quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. I'm actually listening to the audio book, which is 57 hours long!

I'm just now getting to the invasion of Poland, but I've learned so much history that I did not know before. Particularly just how insane Nazi Germany was even before the war started, and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up. I never knew that Czechoslovakia had such a strong military force available to fight the Germans (according to the book, 35 well trained and equipped divisions defending a heavily fortified border), but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

quote:

ORIGINAL: wings7

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: wings7

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

warspite1

Patrick there is reference to South Africa and Canada's position in Chamberlain and Appeasement (RAC Parker). That this view was supported by the other Dominions I recall from a TV documentary - but sadly cannot remember which one. I don't think it was The World at War though. If I find it I will let you know.

quote:

ORIGINAL: wings7

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: wings7

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

warspite1

Patrick there is reference to South Africa and Canada's position in Chamberlain and Appeasement (RAC Parker). That this view was supported by the other Dominions I recall from a TV documentary - but sadly cannot remember which one. I don't think it was The World at War though. If I find it I will let you know.

Yes if you do find it (TV documentary), please let me know, thanks Robert.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Zorch

4 new naval books of note, 2 from each war:

'Securing the Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol 1914-1918' by Steve R. Dunn.

'The War In The North Sea: The Royal Navy And The Imperial German Navy 1914-1918' by Quintin Barry, 608 pages.

'Doomed Before the Start: The Allied Intervention in Norway 1940. Volume 1: The Road To Invasion and Early Moves' by Niall Cherry.

'The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942' by Andrew Boyd, a hefty 496 pages.

I haven't read any of them.

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: wings7

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: wings7

quote:

ORIGINAL: warspite1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Ranger33

....and how badly Chamberlain screwed things up......but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment.

warspite1

I think that stating ‘how badly Chamberlain screwed things up’ is somewhat unfair. Less so is ‘but were forced to surrender when France and Britain turned their backs at the last moment’, as yes, I think it is fair to say that this was not Britain and France’s finest hour. But having said that, was the situation really that black and white?

Firstly, to suggest someone screwed something up means that, with the benefit of hindsight (and sometimes even without it) it is clear that another, definitely more advantageous decision to a problem could have been taken. I don’t think that is necessarily the case here, and also ignores the situation in Britain and France in those dark days of the late 30’s.

Yes, with hindsight, knowing what actually happened, it is tempting to think about what may have been. But in doing so we cannot know for certain what would have resulted from the British and French drawing a line in the sand over Czechoslovakia rather than Poland.

Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that both the British and French premiers were leaders of democratic nations – two nations that had suffered hugely in the First World War – and where public opinion mattered. A government’s first responsibility is to its own people and, quite simply, there was no appetite for war in either country. The post war years were incredibly tough with economic depression, mass unemployment and civil strife blighting the landscape – against that backdrop, asking the people of Britain and France to go to war over a country most could not even place on a map was no easy option. The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia.

In addition to this of course is the growing support that Germany had over the Treaty of Versailles terms. There was a feeling amongst many at the time that the treaty terms were too harsh. This led to a broad consensus that some of those terms needed to be undone in fairness to the German people and in order to avoid future war. Until Hitler took over the rump Czech state in March 1939, what had been conceded to Germany largely involved territory that was either German or had a majority German population. In other words, for the sake of peace, the democracies were bending over backwards to treat Germany ‘fairly’.

With regard to what was on offer, just about everything was on the table – but what Chamberlain in particular did not understand was that Hitler was not like any ordinary politician; what Hitler wanted was not possible to allow. It is difficult to lay too much blame at Chamberlain’s door for not recognising this given the list of people that Hitler fooled – including the German politicians that put him in power in the first place, a large portion of the German electorate and even Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!

Whatever conclusions are drawn from analysing other options that may have been open to Chamberlain and Daladier, it needs to be understood that these two gentlemen, and their governments, were trying to do the best they could in what were pretty unenviable circumstances. And while it is easy to say now what could or should have happened, the reality is that these were colossally high stakes being played for and both Chamberlain and Daladier need to be cut some slack in that regard.

So having said that, was the decision to give the Sudetenland to Germany the best option open to the Western governments? Well as said – and certainly with hindsight - it was a pretty awful thing as it paved the way for the carve-up of the country. But it’s impossible to know whether an alternative would have been better for certain isn’t it? As soon as the historical path is diverted from, all elements are subject to change.

The argument goes that Chamberlain screwed up because the German Army was weaker in 1938, the Czechoslovak Army was strong (with decent border defences) and there was no German-Soviet agreement. If the Germans struggled to beat the Czechs the Western Allies and maybe the Poles would join forces and attack the Germans from three sides. Maybe too, Hitler is overthrown by the Army and the full horrors of WWII and the holocaust are avoided. Simple.

Maybe. But that assumes a lot.

Maybe things would have panned out differently. For one thing, the German Army was weaker yes – but so were the British and French armies. Having declared war over Poland in 1939, neither was in any state to launch an offensive against the German Army. The plan was therefore to sit behind the Maginot Line and wait. Why would that be any different in 1938 when the British could provide even less of an army? The French army was deficient in many areas in 1940 – it was no better off in 1938. Well the Czechs in 1938 may have been more formidable than the Poles in 1939. Again, maybe. This is not something that can be proved one way or the other, and nor is how the Soviets would have reacted to this unfolding drama. The Soviets could have still come to an agreement with Hitler. Even if not, they could not come to the aid of the Czechs as Poland would never have allowed Soviet soldiers on Polish soil as we know from the pre-war negotiations between the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1939. Whether the Soviets got involved at all therefore cannot be known. Finally there is the tantalising prospect that the German General Staff would have launched a coup the moment Case Green was given the go ahead. Again there is no guarantee that this would have been carried out – or that it would have been successful.

In conclusion I think that on balance it is probably more likely than not that the British and French refusing to back down over the Sudetenland would have been better than the action actually taken. But in saying that I recognise that there are no guarantees and the case for an alternative, and less successful outcome for the Allies, can be made. I have a lot of sympathy for the Western leaders in the 1930’s. I think Chamberlain and Daladier were good men who were dealt a really poor hand but did what they thought was right and for the right reasons. If they ‘screwed up’ it was against that backdrop and they deserve understanding not opprobrium.

Excellent post Robert! A question and a statement for you:
Question: Could you elaborate and/or source, "The British could not ignore the Dominions either when they made clear that they would not support Britain going to war over Czechoslovakia."
Statement: "Time Magazine which actually pronounced him ‘Man of the Year’ in 1938!". Time's 'Man of the Year' does not always translate to 'good or right', it also applies to 'impact (and the like)' to and in the world.

Keep up these posts Robert, absolutely enjoyable and enlightening! [:)]

warspite1

Patrick there is reference to South Africa and Canada's position in Chamberlain and Appeasement (RAC Parker). That this view was supported by the other Dominions I recall from a TV documentary - but sadly cannot remember which one. I don't think it was The World at War though. If I find it I will let you know.

Yes if you do find it (TV documentary), please let me know, thanks Robert.

warspite1

Still cannot recall the documentary but this fits the bill! An extract from Britain and Empire 1880-1945 (Kennedy)

[image]local://upfiles/28156/4AAC5BA1F4EB4C1F85DD3F110BCCDA30.jpg[/image]

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ORIGINAL: barkhorn45

"The Face of Courage" holders of the knights cross and close combat badge in gold. Florian Berger.
Only 96 men had this distinction

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ORIGINAL: demjansk

Just finished Unfit for Command by John O'Neill about traitor Kerry.

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"Nope. Not to brag, but I have high HP and Strength. If I were able to actually hit monsters most of the time, I might defeat them before they ever got a chance to hit me in return. I could hold back and let them attack me on purpose, but...it's not the same. It's like...to go in there swinging my sword as hard as I can, but it's just not enough, and they overpower me...that feels so good, you know?"

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My party can't be this dysfunctional.

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

Has anyone read Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin? It looks interesting and has good write-ups on Amazon. Anyone read it? Thoughts?

warspite1

I'll take that as a no [:D]

Anyways, I purchased this and looking forward to this (maybe bedtime reading?). However, at the moment I am still very much in Western Front mode. I read Sebag-Montefiore's Dunkirk when I was on holiday about 6 years ago.

As such, with other distractions, I am not sure I gave it the attention it deserved. So, as much as I hate re-reading books, I thought I would give this another go.

Wow! I am really glad I did - particularly as its hot on the heels of other books on the subject - and so gives another opinion on what happened in the fateful weeks in May 1940.

It's absolutely riveting stuff. Recommended and back again.

warspite1

I must say I'm finding Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin a little heavy going at the moment. Not exactly riveting reading, but then the first chapter or so has been an introduction to people I've never even heard of combined with the fact that the author does not have the most interesting of writing styles.

Let's hope it improves......

warspite1

......well it has [:)]

Interesting stuff now that he has left the personalities and got to the actual war [:)]

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin

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ORIGINAL: Matti Kuokkanen

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin

Can you tell something about contents of the book? Does Swastika refer to Germany, or to Eric von Rosen, or to Finnish Air Force?

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: Zorch

4 new naval books of note, 2 from each war:

'Securing the Narrow Sea: The Dover Patrol 1914-1918' by Steve R. Dunn.

'The War In The North Sea: The Royal Navy And The Imperial German Navy 1914-1918' by Quintin Barry, 608 pages.

'Doomed Before the Start: The Allied Intervention in Norway 1940. Volume 1: The Road To Invasion and Early Moves' by Niall Cherry.

'The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935-1942' by Andrew Boyd, a hefty 496 pages.

I haven't read any of them.

warspite1

Of these I currently have the last under review. As you said about the O'Hara book above, I am not sure what there is new to say about WWI naval battles so the first two don't appeal.

Amazon allows you to read some passages from the third on your list. I cannot say I am particularly impressed with the author's style - the sentences are too long and its a bit all over the place. In addition I think Geirr H Haarr's German Invasion of Norway and the Battle for Norway are the last word on that campaign.

And so to the last book on the list. I am interesting in this but I don't really get the premise of the book. 1935-42 seems an odd period to be writing about, and I am really not sure what the author is getting at. Why is this period the 'linchpin of victory'? He is also suggesting that Force Z was not Churchill's fault but the Admiralty's. This flies in the face of what I have read previously, but I am certainly curious to understand why he has come to that conclusion. One 5-star review on Amazon, but that might just be the author! I will continue to monitor this one.

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: Matti Kuokkanen

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin

Can you tell something about contents of the book? Does Swastika refer to Germany, or to Eric von Rosen, or to Finnish Air Force?

warspite1

The book is all about Sweden in the years 1939-45. In particular the book focuses on Sweden's determination to remain neutral, even after she became 'surrounded' following the conquest of Norway and Finland joining Germany. In its most interesting chapters, the book describes the trade agreements with Germany and the Allies, the concessions that Germany sought from Sweden e.g. transit of troops to Norway and Finland. The book also brings out Sweden's reliance upon Germany for essential imports at this time and the provision of 'Safe Conduct Traffic' to allow for key imports from the west (particularly oil). The book also brings out the pressures that the Allies brought to bear on Sweden.

The book looks at Sweden's position in respect of Norway/Denmark but also Finland, and the ever present threat from the East, the Soviet Union.

There are also chapters on the Home Front, Security, Propaganda and Censorship, the Military position.

I hope that is helpful.

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

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ORIGINAL: Matti Kuokkanen

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ORIGINAL: warspite1

Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin

Can you tell something about contents of the book? Does Swastika refer to Germany, or to Eric von Rosen, or to Finnish Air Force?

warspite1

The book is all about Sweden in the years 1939-45. In particular the book focuses on Sweden's determination to remain neutral, even after she became 'surrounded' following the conquest of Norway and Finland joining Germany. In its most interesting chapters, the book describes the trade agreements with Germany and the Allies, the concessions that Germany sought from Sweden e.g. transit of troops to Norway and Finland. The book also brings out Sweden's reliance upon Germany for essential imports at this time and the provision of 'Safe Conduct Traffic' to allow for key imports from the west (particularly oil). The book also brings out the pressures that the Allies brought to bear on Sweden.

The book looks at Sweden's position in respect of Norway/Denmark but also Finland, and the ever present threat from the East, the Soviet Union.

There are also chapters on the Home Front, Security, Propaganda and Censorship, the Military position.

I hope that is helpful.

warspite1

Well perhaps it was, perhaps it wasn't.... we'll never know [&:]

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ORIGINAL: Mike Dubost

All of the recent posts about Munich made me go back and dig up Failure of a Mission by Sir Neville Henderson (the UK ambassador to Germany at the time). I bought the e book a few years ago. It makes very interesting reading. It is definitely not the standard perspective/received wisdom on the events. Yeah, as a memoir, it can't be called unbiased, but so what? You know what you're getting.

He was clearly a believer in Appeasement. I think it really was from an honest devotion to diplomacy and a fear of Communism, not a devotion to Fascism. In any event, the book does give you his views on the issues.