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wdolson -> Semi OT - Naval Observations (4/17/2013 1:32:33 AM)
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About two months ago I scored a 100+ kit collection of ship kits on Ebay for a killer deal. All except one were Japanese waterline 1/700 scale kits from Fujimi, Aoshima, Hasegawa, and Tamiya. I already had most of the carriers and battleships, so there were some duplicates. I've been doing a bit of research to fill in my knowledge blanks.
In my internet searches I came across a table that showed what the two navies have on Dec 6, 1941, what they built during the war, and what they had in August 1945. I have since lost track of the page (should have bookmarked it!), but I recreated it in a spreadsheet, or at least most of it. It really shows how dramatically the US out-built the Japanese.
At the start of the war the two navies were pretty much at parity in cruisers. The US had 18 CAs and 19 CLs, and the IJN had 18 CAs and 20 CLs. Because they fudged on the treaty limits, IJN CAs were heavier built than US CAs at war's start, which was an advantage in early surface conflict. Plus the US didn't really learn to respect IJN torpedo tactics until they had a few scraps.
In CLs the US had an advantage toe to toe with IJN CLs. IJN CLs were built for a different mission than US CLs and were much lighter. Most US CLs were essentially CAs with 6 inch or 5 inch armament. The smallest US CLs, the Atlantas were still bigger than the largest IJN CLs.
Of most ship types, the US more than doubled their pre-war strength. CVs went from 6 to 20, CVLs went from 0 to 8, CVEs went from 1 to 75. At war's end 7 more Essexes, 3 Midways, 2 CVLs, and 10 more CVEs were all finishing construction or were in pre-commission shake down cruises. BB strength wasn't doubled though 2 Iowas were not completed. While CL strength went from 19 to 48, the US only commissioned 11 CAs during the war. That is a bit of a mystery to me considering the CA losses in 1942.
I discussed this with a friend who knows more about naval stuff than I do, and he thought it was just due to a shift in doctrine, but the US had 10 CAs under construction or doing shake down cruises when the war ended. If the doctrine had changed, why complete 10 CAs so late?
Japanese war time construction was rather paltry by comparison. A lot of ships that qualified as war built were laid down before the war like the Yamatos. The IJN did a lot of conversions to carriers, 15 in all, but the only capital ship construction was the Taiho and the 6 Unryu class, of which 3 were never completed and I don't believe two ever left home waters. In DDs, CLs, and CAs, the IJN didn't even complete as many ships as the US did CLs. Only 18 DDs and 5 CLs with no CAs. One of the CLs was completed so late she never really saw service.
On VJ Day the IJN had fewer DDs than the US had CLs. And most surviving Japanese ships were in bad shape. The Nagato was used for the Bikini tests and the repair crews were only able to get 10 knots out of her on the way to the test site and the ship broke down part way there and had to be towed. The two surviving CAs were wrecks that were largely scrapped in place after the war. Only a few of the surviving IJN warships were mobile under their own power. A sad end to a navy that had once challenged the USN on equal terms.
From a modeler's perspective, I think the IJN is a more interesting subject. There is more variety among ships of even the same class. US ships, especially war built tended to be mass constructed and ended up being very similar in layout from one to another. Though US camo patterns are far more interesting and varied. The IJN mostly stuck to a fairly drab paint scheme.
Now I'm trying to understand why nobody has ever made a 1/700 scale Yura, Noshiro, or Sakawa. OK, the Sakawa didn't do much, but the Noshiro and Yura were in the thick of things until their loss. With this collection, I now have every CL, CA, BB, CV, CVL, and almost all CVEs from the IJN except those three CLs. I have a scattering of DDs now too, but I think only a wealthy masochist would want to acquire and build 182 DDs.
Oh and another tid bit. Both sides were looking for the perfect naval tactic in a surface fight for many years. The US realized naval gunnery was inaccurate during the Spanish American War and worked to improve it. The Japanese similarly realized naval gunnery could be better during the war with Russia in 1904. The Japanese built a doctrine around torpedoes and first rate optics in their rangefinders. They did make probably the best torpedoes of the era. However, this analysis shows the Long Lance did not really live up to its reputation. http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-067.htm
Ultimately the "killer app" that trumped everything else was radar guided gunfire. When the US surface ships started using it, the IJN couldn't compete. Surgio Strait was sort of a "set up" battle in which the Japanese sailed into a very well laid trap, but the radar guided gunfire didn't even give the IJN a chance. Olendorf pounded the IJN from max range with the old BBs.
One wonders what would have happened if Halsey had read the tea leave correctly and had his fast BBs at the exit of the San Bernardino strait instead of chasing carriers to the north. It may have been a repeat of the Surgio Strait battle from the night before. Ultimately air power was the big trump card by 1944. Leyte Gulf was the last gasp of the dreadnaughts. It's telling that the US fast BBs only had two opportunities to do the job they were designed for and in one of those circumstances the BBs were out of position when the big battle came. Ultimately the Iowa class never fired their guns in anger against another ship.
Not really any point, just spitting out some thoughts bouncing around in my head lately.
Bill
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