quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The book is primarily about VT-8, but it also went into a lot of detail about the entire air group at Midway. Air Group 8 suffered from some pretty poor leadership. Waldron should have been CAG, he was the only competent commander they had. VT-8 was the first squadron to get TBFs because of Waldron. They just missed being on the Hornet at Midway.

Waldron's replacement Swede Larson was a fearless warrior, but an abysmal leader. In game terms, he would have aggression of 90, but leadership of 30.

The author in the appendix said he was initially only going to write about VT-8 at Midway, but as he researched, he found a whole untold story about the Ring fiasco at Midway and the later deployment of VT-8 during the Guadalcanal campaigns.

He did say Ring proved himself to be a very competent staff officer, which is why he did rise in rank later. Some people are just not cut out for some jobs and Ring should never have been in a cockpit. Or at least not in command of a combat unit.

Bill

quote:

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

If anyone here has not read "Shattered Sword"......don't walk, RUN to the nearest computer to order from Amazon.

I 100% guarantee satisfaction if you are reading this (which means you are interested in the Pacific War)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

quote:

ORIGINAL: Q-Ball

If anyone here has not read "Shattered Sword"......don't walk, RUN to the nearest computer to order from Amazon.

I 100% guarantee satisfaction if you are reading this (which means you are interested in the Pacific War)

+1

I only read this last year. It is an excellent book, a true "must read"-particularly for players that play the Japanese side of this game.

quote:

ORIGINAL: Commander Stormwolf

So the midway debacle was less of a disaster than it could have been.

A man of science, I take no sides in war

Might makes Right

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

I'll certainly second, third or fourth the motion to read "Shattered Sword".

It is a truly great book. I knew what happened that day, sorta. I really did think that luck was one of the most important deciding factors. But the string of the narrative is compelling: one keeps reading thinking that somehow what you know is going to happen is not going to happen. But all the while you keep feeling that the situation is spinning out of control of the commanders. And then finally what you know is going to happen does happen.

One item highlighted in the book that clearly ought to be reflected in this game is the INABILITY of the Japanese to put all their attack aircraft into the same strike package under all but the most ideal circumstances. A morning and afternoon strike of 20 fighters and 40 bombers is a dang site easier for the U.S. to handle than a morning strike of 40 fighters and 80 bombers. U.S. doctrine varied from Japanese doctrine: part of that is reflected in the way U.S. airstrikes tend to come apart in 1942 with one squadron showing up at a time. U.S. carriers didn't much operate together pre-war and didn't practice keeping things together so it's fully justified that U.S strikes tend to come unglued from what the Allied Player intends.
But that begs the question. The Japanese DID PRACTICE LAUNCHING HALF their bombers from each carrier in a division. It was their doctrine to do so. The only time they didn't do that in a carrier battle was at Coral Sea where their air groups had already been significantly reduced due to operational and other losses and the range was very short (less than 100 miles). At Pearl Harbor they appeared in 2 distinct waves and the second wave suffered 3 times the loss rate of the first wave. This is not insignificant and should be reflected in the way carrier battles are fought in the game.