RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (Full Version)

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LoBaron -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/29/2012 8:15:05 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: panzer cat

This is a great post, wish I had known some of this before I lost most of my carriers. Improving the nav search skill for bomber pilots had never occured to me. Do I need to train my ASW pilots in nav search also.(off topic, sorry).


Thanks panzer cat.

I am not really an ASW expert. What I know is that ASW works different from conventional naval attack.

As far as I know ASW mission (and so the respective skill) covers both, the search and the attack part, of sub hunting. So it is not an absolute necessity.
On the other hand NavS range is not halved, as ASW range is. So it does make sense to train ASW units in NavS as well, more so as NavS can also spot submarines.

I prefer to keep this thread focused on CV operations, but ASW does have a place here. Submarines are obviousely a threat to carriers, and so ASW is a topic which needs
attention.

As I mentioned already though, the best weapon against submarines is to not get spotted by them. I reccommend, depending on the are threat level, to not use carrier
based search at all if you are in a backwater transit area, but either leave the ASW to float plane ops, or to LBA in combination with ASW TFs. One or the other "I-165 is
spotted by carrier divebomber" message can give more intel to the enemy as you want him to have.



obvert -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/29/2012 10:12:26 PM)

The ASW capabilities for the IJN CVs are crucial I feel. The Kate is probably the best ASW platform Japan has and I always train KB pilots in ASW when they are sitting around. This does several things related to CV combat.

One, if they gain a new skill they also gain experience, improving their overall combat survivability and effectiveness.

Two, it is useful to use them as LBA ASW platforms when the KB is in port, both hitting subs and possibly providing false intelligence if they are not stationed where the CVs are kept. I always use them when there is an upgrade happening, but may move them to another location likely to cause concern if my opponent is paying attention.

Three, this is vital during movement from one area to another or heading back for upgrades/repairs. When in the safe areas behind the lines where I can use 60% ASW settings, having 100+ Kates with 60-80 exp and 70 skill in ASW looking for subs can't hurt. Often the float planes of escorts and CS will be flying some combo of day/night search as well, and the CVs will follow a surface ASW group. I have had several CVs hit by subs, even though these groups were there, but this was usually when a CV was moving solo with escorts to or from the HI for upgrades/repairs, and the presence of the Kates might have been a factor in the CV not getting sunk that day or the following few.

The key is not using this close to contests areas, as a surprise attack could leave you in trouble if your TBs are flying even 10-20% ASW. Also, if you want to keep secrecy of your CVs, use both DBs and TBs on a saturated search pattern in another area where you know subs operate frequently, hopefully confusing the intel.



Crackaces -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/29/2012 11:16:48 PM)

quote:

I prefer to keep this thread focused on CV operations, but ASW does have a place here. Submarines are obviousely a threat to carriers, and so ASW is a topic which needs
attention.
...............
As I mentioned already though, the best weapon against submarines is to not get spotted by them. I reccommend, depending on the are threat level, to not use carrier
based search at all if you are in a backwater transit area, but either leave the ASW to float plane ops, or to LBA in combination with ASW TFs. One or the other "I-165 is
spotted by carrier divebomber" message can give more intel to the enemy as you want him to have.



I think there is a discussion around ASW,secuirty, and CV operations. One reason when staging the CV's is to use ASW and short ranges is to get DL on subs at the risk of annoucing the presece of the CV TF. As you mention Submarines discovering Carrier planes get specific messages "XYZ spotted by a fighter bomber", or better yet,:" XYZ being tracked by carrier planes" etc that with other intellegence like increasing DL on ones subs provides a big picture can be brought together. As an AFB, I think this decision is absoultely critical for the IJ if they plan to adventure out of Mavis range, especally with advanced weather = on.

As a strategy I assume that my USN submarines will dud .. but the intellegece gathered by patrolling lanes where I think the KB is headed or leaving provides invaluable information. Especally when I have the USN CV's out ..

On somewhat the same subject .. There might be a good discussion around flooding areas in the planned CV patrol zones with submarines just to gather intelligence before committing ones CV's .. even the rare XYZ is spotted by a patrol and increasing DL on ones submarines provides information how far out the enemy's patrol arcs extend ..

The best intelllegnce is a big ol' fat CV in the periscope [8D]



SenToku -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 12:53:13 AM)

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.



Crackaces -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 1:38:03 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.


The problem is that weather adversely affects seabased patrol planes. Thus, if there is weather in the hex with the platform, it is very likely these fine patrol aircraft will not fly. However, weather does not affect CV based planes such as DB's and TB's as dramatically. Thus if it is possible to fly, at least the DB's and TB's will find a a target preventing the Midway scenario ...

Using Advanced Weather makes the Earth more like the planet Hoth and greatly increases the probability of grounding sea based float patrol craft. Massing all the platforms in one big TF puts the weather die roll in a huge risk of ruin situation.

This particular operational detail is critical for the IJN seeking engagments outside of Mavis range, because land-based patrols are not dramaticaly affected by weather . Sailing the KB into distant patrol zones well-covered by Cat's with advanced weather =on is a sure way to reenact Midway aganst a tough Allied opponent. [8D]



Crackaces -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 1:55:36 PM)

LOCATION:

I think location of the battle is a very worthy topic. Albeit my experience is quite limited it seems that many CV battles take place because of a landing or power projection into an area that sometimes migt be without thought as to the big operational picture. Just a quick example, Sailing a CV TF into a merchant lane with the thought of engaging an enemy CV TF, or worse an enemy CV TF suddenly shows up. Because Naval attack is totally up to the distance parameters and hidden algorithums, and mostly totally out of control of the player, this brings into play strike packages finding targets better engaged on another day.

I am not suggesting the suicide xAKL strategy, but I am focusing on lanes within the Gilberts as an example, or just north of Suva where it might be very likely merchant targets might be found which might be good, but in the presence of the enemy CV's, which might be very very bad.

I have two such experinces with the KB/mini KB's deviating strike packages toward merchant vessels rather than a total focus on destroying CV's and capital ships. Needless to say the dilution of assests caused much grief [8D].

On a different note, within a CV TF BB's will dilute strike packages sparing the precious carriers from the full wrath.



FatR -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 2:14:25 PM)

quote:

NavS: Every DB or TB pilot participating in a strike requires this skill maxed out. This actually is no secondary skill at all,
it is close to equally important than NavB/NavT. If you do not find your target, and if you are unable to max out the DL of your
target, you lose the CV battle! Train this skill up with as much enthusiasm as you would train NavB/T.


I don't agree with that. Training an extra skill to good levels is time-consuming (and you might want carrier pilots to know GrdB too) and Japanese pre-war veterans are too valuable for strikes. I prefer to conduct naval search with seaplanes and several dedicated Kate/Jill groups based on smaller Japanese carriers (some of which carry no torpedoes anyway). I train divebomber crews on ASW as a secondary skill, Japanese divebombers are less valuable in naval strikes, and I don't want them to fly ground attack missions against anything with actual AAA, so they have a bit of traning time to spare. Although value of carrier-based ASW is dubious when you want to move unnoticed (which is almost always)...



LoBaron -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 4:00:18 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: FatR

quote:

NavS: Every DB or TB pilot participating in a strike requires this skill maxed out. This actually is no secondary skill at all,
it is close to equally important than NavB/NavT. If you do not find your target, and if you are unable to max out the DL of your
target, you lose the CV battle! Train this skill up with as much enthusiasm as you would train NavB/T.


I don't agree with that. Training an extra skill to good levels is time-consuming (and you might want carrier pilots to know GrdB too) and Japanese pre-war veterans are too valuable for strikes. I prefer to conduct naval search with seaplanes and several dedicated Kate/Jill groups based on smaller Japanese carriers (some of which carry no torpedoes anyway). I train divebomber crews on ASW as a secondary skill, Japanese divebombers are less valuable in naval strikes, and I don't want them to fly ground attack missions against anything with actual AAA, so they have a bit of traning time to spare. Although value of carrier-based ASW is dubious when you want to move unnoticed (which is almost always)...


FatR, your way of setting up is an option. At least for the Japanese side.

It does not change my opinion on this topic though, basically for three reasons:

1) Redundancy: specializing a small contingent of your carrier group assets on naval search has the drawback, that if you lose one of those assets (e.g. the CS working as
scouting platform for your strike planes), you immediately lose a huge ammount of CV TF effectiveness. Leaving the NavS jobs to your carrier attack pilots assures balanced
search/strike percentages even in the face of ship losses.

2) Also a personal preference, but if you set up your CVs to operate in several TFs you need to assign search components to each of those groups to ensure NavS coverage in the
event of group separation. This makes the NavS components even more brittle to battle damage. I prefer my multi carrier strike groups to keep on ticking as an offense platform
even in th face of critical ship losses. This, admittedly, is less of a topic for a Japanese player, as for them the decision to form multiple groups is also dependent on escort availability.

3) exp: I would not put CV pilots on ships without them gaining at least 50exp for obvious reasons. To reach this you need to train two skills anyway. True, you can train NavB to your TB pilots,
this makes sense, but the other way around (NavT to your DB pilots) doesn´t. This leaves you with a free to choose skill, mine automatically would be NavS. ASW is another
option, but my personal priority would be easily on the NavS side.

So the discussion is less decided on the IJN side than on the USN side for obvious reasons. Although even there I would rather assign NavS to the strikers, ASW to specialized units - as you
you already said - one should only use airborne ASW in specific situations with CV operations anyway, and GrdB only if it is affordable, which, in most situations, isn´t.



obvert -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 4:32:44 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.


In addition to Crackaces points, some of these ships are subject to conversions. The CS may end up as CVL, and the Mogami upgrade is a choice with a lengthy conversion process right in the middle of the war.

Really though, what are your CV pilots doing most of the time? Mostly sitting in port or moving to another location behind the front lines. So why not improve whatever skill you choose during that time?



SenToku -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (11/30/2012 9:40:46 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: obvert


quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.


In addition to Crackaces points, some of these ships are subject to conversions. The CS may end up as CVL, and the Mogami upgrade is a choice with a lengthy conversion process right in the middle of the war.

Really though, what are your CV pilots doing most of the time? Mostly sitting in port or moving to another location behind the front lines. So why not improve whatever skill you choose during that time?


Doesn't the D4Y-C make this argument completely meaningless by the time CS ships (Chitose class at very least) are leaving for conversion? Mogami seems usefull to me as the number of squardons able to use D4Y-C are limited and with Tone class it would still have min of 20 search float planes in CV TF.



obvert -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/1/2012 12:16:33 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku


quote:

ORIGINAL: obvert


quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.


In addition to Crackaces points, some of these ships are subject to conversions. The CS may end up as CVL, and the Mogami upgrade is a choice with a lengthy conversion process right in the middle of the war.

Really though, what are your CV pilots doing most of the time? Mostly sitting in port or moving to another location behind the front lines. So why not improve whatever skill you choose during that time?


Doesn't the D4Y-C make this argument completely meaningless by the time CS ships (Chitose class at very least) are leaving for conversion? Mogami seems usefull to me as the number of squardons able to use D4Y-C are limited and with Tone class it would still have min of 20 search float planes in CV TF.


Nothing against the D4Y1-C, but they won't solve your search entirely. The service rating is not ideal and there are few groups that can use them, plus you're then taking space still from strike planes. why not just fly 10% search with the planes there already?



Jorge_Stanbury -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 3:28:29 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.


SenToku, if you want to play "historically" then you should keep NavSearch done by floats. Japanese doctrine was to use 100% of carrier planes for direct roles and seaplanes for support.



Puhis -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 3:40:55 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury


SenToku, if you want to play "historically" then you should keep NavSearch done by floats. Japanese doctrine was to use 100% of carrier planes for direct roles and seaplanes for support.


Except this claim is simply wrong... [8|]



Jorge_Stanbury -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 4:43:52 PM)

are you sure? I read it somewhere; and I am talking early war, before Midway

EDIT: I got it from here:

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/sheerluck_midway.htm

"While the U.S. Navy was busy experimenting with the carrier-versus-carrier duels that would so heavily influence its future battle doctrine, the Japanese were still struggling to perfect their carrier doctrine. Sidetracked by the war in China, Japanese naval aviators made little progress in working out an effective strategy for dealing with enemy flight decks.23 Like their American counterparts, the Japanese expected aerial operations to precede the “decisive” clash of battleships that both sides predicted would determine the outcome of the next war.24 Unlike the Americans, however, they failed to anticipate the importance of carrier-based scouting, concentrating entirely on the attack mission.25 No scouting units were assigned to the Japanese carriers, and little emphasis was placed on this important aspect of carrier warfare. Reconnaissance was relegated to a few floatplanes, which would be catapulted from accompanying cruisers. The Japanese also overlooked or failed to develop the deck park, relying instead on the hangar deck to store and prepare aircraft for flight. On the Japanese carriers, aircraft capacity was determined by the size of the hangar, not of the flight deck, as was the case for the Americans.26 The disparity in aircraft-handling procedures and search strategies resulted in substantial differences in the makeup of the typical air group deployed by the two sides.

(...)

"That the lack of a carrier-borne capability for scouting (reconnaissance, in Japanese naval parlance) contributed greatly to the demise of the Japanese carriers was affirmed by Akagi’s former air officer, Mitsuo Fuchida. As Fuchida explained, writing in 1955, Japanese carrier forces were devoted entirely to the attack mission.45 There were no organic scouting units of any appreciable size in the Japanese navy, and very little emphasis was placed on this important aspect of carrier warfare: “In both training and organization our naval aviators [devoted] too much importance and effort . . . to attack.”46 Reluctance to weaken the carriers’ striking power led to a single-phase search plan that was insufficient—in Fuchida’s opinion—to ensure the carriers’ security. “Had Admiral [Chuichi] Nagumo [the commander of the Mobile Force] carried out an earlier and more carefully planned two-phase search . . . the disaster that followed might have been avoided.”47
"
(...)

"The American victory at the battle of Midway was abetted by major weaknesses in Japanese carrier doctrine. The most significant of these was the IJN’s inability to ensure (its leadership having previously failed to allocate sufficient assets for searching) that no enemy carriers were in striking range of its own. This fatal flaw in doctrine caused the Japanese to be caught while their hangar decks were packed with aircraft being fueled and armed. The outcome of an attack in such circumstances had been first predicted in 1933 by Commander Hugh Douglas, U.S. Navy, before an audience at the Naval War College: “In case an enemy carrier is encountered with planes on deck, a successful dive bombing attack by even a small number of planes may greatly influence future operations.”50 The deadliness of such a contingency was well understood by American carrier aviators, who continually worried about being caught in that perilous situation.51"



Puhis -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 5:02:58 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

are you sure? I read it somewhere; and I am talking early war, before Midway


Yes. If you look at battle of Coral sea, you notice that Japan used carrier torpedo bombers as search planes. They also had a few float planes and flying boats and land based torpedo bombers flying search mission. Also in Midway, 2 out of 7 search planes were Kates.

Battle of Coral Sea, from Wikipedia:

At 07:22 (on 7 May) one of Takagi's carrier scouts, from Shōkaku, reported that it located American ships bearing 182°, 163 nmi (188 mi; 302 km) from Takagi. At 07:45, the scout confirmed that it had located "one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers". Another Shōkaku scout aircraft quickly confirmed the sighting. ---
To try to confirm the location of the American carriers, at 15:15 Hara sent a flight of eight torpedo bombers as scouts to sweep 200 nmi (230 mi; 370 km) westward.

At 06:15 on 8 May, Hara launched seven torpedo bombers to search the area bearing 140–230° south and out to 250 nmi (290 mi; 460 km) from the Japanese carriers. Assisting in the search were three Kawanishi Type 97s from Tulagi and four Type 1 bombers from Rabaul...



Puhis -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 5:11:32 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

"That the lack of a carrier-borne capability for scouting (reconnaissance, in Japanese naval parlance) contributed greatly to the demise of the Japanese carriers was affirmed by Akagi’s former air officer, Mitsuo Fuchida. As Fuchida explained, writing in 1955,


Fuchida is a known lier. He was telling fairy tails (written in 1955) because he was trying to conceal his own incompetence... As you see, Japan used carrier planes as scouts. Just because Fuchida didn't want to do it, does not mean that it was against "doctrine"...

Edit: If you want to know what Japanese historians thinks about Fuchida, read Shattered Sword page 442...



Puhis -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 5:16:08 PM)

Double post



Jorge_Stanbury -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/4/2012 11:33:13 PM)

I am certainly getting that book for xmass

thanks



Puhis -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 6:32:07 AM)

Well, actually KB's mastermind of air operations was staff air officer Minoru Genda, not Fuchida. So it was Genda's plan to fly inadequate search at Midway. Fuchida was Akagi's air group leader.

Anyway, in his book Fuchida is trying to conceal incompetence of IJN officers. Japanese war memoirs written in 1950s (right after censorship) are not very reliable. Some might even say that they are nonsense books.



John 3rd -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 7:33:58 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

I am certainly getting that book for xmass

thanks


Shattered Sword is a MUST OWN book with this game!



John 3rd -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 7:35:01 AM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury

I am certainly getting that book for xmass

thanks


Double Post



jmalter -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 7:39:11 AM)

an interesting tactic was posted here, where CV sqns 'go dark' during transit, relying on their TF cruiser float-planes for ASW search.

the idea was, to prevent the opponent from learning the location of CVs, if he received reports that his subs were spotted by carrier-capable aircraft.

imo such reports are gonna be unreliable, they won't reliably identify the plane that spotted them. i've gotten reports of planes spotting my Allied TFs on the West Coast, they report float-planes, torpedo-bombers, or fighter-bombers on a random basis. so i don't put much stock in what is reported, as i know they're all sub-based float-planes.

similarly, i don't think an IJ player will be able to discern the location of an Allied CVTF based on intermittent reports of air-ASW activity from his subs. & i sure don't want to transit my CVs across empty space w/o a goodly percentage of my Avengers on 50% ASW.



Itdepends -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 11:19:42 AM)

If you've got a lot of planes on search though at a wide search radius it becomes pretty obvious when a large carrier group is transiting an area that you have subs in.



Crackaces -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 1:13:52 PM)

quote:

imo such reports are gonna be unreliable, they won't reliably identify the plane that spotted them. i've gotten reports of planes spotting my Allied TFs on the West Coast, they report float-planes, torpedo-bombers, or fighter-bombers on a random basis. so i don't put much stock in what is reported, as i know they're all sub-based float-planes.


One report might be as you describe .. but this game is not about one report. In my opinion, it is about "Heavy Radio Traffic at hex XYZ" combined with submarines sighting carrier aircraft, combined with pointing search arcs into the suspected area, etc. The game has a pattern within its randomness. The game tends not to simply state "3 CV's, 2BB a CA, 8 DD's headed to ABC". Even search planes with pilots with skill of 80+ do not report entirely accurately. But a big picture with intel can be put together, and some level of intelligence for a particular player becomes 'actionable'. The really neat thing about this game is that the player that can put this picture together with the least "hard" intelligence has a distinct advantage.



Crackaces -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 1:26:54 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Jorge_Stanbury


quote:

ORIGINAL: SenToku

IJN seems to have number of suberb scout plane platforms in its inventory, such as Chitose class, Tone class and later converted Mogami. Is there a reason why IJN player needs to use his strike planes to Search or ASW roles, when he can have as many as 100 long range float and recon plane models with his carriers?

Seems kind of waste to double or triple train their pilots, especially since the losses among them are usually pretty heavy and pilot training is what it is.


SenToku, if you want to play "historically" then you should keep NavSearch done by floats. Japanese doctrine was to use 100% of carrier planes for direct roles and seaplanes for support.


If you want to ruin a PBEM game insist that the opponent take up tactics, operational dogma, political strategy that is either a myth, an isolated case, or lead to the eventual conclusion. In my first PBEM game my opponent was immersed in the dogma that the coastal route to Akyab was the only feasible route to attack in Burma. When I pulled off Operation Extended Captial 2 years early he freaked with a mythical description of the actual circumstances that lead to the misguided original campaign.

BTW) This is a game not a similation. If you turn advanced weather on and play by this rule -- I guarantee you will lose the KB in a PBEM contest. [;)] There are game mechanics that provide an advantage in a naval confrontation that require the use of CV based aircraft to patrol if Midway is not to be repeated. And once repeated .. a slow death to the PBEM game ...[8|]



offenseman -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 10:01:12 PM)

Lenny, I think we could add a lot to this thread after we can talk about our battle in depth. I am sure it has a lot of good examples of what, how, and why. Not knowing the exact butcher's bill, we might even say that we both did pretty well in that battle; the brutal battle that it was.

BTW- still wondering what was limping away for 4 days until it got out of my LBA search range. Still guessing it was Alabama... [;)]




LoBaron -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/5/2012 10:22:14 PM)

Agree, it was an interesting and comlex battle, without a desastrous defeat or overwhelming victory for one side.
I am very much looking forward to discuss it in depth when we finally lift FOW my friend.


But have no idea what limping you are talking about. No limping in the USN. Only swimming. Or forming reefs. We are a disciplined navy. [:'(]
You´re confusing with Limp Bizkit maybe? [sm=innocent0009.gif]



GreyJoy -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/6/2012 10:57:04 AM)

I think it still needs to be cleared out the whole thing about operating your CVs into big TFs or smaller ones that respect the coordination issue.
My question now is: for what concerns CAP (so let's forget for a moment about offensive strikes), does it matter to have several CVTFs in the same hex (also forget about the possible reaction for a moment) instead of one big TF? Will the CAP of more TFs operating in the same hex be as effective (or more, or less) as the CAP of a massive CVTF? Will the presence of several TFs in the same hex puzzle the attackers so to divert some enemy bomber strikes to different TFs (even if all present in the same hex)?
And for what concerns AA fire, is it better to have a massive CVTF with several BBs attached or more CVTFs with one BB each... so to say, given the same amount of AA guns in the same hex, does it matter for AA coverage to have it spread over multiple TFs?



jeffk3510 -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/6/2012 2:40:07 PM)

You get a coordination penalty on the strike, as you're aware, but in terms of CAP in the same hex for 1 GIANT task force vs 5 CV groups.. I don't have the answer, and I am curious myself. There probaboy isn't any difference I am guessing.

I saw in someones AAR that they run the USN CVs in one big group and disregard the penalty as it doesn't exist that bad in their opinion.




offenseman -> RE: How To Orchestrate a Carrier Battle v0.1 (12/6/2012 3:46:13 PM)

I have seen several examples in the course of two PBEM where several CV TFs in one hex shared CAP over all the TFs in the hex. I've also never seen a terrible coordination penalty even though I have used some large CV TFs at various times.



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