RE: RHS Design Theory: The Kamakaze Option (Scenario 102)

RE: RHS Design Theory: The Kamakaze Option (Scenario 102) (Full Version)

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el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: The Kamakaze Option (Scenario 102) (7/6/2012 11:02:12 AM)
See revised note below (about four panels down) for current status.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/6/2012 11:13:38 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: dwg quote: Yet it remains the Germans did achieve things we didn't - in particular re jet aircraft. Lots of proposals, a lot fewer actual achievements - which is pretty much my point. Finding papers relating to a proposal does not mean there was anything more to that proposal than those papers themselves. USAF studis, at least, consider German achievements significant and worthy of imitation. In spite of mismanagement, the Germans managed to field operational jet aircraft in some numbers - and also ballistic missiles (although in the event only from improvised launchers - rendering them less accurate then designed - the fixed launchers having been overrun or bombed - these including radar course correction with the best radar in the entire world tracking the missile, so course corrections could be sent to it). USAF is less impressed with how the Luftwaffe organized for war - one paper has the sub title "Strategy for Defeat" Even so, some tactics were effective (see night fighter wild sow for example). It is just as well that Germany had problems with fuel supply, elected to bring the Russians into the war, and failed to organize pilot training on a sufficient scale.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/6/2012 11:31:29 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: dwg quote: the ideas were impressive The ideas were obvious, it's implementation that is impressive. If you develop a new power source, or any new technology, the first thing you do is look for places you can employ it to advantage (just look at the steam engine and the internal combustion engine). There are in fact two direct parallels to nuclear powered submarines that were investigated in WWII, High Test Peroxide based propulsion, and the Elektroboot. The first failed almost utterly, the second, which was a lucky spin-off from the first, might have been a war winner, if it was available in '42, but not only was it too late, Germany messed up the implementation, going for a massive mass-production scheme that might have made sense in 1942 or 42, but which was absurd a couple of years later. So there are parallels that actually went all the way to hardware, but we don't lose perspective over them the way that people do over nuclear power - and the difference is because we have the information to understand them in context and see the weaknesses, not just the possible strengths. I think you are quibbling here. We do not really disagree about the nature of mistakes made. If we disagree, it is that the Germans had a broad range of technical successes we did not - enough so it took many years to catch up in all fields. Yet that was also a failing - too few resources spread too thin in the context of projects that needed more time than was available to be useful in wartime. But we were anything but informed about many of these lines of work. To go with your case on submarine propulsion, see USNI's US Submarines Since 1945. We developed steam power plants (closed cycle - these led to a destroyer plant when we decided we wanted nuclear steam instead); the closed cycle Walter engine you refer to (with Peroxide as the oxidizer), something RN also actually tried to deploy for a while; and a closed cycle diesel engine system, in addition to nuclear propulsion. We got farther than the Germans did eventually - and might have fielded practical boats using them - but nothing could compare with nuclear power in terms of sustained underwater range - so we abandoned the others. Only the Walter boat might not be perfectable - the Russians and British had terrible fires - and we never dared actually deploy any because of the fire risk. The other line of development was rechargable fuel cells - and in fact the successful design now made for several navies was a c 1942 German development not implemented during the war. But an Electroboot using them to recharge would have been a formidable thing to engage. Heisenberg wasn't wrong when he said the only practical wartime application for nuclear power was probably for submarine propulsion. Yet he never seems to have designed one, or even a power plant for one. Japan did both, and there is circumstantial evidence (mainly from US Army reports) it might have got one operational in time to make a single trip to Germany. [We have the interrogation of several passengers who made the trip on a submarine in only two months - utterly impossible for a conventional submarine of that era - particularly since surfaced operations in the Atlantic near Europe were suicide. We also have an Army patrol report of a midget found on the beach in Panama - a "recon" midget never reported in reference books. This vessel spent some years at the US Army Aviation Museum on Oahu, before being returned to Japan as a war relic. None of the conventional Japanese submarines were operating in the Eastern Pacific in 1945. The tale of the Army report can be found in Advance Force Pearl Harbor. Its author is the curator of the Army Aviation Museum on Oahu and had custody of the sub personally until it was decided to give it back to Japan. This is the same book that printed a WWII era picture showing a midget and its torpedo hitting a battleship on the first day of the war - something that has stood the test of forensic examination over time. Just because it is esoteric and little known doesn't mean it isn't true.]

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Test Series Six Status and Threads (7/6/2012 9:41:27 PM)
The Tag Team (Test 6A) AAR thread has been posted by Big Red - and he is in final preparation of Japanese Turn One - over which he has operational control. I have posted the definitions of the three Allied Chairs playing this game. I am preparing Turn One with the same economic foundation but different operational orders for tests 6B and 6C. These will be a standard game vs an Allied player and vs a prototype Japanese script which may be reduced to AI commands in future. [A script is a written set of rules defining what to do in various situations. Each time a new situation arises, a new script to govern that will be written to apply to all future similar cases.] These (identical) start turns may complete for Japan today. All these games are open and players on the RHS mailing list will get the turns, passwords, reports and replays. I do not at this time intend to use the Tracker on them (but it probably will be used in Test 6A). To join the mailing list, contact Mifune, Big Red, or myself. These tests are based on RHS mod 4.15 - which when revised aircraft art is available - will be frozen into the RHS installer - probably technically version 4.20 at that point.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Kamakaze Update: Scenario 106 (7/7/2012 3:18:59 AM)
After investigating how kamakaze units are in stock, and discovering the same unit in scenario 1 doesn't have the box checked but it does in the downfall scenario, I decided to implement Kamakaze units (at least at first) in the RHS 1945 Downfall Scenario 106 vice 102. 106 is based on 102 and in many respects is similar - but its later date makes testing of these units more feasible sometime soon. There also is some air art related to dedicated kamakaze planes we can implement for it. Since this scenario is just starting development, it will be some time before it properly configured. Once it is, depending on how these units behave, we may be able to put the option into other scenarios as well. For the present, 102 will not be reissued to include these units. Kamakaze is both a scenario setting and an air group setting, and apparently both are required to make the code work. Also, a plane used in this role has a different loadout (and range) than with its normal load. This should be properly defined, case by case.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Composite Atomic Bomb Devices (7/7/2012 3:21:45 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: BigDuke66 In that light I wonder why the player is provided with a chance to use the "thin theory" of an Japanese atomic bomb but is denied to use kamikaze(doesn't matter if they make sense or not). in the game See above. After investigation, we are modeling a scenario to use them on the stock Downfall scenario which also uses them. Stock scnario 1 (on which RHS is based) does NOT have this option - as apparently most others do not as well. If we can make it work in Scenario 106 we may backfit it into other scenarios - depending on what we learn about how it works? Both Mifune and I - the mod developers - are not particularly interested in the concept - but at least two players on the RHS mailing list want it. RHS is open to even minority interests - which is one reason we have multiple scenarios with different options.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Start of Game Rules (CRITICAL) (7/16/2012 9:33:11 AM)
There is a common practice among Matrix players to severely restrict Allied movement BEYOND what code does on the first turn, especially at Pearl Harbor. RHS does NOT do that. The reasoning follows here: Game Start: Matrix Options and RHS Mod Elections: 1) Option one, REJECTED: Force the historical start of the war. Base RHS on stock scenario six. This freezes the game results for turn one, defining them from history. No die rolls, no variables, you start with what survived the opening battles. There is considerable historical merit to such a start. Also some practical merit - stock is so broken re aircraft durability that Mifune found it almost tolerable to start this way - at least the Allies lost the right number of planes on the first day! But he found it better to use RHS concepts for plane durability, and AAA values, so the results are closer to right for the whole game. 2) Option two, REJECTED: Start the game without Dec 7 Surprise. This means both sides start even, like any other day. No special effects at all. Clearly events on the first day were NOT like any other. The raid on Clark was the most effective bombing raid of the entire war. Never mind the bombers came in above the heavy AAA - at about 24,000 feet - they hit better than low level bombers did on either side on any other day - due to intensive rehearsal. Allied AAA was uniformly dismal - and when it did shoot - more dangerous to Allied planes than to the enemy! We believe the special effects in the Dec 7 Surprise option are, if unpleasant for the Allies, both reasonable and fair. 3) Option three: ACCEPTED: Start the game WITH Dec 7 Surprise. This means Japanese Task Forces get a movement bonus. At the same time, Allied Task Forces are penalized by losing one of two movement impulses. They are simply slow to form up - and in effect lose 12 hours steaming time. Much of that is reasonable simply because boilers need time to warm up, and crews need time to be recalled. JAPAN knows the war is going to start for sure long before it does - THEIR ships are at sea or ready for sea in a fundamentally different sense than the Allies are. There are also other penalties to die rolls of all kinds, making Japanese attacks more effective, and Allied attacks less so. Again, we think that is reasonable and a fair simulation of history. 4) Standard House Rule option: REJECTED: Most gamers using stock or other mods have a player agreement or "house rule" forcing the Allies to stay in port on the first turn. Often universally. Some even go farther, and forbid other kinds of orders. RHS delegates the decision from the design level to he player level: we PERMIT a player to ELECT to give no orders IF AND WHERE he believes the historical commander would certainly do that. But as designers we do NOT force this on players. Our design intent is to create uncertainty, a wider range of outcomes, and a more interesting campaign. We believe that there is inherently too much knowledge on the first day to begin with, and that players have too much 20-20 hindsight. So we deliberately give SOME power to the players in this matter. Option three bounds it - a hard code Matrix designed set of penalties for the Allies and bonuses for the Japanese. WITHIN that - we further restrict the player with our Primary RHS House Rule: A player is NEVER to give an order he believes, personally, is not one an operational commander would give. Special case: a player is not allowed to give an order he knows is not physically possible. [For example, it is forbidden to order a RR unit to move not along a rail line - although if it retreated off one - it can move directly back to one] This is considered a real restriction, but also one with uncertainty inherent in it: you never know for sure the opinion of the other player what is "realistic" in every case. So you are forced to consider there are at least possibilities. We think that is more like real life than hard rules are. Be prepared. IRL Kiddo Butai had five different attack contingencies it was prepared for: 1) All ships, including carriers, are at sea and operating in tactical cooperation, with air cover and supporting land air strikes 2) All ships, including carriers, are in port, and surprise is NOT achieved - so there is CAP and manned AAA at the target 3) All ships, including carriers, are in port, and surprise IS achieved - so there is NO CAP or manned AAA at the target 4) Only the main fleet, sans carriers, are in port, and surprise is NOT achieved - so there is CAP and manned AAA at the target 5) Only the main fleet, sans carriers, are in port, and surprise IS achieved - so there is NO CAP or manned AAA at the target [historical case] There had been no recon or reports in several days - since the last liner left with two Kempetai officers from the Navy section - so it was possible ships had left port. In the event both Carrier TFs had done so.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: New Aircraft and a Axis Ship Withdrawal Rule (8/1/2012 4:28:04 AM)
On 22 June, 1944, Thai forces staged a coup removing Phibun from power. RTA land and air units, and Marines all disappear (in RHS). RTN ships need to be "interned" in port. This is to be achieved by a house rule: on or after that date, Thai ships in port may not form into a task force or leave port. They can be sunk in port or lost if the port falls, but that is not a reason to move them. If a ship is at sea on that date, it must head to the nearest Axis port and auto-disband. It may not be in a TF with any non-Thai ship. On 7 May, 1945, German naval units in theater are considered to be taken over by the Japanese. Submarines will be assigned I or Ro numbers - at least for new game starts. RHS is now using the standard air art for Allied planes from stock, dababes and reluctant admiral. About eight new Allied plane sub types were added. As well, some additional planes on both sides now point at art that existed, or now exists, but which was not being used. All the documentation about plane slots and bitmaps above is now being updated to the new data. Some new art, added by Mifune, does not yet have tops. The filmstrips will continue to add art until everything needed is done - and filmstrip updates can occur during a game or test game.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Plane CAF Section (REVISED) (8/1/2012 4:34:45 AM)
This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Installer (8/1/2012 4:41:40 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: kevin_hx btw,When does the RHS mod formally issue? The installer may release about 1 August

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Revised Axis Air Art Pointers (8/5/2012 11:58:43 AM)
Mifune added some new air art and I have revised what planes point at which art. Because we have the art, 3 more types were added. Still more art is added for use with his scenario 100 - and even unused art is at least listed under bitmaps so modders can point at it if they wish. [This is also true of the Allied sections] Supporting lists are revised (Slot Order List, Axis Bitmap List, JNAF and JAAF Slot Order Lists)

elcid -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Arming offensive airstrikes (8/9/2012 8:19:24 PM)
First of all, the idea to include torpedo ordnance at land bases was long proposed by Mifune. He observed that land based air units armed with torpedoes often flew with bombs - even when instructed to use torpedoes. This turns out to be related to how code allocates torpedoes. I finally looked at the matter - because I didn't want to have to change the installer. When finally I examined the matter, I determined the problem is more general. It also applies to bombs. The number of bomb armed planes is limited by several factors, but not just the number of planes which can fly. I had major concernes that devices not squads might be treated differently from proper squads. In at least some ways, that seems not to be the case. The system often treats a device for one purpose in one place but as a squad in another place. [For example, a weapon may be a 'squad' when assigned to a land unit, but not when it is on a naval unit.] But when a device is in a land unit, it is listed as a squad, it is tallied in the support requirement, and it increases the supply cost. This has the MAJOR benefit of increasing logistical cost for air units - which is a big problem in AE as some threads have noted. Planes fly almost free. Literally. And the load carried is NOT related to the logistical cost. NOW we can make the base forces which are more likely to arm major air strikes, and those associated with torpedo strikes and bomber attacks cost more. This is similar to adding vehicles which RHS did a while ago - but even more functional - although somewhat abstractly. It makes a base force more likely to arm the planes as desired - but increases the cost of the base force that can do that all the time. It is also now possible to distinguish between Navy and Air Force base forces, base forces of different nations, upper echelon support units, and training support units. And different kinds of small detachments - a recon support element is different from a forward offensive base even if small. For example, a HQ unit with air support repairs planes, or 'fuels them' for a flight - exactly as all units in AE always have done. There are no additional aircraft ordnance or torpedo ordnance elements. A standard base force is the opposite. It has aircraft ordnance up to its aircraft support squad number (or often slightly less than that). Navy Base Forces also get torpedo ordnance - typically at a lower number - variable by nation according to their torpedo usage. Thus - if you only might fly patrol flying boats in a torpedo attack - a typical value might be 12. But if you might support a bomber unit entirely of torpedo bombers, the value might be a major fraction of aircraft ordnance. Dedicated OTU base forces, on the other hand, only get about 1/3 of the aircraft support squads as their aircraft ordnance value. They can arm planes - and better than an air HQ can - but nothing like as efficiently as a combat support base force can. There are many variations on this - and each has proportional logistical impacts. Adding these elements also increases the support requirement, so a combat base force now costs more to move and feed in general, but an air HQ doesn't. Also, those able to arm torpedo attacks more often cost more than those that don't.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Installer Issued (8/15/2012 2:19:22 PM)
The RHS installer has been assembled and distributed to the RHS user list. It contains 8 scenarios - 5 issued and 3 works in progress - 92 May 42 WORK IN PROGRESS by Mifune 100 Greater Asian Prosperity WORK IN PROGRESS (very Japan enhansed) by Mifune 101 CVO (Carrier Oriented, historical, active Russians) 102 AIO (AI Oriented, simplified historical, passive Russians) 103 RPO (Russian Passive Option of 101) 104 RAO (Russian Active Option of 102) 105 EOS (Empire of the Sun - slightly Japan enhansed) 106 DFS (Downfall Scenario) WORK IN PROGRESS and 1945 device/plane testbed In addition to the single compressed file installer available to anyone on the RHS distribution list, Scenarios 101 to 105 files, and RHS art files, are separately available on the following site http://alternatewars.com/Mods/WITP_AE/RHS/RHS_scenario.html

kevin_hx -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Installer Issued (8/20/2012 2:28:57 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: el cid again The RHS installer has been assembled and distributed to the RHS user list. It contains 8 scenarios - 5 issued and 3 works in progress - 92 May 42 WORK IN PROGRESS by Mifune 100 Greater Asian Prosperity WORK IN PROGRESS (very Japan enhansed) by Mifune 101 CVO (Carrier Oriented, historical, active Russians) 102 AIO (AI Oriented, simplified historical, passive Russians) 103 RPO (Russian Passive Option of 101) 104 RAO (Russian Active Option of 102) 105 EOS (Empire of the Sun - slightly Japan enhansed) 106 DFS (Downfall Scenario) WORK IN PROGRESS and 1945 device/plane testbed In addition to the single compressed file installer available to anyone on the RHS distribution list, Scenarios 101 to 105 files, and RHS art files, are separately available on the following site http://alternatewars.com/Mods/WITP_AE/RHS/RHS_scenario.html When I click the pictures download link, it says "404 Error File Not Found"... What happens?

Mifune -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS Installer Issued (8/21/2012 12:19:08 AM)
Something did go wonky with that web page. Layout also got a bit messy too. I am not on the right computer at the moment. I will fix as soon as possible.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: RHS pwhex: Seasonal Construction (8/22/2012 6:53:21 PM)
Spring 1942 Reactivation of minor RR on New Caledonia (1 hex NW from Noumea) Monsoon 1942 Fall 1942 Winter 1942 Completion of Iranian National RR spur (2 hexes E from Abadan/Khorramshahr) Completion of ALCAN highway as pioneer road (segments of 10 trail hexes, 8 trail hexes, and upgrading of 4 winter tail hexes to year around trail in 3 segments between existing road and rail lines in Canada and Alaska) Spring 1943 Upgrading of Whitehorse & Yukon RR to main line completed (2 hexes NW from Skagway) Monsoon 1943 Road along Burma-Siam RR line completed (5 hexes SE from Ye) Winter 1943 Completion of Burma-Siam RR (5 hexes SE from Ye) Completion of ALCAN highway as secondary road (segments of 10, 8 & 4 trail hexes upgraded to minor road) Spring 1944 Upgrading of Bengal & Assam RR to main line completed (15 hexes from existing line near Jessore to Ledo including major river bridging; 8 hex spur to Chittagong) Monsoon 1944 Ledo Road completed to Myitkyina (upgrading 4 trail hexes to minor road) Winter 1944 Ledo Road completed to existing Burma Road near Lashio (upgrading 3 more trail hexes between Myitkyina and Lashio) Fall 1945 Completion of Sumatra RR (aka 'the second death railway') Winter 1945 and Spring 1946 and Summer 1946 (OPTIONAL) Completion of Burma-Yunnan RR (8 minor RR hexes IF construction not suspended as IRL) Upgrading ALCAN to primary road (25 minor road hexes upgraded IF construction not suspended as IRL) Special Case: The Copper River RR is present in ALL versions of the pwhex files. It runs from Cordova, Alaska to Kennicot, a wholly undeveloped dot location. This RR was abandoned in 1938 when the copper mines were closed due to low copper prices. Other copper mines were reopened in WWII (for example in Michigan and in Montana). This copper mine can be reopened IF an Allied player moves engineer to the dot location along with lots of supplies � in which case the RR will function. The Million Dollar Bridge remained in tact until the 1964 earthquake. This location and RR may be ignore by any player who does not want to use them � and NOTHING will move along it � since there will be no production unless the damaged resources are repaired.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Plane additions and revisions (8/25/2012 2:45:37 PM)
Reviewing the Allied turn in test 6A I found in tne NEI that a light trainer that doubled as a transport - the KNIL L-212 - had the wrong data. It was still in the old format, not the one we have determined works best with AE code. For the sake of clarity - let me break out the unique RHS method of rating transport ranges. We consider operational range to be the most important. So we allow transfer range to be wrong. In game terms, extended range is half (sometimes fuzzy) of transfer range. Further, you define them as the SAME distance in miles - we use nautical miles and knots since hexes are defined in nautical miles - but one could use statute miles if one assumed every hex was 46 sm vice 40 nm. USUALLY - if you define them the same - the extended range in hexes is half the transfer range. If it isn't - increase the transfer range to 1 more than the next increment of 20 - and it will be. To get the actual extended range right, on average, we define transfer range and extended range as 88% of actual transfer range. If there is a mismatch, we increase the transfer range a bit, but not the extended range - and that works out every time. The normal range is 80% of the extended range. OK - so the L-212 was not defined that way. So it needs to be. And if we change it - the data will filter into existing games too. Good. But when I find a problem, I check all the cousins. I reviewed every transport plane on both sides. I found two actual data issues - with the C-74 and something so obscure I forget its name. I also decided to treat flying boat transports in the same way as land transports unless armed (as the Empire Flying boats with bombs) - in which case they are defined as patrol planes which AE does allow to transport. But defining a transport as a patrol plane produces the weird effect that it can do armed missions - and even without bombs defined will 'hit' targets on patrol! While I was at it, I realized that a plane I wanted to add - 22 served in the war IRL and the war in RHS can go on another year - can be added - that we had the art in disguised form (as a bomber variant of the plane). So I added the C-69 Constellation, a fairly fabulous transport - with naturally more priority in Scenario 105 responding to the greater Japanese threat in 105. The art was in the 'standard' Allied art we use - for the B-30. Competition for the B-29, it was started way to late to have a shot - and I don't see why the art was put in. But the transport version DID make production in the war - so I wanted it for flavor. Then I realized - if we can use turretless bomber art for a transport - why not do the variant of the B-29 - known as the C-97? We can use some of the Silverplate art - silver plate is the atomic bombers - without turrets - or the B-39 - which is a conventional bomber also without turrets. So I added that as well. Because the plane could have been in service in an extended war, it is also in all scenarios. Working that up, I realized there was also art for the C-99. This is a transport version of the B-36, and it was so low in priority only one was ever made - the biggest landplane in the world - second only to the Hughes Flying Boat in size. It was hampered by low priority, but in 105 we allow the B-36 higher priority - and so its transport also can have that. But this monster is really too big - only the Martin Mars in RHS is anything comparable - and only 5 of these were built IRL. So 'production' is only one a month - and only briefly in 1946. Yet there are one and two plane detachments that can have it if a player wants - if they survive until 1946. And it carries more than whole squadrons of normal planes - so much in fact I had to mis state the cargo - there is a code limit of 64 k - it carries 65,500 pounds in game terms - although its max load is - if just troops - 88,000 and if cargo - 100,000 (it broke that once to set a record). It does that transoceanic - vastly greater than even the other 'giant' transports. Since we have the art - why not put it in? Looking at the art list for the standard set, I noted a plane I do not know. The P-50A. What is that? It is an F5F-1 - stripped of carrier gear for USAAF. It was dropped in favor of the P-65 which ultimately lost out to the later P-38s. But it is a rather neat two engine, land based interceptor with 2 20mm cannon and 2 .50 cals. It is actually better than early P-38s - which are not impressive - and it could have been produced early. In the face of the increased onslaught in 105, I allowed a limited run - at the expense of Grumman F4Fs for a short while - eventually that gets made up. Once in production at 12 a month, it stays until the P-38L comes along - the first clearly superior option. That happens in the month that drop tanks are allowed to USAAF fighters (air force politics) - so it never did get the range it would have if it could have drop tanks. But it is a rather nice plane in 1942 and 1943 - and it really looks different - and we have the art. The lists that changed in this thread are not updated. These include List 1 - Slot Order. List 2 - Allied bitmap order. And the USAAF section of List 1.

Enforcer -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Plane additions and revisions (8/27/2012 9:23:24 PM)
El Cid When do you think the mod will be released? It sound very interesting and I have not played WITP:AE for a year so This may be fun to do again!

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory (9/1/2012 5:52:34 AM)
Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory The original concept for a pure carrier task force (rather than a carrier as an aircraft auxiliary that searched for and tried to damage the enemy fleet prior to the main engagement between the line of battle ships) was that of Vice Admiral Ozawa. Probably the best carrier theorist in the world in 1941, the Doro Nawa Unit (too late planning group) decided he should command the KB on its initial raid against the United States Fleet. As most students of naval history know, a task force usually has several task groups, and these in turn usually have several task elements. In the case of a pure ship task force, task elements are ships. Naval operational organization differs from naval administrative organization, although sometimes an administrative unit is also an operational one. In administrative terms, KB included three carrier divisions, a division of battleships, a division of cruisers, and most of a destroyer squadron (which on paper would include a light cruiser and 12 destroyers - but the number 12 was always to included ships not available for actual operations - so operational numbers were always slightly less than that,) But in operational terms, another of admiral Ozawa's concepts was the formation of operational task groups which included carriers, heavy cruisers or fast battleships, and destroyer. As taught on paper, there could be three such task groups. In practice, when he commanded in a carrier battle later in the war, two were formed. In scenario 105 two major task groups are formed named Kiddo Butai Div 1 and 2. Division 1 includes the older ships, some of them not able to make the modern fleet speed of 36 knots. That includes Akagi and Kaga, and both Kongos, as well as the original CL and the original Yugumo class destroyer assigned to the task force, and 4 Kageros. Division 2 includes the faster Shokaku and Zuikaku, both Tone class cruisers, a CL not historically asigned, the Yugumo herself, and the other four Kagero's originally assigned. Hiryu and Soryu are split - one to each division - not because they do not form a natural division which can be the foundation of a task force but because enough escorts could not be found to permit three task groups given all the other operations in the start of war plan. It also represents probably the ultimate of operational efficiency in the era. By midwar, the USN was operating groups of three carriers - typically two CV and a CVL. The time to assemble air strikes is less, and the loss of a carrier to battle damage is less catastrophic to the fate of the task group - making its ultimate success more likely. In the case of Scenario 105, these two task groups are together, with 2 assigned to follow 1. Division 2 is commanded by Rear Admiral Yamaguchi, possibly the second most able Japanese carrier commander. In Scenario 105, there is also a Ni Butai - Ni meaning 2 or Second. In stock and most mods, this Task Force is called "IJN Cruisers" - although in fact it is a carrier task force with CVL Ryujo. Here we add the CVL Zuiho to the task group/force, add the fourth member of the CA division back, and add a CL as well. The assigned commander is Rear Admiral Fujita, one of the best carrier commanders - because the only better choice - Admiral Nugumo - is a Vice Admiral - too important for a mere glorified CVL division. The only 'real' CVE - Taiho - replaces Zuiho at Kure, where it joins Hosho - a nominal CVL classified as a CVE. In Scenario 105, there also are differences in the assigned aircraft. Most significant of these is the inclusion of a recon variant of the Kate - precursor of a concept IJN later developed more widely. Prototype recon versions of Val were introduced at Midway, and later in the war the C6N1 was developed and intended for late war use on every large carrier. Here the two existing prototype C3N1s are joined by converted B5N1s (to the same standard) - in a lovely camo finish designed to make the planes hard to see. Both Hiryu and Soryu get a flight, and Akagi, with its larger capacity, gets an entire squadron (termed 'unit' by JNAF). In addition, both the CLs are assigned an D11A1 Laura night reconnaissance "floatplane" - so classified because it operates from small ships - it really is a tiny flying boat - like the Walrus. Designed to fly all night so it can land in daylight, painted entirely black, these represent a unique JNAF development. In this case, the planes included the special "night glasses" issued by IJN - something RHS also puts on major warships. "Night Glasses" is a device that is a fairly low probability of detection radar in software terms. The idea of these planes is to try to track all night an enemy force detected the previous day - permitting a dawn engagement without needing to search for it.

moonraker65 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory (9/1/2012 9:30:19 AM)
Has the website been updated for getting hold of the RHS scenarios ? The one listed further back keeps giving a 404 error

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory (9/4/2012 5:04:23 AM)
Not certain - Mifune manages the site. There is an updated RHS installer - pm me for a copy. Development is suspended and we are into long term testing. Series 7 has just begun with the Control game (vs a handwritten script as Allies) has just been executed - while manual games have a Japanese start turn ready for Allied input. There is also supplimental material - most of it in this thread - available as Word documents.

moonraker65 -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Scenario 105 Kiddo Butai Theory (9/4/2012 10:04:38 AM)
Ah ok thanks Sid. Got your e-mail by the way

moonraker65 -> RE: RHS Disappearing Ships (9/17/2012 10:15:48 AM)
Had a strange occurrance whilst playing scenario 104. I have had ships turn up at Balboa and Cristobal as reinforcements but when I look they don't show up in port. Similarly I am moving TK's to Abadan and they too are being swallowed up and no longer showing in the ships in port screen.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Disappearing Ships (9/22/2012 11:16:26 AM)
What is the date? Do you know the names of any of the ships?

moonraker65 -> RE: RHS Disappearing Ships (9/22/2012 12:42:13 PM)
This is 12/28/41 and still early game. No I can't rememeber the names but all are ships which turn up as reinforcements

el cid again -> RE: RHS Disappearing Ships (9/22/2012 10:56:17 PM)
I recommend using updated files. Ships should correct. I have recompiled all the latest eratta into a new installer and sent it to you by private email. I also have sent it to all on the RHS list. Anyone else just ask. The current build - as of today - is 4.18. If you get the installer, only SCEN files are affected - assuming you were current on art and pwhexe files. If unsure - update them as well.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Land and Ship Radar Devices (9/27/2012 5:10:39 AM)
Originally a US Navy Electronics Technician Radar, I have always had an interest in radar history. I have not been comfortable with the WITP or AE treatment of Japanese radar in particular, but had too many other demands on my time to investigate it in detail. The AE system had a number of problems. But AE had enough devices to permit reasonable modeling of the Japanese systems. First of all, unlike other nations, Japan had two different kinds of radio detection of aircraft - called Type A and Type B by the Army. Type A systems were not radars, however. They were radio interference detectors and had more range than most radars, but no indication of bearing or range. Operated in pairs, they revealed when a formation crossed the line between them - typically 250 km apart (but the longest example was 400 km). Using maps and information about when lines were crossed, it was possible to track a B-29 raid all the way from India to Japan, and to issue 2 or 3 hour warnings at the target city for civil defense and manning of air defenses. This type of device was produced en mass in 1940 and 1941 and kept in service longer than intended. I found a way to model this kind of device as a weird radar with lots of range but almost no accuracy or effectiveness. Second, the first production army Type B radar was the Tachi 6 - an abbreviation for two words - the first for the radar institute location - the second meaning land based. Tachi numbers below 6 are not air search radars and did not come earlier in time, so they do not belong in the data set. This basic radar was the foundation of what followed, and its versions were essentially only slightly smaller and easier to make variations - with no change in range or effectiveness. In late 1943 the Tachi 7 was introduced - in limited numbers - to address the need for a much smaller set. It was on the same frequency and had the same range, but slightly greater effectiveness. It never replaced the 6 and only supplimented it in service. In early 1944 this the 6 was finally replaced by the Tachi 18, a radar so similar there was also no increase in range, but some increase in accuracy. It was, however, very much smaller, just as the 7 had been, but produced in mass instead of very limited numbers like the 7 was. Only in 1945 was the radar finally improved significantly with the Tachi 20. Range remained as before but accuracy increased greatly - in part because for the first time operators had an indication of target altitude. The Tachi 35 was in a replacement which was identical in game terms. Germany eventually decided to release radar information to Japan, including plans and sample equipment, but the Wurtzburg system supplied was not quite ready for manufacture when the war ended. RHS models this for the first time - for games that go beyond August 1945. But Wurtzburg is not a longer range radar like the Tachi series was - it was simply more effective. So Wurtzburgs are additional radars, not replacements for the Tachi system. Based on German materials (German is my second language), the particular Wurtzburg variant involved is given a range of 88,000 yards. Tachi 6 through 35 radars have a range of 325,000 yards. The original Tachi-6 series sets are gigantic and have weights from 60 to 72 tons - explaining why they were not practical for ship use. They also used multiple antennas - usually three - sometimes four. This technique was long not the norm in the world, but is becoming more common today. It more By contrast, Navy radars were smaller, had less range, and weighed a great deal less than Army radars did. The Type 2 Model 1 (or type 21) used by ships was virtually identical with the Type 1 Model 2 (or Type 12) - and had an effective range vs a formation of planes of 109,000 yards. It was much smaller than the Type 1 Model 1 (or Type 11) and could be mounted on any vessel - even a submarine. The Type 11 had a much greater range (of 273,000 yards) - but it came with a gigantic (and unmistakable) antenna. A later version of the Type 11 was the Type 13 - but it was only slightly more effective and had no more effective range. Taiho and Shinano were designed to mount two of these radars, but only the forward one could do a 360 degree search. The second one was blind forward, so its facing should be specified as "rear" - which also sees both sides. Medium sized carriers only got one of these. None should ever be specified for a ship smaller than a cruiser, and only a late design carrier should ever have more than one. The Navy also had a smaller, microwave radar, the Type 22. When introduced, Japanese and US microwave development were only a few weeks apart in time. But the Japanese never improved on it. In game terms this is a surface search radar. Actually all Navy radars were both surface search and air search radars, but the Type 2 Model 2 was much better with small surface targets than the others were. It had a range of 60,000 yards. It was mass produced - thousands were made - but it was not improved on in any important sense.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Japanese Carrier Logic (Revised) (10/16/2012 1:25:26 AM)
RHS Japanese Carrier Logic This is a presentation of the Japanese carrier program to reinforce the ships that start the war on active duty: the "big six" CVs, the CVLs Ryujo and Zuiho, the Hosho (always listed as a CVL but treated as a CVE by AE, and properly so), and the CVE Taiho. It is about the date of appearance, the form the ship appears as, and any variations between Scenarios 101 to 104 vs Scenario 105. Scenario 100 uses an entirely different logic stream, starting long before the war. Historical Name RHS Name RHS Date Stock Date Notes CV Junyo Junyo 420503 420503 CV Hiyo Hiyo 420731 420731 CV Taiho Taiho 440307 440307 CV Shinano Shinano 440704 441119 Not in 105 Note 3 CV Shinano Iwami 430219 Not in Stock Only in 105 Note 2 BB 111 (Kii??) Iwari 430822 Not in Stock Only in 105 Note 2 CV Unryu Unryu 441219 440806 430806 in 105 Note 1 CV Amagi Amagi 450724 440811 430906 in 105 Note 1 CV Katsurigi Katsurigi 441015 441015 440806 in 105 CV Kasagi Kasagi 450515 450515 440810 in 105 CV Aso Aso 450615 450615 450106 in 105 CV Ikoma Ikoma 450615 Not in Stock 450110 in 105 CV Kurama Kurama 450915 Not in Stock 450613 in 105 CV Azuma Azuma 450617 Not in Stock Only in 105 Note 5 CVL Shoho Shoho 420126 420126 Sister of Zuiho CVL Rhuho Ryuho 421128 421128 CVL Ibuki Ibuki 430901 450515 Note 4 CVL Isama Isama 430911 Not in Stock Note 4 CVL Shinyo Shinyo 431215 431215 430615 in 105 Note 6 CVL Kaiyo Kaiyo 450724 431123 430823 in 105 Note 7 Historical Name RHS Name RHS Date Stock Date Notes CVL Kaijo Kaijo 430827 Not in Stock Only in 105 Note 7 CVL Mizuho Mizuho 430604 Not in Stock Note 10 CVL Nisshin Nisshin 420427 Not in Stock Note 11 CVL Chitose Chitose 430503 CVS in Stock Note 12 CVL Chiyoda Chiyoda 430431 CVS in Stock Note 12 CVE Unyo Unyo 420531 420531 CVE Chuyo Chuyo 421125 421125 CVE Shinyo Shinyo 4301215 431215 430615 in 105 Note 14 CVE Kamakura Maru Kamakura Maru from 4306 AP in Stock 411106 in 105 Note 13 CVE Shimane Maru Shimane Maru 450215 450215 440317 in 105 as 1TL CVE Otakisan Maru Otakisan Maru 450515 450515 450214 in 105 as 1TL CVE Yamashiro Maru Yamashiro Maru 450127 450127 450119 in 105 as 2TL CVE Chugasa Maru Chugasa Maru 450615 450615 450215 in 105 as 2TL CVE Ominisan Maru Ominisan Maru 430929 Not in Stock 430929 in 105 as 2TL CVE Nippo Maru Nippo Maru 450615 Not in Stock 441215 in 105 as 1TL CV Kongo Type Kongo etc. Note 16 Not in Stock From 8/42 (1/42 in 105) CV Nagato Type Nagato etc. Note 16 Not in Stock From 8/42 CV Ise Type Ise etc. Note 16 Not in Stock From 8/42 CV Fuso Type Fuso etc. Note 16 Not in Stock From 8/42 Note 1: In Scenario 105, Unryu and Amagi are repeat Soryus rather than Unryu class design, so it may lay down sooner. Note 2: In Scenario 105, Yamato Class hulls Shinano and No 111 are not suspended on mobilization - but keep building while a conversion design is drawn up - and then completed to a full hanger deck CV rather than as a support carrier as IRL: air group = 96. In addition, after 7/44 in all scenarios it is possible to convert any Yamato class Battleship to a Shinano CV. 105 features a full air group. Note 3: In Scenarios 101 to 104, support aircraft carrier: air group = 43. May convert to a Yamato class battleship. This represents a decision to build the ship as a gunship vice as a carrier. Note 4: May upgrade to CA form. This represents a decision to build a gunship vice a carrier. This second hull was laid down ten days after Ibuki, but was cancelled a month later. In RHS, the player decides if it is to build or not? In 105 only, these ships lay down as repeat Suzuya class and may complete to a CVL form identical with Ibuki. Since carriers take less time to build, the CVL form appears first - and if a player wants the gunship - simply converts it to one after it appears. Note 5: Historically eight Unryu's were authorized (the original plus 7 follow ons) not counting eight slightly larger follow on designs. This is the seventh hull of the series. Note 6: In Scenario 105, Scharnhorst is converted early. Note 7: In Scenarios 101 to 104, APs Argentina Maru and Brazil Maru may convert to CVLs Kaiyo and Kaijo. Stock has Argentina Maru represented by two hulls, and does not allow Brazil Maru to convert. Note 8: In Scenario 105 Nippo Maru, Shimane Maru and Otakasan Maru appear as Type 1TL Tankers. Note 9: In Scenario 105 Yamashiro Maru, Chugasa Maru & Ominisan Maru appear as Type 2TL Tankers. Note 10: Mizuho starts the game as a CVS in stock and Scenarios 101 to 104. In 101 to 104 she may convert to this CVL form. In 105, it appears in CVL form. Plans existed for this conversion. She is almost identical in hull form with Chitose and the CVL form is identical. Note 11: Nisshin starts the game as a CVS in stock and Scenarios 101 to 104. In 101 to 104 she may convert to this CVL form. In 105, it appears in CVL form. It did not require deconstructing as much as Mizuho when the decision was made to convert her in July, 1941, so it completes sooner. Note 12: Chitose and Chiyoda start the game in CVS form in stock and Scenarios 101 to 104. In stock and in 101 to 104 they may convert to this CVL form. Note 13: Chichibu Maru, an AP, was renamed Kamakura Maru in 1939. She was planned for conversion to a CVE starting from 1943, but was sunk before work began. In 105 she is not used as an AP at all, but instead converted starting in the fall of 1941. Note 14: In Scenario 104, Scharnhorst starts conversion into CVE Shinyo sooner. Note 15: Type 1 TL may convert to Shimane Maru CVE and Type 2 TL tankers may convert to Yamashiro Maru CVEs in all scenarios. These are similar to Allied "merchant aircraft carriers" used in the Atlantic but in this case are actually Army aircraft carriers for Army fighters or ASW aircraft. Note 16: After the Battle of Midway, plans were drawn up to convert every capital ship to carrier or to semi-carrier form. There were three options for each class: a 1/3 conversion as was ultimately done for the Ise class; a 2/3 conversion which is similar but provided about twice as much aircraft capacity; and a full conversion suitable for use with carrier aircraft. RHS provides for 1/3 conversions for Ise and Fuso classes and for full conversion of all classes from 8/42. In 105 there are contingency plans for the fast Kongo class drawn up in the fall of 1941 so conversion is an option from 1/42. Except for Ise and Hyuga, there is no provision for dedicated air groups for these ships. The partial conversions actually got half seaplane air groups, and half carrier planes which could not be recovered by the ship - but there is no way to model this case in AE - so semi-carriers get seaplanes and only full conversions get carrier planes.

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Cruisers and Destroyers as Fast Transports (10/19/2012 6:11:20 PM)
I got a report "I don't have much luck using RN cruisers as fast transports" So I checked - their troop capacity is uniformly zero - same for cargo capacity - same for almost every fast transport except for APDs and sometimes minelayers. Fortunately ship class data of this sort both updates instantly AND does NOT require going to every ship (like most updates do) - cargo is dynamically linked to ship records real time. So the next microupdate will attempt to address this matter comprehensively for all classes on both sides. My first USN ship was an amphib - and I understand how this works. I am not happy that carriers and tankers can not carry anything - and in fact we have a weird ship that is defined in upgrade as a CVE with troop and cargo capacity - so we will be testing that in due course. But certainly cruisers and destroyers can carry troops - inefficiently - as the Fast Transport rule permits (with higher risk of losses). As always, we will use an algorithm. Based mainly on tonnage. A destroyer carriers more or less a company, a cruiser more than one company. Some warships had fold down canvass "bunks" on the sides of passageway walls to facilitate this. A first pass algorithm which seems to produce reasonable values is three times the square root of ships size in tons = troop capacity unless the ship has special cargo spaces - see USN blockade runners (ex 4 piper bananna boats) or HMS Centurian (whose magazines no longer hold ammunition) - cargo = 1/10 of troop capacity rounded up in tons (based on the actual planning rule of thumb - you need 100 kg per man for weapons, ammunition and equipment MINIMUM for a military unit movement, not just personell movement)

el cid again -> RE: RHS Design Theory: Third Generation RHS atomic bomb devices (10/25/2012 10:04:26 AM)
This will probably be the last level of development of atomic bomb devices for RHS - we are about at the limit of what can be done statistically with the ranges available in the fields of the devices. There are two different RHS atomic bombs - a Little Boy type called UB (for Uranium Bomb) and a Fat Man type called IB (for Implosion Bomb). There is also a third special bomb for B-29s of the Silverplate (atomic bomb carrier) version - a conventional Pumpkin Bomb - of the same weight as a Fat Man - for operational use to give bombers practice (or, if you wish, to have non-atomic bombers in the formation that still drop something - Silverplate bombers have more range than conventional B-29s do - so Pumpkin Bombs is something you can drop. It also gives bomber crews experience - as was intended IRL - these weapons were used operationally.) The two atomic bombs are similar, with slightly different yield assumptions - and slightly different weights. The differences are pretty academic from a practical point of view - a difference of yield that probably makes no difference whatever to the target (since it is all but certainly destroyed) and of weight of 300 pounds. However, just in case different data may sometimes yield different results, and also because availablilty differs by type, we have the two kinds. In the normal case, the US gets 1 UB per month starting in July, 1945, and two IB per month starting in August 1945. [This is controlled by issuing special UB and IB Silverplate B-29s at that rate - and requiring you to either upgrade, that is change - the bomber type in the unit or disband the unit after you use it to drop an atom bomb.] There is a very slight chance Japan might make UB after the end of the historical war - first is the G8N - and later the Ki-91 might also be made. That would require enough HI points to make planes and engines, dedicating a plant to just atomic bombers of one or both types, and none of these plants suffering damage (HI plants, engine plants, plane factories) - and that there is fuel and resources for the HI plants to consume. If the G8N goes into production in the fall of 1945, or the Ki-91 later still, the requirement the air unit disband (there is only one for each) means "production" (or at least use) is limited to one per four months per type. This may not be fair, but it is in fact optimistic about the ability to produce atomic fuel for the bombs. While Japan was aware of Plutonium (eka uranium) and had a more sophisticated sense of how to exploit it in reactor fuel than we did, they made no attempt to master separation technology or to design implosion bombs - which they also knew about because they had Manhattan project intelligence in detail. So only gun type Uranium Bombs are a possibility. For the US - bomb production is certain - at a low rate - after August 1945 3 per month. For Japan bomb production is highly uncertain and in no case can exceed 1 every 2 monts - half that until the Ki-91 is made. The new system involves loading each atomic bomber with 24 bomb devices: the dud bomb device (which works 99% of the time that all the rest fail); the 33% device (from the first generation RHS design, which has 50% - or 46% - chance of failure so the bombs will tend to be either "near normal yield" or "near maximum yield" about half the time each. The second generation 11% device is replaced by a 3% device. Instead of carrying six 11% devices, the plane now carries twenty two 3% devices. The statistical odds are that a single drop of this package will destroy either 22 or 23 targets - with a slight chance of 24 targets - and a modest chance of 20 or 21 targets. Even in the very unlikely case all the normal yield devices fail, a dud bomb device will work 99% of the time, taking out one target (probably). This is much better than the first generation RHS model with a maximum of 4 targets, or the second model with 8. But we won't be able to increase it from there. And we probably don't need to. This probably means the devices will have adequate game effects on enough targets in the target hex to consider it an atomic bombing.

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