that Japan MUST prepare for some sort of commerce war if she goes to war against a major power. This small faction agitates for better ASW Research, resources, and vessels. They also advocate for a Coastal Command HQ to coordinate a national response when needed. Unfortunately for Japanese, geography sort of screws them here - no suitable or easy to capture bases to wage sustained submarine warfare against any of the really vital enemy trade routes. Well, in case of reaching their RL perimeter they will be able to reach into some of them in the Indian Ocean, but at that stage overrunning everything up to India is a pipe dream. They plausibly can sound the alarms about the paramount importance of protecting one's own trade routes for an island nation, eventually leading to extensive conversions of old DDs for escort purposes and earlier order of dedicated Es, as I've outlined above. quote: ORIGINAL: John 3rdH. As war breaks out in Europe a large set of 'observers' travel to the region and absorb 'lessons' from what they see. For the Army and Navy this means: AIRPOWER. The ASW faction sees its fears realized with the German SS success against British Commerce. The Army...well...I am not really sure what they would see... Army (ground component), primarily needs industrial muscle to make new weapons appear on the frontlines in any significant numbers... Straightforward copying of usual early-war German designs is unhelpful here. They will of course try to absorb and copy German experience of mechanized warfare, as happened IRL (leading to creation of Japanese tank divisions), but difference in circumstances will make its usefulness limited.

JWE -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/13/2011 11:15:15 PM)
I would be very judicious about any technology transfers from Germany. Germany wouldn't do it in the first instance, and the Japanese doctrine was so vastly different that technology transfer would be non compos mentos. What you want to avoid is IJA SS Panzer Armies scouring the map. There wasn't much beyond electronics that Germany could offer, anyway. And even electronics she held close to the chest. So, Metox, cool. Japan had a cavity magnetron way before Germany (or anybody else, for that matter), so what's the point in German radar technology? Perhaps German operational use would open some eyes, but not German radar technology in 1941. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi radar; it wasn't. Aircraft engine technology was about the same, and I dare say Japan's was better, for radials. Germany perhaps had better fairing tech and aerodynamic modelling, but engines ? No! Airframes? No! Japan just didn't have the facilities to crack enough of the really high octane additives to make things go faster. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi airplanes; they weren't. As to subs, everybody knew that wall thickness equated to diving depth. And everybody know about the moduli of T and S grade steel. Japanese ship designers weren't stupid. Japan had a bunch of german War-I boats to evaluate and decided .. nah .. not what we want for our purposes. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi sub tech; it wasn't. Could go on and on, but this uber, ober, Nazi technology, wasn't. So please, oh please, don't go there.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/13/2011 11:53:25 PM)
If Japan sends observers to Europe on the outbreak of war, it'll be too late to change anything. As "FatR" points out, it's the industrial base that's the issue; Japan had a pitiful military industrial complex, and no realistic way of developing one without more raw materials which could not be gained without warfare.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/13/2011 11:56:20 PM)
quote: Historically, the German influence on Japan’s submarine force waned in the second half the 20’s, as IJN senior leadership drifted firmly into the shoals of the “Decisive Battle” doctrine, in which submarines would function as an integrated part of the battle fleet. By 1930, the last of the Germans had returned home. In my alternate history, however, things turned out differently. In May 1922, a German called Reinhardt Fischer debarked from a steamship in Yokohama. During The Great War, he had been a U-boat commander in the Atlantic, winning some renown for a number of audacious attacks, and was an almost fanatical believer in the independent use of submarines as weapons of war. Finding Japan to his liking, Fischer assimilated rapidly, learning the Japanese language, and making a number of close connections among junior and middle-ranking IJN officers. The charismatic and outspoken Fischer played a significant part in planting the seeds of an independent Japanese submarine arm, and by the time he died of a heart attack in the winter of 1929-30, the process was well underway. The biggest difference between the traditionalist viewpoint of submarine operations, where the boats were part of the battle fleet, and the new independent submarine doctrine was the concept of control. Under the control of the battle fleet, the submarines were meant to be essentially static torpedo batteries, deployed in strict patrol lines to wait for the enemy fleet to basically sail right over them. Each patrol line would be assigned a strict map position, and controlled by a flagship boat, thus requiring the individual submarines to come to the surface often in order to receive commands. This, combined with their lack of authority for independent movement or action, would doom the IJN submarine arm to playing fourth fiddle in the orchestra. Under the Fischer scheme, individual submarines would be assigned larger patrol sectors on the map for independent operations. It was recognized that the idea of central control would be almost impossible to implement effectively, not to mention counter-productive, and potentially deadly to the flagship boats. Furthermore, it would be beaten into the heads of IJN submarine captains that there was no such thing as an “unworthy target”; their boats would be commerce raiders, attack the enemy fleet train, everything they could put in front of their torpedo tubes. “Every enemy vessel, from the mightiest battleship to the smallest coastal steamer, supports his war machine and is a target that you must pursue with utmost aggressiveness. The only way you can fail the Emperor is by not pressing your attack home with all might. This is the way for Japan to win.” Commander Koizo Nakamura, senior lecturer at the Kure submarine school, to his students The above is a quote from a little paper I wrote for my own amusement on the issue of submarine warfare in our game. The point is turning the brains of the IJN away from seeing the submarine as a fleet weapon. On the materiél side, it has the IJN turning away from the giant fleet boats in 1935 and building medium-sized boats instead for use from forward bases. The subs also shift from the control of the numbered fleets to a single HQ.

Footslogger -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/13/2011 11:59:22 PM)
TERMY!! TOE

John 3rd -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 12:57:44 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Herrbear quote: ORIGINAL: John 3rd You've done a bunch of Postings this morning Stanislav! As I have been perusing the records of the Thread here are the big dates/events we've chosen to incorporate into our timeline: A. 1904-1906 Russo-Japanese War---The Imperial Fleet realizes how near of a thing the war was. The real lessons taken from the experience is that any war will be longer (1.5-2 years), be attritional, and require different planning. B. World War One: Several officers who serve with the ASW Detachment in the Med realize that Japan MUST prepare for some sort of commerce war if she goes to war against a major power. This small faction agitates for better ASW Research, resources, and vessels. They also advocate for a Coastal Command HQ to coordinate a national response when needed. C. Washington Treaty allows for the Japanese to build-up to 3.5 instead of 3.0. D. London Treaty does the same thing in 1930. E. Manchuria is invaded but the Japanese Army is reigned in and the occupation is much more peaceful. A concerted Japanese economic investment takes place here and in Korea. F. The Army Mutiny, spoken of on the previous page, is RUTHLESSLY put down and the middle grade of the Army Officers are forced to sit back instead of assassinate at will. A much stronger Privy Council takes hold that prepares for war as well as forces the Army and Navy to somewhat better cooperate. G. In 1939 open war breaks out in China as the Chinese Warlords will no longer be cowed. The army deploys into the region and massed fighting takes place. Once again, the progressive elements of the Japanese Army work to make the 'peace' in China much more passive. There is no Nanking... H. As war breaks out in Europe a large set of 'observers' travel to the region and absorb 'lessons' from what they see. For the Army and Navy this means: AIRPOWER. The ASW faction sees its fears realized with the German SS success against British Commerce. The Army...well...I am not really sure what they would see... I. In 1940 the Japanese sense opportunity and throw themselves in with Germany and Italy. The die is cast... Did I miss anything? Thoughts? Not that you have missed it, but just curious, regarding in building up the Mandated Islands. The agreement by Japan on 5:5:3 was accepted requiring the islands of the Pacific not being built up. In winning the 5:5:3.5 agreement is that corollary still in or are you looking at the ability of islands such as Guam, Carolines and so forth being able to be built up? That is an excellent possibility. Just commented about that in the other Thread.

John 3rd -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 1:06:10 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus quote: Historically, the German influence on Japan’s submarine force waned in the second half the 20’s, as IJN senior leadership drifted firmly into the shoals of the “Decisive Battle” doctrine, in which submarines would function as an integrated part of the battle fleet. By 1930, the last of the Germans had returned home. In my alternate history, however, things turned out differently. In May 1922, a German called Reinhardt Fischer debarked from a steamship in Yokohama. During The Great War, he had been a U-boat commander in the Atlantic, winning some renown for a number of audacious attacks, and was an almost fanatical believer in the independent use of submarines as weapons of war. Finding Japan to his liking, Fischer assimilated rapidly, learning the Japanese language, and making a number of close connections among junior and middle-ranking IJN officers. The charismatic and outspoken Fischer played a significant part in planting the seeds of an independent Japanese submarine arm, and by the time he died of a heart attack in the winter of 1929-30, the process was well underway. The biggest difference between the traditionalist viewpoint of submarine operations, where the boats were part of the battle fleet, and the new independent submarine doctrine was the concept of control. Under the control of the battle fleet, the submarines were meant to be essentially static torpedo batteries, deployed in strict patrol lines to wait for the enemy fleet to basically sail right over them. Each patrol line would be assigned a strict map position, and controlled by a flagship boat, thus requiring the individual submarines to come to the surface often in order to receive commands. This, combined with their lack of authority for independent movement or action, would doom the IJN submarine arm to playing fourth fiddle in the orchestra. Under the Fischer scheme, individual submarines would be assigned larger patrol sectors on the map for independent operations. It was recognized that the idea of central control would be almost impossible to implement effectively, not to mention counter-productive, and potentially deadly to the flagship boats. Furthermore, it would be beaten into the heads of IJN submarine captains that there was no such thing as an “unworthy target”; their boats would be commerce raiders, attack the enemy fleet train, everything they could put in front of their torpedo tubes. “Every enemy vessel, from the mightiest battleship to the smallest coastal steamer, supports his war machine and is a target that you must pursue with utmost aggressiveness. The only way you can fail the Emperor is by not pressing your attack home with all might. This is the way for Japan to win.” Commander Koizo Nakamura, senior lecturer at the Kure submarine school, to his students The above is a quote from a little paper I wrote for my own amusement on the issue of submarine warfare in our game. The point is turning the brains of the IJN away from seeing the submarine as a fleet weapon. On the materiél side, it has the IJN turning away from the giant fleet boats in 1935 and building medium-sized boats instead for use from forward bases. The subs also shift from the control of the numbered fleets to a single HQ. Excellent. This is the direction I think we are headed for with the IJN SS. We allow the building of the 'normal' Japanese SS until Circle Three (1934) and then move in a new direction with a capable medium-sized SS. Cheaper, more of them, and they might be darned effective until Allied ASW becomes too effective in 1943 and later. The new direction concurs with what we are talking about with slapping the IJA around some and allowing for a 'new vision' to take over. I wish I could find something written by Yamamoto regarding SS. He still adhered to the 'Decisive Battle' so I doubt if it would provide much ammunition but would love to see his thoughts.

John 3rd -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 4:35:22 AM)
ORIGINAL: John 3rd B. World War One: Several officers who serve with the ASW Detachment in the Med realize that Japan MUST prepare for some sort of commerce war if she goes to war against a major power. This small faction agitates for better ASW Research, resources, and vessels. They also advocate for a Coastal Command HQ to coordinate a national response when needed. Unfortunately for Japanese, geography sort of screws them here - no suitable or easy to capture bases to wage sustained submarine warfare against any of the really vital enemy trade routes. Well, in case of reaching their RL perimeter they will be able to reach into some of them in the Indian Ocean, but at that stage overrunning everything up to India is a pipe dream. They plausibly can sound the alarms about the paramount importance of protecting one's own trade routes for an island nation, eventually leading to extensive conversions of old DDs for escort purposes and earlier order of dedicated Es, as I've outlined above. I meant this to mean the Japanese would prepare to fight AGAINST a commerce war. We'd see the 36+ Escorts you described built before the war, creation of a Coastal Command as soon as war begins, and then the creation of dedicated ASW Ships to fight the war starting in late-42.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 10:40:27 AM)
I think an Escort Command HQ should be created before war breaks out and spend a few years training alongside the submariners.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 11:48:43 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus The above is a quote from a little paper I wrote for my own amusement on the issue of submarine warfare in our game. The point is turning the brains of the IJN away from seeing the submarine as a fleet weapon. On the materiél side, it has the IJN turning away from the giant fleet boats in 1935 and building medium-sized boats instead for use from forward bases. The subs also shift from the control of the numbered fleets to a single HQ. A good idea. It will require expanded submarine tender costruction, but as subs, at least in terms of money, ate a massive portion of the fleet's budget in the last years before the war, that should be possible with proper planning.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 11:58:36 AM)
There would be no conversions of the original subtenders, for one.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 12:02:47 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus I think an Escort Command HQ should be created before war breaks out and spend a few years training alongside the submariners. This is also very important, as IRL lack of attention to ASW training and tactics before the war was a major problem for IJN (USN had British to share their accumulated experience in this area). Similarly, submarine forces didn't honestly test their doctrine and tactics before the war.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 12:16:37 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: John 3rd I meant this to mean the Japanese would prepare to fight AGAINST a commerce war. I thought about 18 Es laid down before the war and over 50 old destroyers refitted with escort function in mind. A question to the devs here: does surface combat code treat DD/E/PC differently or it all just depends on ship's stats? I'd like to give above-mentioned refits a different class designation from the first-line DDs.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 1:26:31 PM)
No difference. Plenty of DD's upgrade to E's in the stock scens.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 1:32:20 PM)
Speaking of IJN convoy escorts, a pre-war escort command should lead to the consideration of a standard class of escort ship. In my mod, I call it the Sakikata ("Companion") class. This is essentially an IJN Flower-class corvette, meant for ease of construction above all else. About 1,000 tons, 16 knots, 4,000-mile range, 110cm gun and 12pdr gun with 2 DC rails and 18 DCs. Space for an additional Y-Gun and up-arming to about 50 DC's upon start of the war.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 3:46:26 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Speaking of IJN convoy escorts, a pre-war escort command should lead to the consideration of a standard class of escort ship. In my mod, I call it the Sakikata ("Companion") class. This is essentially an IJN Flower-class corvette, meant for ease of construction above all else. About 1,000 tons, 16 knots, 4,000-mile range, 110cm gun and 12pdr gun with 2 DC rails and 18 DCs. Space for an additional Y-Gun and up-arming to about 50 DC's upon start of the war. Rather too big, short-legged and underarmed compared to any of RL Japanese escorts. The idea of changes in the escort construction program, though, is sensible and logical, if the Escort Command exists before the war and tries to get its own slice of the budget pie. IRL, Shimushu-class escorts were not actually meant for escort duty, but for keeping tabs on the Soviets across the naval borders and economic zones in the north. They had rather complicated construction, simplyfing which took time on the following models. If there is a branch of the navy, clamoring for a mass-produced dedicated convoy escort, it might instead be developed separately before the war, with small test series already built.

oldman45 -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 3:52:58 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: FatR quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Speaking of IJN convoy escorts, a pre-war escort command should lead to the consideration of a standard class of escort ship. In my mod, I call it the Sakikata ("Companion") class. This is essentially an IJN Flower-class corvette, meant for ease of construction above all else. About 1,000 tons, 16 knots, 4,000-mile range, 110cm gun and 12pdr gun with 2 DC rails and 18 DCs. Space for an additional Y-Gun and up-arming to about 50 DC's upon start of the war. Rather too big, short-legged and underarmed compared to any of RL Japanese escorts. The idea of changes in the escort construction program, though, is sensible and logical, if the Escort Command exists before the war and tries to get its own slice of the budget pie. IRL, Shimushu-class escorts were not actually meant for escort duty, but for keeping tabs on the Soviets across the naval borders and economic zones in the north. They had rather complicated construction, simplyfing which took time on the following models. If there is a branch of the navy, clamoring for a mass-produced dedicated convoy escort, it might instead be developed separately before the war, with small test series already built. Might not be a bad idea to drop the Shimushu for a "Flower" type escort. They could also be built in regular ship yards which is a plus.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod (8/14/2011 4:16:48 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JWE I would be very judicious about any technology transfers from Germany. Germany wouldn't do it in the first instance, and the Japanese doctrine was so vastly different that technology transfer would be non compos mentos. What you want to avoid is IJA SS Panzer Armies scouring the map. There wasn't much beyond electronics that Germany could offer, anyway. And even electronics she held close to the chest. So, Metox, cool. Japan had a cavity magnetron way before Germany (or anybody else, for that matter), so what's the point in German radar technology? Perhaps German operational use would open some eyes, but not German radar technology in 1941. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi radar; it wasn't. Aircraft engine technology was about the same, and I dare say Japan's was better, for radials. Germany perhaps had better fairing tech and aerodynamic modelling, but engines ? No! Airframes? No! Japan just didn't have the facilities to crack enough of the really high octane additives to make things go faster. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi airplanes; they weren't. As to subs, everybody knew that wall thickness equated to diving depth. And everybody know about the moduli of T and S grade steel. Japanese ship designers weren't stupid. Japan had a bunch of german War-I boats to evaluate and decided .. nah .. not what we want for our purposes. So forget tech transfer of uber, ober Nazi sub tech; it wasn't. Could go on and on, but this uber, ober, Nazi technology, wasn't. So please, oh please, don't go there. I agree with this sentiment in general, but I do believe that Japanese would have benefitted from buying a license for an existing type of a flak cannon in 75-90mm range, or contracting one of European manufacturers to develop such cannon for them before the war (as they did with 25/60), instead of reverse-engineering guns they have captured from Chinese and British. Unfortunately, all high-ballistics, fully automatic 37-40mm guns potentially on the market before 1939 are poorly suited for mass production and/or naval use, so Japanese have nothing to obtain here.

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 5:37:50 PM)
A case could be made that the IRL Jap escorts were overarmed, but that's neither here nor there. The IJN escort command needs hulls in the water, ships that can be built quickly and cheaply in yards that would otherwise be lying idle. Secondly, the Sakikata is indeed relatively short-ranged, but the Jap convoy routes to the SRA are littered with ports that can be used as bases for escort groups, and my scheme envisions a sort of "relay race" where one group hands off a set of merchies to another on the way to the home islands. Third, I wasn't clear enough about the "standard" escort: the IJN is to have three groups of early-war ASW ships: - Old destroyers and torpedo boats with extra DC's. - The Sakikata class. - Small picket boat type classes, for doing point-defence ASW around ports. Fourth, the whole idea of the Sakikatas is to give the IJN an EARLY-WAR escort ship, something to hold the line. Later in the timeline, you can build something similar to IRL escorts. It's not terribly realistic to start out with an escort type carrying 100+ DCs (nobody had that), but you can certainly justify it from 1943 onward.

JWE -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 8:03:13 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Fourth, the whole idea of the Sakikatas is to give the IJN an EARLY-WAR escort ship, something to hold the line. Later in the timeline, you can build something similar to IRL escorts. It's not terribly realistic to start out with an escort type carrying 100+ DCs (nobody had that), but you can certainly justify it from 1943 onward. I do agree completely. Both the US and UK had extensive ASW experience in War-I and neither of them had dedicated escorts with big DC load-outs at the beginning of War-II. 24 to 36 was the best they had, from two stern rails. Brits added a Y-gun or 2, to those ships that had the open transom space (not bloody many), and the US followed (that was how they got from 24 to 36). It wasn't for quite a while till escorts got K-guns and a decent DC load-out. There's no reason that Japan, given its lesser involvement and experience, would be more perceptive (that's hindsight). Japan should start with the ASW suites she had. But ... Japan had Shimushus and Hashidates (a few of each) on opening day, so rather than beefing up the ASW suite (not goodnik) just build some more Kaibokan. I like Termy's Sakikatas, but whether it's them or Shimushus, I think numbers are a better objective than early war capability. The cost issue is an apples to oranges thing. Ok, a Shimushu Type-A (or Etorofu/Mikura/Ukuru Type-B) was way more expensive than a Type-C or D, but compared to a 'special type' DD, they were butt-cheap; and way more cost effective for their mission. I would go with Termy on this one.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 10:55:57 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus A case could be made that the IRL Jap escorts were overarmed, but that's neither here nor there. The IJN escort command needs hulls in the water, ships that can be built quickly and cheaply in yards that would otherwise be lying idle. Secondly, the Sakikata is indeed relatively short-ranged, but the Jap convoy routes to the SRA are littered with ports that can be used as bases for escort groups, and my scheme envisions a sort of "relay race" where one group hands off a set of merchies to another on the way to the home islands. Third, I wasn't clear enough about the "standard" escort: the IJN is to have three groups of early-war ASW ships: - Old destroyers and torpedo boats with extra DC's. - The Sakikata class. - Small picket boat type classes, for doing point-defence ASW around ports. Fourth, the whole idea of the Sakikatas is to give the IJN an EARLY-WAR escort ship, something to hold the line. Later in the timeline, you can build something similar to IRL escorts. It's not terribly realistic to start out with an escort type carrying 100+ DCs (nobody had that), but you can certainly justify it from 1943 onward. Sounds solid this way, thanks for sharing your thoughts. The composition of dedicated ASW forces I had in my head is quite similar: 1)DD/TB conversions. Only the less valuable half, modernized TBs, will be actually given to the Escort Command. The Escort Command will want more, preferably newly-built DD-ASW (variations on Matsu theme), but these will remain only on blueprints before the war. Assigned for most vital convoys, whenever possible. 2)Kaibokans. Evolved from large subchasers, instead of Shimushus (note that type C/D escorts had the engines comparable to that of large Japanese SCs - 1700 hps on the most numerous Type 28 SC, 1900 on Type C kaibokan, so this is not a stretch). Still thinking on exact types. Large SCs are eventually abandoned by the Escort Command, due to their inherent inferiority. Kaibokans are workhorces of the Escort Command, doing most of the routine jobs. 3)Auxilary subschasers of sufficiently simple construction to be handled by small shipyards that were building fishing trawlers and other small coastal ships before the war. For escorting coastal convoys and harbor defense. designed with the possibility of construction on civilian shipyards in mind. I don't think that production of a really stripped-down design is plausible before the war even then. will want newer ships of similar capabilities (although it will not get them before the war), resulting in earlier development Naval Ministry

John 3rd -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 11:18:13 PM)
Been gone all day at the Denver Zoo. Nice give-and-take of ideas and concepts. Have no objection whatsoever to the ASW composition and command set-up. Odd question: WHERE would be the appropriate place for a Japanese 'Coastal Command' HQ? Would it be in Osaka? Nagasaki? Tokyo?

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 11:29:25 PM)
Kobe, right down the road from the submarine school. Helps to inculcate proper cooperation between the branches.

John 3rd -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/14/2011 11:52:19 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Kobe, right down the road from the submarine school. Helps to inculcate proper cooperation between the branches. PERFECT! I like the symmetry of that.

oldman45 -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/15/2011 4:48:50 AM)
FatR- they may not quit building the large SC's because they can be built at any yard and they are cheap and easy to build. Look at the Brits, the Flowers were not the best ASW platform but any yard could build them, in the mean time they are designing the newer boats that come out in 43-45 Rivers etc

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/15/2011 3:12:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: oldman45 FatR- they may not quit building the large SC's because they can be built at any yard and they are cheap and easy to build. That's the qualities that are neeeded from Es, except larger Es are considerably more operationally useful in all ways, while, as noted above, using only slightly more powerful engines, even compared to Ch-13/Ch-28 subchasers.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/15/2011 3:38:00 PM)
So, returning to our post-treaty battleships: 1)A 460mm gun is rejected during early research stages because of its massive cost of its production and replacing guns that exceeded their barrel life (relining them was practically impossible). As the conflict is expected to be protracted, this is unacceptable. A more modest 410/50 gun is created for new battleships instead. 2)This leads to increased emphasis on maintaining a favorable distance of engagement in a battleship battle. In combination with greater influence of the carrier faction, leads to requirement of 30-knot speed. 3)Protection remains on the level of Yamato, to ensure qualitative superiority against American and British battleships. Greater accuracy of Japanese heavy guns at long ranges alone cannot ensure this superiority in a battleship battle, and increasing the number of guns beyond 9-10 will make the ship even more heavy, making it difficult to achieve the necessary speed. 4)All possible weight-saving measures are implemented to achieve necessary speed. Secondary anti-DD battery is not used. Instead it is planned to arm the new BBs with about 20 of 120/55 DP guns, still in development during its design, but delays with their development and production will cause the first two new battleships (those available before the war) will be initially armed with old 120/45 Type 89 twins. All main calibre turrets are positioned forward, to reduce the citadel's length, like on the initial A-140 project: [image]local://upfiles/33131/16818AB2844844AE8DEB38AE06F09616.gif[/image] Reduction in range to about 6000-7000 nms can be accepted, if necessary. 8000 is the desirable figure. The questions are - can the most powerful Japanese turbine (160 000 hps) produce the necessary speed on this project (so that we won't inadverently go past both plausibility Yamato's price tag), and what will be its displacement?

Terminus -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/15/2011 4:17:58 PM)
Are you replacing or supplementing older classes, because I could see this as a Kongo replacement class. 46-48,000 tons and 29 knots.

FatR -> RE: The PERFECT WAR Mod: What is the Vision? (8/15/2011 5:10:28 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus Are you replacing or supplementing older classes, because I could see this as a Kongo replacement class. I suppose project A-150 will be meant to serve as Nagato replacement then[:)]. But indeed, without the war these ships might well eventually replace Kongos, when the latter will be too worn out for use, but the war will happen before that. As all Kongos but Hiei finish their second reconstruction 3-4 years before these ships will be available, said reconstruction still happens as IRL. quote: ORIGINAL: Terminus 46-48,000 tons and 29 knots. 29 is acceptable, I think.

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