RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories

RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (Full Version)

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wdolson -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 6:45:34 AM)
Some commanders are good tactical commanders and some are good strategic commanders. Fletcher was the right strategic carrier commander in the early going. He positioned his carriers perfectly at Midway and he agreed with Nimitz's orders to do the maximum damage to the Japanese while preserving the carriers as much as possible. When it came to tactical situational command, he was not as good. He tended to be too cautious in many of those situations. Bill

Barb -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 7:23:20 AM)
Consider Fletcher was not an aviator (disadvantage, but Spruance wasn't too), but he usually handed air ops to his more experienced colleagues (clever move). At Wake - he was recalled (lucky move) At the Marshalls-Gilberts raids - he was under Halsey, under Brown at New Guinea At the Coral Sea - he was under Fitch. Coral Sea being first Carrier-vs-carrier battle was hatchery for mistakes on both sides because of the unknown and unproven concepts. At Midway - well this was lucky battle for the US, the loss of Yorktown was maybe preventable, but still clear victory At Guadalcanal landings - a command mishaps by Americans and faulty communication procedures resulted in heavy losses. But Fletchers main responsibility was for his carriers - the only striking power of the US Pacific fleet. Keeping them exposed could easily result in their loss (as had later happened to Wasp + torpedoing of Saratoga). At Eastern Solomons battle - he managed to fulfill his mission of protecting Guadalcanal. His "total" score was positive: He only lost Yorktown totally. Had Enterprise damaged under him. Yet he participated in sinking of 4 fleet (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu) and 2 light carriers (Shoho, Ryujo), plus damaging 1 (Shokaku). He could maybe saved the Yorktown, but this was ship captain "work and decision", not of commanding admiral. He could have had 3rd Carrier at Eastern Solomons, but it is questionable it would help much given the CAP fubars and inability to find Shokaku and Zuikaku by main strikes.

Barb -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 7:26:03 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: wdolson Some commanders are good tactical commanders and some are good strategic commanders. Fletcher was the right strategic carrier commander in the early going. He positioned his carriers perfectly at Midway and he agreed with Nimitz's orders to do the maximum damage to the Japanese while preserving the carriers as much as possible. When it came to tactical situational command, he was not as good. He tended to be too cautious in many of those situations. Bill Consider the responsibility of having the ONLY offensive power of the US Pacific Fleet under him. He had to preserve his carriers. Thus he cannot be too aggressive with his assets.

warspite1 -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 8:45:11 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Barb quote: ORIGINAL: wdolson Some commanders are good tactical commanders and some are good strategic commanders. Fletcher was the right strategic carrier commander in the early going. He positioned his carriers perfectly at Midway and he agreed with Nimitz's orders to do the maximum damage to the Japanese while preserving the carriers as much as possible. When it came to tactical situational command, he was not as good. He tended to be too cautious in many of those situations. Bill Consider the responsibility of having the ONLY offensive power of the US Pacific Fleet under him. He had to preserve his carriers. Thus he cannot be too aggressive with his assets. warspite1 This I figure is his biggest defence. How would history have portrayed him if he'd lost those carriers early in the war? Interesting that Nimitz appears to have favoured keeping him at sea but it was King that overruled that. Anyway, always the sign of a good book - lots of talking points arising from it. Thanks for your responses Barb and wdolson.

wdolson -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 9:56:39 AM)
Halsey was so aggressive he might have lost multiple carriers if he had been in command in some of the battles where Fletcher had command. Later in the war when the US had plenty of carriers that boldness was considered a good thing and Halsey was forgiven for sailing into the teeth of a couple of typhoons as well as letting a cruiser get torpedoed near Formosa. And though his performance at Leyte cast a shadow over his legacy, it didn't get him fired. Bill

warspite1 -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 1:15:17 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK And I was commenting on the comments made in the book. If I wanted to make abusive comment about your skills I'd just cut & paste from your World in Flames AARs. warspite1 I was totally dumbfounded by that response. I couldn't understand where it came from - but thought I wouldn't react. Anyway, I've just re-read it - and then read my comment that preceded it. I can only assume that you thought the "who are well read on this theatre" was a dig at you and I was in some way saying that did not include you. Why you would think that I don't know (hence my confusion) but that's the only explanation I can think of. So if it was, then just to be clear it mean't nothing of the sort as you are one of the people on the forum who seem to have good grasp of history.

Chickenboy -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/8/2014 8:42:04 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: JeffK And I was commenting on the comments made in the book. If I wanted to make abusive comment about your skills I'd just cut & paste from your World in Flames AARs. What a rubbish comment, Jeff. Totally unwarranted.

Reg -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/10/2014 7:14:05 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Second hand copy arrived yesterday - turns out to be an old library book from a library in Somerset! Anyway, read the intro and first chapter last night. I can tell already that this is going to be one of this unputdownable books. The author has a clear writing style and the subject matter is so interesting - the perfect combination for a great book. I'm glad you are liking it as it's been a favourite of mine for a long time. Let us know what you think when you are finished....

warspite1 -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/10/2014 7:31:33 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Reg quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 Second hand copy arrived yesterday - turns out to be an old library book from a library in Somerset! Anyway, read the intro and first chapter last night. I can tell already that this is going to be one of this unputdownable books. The author has a clear writing style and the subject matter is so interesting - the perfect combination for a great book. I'm glad you are liking it as it's been a favourite of mine for a long time. Let us know what you think when you are finished.... warspite1 Will do - and it won't be long - it really is one of those books you can't put down. Guadalcanal is one of the most interesting campaigns of WWII.

warspite1 -> RE: Correcting a mistake in S E Morison's Histories (11/16/2014 11:06:41 AM)
I finished The Shame of Savo this morning. What a thoroughly engrossing book! Thanks for the recommendation Reg. Well written and clear (although some of the complexities around communications flew right over my head!). I too would recommend this to anyone interested in the Pacific War � and the Solomon�s Campaign in particular. I mentioned before that the book seemed to be singling out Fletcher, and indeed this was a consistent theme. However, the more I read, the more his actions do appear to have been wrong; indeed Admiral King decided that for himself. However, Fletcher was not the only one to have been considered at fault; Ghormley, Noyes, McCain (although he got away with it) Riefkohl and Greenman chief amongst them � and King ensured they would never command at sea again. The poor - in some cases inexplicable - performance of some of the US destroyers (Jarvis, Blue, Helm and Wilson) and of course, as is well known, the cruiser Chicago, was highlighted. In contrast the roles of Admirals Turner and Crutchley came out positively, as did the conduct of the US destroyers Patterson and Ralph Talbot. It appears from all the evidence that HMAS Canberra � the only Allied cruiser seemingly in readiness to take the battle to the Japanese was denied from doing so by her inadvertent torpedoing by USS Bagley right at the start of the battle. The idea that she could be crippled, so completely, by gunfire alone has been effectively dismissed. The only case in the book for any sort of �cover-up� over the whole episode was in trying to get to the truth of Canberra�s almost immediate disabling. The Australians were denied access to a 1954 report and the suggestion is that this would likely have led to an investigation into Bagley�s torpedo attack. The book ended on a highly positive note though: a) there was acceptance - and a degree of admiration - that the enemy were bold in their plan of attack and used their night-fighting prowess to their advantage. b) the way the US used the experience of Savo to the positive - both in terms of their own shortcomings and the skill of the enemy; that the American turnaround was not simply the result of the overwhelming superiority in resources and technology, but the ability of the USN to learn lessons from defeat and put those lessons into practice was key.

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