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LTCMTS -> The Archduke Charles and the Marshalate (3/25/2003 2:51:07 AM)
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I notice someone proposed the entire Marshalate for "most incompetent generals". The Marshalete existed as a creation of Napoleon, as his tool to manage his method of war. Each Marshal had his particular capabilities and Napoleon relied on his ability to assign the correct mission to each one. To fault Ney for his performances during 1813-14 and Waterloo ignore his declining health and his master's misuse of his talents. Ney, along with most of the Marshals needed Napoleon's direct supervision. Putting Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot or Murat on their own as independent commanders is a recipe for disaster, but as operational and battlefield commanders under Napoleon they were magnificent. Each commander should be judged within the political and command relationships within which they existed. As far as the Marshalate, Massena at his best, Suchet, with small forces and, especially, Davout, could compete with any Allied general. But then how do you rank Berthier, who obviously "bolloxed" up the initial French response to the Austrian offensive in 1809 (with the help of his Emperor) and had to have Davout retrieve the situation, but who, when he was absent from his Emperor's side, might be the primary reason for Napoleon's losing at Waterloo.
As far as Archduke Charles and Wellington, neither were independent actors, constrained by the agendas and objectives of their civilian masters and their allies. Napoleon was both supreme military and civil commander and was only constrained by geography, French and allied resources and his ego. The Archduke was constrained by his Emperor's distrust, by the need for Austria to survive, not conquer and the limited resources that the Austrian and Hungarian crowns could command. The Austrian Army was the single unified institution in the Empire. If the Army could survive, no matter how bad things got (remember 1746-48) the Empire would survive. The Empire finally went under when the Army came apart in 1918. As for 1809 (and its Bowden's book that's one of the best), Charles' initial plan was for an offensive through Bohemia into Germany, a much more aggressive and riskier plan than the Emperor or the Hofkriegsgerat would accept. Finally, there was that little problem of epilepsy.
Wellington was also a cautious commander. He knew that his armies would never have the strategic mobility that the French enjoyed with their corps organization and supply through requisition system. Throughout the Peninsular War, he commanded Britain's sole deployable field army, the loss of which, either in battle or through strategic consumption (which almost happened twice during the retreats of 1809 and 1812) would eliminate the ability of Britain to intervene militarily on the continent. When the occasion demanded it and the situation supported it, such as in 1813, he could be as aggressive as any general of his time. What also needs to be remembered about Wellington is his experiences in India, where he was a very aggressive general. Finally, Wellington's armies would always be samller, not so much because of a lack of troops, but a lack of qualified commanders, since Hill and Graham were perhaps the only British generals capable of semi-independent corps command, and no commander in that state of military command technology could directly command more than 50-60,000 troops.
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