IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (Full Version)

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Commander Stormwolf -> IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 2:30:37 AM)

Greetings,

it is wondered if perhaps the IJN's reports from liason officers observing the battle of britain
were counter-productive.

The main suggestions: increase the range of the fighters, increase the maneuverability
The result: the Zero fighter

The consequences: "a light airplane with a heavy payload, a strange contradiction" as quoted from the
controversial book "Zero Fighter".

The question is: why does every other fighter in the world carry less fuel than the zero?
Why is every other fighter faster than the zero?
It appears that larger fuel tanks with more fuel inside weight more..

Even soviet fighters made of laminated wood with large radials (LAG-5) fly more than 400mph,
yet all IJN fighters struggle to achieve such a basic speed.

Out of concern of operational losses, severe compromises were made to the aircraft's tactical capabilities
(speed, survivability, and firepower)

Even late war fighters such as the N1K George are encumbered with massive fuel loads 2 or 3 times larger
than european counterparts such as the FW190, Lag, or Typhoon (the entire fuselage is an integral fuel tank)

The dichotomy of speed cannot be described only by a compaison of fuel quality (100 vs 92 octane), or construction
materials (after all, japan had an abundance of the best aluminum in the world, 3 times that of the USSR)

Perhaps the correct lessons were not the defficiencies of the luftwaffe, but the strengths of the RAF.
Figthers with superior tactical capabilities, radar networks, large 4-engined strike planes, and above all, a unified
airforce structure preventing the redundancy of aircraft design and production, and allowing the fluid transfer of pilots.
(how many Army pilots were begging to fly Zeroes instead of Oscars..) (how many navy pilots should have been put
into franks instead of Zeroes by 1944)

This commander's suggestion to the Koku Hombu: build the Ki-44 with a Kasei-21 radial (1850hp vs 1530)
half the internal fuel, 2x 20mm on the cowling just like the Lagg-5, build it of good aluminum instead of wood
and you have the highest power-to weight ratio of any fighter in the world. A speed of 425mph in 1943 would be competitive with FW190 / F4U type planes.

Either this, or just copy the 3 Heinkell-100s you imported from germany instead of letting pride blind your judgement [:'(]














mdiehl -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 3:08:58 AM)

To make a long answer very short: for all its faults, the Zero made a ton of sense from a Japanese logistical and strategic standpoint.

1. It was light. For a nation with no vast deposits of its own aluminum sources, minimizing the construction weight was very economical.

2. It was light. For a nation with vast stretches of water over which the Zero would have to fly, a light weight aircraft with great range made it strategically useful -- especially during those early months of the war where long range and good prepositioning allowed it to gain local air superiority in places where it was not expected, by the allies, to show up.

3. It was light. That allowed it to be powered by a 9-cylinder 950 HP radial engine that could run on low octane fuel.

4. It was light. That allowed the designers to give it relatively great maneuverability at a time when people figured maneuverability gave pilots a combat edge (do recall it was designed in 1936).

Hope that helps.

The Ki-43 was designed with similar principles in mind. The later war Japanese types with higher pressure radials and greater weight had significant teething troubles. They never really lived up to Japanese expectations and were pretty much universally inferior to the front-line Allied a.c. that they faced from 1943-1945. Even the oft-ignored P-63 could eat any Japanese a.c.'s lunch with respect to speed, ceiling, and hitting power.



wpurdom -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 3:37:35 AM)

Bergerud in FIre in the Sky makes out the case that the Zero/Zeke was a case of the Japanese doing an excellent job of making a virtue out of necessity. Not only were raw materials a constraint, but more importantly Japanese industry was not up to producing high-powered engines without a high defect rate or or maintaining them after they were produced. The Japanese had the blueprints of the Me_109E engine and two prototypes in early 1940. They were not able to begin even a small production run until Aust 1942, despite a high priority. By early 1943, after losing at Guadalcanal, they decided to deploy their 200 Tony's with the German based engines to Rabaul. Until October 1943 they were unable to get production above 50 per month, the early flights to Rabaul lost half the numbers and they couldn't keep them maintained that far from Japan - having to ship the planes 1,000 miles for an engine change for instance. So basically the Zero was a brilliant example of making a maneuverable design with a small engine and a plane with a great endurance to gain strategic offensive reach and flexibility and make the best of Japan's limited industrial capacity.

PS - It also makes a big difference whether your raw human material for industry and armed forces spent their teen years fixing cars or doing stoop labor in a rice paddy.



Commander Stormwolf -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 3:50:15 AM)

quote:

To make a long answer very short: for all its faults, the Zero made a ton of sense from a Japanese logistical and strategic standpoint.

1. It was light. For a nation with no vast deposits of its own aluminum sources, minimizing the construction weight was very economical.



Japanese aluminum production averaged 120k tons per year (3 times that of russia in 1941)

quote:



2. It was light. For a nation with vast stretches of water over which the Zero would have to fly, a light weight aircraft with great range made it strategically useful -- especially during those early months of the war where long range and good prepositioning allowed it to gain local air superiority in places where it was not expected, by the allies, to show up.



Agreed. It was designed as an escort fighter, one that was pressed into service in the air-superiority and interception roles to which it was poorly suited (though they did manage to clear the table against the obsolete allied types)

quote:



3. It was light. That allowed it to be powered by a 9-cylinder 950 HP radial engine that could run on low octane fuel.



Japanese fuel quality was similar to that of germany (92 octane) however not as good as US fuel (100 octane).
The Kasei-21 that powers the H8K running on 92 octane generates 1850 hp. The problem facing japan was
high-temperature alloys for turbochargers, a problem that was never remedied (see turbocharged Kasei-ru of the J2M)

quote:



4. It was light. That allowed the designers to give it relatively great maneuverability at a time when people figured maneuverability gave pilots a combat edge (do recall it was designed in 1936).



Not light enough. With half the fuel load, the zero is capable of less than 100Kg/m2 for wing loading.


The zero was pressed into service for too many roles, perhaps why the Tojo with some armour is preferred among WITP:AE players.






Erkki -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 9:07:17 AM)

quote:

The problem facing japan was high-temperature alloys for turbochargers, a problem that was never remedied (see turbocharged Kasei-ru of the J2M)


Germans did just fine without turbochargers. The only Allied fighter with it was the P-47 any way. The main drawbacks are that its dead weight at lower altitudes, it does not allow for rapid power setting changes that are required in combat(however very good for cruising at high altitudes) and it increases pilot workload.

At high speeds the mass of the plane doesn't matter at all as F=ma=0 and the trust only needs to counter the air resistance. The better air resistance/engine power(trust) ratio you get the faster the plane flies. While Japanese fighters often had very high powerloading and very low wingloading (allowing very rapid low and medium speed acceleration, good climb, excellent sustained rate of turn, very tight circle of turn and very good low speed handling) the problem was there was not enough power in them to get go fast. Another issue with especially Zero design are the long, thin ailerons: while they are aerodynamic and good solution for low speed handling, the required stick forces to move them at high speeds made the Zero roll poorly. Common move for Allied fighters to escape a Zero was to dive and roll in a Split-S the Zero couldn't follow, allowing to buy the time and separation to make use of the Allied fighters' better maximum dive speed and typically better top level speed. Actually the advantages the F6F had over Zero (higher speed, better high speed handling, better roll, higher Ne speed) were exactly the same the most models Fw 190 had over most models of Spitfire.



mdiehl -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 6:01:12 PM)

quote:

The only Allied fighter with it was the P-47 any way.


You must be thinking of a different device, I think. The following US a.c. had turbochargers: P-38, P-40, P-51, F4F-4, F6F, F4U, P-47, P-51, P-63. F8. Later the F-81 twin mustang (which was a white elephant) also had 'em.

Someone could provide you with a list of the UK a.c. I suspect. Anyhow, it was common in US fighters. The only American ones without them at war's start were the P-39/P-400, the P-36, and the F2A.

The US F4F3A had a 2-stage turbocharger, which was less complex than the ones used on other US a.c.



Nikademus -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 6:22:41 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

The question is: why does every other fighter in the world carry less fuel than the zero?
Why is every other fighter faster than the zero?
It appears that larger fuel tanks with more fuel inside weight more..


Range was an important factor in the plane's design, essential for the operations it would be asked to perform. Without that range, The Japanese operations in the SRA and Phillipines would have been impossible. A 109 or Spitfire would not have been able to do the job. In 1940, when the A6m debuted, it was one of the fastest fighters in the world. The primary constrictor on Japanese airframes was the HP of it's engines. 950hp was not alot to work with, so the Zero had to be as light as possible. Still....the plane was impressive at the time but as the plane's designer fortold....you get about 3 years max out of most fighter designs then it's time for a sucessor plane. The true failings and weaknesses of the JNAF lay not within the Zero itself but within the nation's aircraft industry...specifically it's ability to produce newer designs quickly and efficiently whilst also building an adequate number of existing airframes.


quote:


Perhaps the correct lessons were not the defficiencies of the luftwaffe, but the strengths of the RAF.
Figthers with superior tactical capabilities, radar networks, large 4-engined strike planes, and above all, a unified
airforce structure preventing the redundancy of aircraft design and production, and allowing the fluid transfer of pilots.
(how many Army pilots were begging to fly Zeroes instead of Oscars..) (how many navy pilots should have been put
into franks instead of Zeroes by 1944)


The Force modifyers conveyed by Dowding's well developed air defense net coupled with the decisions made by both sides during the Battle gave the RAF a critical edge and allowed it to survive. By surviving it won the battle by default.



Erkki -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 6:23:07 PM)

Supercharger != turbocharger. Very, very few WW2 aircraft had turbochargers. Actually, of fighters, in addition to P-47 the P-38 had turbocharger too, but it wasnt too useful as the whole design was plagued by high altitude heat issues any way. When those issues were finally fixed the P-38 was already moved to ground support role, in Europe, and Japanese air forces had collapsed long ago.



Chickenboy -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 7:29:32 PM)

From reading, "Fork-tailed Devil", I recall that the P-38's superchargers were useful, if occasionally temperamental. Early models without them failed at the high-altitude, long-range bomber escort over Europe for which they would have excelled.

My recollections from Bergelund's (and others') works is more that the Japanese aircraft manufacturers made what the Japanese pilots wanted-they fitted the product to a "T". So, pilots got aircraft that were marvelously maneuvarable, great flying machines. Think the pilots gave a rip about ground maintenance, materials availability issues and the like? No-they wanted dogfighters to engage the enemy in moderate to low altitude manuevering contests, mano-a-mano bushido-style duels of honor. And they got it. Particularly so with the Oscar.

Problem is, the Allies (wisely) chose to not fight that fight. Aircraft were designed with pilot input, but only that. Maintenance, reliability, parts, mission profile, armament, mass production ease, etc. also factored into production for American fighters.

So, to the OP's observation: Yes-the Japanese built the fighter they were asked to build. That's what happens when you ask the wrong group of people for their exclusive opinions.



Nikademus -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 7:55:18 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

My recollections from Bergelund's (and others') works is more that the Japanese aircraft manufacturers made what the Japanese pilots wanted-they fitted the product to a "T". So, pilots got aircraft that were marvelously maneuvarable, great flying machines. Think the pilots gave a rip about ground maintenance, materials availability issues and the like? No-they wanted dogfighters to engage the enemy in moderate to low altitude manuevering contests, mano-a-mano bushido-style duels of honor. And they got it. Particularly so with the Oscar.



from reading Jiro Horikoshi's book on the plane, along with Peattie's "Sunburst" there were two factions amongst the pilots, the one (that prevailed) wanting increased maneuverability and the other group wanting more speed even at the expense of increased maneuverability. Whilst the former group did largely get their way, it's a mistake to label the A6M as a one trick pony. It was, as mentioned, fast and well armed for it's time as well though the light airframe and need for extreme low speed turning ability did convey penalties at higher speeds. Still...i always found it interesting to note that the IJNAF's preferred tactics were the same slashing high speed runs as those of other powers. JAAF was similar. What made for a steep learning curve for the Allies was the tendancy for fights to devolve into turning fights after an initial pass. Allied pilots, schooled to consider Japanese pilots and planes as inferior to themselves got caught in a trap as a result. Christopher Shores, at the end of Vol II of his series on the SRA/Burmese fighting stated that the "superplane" myth revolving around the A6M was in fact started by Allied pilots as it was psychologically more palatable to attribute their defeat to a superior machine vs. a superior (or well trained at least) pilot. Jiro never considered it as such and he fretted over the lack of progress in getting the A6M's replacement onboard even as the Pacific war heated up.

In reading Bergerud, the key point I pulled out of the book was that it wasn't so much about speed that made the 2nd generation Allied planes so hard to fight....it was their superior high alt performance. P-38 especially was very tough as it was in it's element at high alt while the A6M, while better off than either the P40 or F4F, was nevertheless not all that great above 20k itself. Combine this high alt performance with high speed, good diving characteristics and a centerline armament and it's no suprise to me that the Lighting became such a Zero killer.



Erkki -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 8:09:25 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

From reading, "Fork-tailed Devil", I recall that the P-38's superchargers were useful, if occasionally temperamental. Early models without them failed at the high-altitude, long-range bomber escort over Europe for which they would have excelled.


The overheating issues were finally fixed in the P-38J model where the radiators were enlarged and intakes moved form beneath the nacelles to the wing leading edge. P-38 would (imho) have probably been much better a fighter had it had RR Merlins instead of Allisons. Not only crap and overheating at high altitudes but also increased workload, it took minutes of pushing buttons and careful attention with 3 different levers to get the plane ready for a fight from cruising mode while the Luftwaffe pilot simply pushed his throttle lever forward.

What would be interesting to see in WitpAe would be Allied player having some control over his plane production, but the factory outputs tied to relative costs of different aircraft. Do you want a B-17, 3-4 P-38s, 6 P-47s or 12 P-51s? [:)]



bk19@mweb.co.za -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 9:40:22 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Erkki
What would be interesting to see in WitpAe would be Allied player having some control over his plane production, but the factory outputs tied to relative costs of different aircraft. Do you want a B-17, 3-4 P-38s, 6 P-47s or 12 P-51s?



A great idea.... That would give the Allied player something 'constructive' to do during the first part of the game besides avoiding Japanese battle fleets et al. Why should the Japanese get all the fun at manipulating his manufacturing and R&D?




herwin -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 9:48:28 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: bk19@mweb.co.za


quote:

ORIGINAL: Erkki
What would be interesting to see in WitpAe would be Allied player having some control over his plane production, but the factory outputs tied to relative costs of different aircraft. Do you want a B-17, 3-4 P-38s, 6 P-47s or 12 P-51s?



A great idea.... That would give the Allied player something 'constructive' to do during the first part of the game besides avoiding Japanese battle fleets et al. Why should the Japanese get all the fun at manipulating his manufacturing and R&D?




You really don't want both sides optimising their orc production. Japan is enough because it doesn't really save them. SPI was never able to get their strategic build system tuned for War in Europe, which meant campaigns tended to go off the rails...



bk19@mweb.co.za -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 9:56:39 PM)

Hi Harry,

I am glad I only read a BSc and not progressed to a PHD... I don't yet have to take everything I read so literally :)




mike scholl 1 -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/14/2011 11:44:24 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Range was an important factor in the plane's design, essential for the operations it would be asked to perform. Without that range, The Japanese operations in the SRA and Phillipines would have been impossible. A 109 or Spitfire would not have been able to do the job. In 1940, when the A6m debuted, it was one of the fastest fighters in the world. The primary constrictor on Japanese airframes was the HP of it's engines. 950hp was not alot to work with, so the Zero had to be as light as possible. Still....the plane was impressive at the time but as the plane's designer fortold....you get about 3 years max out of most fighter designs then it's time for a sucessor plane. The true failings and weaknesses of the JNAF lay not within the Zero itself but within the nation's aircraft industry...specifically it's ability to produce newer designs quickly and efficiently whilst also building an adequate number of existing airframes.



AMEN Nick! Range was the key factor because the Zero wasn't just the IJN's carrier fighter, it was their "general purpose" fighter. And from land bases it had to be able to deploy all over the Pacific Theatre to wherever they were needed. The Germans might well have been better off with Zeroes in the Battle of Britian (with the 20mm's replaced by their superior models). The 109 had about 20 minutes "loiter time" over England from the Continent, and the 110 couldn't maneuver with a Spit or a Hurricane. The Zero could loiter for hours, and out maneuver anything in the sky. Wouldn't have been a "perfect" fit, but it would have chaanged the situation considerably.



Apollo11 -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/15/2011 10:45:40 AM)

Hi all,

You can also read the thread I started 2.5 years ago with similar topic...


Failure of the Japanese to learn from WWII Europe air war (2+ years of time)...

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=2010279


Leo "Apollo11"



Speedy Gonzales -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/16/2011 10:48:39 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
it is wondered if perhaps the IJN's reports from liason officers observing the battle of britain
were counter-productive.


I beg to differ on this statement. Both the UK and Germany designed their fighters as interceptors, meaning they had very short legs. That was fine for the Brits since the BoB was fought over home territory. For Germany that was a huge problem since they struggled to provide decent fighter escorts. Especially when attacking targets further north, German fighter escorts often had to turn around half way. The lesson from the BoB was that you needed fighters able to provide cover the whole way if you want to conduct offensive, strategic bombings (or have bomber that can survive on their own like 4Es).

The Zero was thus designed on the right assumptions for the upcoming offensive. You know this from WITP. Early on your P40's, Hurricanes and Spitfires are useless for supporting long range offensive bombings and the P38 and other long range fighters are vital to kick off the allied air offensive. It is no coincidence the American fighters developed 'longer legs' during the course of the war and the Brits bombed mostly at night because their Spitfires still were interceptors.



ChezDaJez -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/17/2011 8:52:38 AM)

quote:

The Ki-43 was designed with similar principles in mind. The later war Japanese types with higher pressure radials and greater weight had significant teething troubles. They never really lived up to Japanese expectations and were pretty much universally inferior to the front-line Allied a.c. that they faced from 1943-1945. Even the oft-ignored P-63 could eat any Japanese a.c.'s lunch with respect to speed, ceiling, and hitting power.


Quite true. Early war Japanese aircraft engines designs were deriatives of US and British designs obtained under license before the war. IIRC, Bristol and Pratt & Whitney provided Japan with many of their engine designs.

Japan's access to allied design improvements to existing engine technology became quite limited once the embargo against Japan took effect. After the war started, Japan's access to that technology was totally cut off. Japan was then forced to begin development of their own aircraft engines. And the more time that passed without access to allied engine technology, the more difficult it became for Japan to produce good engine designs. That doesn't mean that Japan didn't design some very good engines of their own later in the war because they did. But it was inability of Japanese manufacturers to meet strict internal tolerances that resulted in constant breakdowns and made the new designs unreliable in the field.

One factor that is often overlooked when contemplating design specifications for the Zero and Oscar fighters is that Japan basically designed them for the wrong war. The initial Oscar and Zero designs were completed before the lessons from the war in Europe were known. Japanese prewar fighter design specifications were based upon experiences gained in aerial combat in China during the 1930's where they were encountering older Russian biplane fighter types that were very maneuverable. Japan's aerial warriors wanted aircraft with excellent maneuverability so they could take on these types in one on one combats as befitting their warrior code. Indeed, Japan's army pilots were so insistant of this specification that they intially rejected the Oscar as being unsuitable for fighter combat until it was fitted with butteryfly flaps.

In order to get this type of maneuverability, the aircraft also had to be built very light yet very strong and Japan was quite innovative in this regard. US designers were quite impressed with some of the weight saving techniques after examining the Koda Zero. But this design philosophy had a serious drawback. The design was very strong when the structure was whole. But once damaged, it's strength was quickly compromised and it had a tendency to disintegrate. Couple that trait with no armor and no self-sealing tanks and you had the proverbial welterweight boxer with a glass jaw.

Chez



msieving1 -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/17/2011 6:21:07 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

The only Allied fighter with it was the P-47 any way.


You must be thinking of a different device, I think. The following US a.c. had turbochargers: P-38, P-40, P-51, F4F-4, F6F, F4U, P-47, P-51, P-63. F8. Later the F-81 twin mustang (which was a white elephant) also had 'em.



Of that list, only the P-38 and P-47 had turbochargers. The others had mechanically driven superchargers. The P-39, P-40, and F4F-3A had a single stage, single speed supercharger. The F4F-4 had a single stage, two speed supercharger. The P-51 and P-81 had two stage, two speed superchargers.

A turbocharger drives the air compressor with a turbine powered by the engine exhaust. A mechanical supercharger drives the air compressor with a chain or gears powered by the engine crankshaft. The difficulty in building a turbocharger is that the turbine blades must withstand high temperatures at extremely high revolutions (over 20,000 rpm).



Crackaces -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/17/2011 7:59:11 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: msieving1


quote:

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

quote:

The only Allied fighter with it was the P-47 any way.


You must be thinking of a different device, I think. The following US a.c. had turbochargers: P-38, P-40, P-51, F4F-4, F6F, F4U, P-47, P-51, P-63. F8. Later the F-81 twin mustang (which was a white elephant) also had 'em.



Of that list, only the P-38 and P-47 had turbochargers. The others had mechanically driven superchargers. The P-39, P-40, and F4F-3A had a single stage, single speed supercharger. The F4F-4 had a single stage, two speed supercharger. The P-51 and P-81 had two stage, two speed superchargers.

A turbocharger drives the air compressor with a turbine powered by the engine exhaust. A mechanical supercharger drives the air compressor with a chain or gears powered by the engine crankshaft. The difficulty in building a turbocharger is that the turbine blades must withstand high temperatures at extremely high revolutions (over 20,000 rpm).



Also the design of the wastegate early "stovepipe" wastegates had huge throttle variances ... (http://www.moapilot.com/pdf/May01/May_mp01.pdf) In a senseless self-promotion ... :) That also meant adjusting the critical altitude by the size of the stovepipe. ... flying one can be read .. (http://27189.sites.myregisteredsite.com/pdf/Apr01/TMP_April_2.pdf)



FatR -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/18/2011 10:25:27 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

Greetings,

it is wondered if perhaps the IJN's reports from liason officers observing the battle of britain
were counter-productive.

The main suggestions: increase the range of the fighters, increase the maneuverability
The result: the Zero fighter

Technical requirements for Zero were formulated far earlier and at the time of BoB they already were testing prototypes.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
The question is: why does every other fighter in the world carry less fuel than the zero?
Why is every other fighter faster than the zero?

Because they aren't? In particular, every carrier fighter in production until Hellcat and Seafire was considerably slower than Zero. Looking at land Allied fighters, Warhawks and Aerocobras demonstrated approximately equal speed in real combat, Hurricanes were much slower. The main vice of Zeros was an engine which reserves of improvement ran out in 1942 (later modifications of Sakae had better high-altitude performance, but no more power). There was no "faulty Japanese approach to air combat", just the design dead-end. Of course, Zero had an expiration date anyway, like its Allied contemporaries, but development of its successor was slowed down by various factors, and even had it been free of troubles, A7M almost certainly woudn't have been available in numbers for crucial battles of late-1943 and 1944 anyway (Ki-84 really appeared in large numbers only in autumn of 1944, production of N1K-J, adopted even earlier, was very slow).

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
It appears that larger fuel tanks with more fuel inside weight more..

Even soviet fighters made of laminated wood with large radials (LAG-5) fly more than 400mph,

No version of La-5 achieved or exceeded 400. That only became reality on La-7

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
yet all IJN fighters struggle to achieve such a basic speed.

Late-war versions of N1K2-J achieved it. See:
http://www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=11204.0

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
Out of concern of operational losses, severe compromises were made to the aircraft's tactical capabilities
(speed, survivability, and firepower)

Considering that Zero was one of the perhaps top three most heavily armed singe-engined fighters in existence at the time of its adoption, I wonder how a non-compromised firepower should look like.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
Even late war fighters such as the N1K George are encumbered with massive fuel loads 2 or 3 times larger
than european counterparts such as the FW190, Lag, or Typhoon (the entire fuselage is an integral fuel tank)

That's because Western Europe is small compared to the Pacific. By late war Japanese actually had to struggle with lack of range on some of their newer planes.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
This commander's suggestion to the Koku Hombu: build the Ki-44 with a Kasei-21 radial (1850hp vs 1530)

This is a good proposition, but twisting manufasturer's arms in such a way requires signigicant hindsight, and that's why it wasn't done. Besides, Kasei did not achieve 1850 hps until late 1943.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
half the internal fuel,

Ki-44's range was already insufficient.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
2x 20mm on the cowling just like the Lagg-5, build it of good aluminum instead of wood
and you have the highest power-to weight ratio of any fighter in the world.

No, after enlarging the entire plane to accomodade Kasei, with its bigger radius (never mind cowling guns), you probably won't. Well, the result probably will be still better than historical Ki-44, but see above.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
A speed of 425mph in 1943 would be competitive with FW190 / F4U type planes.

Corsairs achieved 425 in second half of 1944, for the record.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf
Either this, or just copy the 3 Heinkell-100s you imported from germany instead of letting pride blind your judgement [:'(]

He-100 is a failed fighter that got good PR post-war by basically comparing its factory test performance (if not exaggerating it) with actual field performance of RL alternatives.




wdolson -> RE: IJN lessons from Battle of Britain ~ the wrong lessons? (9/18/2011 11:18:19 AM)

The Sakae engine was a derivative of the French Gnome Rhone 14K.  The Japanese aerodynamic designs were top notch at the beginning of the war, but their engine industry lagged a bit behind the rest of the world.  During the war they did produce some all new designs to compete with the larger radials the US had, but they went through a lot of teething problems with those engines.

The Zero stayed in production as long as it did in part because the Japanese were struggling to produce the larger engines for the N1K, Raiden, and the Ki-44.  It was better to have some obsolescent fighters than none at all.  The Navy also never really put into production anything to replace the Zero as a carrier fighter, but then that issue was pretty much moot by mid to late 1944.

The US had some cutting edge carrier fighters in development at the start of the war, but in 1942, the Zero was the best carrier fighter in the world in most categories.  It was a fairly new notion in the late 30s that carrier fighters could be anything close to land fighters in performance.  Many carrier fighters were two seaters until the mid-30s.  The British were very slow to adopt high performance designs for carriers and lagged behind the US and Japan most of the war (at least with native British designs, they did use a fair number of American aircraft on their carriers). 

When it was introduced the Buffalo was a sensation for being the first monoplane fighter in USN service.  The Corsair, TBF, and SB2C came out of a 1938 specification.  All were flying by Pearl harbor, though the SB2C and the Corsair had a lot of problems.  One of the serious problems the Corsair had was it was incredibly tough to land on a carrier.  The Hellcat was adopted as the primary Navy fighter, even when VF-17 worked out the problems landing F4Us on carriers because it had 90% the performance of the Corsair and had excellent handling characteristics landing on a carrier.  The trade off in performance was worth it until the kamikaze attacks started.

The Zero was an excellent design compared to it's contemporaries with the same mission.  It had the legs for long escort missions, or long loiter time on CAP.  It had heavier fire power than any other carrier fighter at the time (though the cannons on the early models weren't terrific).  And it fit well with the Japanese doctrine which sacrificed defensive features for high maneuverability and range.

Bill



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