M60A3TTS -> RE: T110-The long road to Berlin - hooooper welcome (2/5/2014 12:24:09 AM)
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I've seen the bugaboo of the big bad Soviet airforce before. It's overstated and I'll list several reasons why. The Soviet OOB includes all aircraft in the National Reserve. There may be thousands of aircraft there, and while they sit they do nothing to influence the air war. Airbases, that these aircraft sit on, are support-heavy. It takes 5,000 men to support an airbase that at best consist of 40 pilots with planes. That is an awful low tooth-to-tail ratio. It is a rifle brigade or 40% thereabouts of a rifle division. Now if the Soviets have a wealth of manpower reserves, then you can do both, but it's still 5,000 less riflemen on the battlefield. The airbase can hold 9 regiments max. The more the Soviets add to that base, the higher the operational losses go, and pilot experience becomes diluted. Soviets probably can peak at about 5 regiments before op losses start growing. I've found keeping that number of planes on a base perform just as well as 9. So what I say here is you can cut the Soviet air force down, but it won't necessarily change the air results. Bases of an air command or air army have to be assigned to a front to be effective for that front. That gets added against the cap of units assigned to a front and may force an overload with a lot of bases. Support cost can be enormous in terms of trucks. This applies particularly to level bombers. These same trucks are needed to support the Red Army, mech, tank corps and all. Just like with the 5,000 riflemen choice, there's an opportunity cost. So until the Red Army can keep its truck fleet in shape, which is often a challenge until mid-43 the Soviets shouldn't want a huge airforce deployed. Having played the Soviets exclusively, at the end I spent a lot of time disbanding air regiments just to keep top airframes in ready supply for my experienced pilots. Bottom line whatever most people do with a Soviet airforce of 20,000 planes, I can do much the same with half that.
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