marty_01 -> RE: EXPLOIT OR NOT - LUFTWAFFE DEAD in 1941 (10/13/2011 5:41:23 PM)
|
quote:
ORIGINAL: 76mm quote:
ORIGINAL: marty_01 This isn't a tactic the Luftwaffe had to employ historically in order to survive...I think many people are dealing with this issue via house rules...When players start having to invoke house rules, it's more often than not an indication that there is an inherent problem with the system. I never said that it was remotely historical, but much of what happens in this game (especially the air war) is the same, so to complain about this particular anomaly is besides the point. This does help the Luftwaffe survive, however. Even if the LW uses these tactics, I think it will be slowly ground down, but at heavy cost to the Sovs. Dunno. According to Pavel, the air war has now been "fixed" but I am fully patched and frankly don't see any noticeable difference in air base bombing results. I also "play" the game. By "play", I mean I adopt tactics to suit the foibles of the system. Or Gamesmenship, or being gamey, or being cheesy, or whatever you wanna call it. Unfortunately I’m looking for more out of this particular game system as it’s sucked me into its addictive web. What I want is a learning curve that forces players to adopt tactics and strategy that make sense in terms of what seemed to make sense historically. The problem here is players that go into the game thinking that employment of historically successful air tactics\operations will yield a reasonable level of success are in for a rude awakening. Soooo….in addition to pretty much every other odd-ball way of eeking out some sort Luftwaffe survivability strategy already mentioned on this thread, I have also adopted a number of other weird gamey tactics that I have found help. They are based upon lessons one isn’t going to come across in any history of the event nor in any air operations manual from this period of air warfare. The current system still encourages the Soviet player to employ gamesmanship in the form of click-fest airbase attacks on the Luftwaffe very early on in the war. Why – cause’ it’s very effective at whittling the Luftwaffe down via a long series of 1:1, 1:1.5 or at the worst 2:1 kill ratios. Even the latter kill ratio is still a very happy tactic for the Red Air Horde. And by “click-fest” I mean a Soviet player that is willing to click on the airbase attack button 30 or 40 times per air base at multiple locations on the map on a per turn basis. It works – just like checker board defense works. The system encourages it and players will utilize the tools they are provided. Unfortunately, I see some of the undertone of this thread being that all is now well with the Air War portion of the game. IMHO – based upon not quitting PBEMs during the winter of 1941 -- but actually pressing on into 1942 and 1943 – is that something is still rotten in the state of Denmark with respect to the air combat model. I have seen and appreciate the efforts of the design team with changes being invoked in the air war model over the last few patches. However, I am still of the opinion that the lesson the game continues to preach to the ”true-believers” is that "quantity has a quality all its own". Ok -- I get it. If nothing else, WiTE succeeds in hammering home this particular lesson. I would add that the last two or three thousand years of recorded military history also shows us rather clearly that "Quality has a Quality all its own". I do not see this latter lesson being reinforced in WiTE -- at least not with respect to the current air war model. The history of this particular event -- The War in Russia from 41- 45 -- has quality schwaking quantity for the first 2 to 2.5 years of the event. But the model we indulge ourselves in is suggesting that unless we adopt very ahistorical air war tactics and strategies and invoke a fair amount of gamesmanship, “quality” will only last 7 or 8 months before being overwhelmed by quantity. And even after we invoke all our gamesmanship, post-1941, the Luftwaffe becomes at best a relatively impotent tool relative to its historical counterpart. It has to huddle together like a heard of frightened sheep and maintain an arms-length from the front line. It’s a sheep in wolves clothing post 1941 because of the sheer size and over-whelming capability granted the Red Air Horde. As has been pointed out by others, I also think there is insufficient disparity in the effects of crew training and crew experience in the current air combat model. Apparently there are also issues with numbers of sorties that fighter crews can fly during a week before they need to go to sleep. I’d argue that if I have 150 operational ME-109s with experienced highly motivated pilots in a hex, I ought to be able to command the airspace around my airbase. If I park 15 plus flak units – battalions and regiments of light and heavy flak!!! – I ought to be able to due some serious damage and/or disruption of any attacking air units that manage to wrangle their way through my CAP of ME-109s. Unfortunately my frustration with the air game when playing the Axis is that I am still seeing battles over and on airbases in which my highly trained, uber-experienced, air crews still suffer 1:1, 1.5:1 or at best 2:1 loss ratios as a result of click-fest air base attack tactics. Is there a historical precedent for these very favorable to the Red Air Horde exchange ratios in 1941 and 1942 air superiority battles? Is there historical precedent for the Red Airforce conducting several hundred airbase attacks per week starting from about the late winter of 1942 onward?
|
|
|
|