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pharmy -> Japanese insider on pre-war till end ASW efforts and planning (7/15/2012 6:20:31 PM)
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http://dreadnoughtproject.org/friends/dickson/ijn%20asw.pdf
While this was written by the officer in the 50s who was attached to the ASW planning department, and has an axe to grind, particularly against the Combined fleet, regarding the late and hardly fulfilled request for frigates, modern equipment, having a centralized command instead of Naval districts, and having enough a/c assigned for patrol duty, it seems to be quite a good insight as to why Japan lagged so far behind and prepared so badly. The grand battle doctrine (vs the complete lack of Mahan's teachings), the lack of glamor of the task resulting in the basically undesirables/deadenders being assigned to the effort (compared to the ASDIC effort) and the pre-war underestimation of losses (shows why AK construction is so slow at the beginning of the war)
The 1944 establishment of a separate but equal command was way too late and too little, funny enough approved when there was no more chance of a decisive battle - by the way found the OOB of the escort command http://ww2db.com/ijn/04.pdf
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