quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

With hindsight it doesn't seem like much of a victory at all. Only 2 relatively obsolete battleships permanently lost. I think the way PH is commonly perceived in most people's consciousness is that the Japanese destroyed the whole American fleet. I remember reading somewhere that the Japanese would have been better advised to go after the oil storage farm and the port facilities and that would have knocked the US out of the fight for a longer period of time than hitting the battleships actually did.

That's just what LCDR Fuchida (leader of the strike and purported (mostly by himself) advocate of the "third strike") said to his interrogators after the war.

In his book on Pearl harbor Alan Zimm analyzes this particular proposition. Destroying oil tanks sounds quite easy after all. Strangely, the Navy had recognized that oil burns, in fact burns quite well; and had taken some precautions to protect the tanks (especially from one another). They built earthen berms around each tank capable of containing the oil contained in the tank. It should also be noted that in order for Bunker C/NSFO #6 to even flow (you know, like a liquid) it is necessary to heat it to about 140F. It is not very volatile so a fire in a single tank would NOT have been likely to spread to adjacent tanks. One might also consider that the number of bombs which could have been carried for this "proposed" strike was limited to those that the (surviving) a/c could have carried (most limited to one or maybe two bombs) and in any case well under 250 a/c (which were not B-17s or B-24s).
Also the Americans were quite likely to have their flak guns manned and ready for any repeat performance by the KB. As it was the 2nd strike (on Dec 7th) still benefiting some from surprise suffered damage to roughly a third of its aircraft. Alan Zimm argues that the "Oil Tank Raid" is mostly a combination construct of American hysteria following the initial raid combined with Fuchida's postwar testimony regarding his imaginary prescience.

The KB did what nobody had done before by launching two massive coordinated air strikes against an enemy bastion. It satisfied Yamamoto's desire to shock by sinking battleships. If there had been any carriers in the harbor it probably would have sunk them as well. BUT the KB was a raiding force. The KB was not like the 1944-45 style USN CVTFs that parked themselves off the enemy's shore and pounded whatever they wanted to for as long as they wanted to do so. The KB was a PIONEER in carrier operations, not their ultimate expression of power.

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

With hindsight it doesn't seem like much of a victory at all. Only 2 relatively obsolete battleships permanently lost. I think the way PH is commonly perceived in most people's consciousness is that the Japanese destroyed the whole American fleet. I remember reading somewhere that the Japanese would have been better advised to go after the oil storage farm and the port facilities and that would have knocked the US out of the fight for a longer period of time than hitting the battleships actually did.

That's just what LCDR Fuchida (leader of the strike and purported (mostly by himself) advocate of the "third strike") said to his interrogators after the war.

In his book on Pearl harbor Alan Zimm analyzes this particular proposition. Destroying oil tanks sounds quite easy after all. Strangely, the Navy had recognized that oil burns, in fact burns quite well; and had taken some precautions to protect the tanks (especially from one another). They built earthen berms around each tank capable of containing the oil contained in the tank. It should also be noted that in order for Bunker C/NSFO #6 to even flow (you know, like a liquid) it is necessary to heat it to about 140F. It is not very volatile so a fire in a single tank would NOT have been likely to spread to adjacent tanks. One might also consider that the number of bombs which could have been carried for this "proposed" strike was limited to those that the (surviving) a/c could have carried (most limited to one or maybe two bombs) and in any case well under 250 a/c (which were not B-17s or B-24s).
Also the Americans were quite likely to have their flak guns manned and ready for any repeat performance by the KB. As it was the 2nd strike (on Dec 7th) still benefiting some from surprise suffered damage to roughly a third of its aircraft. Alan Zimm argues that the "Oil Tank Raid" is mostly a combination construct of American hysteria following the initial raid combined with Fuchida's postwar testimony regarding his imaginary prescience.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Zimm's book did go into detail on an attack on the tanks. Enough bomb hits would certainly have caused substantial damage was the conclusion. However the main point was that any damage caused would only have been temporary and given that the battlefleet was already immobilized, the net result would not have greatly added to constraints on USN operations. An emergency tanker shuttle would have quickly been established and repairs of those tanks hit would have been estimated on a matter of weeks. The overall attack on PH had already given the Japanese months of free handed ops.

In other words, its a bit of a Red Herring.

quote:

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Can you Imagine...."I bombed a drydock!". [X(] Poor guy would be laughed right out of the O-club! [:D]

quote:

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

Zimm's book did go into detail on an attack on the tanks. Enough bomb hits would certainly have caused substantial damage was the conclusion. However the main point was that any damage caused would only have been temporary and given that the battlefleet was already immobilized, the net result would not have greatly added to constraints on USN operations. An emergency tanker shuttle would have quickly been established and repairs of those tanks hit would have been estimated on a matter of weeks. The overall attack on PH had already given the Japanese months of free handed ops.

In other words, its a bit of a Red Herring.

quote:

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

Can you Imagine...."I bombed a drydock!". [X(] Poor guy would be laughed right out of the O-club! [:D]

quote:

ORIGINAL: ilovestrategy

I think that Nagumo did the thing though by taking his winnings and leaving, regardless of whether he could have knocked out the oil tanks or not. All he knew was that the carriers were not at Pearl and he knocked out the battleships as instructed.

I always felt that he got a bad rap for not hitting the tanks. He had accomplished his objective of hitting the battleships and he had no control over the carriers not being there. On top of that he was resonsible for getting his six aircraft carriers home

In his place I would have also taken my winnings and go home.

quote:

ORIGINAL: jeffk3510

quote:

ORIGINAL: ilovestrategy

I think that Nagumo did the thing though by taking his winnings and leaving, regardless of whether he could have knocked out the oil tanks or not. All he knew was that the carriers were not at Pearl and he knocked out the battleships as instructed.

I always felt that he got a bad rap for not hitting the tanks. He had accomplished his objective of hitting the battleships and he had no control over the carriers not being there. On top of that he was resonsible for getting his six aircraft carriers home

In his place I would have also taken my winnings and go home.

I would agree that Nagumo and his bad rap were wrongly given. Much like Spruance after the The Battle of the Philippine Sea. All he did was do exactllyl as he was instructed..

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

I have read elsewhere that even the USN admiralty did not fully appreciate the value of the tank farm at PH until near the end of the war or after when people started asking "what if" questions.

Targeting the logistical support for a war machine was in its infancy in 1941. The only ones trying to do it were the British with Bomber Command and they were not doing a very effective job up to that point.

Up until WW I it was completely impossible to take out another countries logistical support, so nobody ever though to do it. The capability in WW I was very tiny and very little was accomplished other than the age old strategy old naval blockade.

The weapons of WW II made strategic warfare targeting manufacturing, transportation, and other support possible, but it was still not integrated doctrine. By 1944, the lessons learned from Bomber Command, the US strategic offensive on Germany, and the US fast carrier fleet taught that logistical warfare can cut off an enemy at the knees without having to put your grunts in harm's way as often. By 1945, it was virtually gospel.

Looked at from the perspective of 1944 or 1945, attacking the oil storage facilities at PH would have been a high priority target. By a 1941 perspective, while it was technically possible, it was outside the consciousness of most commanders on both sides. The Japanese were attempting to have a reprise of the 1906 naval battles with Russia using planes instead of surface ships. I have never seen any evidence that the Japanese gave any consideration to attacking the oil facilities except for the information that came from Fuchida. I recall seeing somewhere that Fuchida's interviews after the war may have been tainted by leading questions from his interrogators.

Bill

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

I once read that the US would have done better at both the Philippine Sea and Leyte if Halsey and Spruance swapped jobs. Spruance's style would have done better at Leyte and Halsey's would have been better at the Philippine Sea.

In any case the Philippine Sea coupled with Halsey's raid on Formosa before Leyte broke the back of the IJN's carrier arm's most difficult asset to replace, it's pilot pool. It never recovered from those two battles.

Bill

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

Spruance will always have my respect for being in charge at Midway. He led the US fleet to victory in the single most cruicial battle of the Pacific campaign. Maybe luck was on his side but I'm sure there were ways he could have royally screwed up...but didn't.

quote:

ORIGINAL: msieving1

quote:

ORIGINAL: Gary Childress

Spruance will always have my respect for being in charge at Midway. He led the US fleet to victory in the single most cruicial battle of the Pacific campaign. Maybe luck was on his side but I'm sure there were ways he could have royally screwed up...but didn't.

Spruance wasn't in charge at Midway, Fletcher was. After Yorktown was damaged, Fletcher released Spruance to operate on his own.