orc4hire -> (2/12/2001 12:15:00 PM)
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Every 3rd post here talks about how vulnerable 'unsupported' tanks are to infantry... the trouble is the definition of unsupported. Infantry following close behind a tank _will not_ protect it in SP. Only infantry _between_ the enemy infantry and the tank, or infantry actually stuck to the tank's exterior as auxiliary armor. If you have hostile infantry 1 hex (50 yards) in front of a tank, and friendly infantry 1 hex (50 yards) behind, the enemy infantry will close assault, and likely as not destroy the tank without the friendly supporting infantry being able to react. (Incidently creating a smoke hex from the wreck, blocking the friendly infantry's line of sight and assuring that they will take some casualties from op-fire if they try and get close enough to attack the enemy squad.)
So, how close to the tank does infantry have to be to be considered 'supporting'? In SP, they have to be in physical contact. Note, that doctrine generally held that the infantry _followed_ the tanks. In SP, of course, this is suicide; tanks are far too fragile to risk running into hostile forces.
Oh, and since we're quoting....
From EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NIGHT FIGHTING ON THE EUROPEAN LAND MASS DURING WORLD WAR II:
"(2) Mark IV and Panther tanks of the 3d Panzer Regiment reached a roadblock protecting Bastogne and defended by an understrength tank battalion of CCR, 9th Armored Division after darkness on 17 December 1944. Sweeping the area with machine gun fire to clear any infantry who might be protecting the American tanks, the panzers overran and destroyed two tank platoons, set other vehicles ablaze with tracer bullets, and knocked out the roadblock. Pp. 295-296."
Heavens to betsy! Unsupported tanks overrunning a roadblock protected by a mixed force, at night and in close terrain no less. How could such a thing be possible? Why did the ferocious infantry not just whip out their trusty P-38 C-rat can openers, pop the tops on the panzers and beat the crewmen to death with a rolled up field manual?
From a 'Lessons Learned' document, from the field, 16 June, 1944:
"d, The combined use of armored and infantry units has been too cautious. The over-emphasis placed on fire power of tankts during the period when weather and terrain conditions prevented full use of armor has not been overcome and mobility has not been restored to its proper importance in the
employment of tanks. Too often a column of tanks has remained inactive on a road, held up by a single SP or AT gun. The time lost waiting for infantry to arrive, deploy and attack the gun could have been reduced 50% or more by a rapid deployment and movement of the tanks or by a wide envelopment which
would in most cases have resulted in the capture or destruction of the gun.
Likewise, relatively large groups of infantry have been long delayed by a small enemy group with a machine gun or two astride a road. Again, the time waited waiting for the arrival and action of tanks could have been materially reduced by early and wide deployment."
I am so staggered that I can barely type.... American doctrine suggesting that maybe tanks _shouldn't_ always wait for the infantry to show up (but what would tanks be doing wandering around without infantry stuck to them? Don't they know that that's suicide?), but rather take care of the situation themselves?
From the U.S. War Department "Handbook On German Military Forces"
(Mar'45) TM-E 30-451
"A typical attack formation of this type might be divided up among the Panzer division's units as follows: the first wave, on a frontage of about 2,000 to 3,000 yards, might consist of one tank battalion, two companies forward, supported on the flanks by elements of the assault gun battalion. Close to the rear of the first wave usually follow one or two Panzer Grenadier companies in armored half-tracks.
About 150 yards to the rear of the first wave moves the second wave, formed of the second tank battalion in the same formation, closely followed by the remainder of the armored Panzer Grenadiers, who are in turn followed at some distance by the motorized Panzer
Grenadiers. The flanks are protected by antitank guns which normally operate by platoons, moving by bounds. The artillery forward observer travels in his armored vehicles with the first wave, while the
artillery commander of the supporting artillery units usually travels with the tank commander. Assault guns normally also accompany the second wave."
Why, those wacky Germans; leading with their tanks like that. They can't possibly have ever won a battle that way.
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