Necessity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Full Version)

All Forums >> [General] >> General Discussion



Message

Britvojnik -> Necessity of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (2/12/2002 9:26:00 PM)

I come here to ask some of the most knowledgeable people I can imagine on this subject. I have recently been exposed to some outrageous claims that the US JCoS issued a report after the war claiming the invasion of Japan (Gymnast) could have been carried out with only 50K US dead (and i imagine 3 times a many wounded) This of course is farcical given the totals from okinawa. But what does anyone know of this report, or a historian named Blum. Also this hisorian claims Japan was trying to surrender for several years (1943). That there never was a need to drop the weapons... their army was demoralized and wanted give up. To me this is all revisionist bull****, but i wanted to pick your brains and see if there was any credence to any of it. thanks



mogami -> (2/12/2002 10:14:00 PM)

Hi, my sources (well at least my recollection) have 100k killed on landing 1 million casulties total. The 2nd Marine Division was to make the first landing (Operation Olympic) and was written out of planning on D-Day+5 (it was presumed to have been wiped out by then) Personally I do not think the bombs by themselves are what made Japan surrender. (they had sent feelers out in 43 and 44 but did so through the Soviets who just sat on the requests) On Aug 8th 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and began overrunning Manchuria, they caused over a million Japanese casulties. This is what I believe actually caused Japan to surrender (the fear of Soviet occupation)



asgrrr -> (2/12/2002 11:41:00 PM)

I participated in a somewhat heated discussion about this on the SPWAW forum a few months ago. Will perhaps try to find it, though it will be difficult without the search function.
I must say though that your approach seems prejudiced, and not likely to encourage factual debate.



asgrrr -> (2/12/2002 11:58:00 PM)

Here it is. Knock yourself out. http://www.matrixgames.com/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=2&t=007585



Britvojnik -> (2/13/2002 12:06:00 AM)

I think you have judged me too quickly, but perhaps not. i do hold a view that it was necessary... but im a willing ot listen to others. it is just that must people on the other board im at know very little about this subject. they read one random article and they feel they have the truth wit ha capital T. thanks for the link...



Frank W. -> (2/13/2002 12:21:00 AM)

as far as i know, japan was 1944 bacause of some changes in the goverment not anymore so shure to win the war. they even tried to come to some peace talks with the US. but US wanted uncondinial surrender. some sources said,there were some studies about late ´44 and early ´45 that came to conclusion that japan would have surrendered in 1946 because of total air and sea suppority of the allies. they would have surrendered without the a-bomb,too. perhaps it would had taken more time.... and even more weird was it that roosevelt let the russians anter the war against japan as they were almost dead. so the sovjets made easy prey with little cost. USA even supplied their far east army.



Frank W. -> (2/13/2002 12:37:00 AM)

let me add the contracts with the russians were made in jalta, little time after jalta roosevelt died. he was a quite russian friendly president.



RolandRahn_MatrixForum -> (2/13/2002 12:41:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Britvojnik:
I come here to ask some of the most knowledgeable people I can imagine on this subject. I have recently been exposed to some outrageous claims that the US JCoS issued a report after the war claiming the invasion of Japan (Gymnast) could have been carried out with only 50K US dead (and i imagine 3 times a many wounded) This of course is farcical given the totals from okinawa. But what does anyone know of this report, or a historian named Blum. Also this hisorian claims Japan was trying to surrender for several years (1943). That there never was a need to drop the weapons... their army was demoralized and wanted give up. To me this is all revisionist bull****, but i wanted to pick your brains and see if there was any credence to any of it. thanks
There are several estimates. Dunnigan&Nofi: The Pacific War Encyclopedia, p.317 gives an estimate of 370k U.S. casualties, including 80k killed (for Olympic *and* Coronet). I recommend to read "Downfall" by Richard B. Frank.
In the chapter "The Invasion and the President" there is an excellent listing of several estimates.
For example, if you argue that an invasion force of 1.792.700 men fights a ninety-day-campaign and if you look how many men are killed on each day in ETO/PTO, you might try to estimate the casualties by taking into account the total number of men involved, the length of the campaign and the average loss rate in ETO/PTO.
These estimtes lead to:
348.501 casualties (67.764 killed) using the ETO loss rate.
With the PTO loss rate, there are 1.202.005 casualties (348.501 killed). On the other hand, you might try to find out how many US servicemen are killed/missing/wounded to kill/capture one japanese soldier.
On Luzon, the rate was something like one to five (One US soldier KIA/MIA/wounded to kill/capture 5 Japanese).
On Iwo Jima, the rate was something like 1.25:1 (however, I think that this number might be wrong, it could also have been something like 1:1).
And there are many other problems:
How would the japanese militiamen fight?
To the last spear or would they use their brain?
What about chemical weapons?
As you can see, there are lots of variables, and no one can be sure how many US soldiers would have been killed in an invasion. And there would be a lot more non-japanese people be killed on the asian mainland (including losses from chemical and bio weapons).
And there would have been many dead japanese civilians.
Not only due to the fighting.
Also by starvation.
Even with the end of the war, Japan was unable to feed her population - without massive US help, there would be a horrible mass starvation in 1946.
As for the "Japan was going to make peace": All I know doesn't support this thesis.
There are prominent people who say that this was the case (for example Mr. Galtung), but in fact there was an exchange of telegrams between Sato (Japanese ambassador in the USSR) and Togo (Japanese foreign minister).
This exchange was read by the US (magic).
It showed that the Japanese leadership was not willed to accept anything like an unconditional surrender.
I do fully sympathise with every innocent killed by the bombing (nuclear and conventional) of Japan, but the alternatives to the bomb would very likely have been much bloodier. If you are really interested in this topic, I can only encourage you to read "Downfall". Hope this helps,
Roland



Unknown_Enemy -> (2/13/2002 1:00:00 AM)

Something to add to this thread is that Japanese high command was divided. The most influent faction wanted to continue the fight whatever the cost, they knew the war was lost, but they wanted to make sure that when an US landing were to occur, a massive bloodbath was to be ensured, for lots of old schoold army officers, there could be no such thing as surrender. The honor dictated to die fighting. But there was a peace faction in the army, which was arguing "then what shall we do if the US just keep fire bombing us whithout any intend to conquest our country ?". There was no answer to that question from the other side. The Emperor expressed his views supporting the second group, but was not yet listened to.
The problem was the "unconditionnal surrender", they had just witnessed the nazis beeing wiped out, so it conforted the die hard staff that US would try to crush them in battle. Then, for the decision to A-bomb cities, please remember that at this time, civil targets were valid targets from ALL military commands involved in WW2. From our moral evolution, it is not anymore, and thanks god for that. But it was not so at the time. We may judge the act from our current moral values, but these were at the least different at that time. So were Hiroshima & Nagasaki a military or a political decision ? I don't know. But whatever, I don't want it happening again.



MarkFroio -> (2/13/2002 1:35:00 AM)

From what I've read it seems that the first bomb was definitely necessary. And if the second bomb was not, why didn't the Japanese do everything that they could to make sure the US knew they wanted to surrender? Because they didn't want to surrender, that's why. And in the end, it wasn't unconditional surrender. The Japanese Emperor retained his postion.



ratster -> (2/13/2002 2:38:00 AM)

The second bomb was more punitive than "neccessary". Why did they firebomb Dresden for that matter, because there were a lot of pissed off people back then, who wanted payback. The Japanese high command was at that point(up too and including Hiroshima) more concerned with the firebombings then the A-bomb(of which they were not aware of its full efects yet). There's a good argument that the second bomb "convinced" them of the "error" of their ways. As others have stated, there is no way to be sure what the casualties would have been in an invasion of Japan. However, at that point, 1 would have been unacceptable. Remember, the Japanese attacked the US first. Its easy to come up with alternatives in the 20/20 hindsight of the historical record. One could also argue that one of the chief reasons nukes have not been used since that time is because of the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.



asgrrr -> (2/13/2002 5:04:00 AM)

One can speculate back and forth on the casualties in the case of invasion, but all that is irrelevant. No such invasion would ever have taken place. There was no option left to the japanese but surrender. The japanese leadership knew this. The US leadership knew this. And the US leadership knew the japanese leadership knew this. They only had to come to terms with this (to them) monstrous fact, which they would have in due course. The only thing they still put a question mark to was the fate of the emperor. Even after two atomic bombings, they opened negotiations by querying US intentions on that point. The reply was that he would not be harmed (as came true), after which the japanese agreed to surrender.
Anyway, since they were willing to surrender when faced with atomic destruction, why would they not have surrendered when faced with certain destruction by other means?
In Alperovitz's book that I mentioned in the thread above, the author reveals that little or no references exist in historical documents that the decision to use the bomb was discussed in the context of precluding the necessity of invasion or saving lives. Those documents make it all too clear what was on the mind of those making that decision (mainly Truman): To bring about the speedy capitulation of the japanese before the soviets could make substantial gains on the asian mainland, and in the process demonstrate the new weapon to them. This explains a murky side of the matter: why there was such a short time before the two bombings.
The commanders of the military branches did not have a part in this decision (which one would assume they had, if the objective was to spare their troops).
Macarthur, commander of the army (which might have been expected to have been the main "beneficiary" of the atomic attacs, did not even learn of the bomb's existence until days after the order to use it had been given. He later publicly described his disgust at this same decision.
Top navy leaders, including King (commander) and Nimitz, believed that japanese surrender was only a matter of time.
According to his aide, and supported by varios public utterances, Arnold, commander of the Air force, was of the opinion that the bombings were unnecessary, but that it was a political decision that was not his to question. I close with a quote of Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the president: "The japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender".



Randy -> (2/13/2002 2:17:00 PM)

Hi, two good books you might want to check out are:
1)"The Invasion of Japan" by John Skates
ISBN 0-87249-972-3
2)"Downfall" by Richard Franks
ISBN 0-679-41424-x
Hope these help.



Supervisor -> (2/13/2002 3:07:00 PM)

It's usually forgotten by both sides in this debate that both the leading contenders for ending the war with Japan without using the atomic bomb would have probably killed more Japanese than the bombings. Either an invasion or starving the islands into submission would have killed even more Japanese. Ironically, horrible as they were, the atomic bombings were the most humane solution for both sides. The terms the Japanese floated through Stalin in 1945 were plainly unacceptable not only to the United States but the Asians who had suffered the brunt of Japanese agression and war crimes. There is also considerable doubt whether the Japanese Cabinet could have gotten the Army, who had basically run the country since the early thirties, to go along with any terms which smacked of surrender. The most strident criticism of Truman's decision comes from poorly researched and one sided interpretation of a handfull of documents. The stuff I've read totally forgets the context and events that drove Truman. "Thank God for the Atomic Bomb" an essay by Paul Fussell, the author of The Great War and Modern Memory as well as other wonderfull work, best puts the events in their contemporary context. He had just survived combat in Europe and was shipping off to Japan when the bombs dropped. [ February 13, 2002: Message edited by: Ed Jenkins ]



Raverdave -> (2/13/2002 6:45:00 PM)

quote:

Originally posted by Penetrator:

In Alperovitz's book that I mentioned in the thread above, the author reveals that little or no references exist in historical documents that the decision to use the bomb was discussed in the context of precluding the necessity of invasion or saving lives. Those documents make it all too clear what was on the mind of those making that decision (mainly Truman): To bring about the speedy capitulation of the japanese before the soviets could make substantial gains on the asian mainland, and in the process demonstrate the new weapon to them.
I think that this is the true reason for the A-bombs being used....more so as a signal to the soviets than to further pressure the Japanese. The US had seen the half of Europe swallowed up by the Soviets who were busy installing pupet governments and now with the USSR declaring war on Japan, they had the nightmare of the soviets gaining control of large areas of Asia. I just don't see how the A-bombs alone could have convinced the Japanese....lets face it....by mid June most of Japan's industry and cities were a fire-bombed wasteland....Kobe, Kawasaki,Yokohama,Osaka,Nagoya and of course Tokyo. There was no military need to drop the bombs. In fact "Hap" Arnold was so convinced that the USAAF could wipe out the rest of Japan that he sent LeMay to Washington to try to convince the JCS that there would be no need for an invasion of the home land. And as for the timing? Well the first bomb was droped on the 6th of August....the same day that the Soviets declared war.



Raverdave -> (2/13/2002 6:49:00 PM)

The US had 50,000 casualties taking Okinawa.
Marshall expected 275,000 casualties of the 780,000 men that MacArthur was intending to use in the planned landings at Kyushu.



Supervisor -> (2/15/2002 3:58:00 PM)

We do have the testimony of senior members of the Japanese cabinet that the bomb was instrumental in forcing the Army to accept surrender. Even so there was an aborted coup on the night of the Emporer's broadcast and the CIC of the Army committed suicide rather than face the resposibility for surrender. If the bomb had nothing to do with Japanese surrender, why did they surrender so suddenly after the second bomb. The conditions floated by the Japanese contained considerably more than assurances for the Emporer's safety. They demanded that the Japanese forces disarm themselves, not the allies, and that any war crimes trials be conducted by the Japanese. Most historians and observers at the time have concluded that the Japanese would have murdered the remaining allied prisoners in their care if given enough time. American policy makers were convinced at the time if one set of conditions were accepted the Japanese would add new ones. They were undoubtedly right. As to the invasion scenario itself, we do know that beyond a new wave of Kamakazis, use of civilians as cannon fodder and other plans that would have led to massive causualties on both sides, the Japanese planned to use the biological and chemical weapons they had developed in Manchuria. Which incidently they had tested on the Chinese population and allied POWs. I don't think anyone knows what the final death toll would have been on both sides. Any estimate is at best a guess and probably a low one. It was better that the war end quickly in a massive allied victory. If we were merciful as we were then it was our mercy not a "last" victory wrung from us by the Japanese militarists. The situation with the Soviet Union played its part. However, it was only one component of the equation. Does anyone really believe Asians in general or the Japanese in particular would have been better off liberated and occupied by Soviet troops? Given the conduct of the war up until Truman's decision was the bomb an extraordinary weapon to use? The Japanese had carried out a reign of terror throughout Asia. They had routinely tortured and murdered POWs. They had encouraged Japanese civilians in areas captured by the allies to commit mass suicide. The Amercans had already crossed the Rubicon when they began fire bombing of Japanese urban centers. War is all hell. No one at them time knew exactly what the bomb would do. Even today it's hard to conclude that it was more inhumane than the alternatives. [ February 15, 2002: Message edited by: Ed Jenkins ]



Britvojnik -> (2/15/2002 11:17:00 PM)

I would like to say thanks to you all for your input and recomended readings... I will actually take a few of them up... again thanks i knew i came to the right place.



asgrrr -> (2/16/2002 1:31:00 AM)

Well that is so and so is that. Mr. Ed: there is quite a lot of speculation on your part, considering the seriousness of the decision. If you believe that the bombings were necessary and/or justified, the contemporary US military leaders seem to have disagreed with you, then and later. It seems at least clear that there was no conscious decision on behalf of militarily informed persons, that the use of the bomb would save lives.



Gump -> (2/16/2002 1:48:00 AM)

I don't think it's possible for us to fully understand the mindset of those involved... It's very easy now to speculate that it was ugly revenge that motivated them.... and it probably was.... My question would be that if we could possibly imagine what it was like to have gone through that bloody period. Fresh after the loss of 50000 boys on Okinawa... your damn right it was revenge... very necessary revenge. If you are in that kind of a fight revenge and bloodlust are the absolute tools of the trade. I would also speculate that the true horror of what an atomic bomb was might not have been fully understood..... To them I believe it was a "new toy that would kill a lot of Japs.... a very easy decision for them I bet........



Dan Keleher -> (2/16/2002 2:05:00 AM)

quote:

Mr. Ed: there is quite a lot of speculation on your part, considering the seriousness of the decision. If you believe that the bombings were necessary and/or justified, the contemporary US military leaders seem to have disagreed with you, then and later.
one could say the same about yours. You conveniently ignore the very good points Ed raised in his first paragraph, particularly the testimony of Japanese cabinet member who I imagine were better placed that Adm. Leahy to judge whether surrender was only a 'matter of time.' If you are interested in 'factaul debate', take a look at Frank's book. It may not change your mind but it will provide an alternate view-point abd counter-balance to the strident revisionism of Alperovitz' book. 'Thank God for the Atom Bomb' is also a highly instructive read. Mr. Fussell is certainly no mindless patriot (see 'Doing Battle') but he does have some pointed words to those who decry the use of the A-bombs.



Gump -> (2/16/2002 3:03:00 AM)

Factual debates are of course meaningless in this case..... The decision to use it was made by one man. Certainly the issue has been revised and cleaned up after the fact, but in reality it was the machinations in Truman's own conscious that determined the outcome. I ask again.... Sitting in the comfort of our intellectual easy chairs, Is it possible to "feel" what he felt, what the American people felt ??? Look at the reaction to 9/11 .... 3000 people...
Now imagine 200,000 ........ I dare say that "killing Japs" was a very acceptable reaction, and needs absolutely no apology by anyone. Not the mention the political side benefits of the act. [ February 15, 2002: Message edited by: Gump ]



asgrrr -> (2/16/2002 3:50:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Dan Keleher:

You conveniently ignore the very good points Ed raised in his first paragraph, particularly the testimony of Japanese cabinet member If you are interested in 'factaul debate', take a look at Frank's book. It may not change your mind but it will provide an alternate view-point abd counter-balance to the strident revisionism of Alperovitz' book. 'Thank God for the Atom Bomb' is also a highly instructive read. Mr. Fussell is certainly no mindless patriot (see 'Doing Battle') but he does have some pointed words to those who decry the use of the A-bombs.
The point about japanese cabinet members tells me absolutely nothing except to explain why they surrendered at this particular time. It says nothing whether they would have surrendered shortly afterwards without it. This is why I brushed it aside. The title of Fussell's book does not indicate an impartial treatment of the subject. If I were to choose from several titles, this one would indicate "a waste of read".
Does Frank's book deal with anything besides casualty estimates?



asgrrr -> (2/16/2002 4:05:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Gump:
Certainly the issue has been revised and cleaned up after the fact, but in reality it was the machinations in Truman's own conscious that determined the outcome. I ask again.... Sitting in the comfort of our intellectual easy chairs, Is it possible to "feel" what he felt, what the American people felt ???
I can absolutely understand those sentiments. However, we must bear in mind what the object of historical research is. It is to know the past in order to
a) understand the present;
b) be able to avoid repeating our predecessors' mistakes in the future. This cannot be achieved if we allow sentimentality to cloud our vision. I have no doubt that to Truman (and others) the results of the bombings were much more horrible than had been imagined. It was only in the aftermath, when the horrendousness and futility began to sink in, that the theory of "saving lives" began to be formed, because there is no indication that those considerations were the basis of the decision. "Forgiveness" based on circumstance, so the responsible parties can "rest in peace" or whatever, must be excluded from serios historical research and debate. We have to make an ice cold determination whether this decision was the right one or the wrong one, if we want to draw any useful lesson from it.



Gump -> (2/16/2002 4:27:00 AM)

The most important point being that It was not horrible or futile given the mindset of people at the time (all people not just the US). I believe Truman's sentiments might probably have been something along the lines of:

"If it will save 1 American boys life I would gladly drop 10 A-bombs." Which I would guess would mirror most peoples opinion at the time. And for us to learn anything from the past I think that is the most interesting revelation. You would like to study war and history removed from the emotions of the people involved and that is pointless. Emotion and vengence and bloodlust are the real drivers of history, not dispassionate debate 50 years later.... That is the real lesson to be learned.... Humans are much more unpredictable and dangerous under those conditions than we can appreciate in a time of peace..... Learn that lesson if you would somehow like to avoid something in the future.



Blackhorse -> (2/16/2002 5:07:00 AM)

Was it necessary to drop the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima in order to win the war? No. There were four other ways that the war could have been won. 1. Continued conventional bombing and blockade: This was the approach favored by the Sky Kings (Air Force Generals). According to the Strategic Bombing Survey, from April through August conventional bombing had destroyed 40% of 16 cities in Japan. Beginning in September, the USBS estimated that strategic bombers could deliver a daily payload ten-times greater than the April-September daily average. What does that mean? By the end of 1945 over 100 Japanese cities would have been burnt-out shells, and the death toll from air raids and starvation would have topped 1,000,000 lives. 2. Blockade only: (With continued bombing of transportation facilities). I don't know that anyone "in the loop" advocated this during the war. Afterwards, this became the favorite option of those who felt we shouldn't have dropped the bomb. I suppose it has the moral advantage of shifting the burden of deciding how many people have to die before the war ends from the U.S. to Japan. However, the Allied leaders had every reason to believe that Japan would hold out for months, or years, based on the willingness of Japan's leaders to sacrifice soldiers and civilians (on Okinawa, only 7,000 out of 115,000 soldiers survived, and between one-quarter and one-half of the civilian population perished as well). Herbert Bix' Pulitizer Prize winning biography Hirohito concludes that the Japanese ruling clique would have accepted months of mass starvation in the civilian population while hoping to lure the U.S. into a "decisive battle" on the Japanese mainland. 3. Invasion: Obviously, the least attractive alternative for American political leaders. Japanese casualties would be measured in the millions. Most importantly for American leaders, American casualties, even in the best case scenarios, would be counted in the hundreds of thousands. 4. A Negotiated Peace: The policy of the Allies was "unconditional surrender." This made sense for two reasons: 1. It reassured an awkward coalition of suspicious partners that no country would 'bail out' and sign a separate peace with Germany or Japan. 2. It erased the fear that WWII could end the way WWI did -- with a negotiated armistice, and with the defeated country's military cliques and infrastructure still in place so they could plot a war of revenge. If the U.S. was willing to abandon those two principles, we probably could have negotiated a peace with Japan. On the other hand, we would have pissed off our allies, absolutely infuriated the Russians, and left a dangerous militarist regime in charge of Japan. As WWI and the Gulf War demonstrated, if you have to go to war with another country, its best to finish the job. What I find interesting is that each of the three "military" alternatives to dropping the Atomic Bomb would have almost certainly resulted in far more Japanese deaths. I disagree with arguments advanced that the A-bomb was dropped "for revenge" or to keep the Russians out of the war. The American approach to WWII was fairly straightforward -- we wanted to win the war as quickly as we could. In Truman's words, "we found [the bomb] so we used it." As for the Russians -- the Americans had been pressing the Russians to declare war against Japan. We wanted to bring as much power to bear against Japan as fast as possible. Many American leaders were suspicious of the Russians, but our national policy was still to cooperate with them -- the mutual hostility of the Cold War would not form until several years later. One factual correction of a previous post: The United States did not drop the Atomic Bomb in response to Russia's Declaration of War against Japan. Quite the reverse. The Hiroshima bomb was dropped on August 6th. The Russians declared war on August 8th -- and by many accounts, the Russians hastily declared war after the bomb was dropped in order to get into the war before Japan surrendered.



asgrrr -> (2/16/2002 6:21:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Blackhorse:
[QB]
What I find interesting is that each of the three "military" alternatives to dropping the Atomic Bomb would have almost certainly resulted in far more Japanese deaths. [QB]
This is a dubious claim. In the case of blockade it depends entirely on duration. Those top military leaders that Alperowitz details, generally believed the surrender to happen around november, without invasion or A-bombing.
quote:

Originally posted by Blackhorse:
[QB] -- the mutual hostility of the Cold War would not form until several years later. [QB]
This is not entirely true. After the fall of Berlin, and indeed sooner, mutual suspicion between US and USSR accellerated tremendously, fuelled by soviet occupation policy in eastern europe. The lend-lease agreement was cancelled in summer of '45.



asgrrr -> (2/16/2002 6:31:00 AM)

quote:

Originally posted by Gump:

You would like to study war and history removed from the emotions of the people involved and that is pointless. Emotion and vengence and bloodlust are the real drivers of history, not dispassionate debate 50 years later....
You can go that way if you like. But, in my opinion, then you are a student of history for curiosity only. You will not be able to learn lessons from it that will help you (or others) avoid repeating history. It is precisely the most important lesson of history methinks, to learn how to avoid being driven by "Emotion and vengence and bloodlust". These are the real evil characters of the history books, and they never die. If we cannot learn how to avoid them, I fear we have no hope of survival in a world saturated with nuclear weapons. Remember, the future is a very long time. We cannot hope to get through it if we perform a dance at the brink of annihilation every 50 years or so.



Charles2222 -> (2/16/2002 6:54:00 AM)

Have a book I'll make a quote from called "Excerpts of The History of the Second World War" regarding Olympic.
quote:

The regular Japanese troops facing the 'Olympic' invasion vastly outnumbered the assault force; and in addition to their regular forces the Japanese hoped to mobilise a huge volunteer army, armed mostly with bamboo spears. The US and British task forces had no direct opposite numbers at all, for the once-powerful Japanese fleet had been whittles down to vanishing point in the Battles of the Phillipine Sea, of Leyte Gulf, and of Okinawa. But the Japanese fleet of kamikaze vessels-each of them intended to eliminate an enemy ship-could theoretically wipe out the entire invasion fleet; and this was only the naval element of Japan's suicide defense force-exactly half the remaining Japanese aircraft were kamikaze machines. And this was only the battle for Kyushu....
On a diagram they showed what Olympic would've tallied. The Japanese had only 19 destroyers compared to 131 Allied surface ships. The Japanese did have the aforementioned kamikaze craft which were 3,300 strong. The Allies wold have had 20 carriers carrying some 9,000 planes, while the Japanese would sport 10,700 planes, hald as mentioned being set aside for kamikaze. The Allies expected to field 650,000 troops. The Japanese on the other hand would field 2,300,000 with another 28,000,000 possible addition of local volunteers.
quote:

The plans relied primarily on the kamikaze (suicide) air units for the defense of Kyushu. The Japanese expected to throw upwards of 10,500 planes (50% of them kamikazes) into attacks in the American transports. Although Japanese experts disagreed among themselves as to the ratio of planes expended to vessels sunk, many confidently expected to destroy at least half of the American troop ships in the first ten days. This, combined with a tenacious beach defense, they hoped would beat back the initial assault and convince America that the cost of subduing Japan was so high that a negotiated peace would be preferable. Actually, the Japanese encountered such difficulty in providing the Kyushu defenders with adequate weapons that it imperilled their ability to resist a landing.
My little guess is that since Japan was always trying to play the losses game with the people she attacked intitially (USA/Britian), that when the USSR attacked they could no longer play such a game. Given time, and probably not much time at that, the USSR would have conquered them. The USSR wasn't afraid of the losses and the USSR also didn't sign the Geneva Convention. To make matters worse, with the A-bombs dropping, they were then faced with the issue that the US might not be willing to invade, but might be fascinated with their new toy and not invade at all, with little if any cost to the US. I'm not sure if the entry of a country that wasn't too concerned about losses scared them more, or the usual loss-conscience US/Britain with a weapon that would enable them to fight from afar, but to have a strategy bent on trying to at least stalemate, by how many losses you could inflict, suddenly backfire by virtue of A-bombs and the entry of the USSR (and their success in China) must've been a massive blow. The fact that the Japanese army in China was surrendering in droves to the USSR might've also told them that the nation wasn't as willing to fight to the death as they expected.



Tomanbeg -> (2/16/2002 7:37:00 AM)

Throwing hia hat in the ring, T. offers "The Rising Sun" by John Toland. Toland has a Japanese wife and in his own words the book is written largly from the Japanese point of view.
Two things that I have not seen pop up yet. First ol' Clauz's notion that War is part of Politics, and as such is subordinate to politics. So it is invalid to examine the Bomb Decision(Which actually wasn't) without looking at the politics that framed it. The second thing is the cultural attitude of the Japanes toward what we would call human rights. Japs of that period had trouble with saying "I'm sorry". They did not send notes of apology. They would disembowl themselves, and a buddy would the decapitiate them. On Okinawa, school children would sit in a circle, a soilder would puul the pin on a grenade and the children would play catch with it until it went off. There are films of women with children in their arms leaping off a cliff that is over 100 meters high into the ocean. This idiot who thinks the Japs were going to give up without the bomb sounds like one of those who think the holocaust was made up for propaganda reasons. Read Toland, with his slight bias toward Japan, he probably has the closest to an impartial viewpoint that will come out of the 20th century. And Like Gibbon on Rome, Toland will be the most quoted reference on the Pacific War of 1941 thru 1945. I'm thinking of the 23rd century, of course. In a few hundred years, Historians will be using Toland, Liddel-Hart, Keegan and Ambrose. Not the yapping curs who are attacking them today.
T.



Page: [1] 2   next >   >>

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
1.875