Alfred -> RE: State of the Air War in AE (3/8/2012 11:58:20 PM)
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ORIGINAL: LoBaron quote:
ORIGINAL: Alfred TheElf, Please, please, oh please do not fall for the old conjuring trick being presented with the aim of pressuring you into changing things when there is no sound fundamental good reason to do so. Too often in the past code has been changed to accommodate poor players who complain when their lack of skill/understanding is exposed. To put up now the detailed reasons for my plea would be too time consuming but here are a few briefly presented reasons.[...] (a) Attrition of the Japanese forces is cited as the correct approach. This is wrong because attrition is a very dumb military strategy. Ask Haig, Joffre and Falkenhayn. What advocates of attrition really should be iterating is that degradation of the enemy force structure, plus misdirection of the enemy military assets, plus pinning enemy forces elsewhere is required before a direct approach to the Home Islands can be undertaken with any reasonable comfort level. None of these elements has anything to do with attrition. In fact given the basic game design, compounded by playing the ahistorical scenario 2, attrition particularly of air assets is to the benefit of Japan.[...] I very much agree with your post, Alfred. Except for the italic part. Attrition is dumb, no doubt about it. But sometimes I am embarrassed to say, I agree with Wikipedia: quote:
Military theorists and strategists like Sun Tzu have viewed attrition warfare as something to be avoided. In the sense that attrition warfare represents an attempt to grind down an opponent through superior numbers, it represents the opposite of the usual principles of war, where one attempts to achieve decisive victories through maneuver, concentration of force, surprise, and the like. On the other hand, a side which perceives itself to be at a marked disadvantage in maneuver warfare or unit tactics may deliberately seek out attrition warfare to neutralize its opponent's advantages. If the sides are nearly evenly matched, the outcome of a war of attrition is likely to be a Pyrrhic victory. The difference between war of attrition and other forms of war is somewhat artificial, since war always contains an element of attrition. However, one can be said to pursue a strategy of attrition when one makes it the main goal to cause gradual attrition to the opponent eventually amounting to unacceptable or unsustainable levels for the opponent while limiting your own gradual losses to acceptable and sustainable levels. This should be seen as opposed to other main goals such as the conquest of some resource or territory or an attempt to cause the enemy great losses in a single stroke (e.g. by encirclement and capture). Historically, attritional methods are tried when other methods have failed or are obviously not feasible. Typically, when attritional methods have worn down the enemy sufficiently to make other methods feasible, attritional methods are abandoned in favor of other strategies. Attritional methods are in themselves usually sufficient to cause a nation to give up a non-vital ambition, but other methods are generally necessary to achieve unconditional surrender. Obviousely, a war of attrition is to be avoided if other methods of warfare are a feasible option. It is also to be avoided if it means investing a lot of assets in an area with an equally strong enemy force with the ability to counter or reverse the attritiing situation. But in context of using attrition to thin out, spread out, and wear down enemy forces to make other means of attack an option (which is basically the context under which this discussion takes place: "A2A is borked, because I cannot attack a, b and c without getting my a** spanked" [;)]), it is a valuable tool. If you apply mission governed attrition warfare, and combine it with short to medium term goals, it is in fact exactly part of what you describe as "None of these elements has anything to do with attrition". Considering our - on first glance - clearly different opinions I wonder if we just have slight differences when using the word attrition in the current context. From my POV every element of warfare contains elements of attrition. If you use this factor to your advantage, I would call it "attrition warfare". I don´t see the benefit of neglecting this element of war, it does not prevent or exclude other strategical elements. Yes there is a misunderstanding about the word.[;)] The Wiki excerpt you quote is not a good exposition of attrition strategy. There is a huge difference between attrition and an attrition strategy. The former is inherent in all warfare from time immemorial, the latter is a concept which has only been developed in the industrial era and as a strategy was very much born and died on the Western Front (with some post facto rationalisation provided by Cadorna to explain his uncreative 11 battles of the Isonzo) of World War I. Prior to the creation of the mass conscript European armies, made possible by the industrialisation of the late C19th, by far the biggest cause of attrition was sickness and desertion. The reason why famous military theorists did not advocate a strategy of attrition was because it was not a practical strategy to pursue. An attrition strategy, as envisaged and implemented by the Western Front leaders (again honourable mention to Cadorna too) was that both sides would incur mutual losses. Early twentieth century military technology is not that of today. Then in order to inflict casualties on the enemy you had to expose yourself to receiving casualties too whereas today it is possible to inflict casualties from a standoff position and not expose oneself to similar treatment (excellent examples being NATO's actions in Bosnia and Libya). Note that the WWI Entente advocates for an attrition strategy did so in the absence of developing an actual war winning strategy and were quite prepared to tolerate suffering more casualties than the enemy. When you employ the word "attrition", you describe actions whose intent is not attrition (a mutual process) but degradation of enemy force structure and pinning of the enemy forces elsewhere, away from the critical front (aided by misdirecting the enemy). The aim of all good generals down the ages has been to defeat the enemy forces, not to ruin their own army in the process. Alfred
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