RE: Naval War Day-by-Day

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warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (7/19/2015 7:10:15 AM)
North Sea (Submarine War) On the 20th November the Royal Navy finally recorded a successful attack with a submarine when HMS Sturgeon sank the German patrol boat V209 in the Heligoland Bight. However patrols in this area were not to last much longer as German ASW measures proved highly effective and the boats had to be withdrawn for their own safety. Before that happened however, this small initial success was about to be followed up by something a good deal larger….. Baltic Sea and Arctic Ocean November 30th – 6th December 1939 As mentioned previously the Soviet invasion of Finland began on the last day of November. The main naval action, such that it was, took place in the Gulf of Finland before it froze over. However there were also naval forces at work in the far north. The Finns had no naval units based at Petsamo – their only sizeable port on that bleak coast – as they knew the area was indefensible should there be a war with the Soviet Union. The Soviets used elements of the Northern Fleet to soften up any defenders at the town of Petsamo as a preliminary to a landing by the 104th Division on the 1st December. The operation was flanked by two destroyers and a couple of submarines with a mixed flotilla of trawlers and patrol boats to provide close escort of the troops to the shore. Further south in the Gulf of Finland, the Finns had a number of naval batteries that needed to be silenced – and quickly. To this end the USSR undertook further naval landing operations. Various islands in the gulf had been “requested” previously as part of the treaty that the USSR was looking to sign prior to the war. Now the Soviets took them by force. These islands – amongst them Seiskari, Lavansaari, Pien-Tytarsaari and Suursaari – situated menacingly between the two countries, deep in the Gulf of Finland were obvious targets. The Baltic Fleet provided support in the form of six destroyers and assorted motor torpedo boats, minesweepers and trawlers in addition to the transports, barges etc. The islands quickly fell to the invaders. During the first couple of days of the war the cruiser Kirov, escorted by two destroyers (possibly Stremitelnyi and Smetlivyi), was ordered to shell the Finnish coastal battery on Russaro island that protected the important port of Hanko. The counter-fire was accurate and the Kirov was forced to retire after damage incurred. Mine barrages were also laid by Soviet submarines.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/1/2015 3:42:53 PM)
1st – 13th December 1939 (South Atlantic – the surface raiders) When we left Kapitan Langsdorff, the Graf Spee was heading back into the South Atlantic after a less than successful spell off Mozambique (see Post 137). It appears that the German captain had grown bored of the commerce raiding activity with which he was tasked. From stories told by at least one of the prisoner officers he spoke to, it seems that Langsdorff felt there was little by way of honour and glory in what the Graf Spee was doing – hiding, sinking merchant ships then hiding, then more sinking before hiding back into the expanse of the ocean once more. So what did Langsdorff propose to do about it? He decided to disobey his orders - and wrote a lengthy report in his war diary about what he planned to do and the reasons why. Essentially Graf Spee had enough fuel for another 3 months – and that does not include fuel reserves aboard the Altmark. However, her machinery was in need of an overhaul having sailed over 30,000 miles to date. This work would need to be carried out in Germany. The plan was therefore: - To spend the first week of December attacking targets on the Cape route. - He would then head west to the expected rich pickings off the River Plate estuary, before starting the long voyage home. - The important change – and where the disobeying of orders comes in – is his decision not to avoid enemy ships. Having disguised his ship with a dummy funnel Langsdorff sailed east and, on the 2nd December, Graf Spee came across the Doric Star (Captain Stubbs), a 10,000 ton refrigerated cargo liner that was carrying foodstuffs from New Zealand to the UK. Curiously Langsdorff did not make use of his ship’s new disguise and ordered fire to be opened at long range. Stubbs ensured that the Doric Star’s distress signals were picked up by other ships before acceding to Langsdorff’s order that signalling be stopped. He further ensured that the liner’s machinery be put out of action so the ship could not be taken as a prize. As it happened, at the same time that Graf Spee was engaging the British liner, the Graf Spee’s Arado, on a search patrol, had ditched in the sea. Langsdorff decided to quickly remove Doric Star’s crew and then sink her before heading off to search for his floatplane. Crewmen from the Graf Spee watch as one of her victims disappears beneath the waves. [image]local://upfiles/28156/D6DB4F60B5124F4791A6C1A69C24BA29.jpg[/image] The Arado and its crew were duly rescued and the pocket-battleship then continued on in a south-westerly direction. The following morning smoke was sighted in the distance. It was the 8,000 ton Tairoa (Captain Starr) carrying a mixed cargo from Australia to the UK. The merchant vessel was overwhelmed and five crewmen were injured from German gunfire – although once again not before the appropriate distress signal had been sent off. The British now had definitive proof that a German surface raider was at large in the South Atlantic. Gunfire had damaged the British ship sufficiently to ensure that she could not be taken as a prize and, after removal of her crew, was sunk by a torpedo. As with the Doric Star, the Tairoa’s cargo yielded little in the way of bounty, but she was relieved of a dozen or so bottles containing carbonic acid – which would be used in repairing the Graf Spee’s troublesome refrigeration plant. The trail of destruction started on the 30th September with the sinking of the Clement and ended on with the sinking of the Streonshalh on the 7th December. [image]local://upfiles/28156/35F0214F041F4AFCB1133C1BEE0FF11A.jpg[/image] Langsdorff now decided to head, as per plan, to the waters off the River Plate. But before doing so would seek one more replenishment from the Altmark – whereupon he would hand over the prisoners (less the captains, radio officers and injured sailors) from his previous sinkings. On the 6th the two German ships sailed west as the Altmark refuelled the Graf Spee. The following day the two ships separated and in the late afternoon Graf Spee came upon what would be her final victim, the 4,000 Streonshalh (Captain Robinson) which was sailing from South America to Sierra Leone. The Germans were able to capture some useful information from this ship – including details of merchant vessel sailings from Buenos Aires – before she was despatched to the bottom of the sea. Although Langsdorff had by now been warned that four British cruisers – Cumberland, Exeter, Ajax and Achilles* - were in the area, fortified by the merchant vessel sailing information gained from the Streonshalh, he continued on his planned course. Langsdorff decided to abandon the disguise for this part of the operation. During the voyage the Arado’s spare engine finally gave up the ghost; Langsdorff would be without his eyes in the sky from now on. Some sources state Achilles as HMNZS. However, the Royal New Zealand navy was not formally formed until the 1st October 1941. At the outbreak of World War II the New Zealanders were a Division of the Royal Navy and the ship was thus HMS. Nothing was sighted for some days until, at just before 0600hrs on the morning of the 13th December, the look-outs on Graf Spee spotted three ships on the horizon. Langsdorff considered his next move briefly – he still had time to change his mind and stick to his orders - before ordering that course be maintained – a course that would lead Graf Spee straight into the path of three Royal Navy cruisers. As has been said, Langsdorff was aware that four British cruisers were in the vicinity. These four-ships made up Hunting Group Force G (see Post 117) which was commanded by Henry Harwood. Harwood had been made Commodore commanding the South American Division of the South Atlantic Station in 1936. But for the two years prior to this he had been the Chief Staff Officer of the Second Cruiser Division. Harwood had spent some of this time thinking about and perfecting his ideas on fighting pocket-battleships. Now, from his Flagship, the 8-inch gunned HMS Exeter, Harwood would have the chance to put those ideas into practice. Harwood’s first crucial decision was made some days before the battle. Upon hearing of the sinkings of the Doric Star and Tairoa, Harwood had to decide where Langsdorff would head next – and be in a position with his three cruisers to intercept the pocket-battleship. Harwood figured that Langsdorff would be likely to choose one of three destinations next a) the waters off Rio b) the waters off the River Plate or c) the Falkland Islands (the anniversary of the First World War battle was the 8th December). *unfortunately for Harwood he would be without the 8-inch County-class cruiser HMS Cumberland which was under-going repairs at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands. Harwood plumped for the Plate. He figured that this is where the German ship could expect to find the most valuable traffic and so would be the place to head for. The three British cruisers – sailing from their various stations - joined forces on the 12th December. The British captains had not operated as one before and had only one evening to carry out manoeuvres before the plan was called upon to be executed. Harwood’s plan called for 1st Division (Ajax (Captain Woodhouse) and Achilles (Captain Parry)) to attack as one, with Exeter (Captain Bell) attacking from the other flank. Harwood impressed upon his captains the need to hurt the enemy. Sinking her was only a secondary consideration. Because she was so far from home or anywhere to seek shelter or repairs, the overriding concern was that she would be sufficiently hurt that she could never make it home - whether that be the result of sinking her now or at the hands of follow-up forces later was immaterial.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/1/2015 4:05:08 PM)
1st – 13th December 1939 (South Atlantic – the surface raiders) (Cont) And so Scene I was set. No one knew it at the time but this was a play destined to be played out in two parts. The forthcoming battle was merely the opening…. The battle started at 0617hrs when Graf Spee opened up her 11-inch guns at just over 21,500 yards. Langsdorff, now committed to the battle, knew he would have to sink the British vessels as he would be unlikely to be able to shake them off if pursued. Graf Spee headed at top speed toward the cruisers in order to close the range. Exeter took the brunt of Graf Spee's initial salvos which were deadly accurate, but three minutes later, the British cruiser was able to return fire and scored a hit both on one of Graf Spee’s 4.1-inch AA guns and her fresh water plant. Graf Spee countered with a direct hit on Exeter's B turret and splinters from this shell smashed into her bridge killing almost everyone there. Captain Bell was wounded but he was able to continue giving orders from the secondary control position. Meanwhile, the light cruisers had begun opening fire at 0622hrs and at about 0630hrs, with Exeter having taken severe punishment, Langsdorff turned his attention to Ajax and Achilles. While the three ships fired at each other, Exeter used the respite to launch an unsuccessful torpedo strike. Graf Spee then turned her attention back to the heavy cruiser once more and for about ten minutes the two ships, Exeter with just four guns left, duelled. The Graf Spee was hit twice more but by now Exeter had just one turret operational. Graf Spee then switched target once more and Achilles was badly damaged by an 11-inch shell near-missing her and causing many casualties in her director control tower. This damage affected her firing accuracy and both she and Ajax were now having problems hitting their target. After this, Graf Spee switched back one final time to Exeter, resulting in the heavy cruiser breaking off the engagement at 0729hrs when her third and final turret went out of action. However, Graf Spee had not got away unscathed and her forward turret had given her problems intermittently during the battle. The two remaining cruisers started to hit the German ship more frequently, although many of the British shells were simply bouncing off the Graf Spee’s armour belt. Graf Spee responded with a shell that took out both X and Y turret on Ajax. It was now 0730hrs and the range was 11,000 yards. Ajax launched a torpedo strike, as did Graf Spee but neither were successful. The fighting continued until 0740hrs, when Harwood decided to withdraw in order to conduct a night attack. But Graf Spee did not follow. Instead, Langsdorff headed west towards the River Plate, shadowed by the two bruised and bloodied light cruisers. From time to time the pursuers strayed into range of the enemy guns and had to withdraw under smokescreen, but they ensured that they remained sufficiently close to Graf Spee so as not to lose her. To the surprise of those on board the British vessels Graf Spee, with 36 officers and crew dead or dying and 60 wounded aboard, was making for the neutral country of Uruguay and Montevideo harbour. Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. As was to be expected the butcher’s bill was greater for the British with 73 dead – 62 of which were from the Exeter. There would be a short interval while Graf Spee entered the harbour of the Uruguayan capital. Scene II however would swiftly get under way and would take place largely on land…… HMS Exeter. The two ships of the class* York and Exeter were heavy cruisers built post the Washington Treaty. Although the Washington Treaty did not limit cruiser tonnage, such restriction was the next logical step. After the failure of the 1927 Geneva conference, limitations finally came into force with the signing of the 1930 London Naval Treaty. The British needed large numbers of cruisers to maintain the Empire’s sea-lanes but the construction of large, 8-inch gunned vessels meant that total numbers were compromised. Anticipating restrictions that were likely to be imposed in the future, the Exeter and York were an experiment in building smaller 8-inch gunned ships by dispensing with one of the four turrets. After these two vessels the experiment was ended and the British gave up heavy cruiser construction and concentrated on smaller 6-inch gunned light cruisers in order to maximise numbers. HMS Exeter was re-built following the battle only to be sunk just over two years later - while out-gunned once more – this time at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Only one source I have ever come across has named the two ships the Cathedral-class. All other sources state the class was the York-class. However, the York and Exeter were more step or half-sisters as they featured key differences in both appearance and detail. [image]local://upfiles/28156/AFC36B7522CB4319A3907BE0AEABED98.jpg[/image] Harwood’s 1st Division. The 6-inch gunned HMS Achilles as seen from the Ajax just before the battle.* [image]local://upfiles/28156/13E1C5ADE0E84465A7B592ECAB726753.jpg[/image] Admiral Sir Henry “Bobby” Harwood Harwood KCB, OBE ‘Phoney War’ Hero. His victory at the Battle of the River Plate at last gave the British public something to cheer about in what was otherwise a cold and miserable winter….. After the River Plate Harwood held a variety of shore based commands before retiring at the end of the war. [image]local://upfiles/28156/9F94492B10C946EC8100A9673AC9E630.jpg[/image] Sources: The Price of Disobedience (Grove)

Capt. Harlock -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/2/2015 2:14:50 AM)
quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/2/2015 6:24:21 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 2:46:49 PM)
I will finish off the Graf Spee tale in the next few days. I know its not exactly day by day but will be easier to finish this episode before moving onto the U-boat war for December.

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 4:18:39 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it. Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay. The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 4:35:16 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it. Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay. The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks. warspite1 It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are: - Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff. - Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port. - Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable. - Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff. - None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain. - Once at Uruguay Langsdorff believed that the RN heavy units had arrived and so a subsequent trip to Buenos Aires was impossible anyway.

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 4:39:19 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it. Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay. The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks. warspite1 It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are: - Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff. - Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port. - Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable. - Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff. - None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain. All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo?

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 4:49:06 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it. Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay. The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks. warspite1 It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are: - Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff. - Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port. - Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable. - Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff. - None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain. All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo? warspite1 Our posts must have crossed - I added an answer to that while you were typing [:)] It appears that the British efforts at subterfuge were so successful that Langsdorff had convinced himself the Renown and co were already waiting off Montevideo.... If here engines were in the state reported, and those Allied ships where there - she would never have made Buenos Aires any more than a run for the sea.

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 6:32:07 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it. Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay. The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks. warspite1 It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are: - Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff. - Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port. - Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable. - Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff. - None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain. All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo? warspite1 Our posts must have crossed - I added an answer to that while you were typing [:)] It appears that the British efforts at subterfuge were so successful that Langsdorff had convinced himself the Renown and co were already waiting off Montevideo.... If here engines were in the state reported, and those Allied ships where there - she would never have made Buenos Aires any more than a run for the sea. Raeder should have taken a more active stance. Instead of "if ship is scuttled do your best to make sure...", he ought to have ordered Langsdorff to fight and inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. That's what a British admiral would have done. Raeder also had good intelligence that Renown was nowhere near Montevideo. It's only 175 statue miles from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. At 17 nautical miles an hour that seems very doable, even if the 16 hours of usable fuel report was true. And some of that would have been within the 3 mile limit (although British might not have respected that if Renown had been present. [image]local://upfiles/34241/A7DCBCCDA21A4B06BC1662ABC8B5FDC6.jpg[/image]

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 6:40:20 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Capt. Harlock quote: Harwood’s goal had been achieved, although his ships had been hit hard, the pocket-battleship had been sufficiently hurt – and as a result she would never see Germany again…. Good to see the posts again. There is a report that a shell from Exeter had found the Achilles heel of the Graf Spee. Because the German pocket battleship used diesels instead of the usual steam engines, it was necessary to process the fuel oil through a special on-board treatment plant so that it would ignite in a diesel engine. This treatment plant was allegedly destroyed by an 8-inch hit, leaving the Graf Spee with less than 24 hrs of usable fuel. warspite1 Hi Capt. Yes the true situation re the fuel seems clouded in a degree of mystery. Apparently there was a report in 2000 (not seen by me - I have no sources for it either) that states the hit to which you refer left Graf Spee with 16 hours of useable fuel - and this was "confirmed" in an exchange between SKL and Langsdorff's no.2. If true, this really rather important fact was not disclosed by the Germans to the Uruguayans and not picked up by them either. The story for why this is so is that the Germans would not want the British to know of this vulnerability of the ships design. If this is true this suggests a valid reason for Langsdorff making for a port (repairs were impossible at sea) but masks two key point that ultimately makes the Graf Spee's escape impossible in any case: 1. Her ammunition supply of 11-inch shells was down to 186 - enough for about 40 minutes of action. 2. Her engines were in a desperate state - cracked cylinders and pistons out of true. Langsdorff's engineers could only guarantee a top speed of 17 knots. So whichever way one slices it, it does not appear remotely possible that the Graf Spee was ever getting back to Germany. If you ever find out where that report comes from I would love to read it. Was it an option to head upstream to Buenos Aires? The government there being more friendly than Uruguay. The Germans might have tried to 'sell' Graf Spee to Argentina in the same way that Goeben and Breslau were 'sold' to the Turks. warspite1 It's a good question. The reasons given by Grove are: - Montevideo was the quickest to reach of the options available to Langsdorff. - Langsdorff feared a night time torpedo attack from his pursuers hence the wish to get to the closest port. - Given the state of the engines (see earlier post) this is perhaps understandable. - Intriguingly, it is suggested that Uruguay's generally pro-Allied stance was unknown to Langsdorff. - None of Langsdorff's subordinates appear to have raised the issue of Argentina's more friendly government with their captain. All true...but could Langsdorff have tried for Buenos Aires after reaching Montevideo? warspite1 Our posts must have crossed - I added an answer to that while you were typing [:)] It appears that the British efforts at subterfuge were so successful that Langsdorff had convinced himself the Renown and co were already waiting off Montevideo.... If here engines were in the state reported, and those Allied ships where there - she would never have made Buenos Aires any more than a run for the sea. Raeder should have taken a more active stance. Instead of "if ship is scuttled do your best to make sure...", he ought to have ordered Langsdorff to fight and inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. That's what a British admiral would have done. Raeder also had good intelligence that Renown was nowhere near Montevideo. It's only 175 statue miles from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. At 17 nautical miles an hour that seems very doable, even if the 16 hours of usable fuel report was true. And some of that would have been within the 3 mile limit (although British might not have respected that if Renown had been present. [image]local://upfiles/34241/A7DCBCCDA21A4B06BC1662ABC8B5FDC6.jpg[/image] warspite1 Another thing that has been mentioned is that Langsdorff was afraid that Graf Spee's radar and other sensitive equipment would fall into Allied hands if she was captured - or even sunk in shallow water. All in all it was a strange episode wasn't it? Given what happened later with Admiral Scheer and others, it seems likely that Graf Spee would have got home had he stuck to orders and not gone looking for a fight.

AbwehrX -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/8/2015 8:51:34 PM)
I wasnt aware of GS fuel system damage. I wonder how it wouldve played out if Raeder wouldve ordered Langsdorff to turn the ship over to Uruguay custody? Perhaps after repairs Uruguay wouldve joined the Axis naval war?! [:D]

Orm -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/13/2015 12:06:01 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: AbwehrX I wasnt aware of GS fuel system damage. I wonder how it wouldve played out if Raeder wouldve ordered Langsdorff to turn the ship over to Uruguay custody? Perhaps after repairs Uruguay wouldve joined the Axis naval war?! [:D] Or, more likely, Uruguay would have turned the ship over to the British.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 1:37:58 PM)
Royal Navy (and later Royal New Zealand Navy). Leander-class Light Cruisers. Leander – Completed March 1933 Achilles – Completed October 1933 Orion - Completed January 1934 Neptune – Completed February 1934 Ajax – Completed April 1935 The Leander-class consisted of five ships built for the Royal Navy between 1930 and 1935. Three half-sisters of the Amphion-class followed and this class will be looked at separately later. The Leander-class ships were named after mythological characters. The design of the Leander-class went through a great many iterations before, in November 1929, a final design was agreed upon and an order placed for one ship (Leander) in the 1929/30 programme. Then, following the signing of the 1930 London Naval Treaty (which set limits on cruiser tonnage and restricted the British to 91,000 tons of new construction until the end of 1936), the Admiralty decided to end the construction of 8-inch gunned ‘heavy’ cruisers and maximise cruiser numbers through the construction of smaller, 6-inch ‘Light’ cruisers. As a consequence an order for a further three ships was placed in 1930 and a fourth the following year. After Leander, detail changes were made to the subsequent ships in order to find weight savings and as a result the final ship (Ajax) weighed in at 6,985 tons (Standard) compared to the 7,270 tons (Leander). The Leanders were fitted with eight 6-inch guns mounted in four twin turrets in A,B,X and Y positions that could elevate to 60 degrees. Secondary armament was originally limited to four single Mk V 4-inch High Angle guns, although these were replaced before the war with the newer Mk XVI gun in four twin mounts (note: Achilles did not receive this upgrade until her refit in 1943-44). For close range anti-aircraft (AA) protection the ships were originally fitted with three quadruple 0.5-inch machine guns. AA protection was substantially strengthened during the war on all ships. Their weaponry was rounded out by two quadruple 21-inch torpedo tubes. A catapult was fitted with space for one aircraft (This was the Fairey Seafox, and later, the Supermarine Walrus). Armour protection was provided by a belt with a maximum thickness of 3-inches which covered the machinery spaces. Box protection to a maximum of 3.5-inches covered the ammunition spaces. Deck armour was 1.25-inches. Turret armour was 1-inch. The power output was increased from the projected 60,000 SHP of the original design to 72,000 SHP and this gave a top speed of 32.5 knots. Leander and Achilles were crewed by New Zealanders, initially as part of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy, and in October 1941 the Royal New Zealand Navy came formally into existence. HMS Neptune, which was largely crewed by Kiwis, was to have been so transferred but she was badly needed in the Mediterranean and before a formal handover could be effected, she was to be lost with all hands save one after hitting numerous mines in the Mediterranean in December 1941. The Leanders were fine cruisers that gave excellent service to the British, Australian and New Zealand navies within which they served. HMS Orion won no less than 13 battle honours during World War II. Although all ships of the class were damaged on at least one occasion during the war, only HMS Neptune was lost. HMS (later) HMNZS Achilles. Achilles was badly damaged while operating off Guadalcanal in January 1943. She was sent to the UK for repair and a major refit. Other priorities at the time meant that this work was delayed until May 1944. During this period she finally received twin 4-inch mounts like her sisters. She was fitted with a second High Angle Director and close-range AA was considerably beefed up. To make room for the latter, X-turret was landed. The latest radar equipment was also added during this refit. Having been involved in the first set piece naval battle of World War II in 1939, HMNZS Achilles was part of the British Pacific Fleet at the war’s conclusion almost six years later. [image]local://upfiles/28156/375670B64260470CADEE41D108CB05FE.jpg[/image] HMS Ajax, like her sisters, was heavily involved across a range of theatres during World War II. She was perhaps most famous for her exploits at the River Plate and in the Mediterranean, but she also won battle honours for the Normandy Landings (Operation Neptune). In between times she missed out on most of 1942 and 1943. She underwent a substantial refit in 1942 and had barely returned to service in the Mediterranean when she was hit by a 1,000lb bomb off Tunisia. Repairs to this damage was undertaken in the US, allowing her to be ready for action come D-Day. [image]local://upfiles/28156/0B4C131CFD3B43FBBC0260BD2524F913.jpg[/image] HMS Orion – a name synonymous with the Battle for the Middle Sea. No less than eleven of her thirteen WWII battle honours were won in the Mediterranean. The picture below shows the damage incurred off Crete. The officers and men of the Royal Navy, operating with no air cover, were subjected to attack after attack. But, just as in Norway, France, Greece and Singapore, and despite serious losses, the senior service would not let the army down…… [image]local://upfiles/28156/6891E82FC40E4E8CAAE264F997685F58.jpg[/image] Sources: Nelson to Vanguard (DK Brown) Conways: All the World’s Fighting Ships 1922-1946 British Cruisers (Norman Friedman)

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 3:52:27 PM)
Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 4:08:56 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'. warspite1 Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise.....

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 5:39:02 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'. warspite1 Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise..... It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books. The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast."

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 6:30:03 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'. warspite1 Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise..... It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books. The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast." warspite1 Doesn't sound like there will be anything on the Lion-class then. I will probably wait for the reviews before taking the plunge. There are a couple of others for later in the year - one ordered and one I am considering. - The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945 (Hobbs) - Considering - No Room For Mistakes (Haarr) - ordered A third possible, Japanese Battleships 1897-1945 (Burt) has not got good reviews so I will give that a miss. The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range.....[:(]

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 6:35:44 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'. warspite1 Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise..... It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books. The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast." warspite1 Doesn't sound like there will be anything on the Lion-class then. I will probably wait for the reviews before taking the plunge. The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range.....[:(] quote: The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range..... Amazon has a copy of Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War for $175 USD - still pretty steep. I will probably get Falkner's 'The Great War at Sea: A Naval Atlas, 1914-1919' when it comes out next month.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 6:39:58 PM)
quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: Zorch Reminds me that Friedman has a book coming out in October, 'The British Battleship: 1906-1946'. warspite1 Mmmmm. This should be an automatic purchase for me, but having recently bought Burt's British Battleships of WWI and 1919-1945, I will have to check what this book has in addition. If Friedman covers the planned Lion-class (which Burt doesn't) then I will buy but otherwise..... It's hard to see what Friedman can add...so many writers have covered this ground, including himself in other books. The blurb says "Norman Friedman brings a new perspective to an ever-popular subject in The British Battleship: 1906-1946. With a unique ability to frame technologies within the context of politics, economics, and strategy, he offers unique insight into the development of the Royal Navy capital ships. With plans of the important classes commissioned from John Roberts and A D Baker III and a color section featuring the original Admiralty draughts, this book offers something to even the most knowledgeable enthusiast." warspite1 Doesn't sound like there will be anything on the Lion-class then. I will probably wait for the reviews before taking the plunge. The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range.....[:(] quote: The Japanese navy book I really want - Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War (LaCroix and Wells) - is sadly about £250 outside of my price range..... Amazon has a copy of Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War for $175 USD - still pretty steep. warspite1 Yeah [:(] even that price would severely dent (or possibly extinguish) my book budget for 2016. Oh well - maybe I'll win the lottery tonight [:)]

Aurelian -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/15/2015 6:47:08 PM)
$175 is the used price at that.....

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/16/2015 9:19:11 AM)
14th – 17th December 1939 (South Atlantic – the surface raiders) In Post 183 we left the damaged Graf Spee heading toward the Uruguayan capital Montevideo, doggedly shadowed by the light cruisers Ajax and Achilles. Although damaged also, the two small cruisers were still in varying degrees of fighting condition, which was more than could be said for HMS Exeter which, with no main guns serviceable, had been ordered to Port Stanley for emergency repair. HMS Exeter at Port Stanley evidencing her impromptu re-design courtesy of the Graf Spee’s 11-inch guns. In a well-rehearsed plan, Harwood had split his force into two. As the greater threat to Graf Spee Exeter had been the focus of the German ship’s attention. [image]local://upfiles/28156/BAAC70D09D2847DE8B5DB42FD7F3BBA7.jpg[/image] Kapitan Langsdorff, himself wounded in the head and arm during the battle, had decided that damage to his ship had been too great to continue the fight and that the best course of action would be to seek refuge in a neutral country where he could effect emergency repairs before confronting whatever would be waiting for him later. Langsdorff’s decision to head for UK-friendly Uruguay rather than the more pro-German Argentina seems strange, and even more so was the fact that none of his fellow officers questioned the decision. The only likely explanation was that a) Langsdorff was unaware of the political situation in the two countries and b) the journey to the Argentine ports was longer – thus putting Graf Spee at risk of night time torpedo strikes from the British cruisers. As Graf Spee made her way toward Montevideo, from time to time her shadowers strayed into range of the her guns and had to withdraw under smokescreen, but they ensured that they remained sufficiently close to Graf Spee so as not to lose her. At one point that afternoon, the British thought they saw a Hipper-class ship approaching from seaward, but this proved to be a case of mistaken identity and they were able to keep the Graf Spee in visual contact for the rest of the day. So as the German raider headed into the River Plate estuary, what was the state of the ship? Graf Spee had received around twenty-three hits; three 8-inch shells from Exeter and the remainder 6-inch shells from Achilles and Ajax. On the face of it, as far as the British could see, she was seaworthy and still able to fight, but things were not quite as they seemed. - The forward 11-inch gun was behaving erratically (as it had for most of the battle) - To compound this problem, the main rangefinder was broken - 11-inch shell supply was enough for a further 40 minutes of action - The port ammunition hoists for the 5.9-inch guns were out of action - The forward Anti-Aircraft director was no longer working - Starboard 4.1-inch gun out of action - One barrel of the port 4.1-inch gun out of action - Starboard chain hoist for the 4.1-inch shells no longer operable - She no longer had the ability to fire torpedoes - A large hole in the bows made sea-keeping in rough waters hazardous if not impossible - Her engines were limited to a top speed of 17 knots - Key auxiliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water was broken - Fuel and lubricating oil purifier was broken - The level of useable fuel was limited to 16 hours [this I have not been able to confirm] - Main galley and baking facilities out of action - Flour store contaminated with sea water So what about the British ships? Both Achilles and Ajax had been on the receiving end of hits and near misses during the battle. The biggest problem was a shortage of ammunition for the Achilles (30% remaining). Ajax was better off for shells (50%) but that was because she had lost half her main armament. Fuel was a concern too, but Harwood would be able arrange refuelling at sea for his two ships while they watched and waited. With the news that Exeter was no longer in the fight, Commodore Harwood had ordered the Cumberland to break-off her self-refit in the Falklands and sail for the River Plate as quickly as possible – she arrived late on the 14th. Reinforcement by the big guns: the carrier Ark Royal, the battlecruiser Renown plus the cruisers Dorsetshire, Shropshire and Neptune would not arrive until the 20th at the earliest…. At just before midnight on the 13th December, the Graf Spee entered Montevideo harbour. The shooting war had ended – politics and deception would now take over. Uruguay, whilst essentially friendly toward the UK (there were strong economic ties between the two countries) was keen to ensure that she did nothing to jeopardise her neutrality and so sought to be as even handed as possible in handling this rather unwanted situation she found herself in. Nonetheless, the fact that the British Minister to Uruguay, Sir Eugen Millington-Drake, was on warm personal terms with the Uruguayan Foreign Minister Dr Alberto Guani and the Defence Minister General Alfredo Campos, did not hurt the British cause. The coldness of the reception the Germans would receive in Uruguay soon became apparent. The German request for assistance from the largest Uruguayan repair yard was met with a resounding no and help had to be sought from Argentinian sources and Germans in the country. A kind of weird situation thus developed in which the Germans wanted to extend their stay in port for as long as possible in order to effect maximum repairs, but the longer the stay, the more chance the British had of concentrating force (at this time the heavy units of the Royal Navy were 1,000 miles away off Brazil). The British meantime wanted the German ship to sail as quickly as possible as an initial external inspection suggested that the ship was not too badly damaged and that she only fled to port due to ammunition shortage and damage to her fire control system. The Uruguayans carried out their own assessment and decided that the Graf Spee would be given three days to complete the necessary works to make the ship sea-worthy and to carry out essential repairs and that she would have to leave Uruguayan waters by 2000hrs on 17th December. It was only on the morning of the 15th that Harwood told Millington-Drake that he should make every attempt to keep the Graf Spee in port as long as possible to allow time for reinforcements to arrive. The only way of doing this would be to ensure that a British merchant vessel leave Montevideo at certain times. Under the terms of the Hague convention it would then be impossible for Graf Spee to leave less than 24 hours after the merchant. The Uruguayans were unmoved by this tactic however – Graf Spee would have to leave by the allotted hour. Three things convinced Langsdorff that heavy units were waiting for him and his men outside the harbour. The first of these was Langsdorff’s own reading of the situation. In conversation with his ex-prisoners, Langsdorff appears to have believed that the British cruisers would not have behaved the way they did unless there were heavy units close by that they were trying to lure the Graf Spee toward. This mind set appears at odds with what he must have known about the Royal Navy. The second piece of ‘evidence’ came from his own look-outs who appeared to be convinced that a Renown-class battlecruiser and the Ark Royal were on the horizon. But it was the deception operation employed on the 16th that would have removed any remaining doubt in Langsdorff’s mind. The British, aware that communications between Montevideo and Buenos Aires were tapped, sent out signals requesting fuel and a berth for the Renown and Ark Royal. News that the two large warships would be entering port shortly then appeared in Argentine newspapers. Langsdorff appears to have ruled out sailing for Argentina as she could not reach a port there without having to sail into open water – and thus engaging with the overwhelming British forces he believed to be waiting for him. Although some repairs were effected – the majority were simply not repairable in the timeframe provided. It was now the Germans turn to press the Uruguayans for a longer stay for the ship – but once again the answer was a firm no. Meanwhile a conference between Grand Admiral Raeder and Adolf Hitler on the 16th presented Langsdorff with two options; sail to Argentina or scuttle the ship in the River Plate. Quite understandably internment by the Uruguayans was to be avoided at all costs. As stated above, the journey to Argentina was impossible due to the shallowness of the waters and was ruled out. Further attempts were made of the Uruguayans to get an extension agreed, but these came to nought. The decision was made – the ship would be scuttled. In the early hours of the 17th the crew were ordered to destroy all sensitive equipment in order that it would be of no use to the enemy. Then, with this done and the decision to scuttle no longer possible to reverse, the Germans got word that the heavy British units were at Rio – nowhere near the River Plate. At just after 1800hrs on the evening of the 17th, the Graf Spee, with demolition charges set, sailed from Montevideo harbour with a skeleton crew. When she was four miles out she stopped. Her skeleton crew disembarked and she soon became engulfed in fire. Graf Spee blew up just before 2000hrs. With the decision made, the scuttling of the panzerschiff went according to plan. [image]local://upfiles/28156/05E3016E54CF4C848A1B281DC87B000E.jpg[/image] The crew of the Graf Spee travelled to Argentina but the reception there was not as may have been expected – and the officers and men of the panzershiff were interned for the remainder of the war. Not so Hans Langsdorff. He took full responsibility for the loss of the Graf Spee and, having been persuaded by his fellow officers not to go down with the ship, he shot himself on the 19th December. Hans Langsdorff seen here at the funeral for Graf Spee's dead held in Uruguay. The German captain engaged the British cruisers against orders and he was to pay for this with the loss of his ship and his life. What should not be forgotten is the humane way in which this officer went about conducting warfare and his treatment of the officers and men whose ships he sank and whom he took prisoner. [image]local://upfiles/28156/F9106942465B4971926799B2D3C96B9F.jpg[/image] Sources: The Price of Disobedience (Grove)

Zorch -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/16/2015 10:48:27 AM)
Excellent!

tripwireCCS -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/17/2015 12:03:47 AM)
The most factual and clear relating of the first surface battle of WWII. Yes... EXCELLENT ! Thank you, Warspite1.

AbwehrX -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/17/2015 12:36:20 AM)
quote: - The forward 11-inch gun was behaving erratically (as it had for most of the battle) - To compound this problem, the main rangefinder was broken - 11-inch shell supply was enough for a further 40 minutes of action - The port ammunition hoists for the 5.9-inch guns were out of action - The forward Anti-Aircraft director was no longer working - Starboard 4.1-inch gun out of action - One barrel of the port 4.1-inch gun out of action - Starboard chain hoist for the 4.1-inch shells no longer operable - She no longer had the ability to fire torpedoes - A large hole in the bows made sea-keeping in rough waters hazardous if not impossible - Her engines were limited to a top speed of 17 knots - Key auxiliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water was broken - Fuel and lubricating oil purifier was broken - The level of useable fuel was limited to 16 hours [this I have not been able to confirm] - Main galley and baking facilities out of action - Flour store contaminated with sea water [X(] Wow I had no idea she was that severely damaged and impaired! Curious if any U-Boots were within range to support an escape?

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/17/2015 1:09:37 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: AbwehrX quote: - The forward 11-inch gun was behaving erratically (as it had for most of the battle) - To compound this problem, the main rangefinder was broken - 11-inch shell supply was enough for a further 40 minutes of action - The port ammunition hoists for the 5.9-inch guns were out of action - The forward Anti-Aircraft director was no longer working - Starboard 4.1-inch gun out of action - One barrel of the port 4.1-inch gun out of action - Starboard chain hoist for the 4.1-inch shells no longer operable - She no longer had the ability to fire torpedoes - A large hole in the bows made sea-keeping in rough waters hazardous if not impossible - Her engines were limited to a top speed of 17 knots - Key auxiliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water was broken - Fuel and lubricating oil purifier was broken - The level of useable fuel was limited to 16 hours [this I have not been able to confirm] - Main galley and baking facilities out of action - Flour store contaminated with sea water [X(] Wow I had no idea she was that severely damaged and impaired! Curious if any U-Boots were within range to support an escape? warspite1 No - I do not believe they could operate that far south until the fall of France. Certainly there were no U-boat patrols iirc in the South Atlantic area until late 1940.

Aurelian -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/17/2015 2:19:23 AM)
quote: ORIGINAL: warspite1 quote: ORIGINAL: AbwehrX quote: - The forward 11-inch gun was behaving erratically (as it had for most of the battle) - To compound this problem, the main rangefinder was broken - 11-inch shell supply was enough for a further 40 minutes of action - The port ammunition hoists for the 5.9-inch guns were out of action - The forward Anti-Aircraft director was no longer working - Starboard 4.1-inch gun out of action - One barrel of the port 4.1-inch gun out of action - Starboard chain hoist for the 4.1-inch shells no longer operable - She no longer had the ability to fire torpedoes - A large hole in the bows made sea-keeping in rough waters hazardous if not impossible - Her engines were limited to a top speed of 17 knots - Key auxiliary boiler that supplied steam to the distilling plant for fresh water was broken - Fuel and lubricating oil purifier was broken - The level of useable fuel was limited to 16 hours [this I have not been able to confirm] - Main galley and baking facilities out of action - Flour store contaminated with sea water [X(] Wow I had no idea she was that severely damaged and impaired! Curious if any U-Boots were within range to support an escape? warspite1 No - I do not believe they could operate that far south until the fall of France. Certainly there were no U-boat patrols iirc in the South Atlantic area until late 1940. http://uboat.net/ is a good source. I looked at a few of the long range boats, I didn't find any that operated that far south.

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/30/2015 5:52:13 AM)
December 1939 (The U-boat War) We last looked at the U-boats in the November summary (post 146). We shall now turn our attention to the state of play in the final month of 1939. Note: from now I will try and keep to calendar months for these updates so this report is for the period 4th -31st December. At the beginning of the month Donitz had just two boats available for service in the North Atlantic; U-47 (Prien) and U-48 (Schultze). Three other vessels could not be prepared in time, for reasons that Donitz attributed to dockyard sabotage, while U-46 (Sohler) was late in sailing. To further add to Donitz’s woes the two boats only had fuel for a few days patrolling. However, both Prien and Schultze added to their ever growing reputations (at that time nos. 2 and 1 respectively on the tonnage sunk list) by sinking three large merchant ships each (for 42,250 tons) including two tankers. Upon their return home that left the late sailing U-46 as the only ship in the North Atlantic at the end of the month. Sohler had a frustrating time, sinking one ship for just under 1,000 tons only and Donitz was unhappy with this performance. The crew were sent for further training upon their return to Germany. Five Type II ducks were deployed on mine-laying duty off the East Coast during the month, and all five achieved at least one kill. Of these, U-22 (Jenisch) was the star performer with 4 kills for around 5,000 tons, while U-60 (Schewe) sank the largest single freighter (4,373 tons). Meanwhile, the large Type IX U-38 (Liebe) was ordered to operate off Norwegian waters and was rewarded with three kills for just over 13,000. There was also success for ducks operating in the North Sea and off the East Coast during the month on non-mine-laying operations, including Otto Kretschmer’s U-23 that sank a freighter for 2,400 tons. U-59 sank four ships on her second December patrol for just over 5,000 – this was in addition to two victims she claimed on a mine-laying patrol at the start of the month. The U-30 (Lemp) and U-32 (Buchel) were employed on mine-laying operations off the west coast – the former off Liverpool and the latter off the Firth of Clyde. Lemp’s up/down U-boat career received another ‘up’ when, on the 28th December, after sinking a small trawler, he came across the battleship Barham and the battlecruiser Repulse. He fired four torpedoes into the ageing battleship, but only one exploded. Barham limped home but would be out of action for three months. After this, Lemp sowed his mines off the important port – and these would achieve considerable success over the next month. For Buchel and U-31, things were not so rosy. U-31 also sunk a small ship on the way to its mine-laying mission, but when Buchel reached his destination, he found the operation too difficult to complete due to the intense ASW activity there. Instead of dropping his mines in mid-channel as ordered, he laid them deeper and they were to achieve no hits. Upon return to Germany Buchel was sacked by an unimpressed Donitz. On the debit side, the U-boat arm suffered one loss in the month of December when the Type VIIA U-36 (KorvettanKapitan Wilhelm Frohlich) was lost at the hands of the British submarine HMS Salmon (see later post). The boat sank with all hands. Summary for the period U-boat, type, ships sunk U-20 (IIB) - (2) Magnus (9th), Foina (10th) U-21 (IIB) – (2) Mars* (21st), Carl Henckel (21st) U-22 (IIB) – (4) Mars* (20th), HMS Dolphin (23rd), HMS Loch Doon (25th), Hanne (28th) U-23 (IIB) – (1) Scotia (8th) U-30 (VIIA) – (1) HMS Barbara Robertson (28th) U-38 (IX) – (3) Thomas Walton (7th), Garoufalia (11th), Deptford (13th) U-46 (VIIB) – (1) Rudolf (21st) U-47 (VIIB) – (3) Navasota (5th), Britta (6th), Tajandoen (7th) U-48 (VIIB) – (3) Brandon (8th), San Alberto (9th), Germaine (15th) U-57 (IIC) – (1) Mina (13th) U-59 (IIC) – (6) HMS Washington (6th), Marwick Head (12th), Lister (16th), Glitrefjell (16th), Bogo (17th), Jaegersborg (17th) U-60 (IIC) – (1) City of Kobe (19th) Total – 28 ships with a tonnage of 79,990. *Cannot get clarity on this – either this is one ship only sunk between them or there are two victims with one mis-named. Sources: Hitler’s U-boat War Volume I (Clay Blair) Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer) www.uboat.net

warspite1 -> RE: Naval War Day-by-Day (8/31/2015 8:06:00 AM)
December 1939 (North Sea. Destroyer mine-laying operations and RN submarine warfare) Posts 119,147 and 162 provided an overview of the audacious – and highly successful - mine-laying operations undertaken by the Kriegsmarine destroyer force that began in October. Two months later and the Admiralty were still unaware that German destroyers has been operating with impunity right under their noses. Two such operations were planned for December and a number of clues should have led the British to conclude what was going on – although these clues were to be ignored. We begin this story on the 2nd December with the sailing from Rosyth of the S-class submarine HMS Salmon (Lt-Cdr Edward Bickford). Salmon was ordered to deploy in the North Sea and was two days into her patrol when, around 90 miles south of Egersund (Norway), her crew sighted a U-boat. This was the U-36 starting out on her own patrol and blissfully unaware of the presence of the British boat. Bickford ordered the German boat be closed at full speed and, when the gap had been reduced to 5,000 yards, a full torpedo salvo was fired at seven second intervals. One torpedo hit the German boat, blowing her apart instantly. The Salmon searched for survivors but found only small pieces of wreckage. 40 German sailors were lost. HMS Salmon was launched in 1933 and was an S-class (Type II) medium submarine. The S-class were designed specifically for patrolling in the North Sea and Mediterranean. More S-class were built for the RN than any other boat class; 62 were constructed between 1931-1945. See next post for further details. [image]local://upfiles/28156/243AE4B12A564EA09FD6C73748FDA314.jpg[/image] Meanwhile, on the 6th-7th December the Kriegsmarine launched another mine-laying operation – with the destination this time being the Norfolk coast off the town of Cromer. Three destroyers were earmarked for the operation: Erich Giese, Hans Lody and Bernd von Arnim, however the latter was forced to turn back to port shortly after starting out due to engine problems. Giese and Lody continued on and, after laying their mines, set course for home in the early hours of the 7th. Two British destroyers on patrol – Juno and Jersey - were spotted in the distance and the German destroyers wasted no time in firing a spread of torpedoes from just under 6,000 yards. Just prior to a torpedo hitting Jersey, the lookouts on board Juno spotted dark shapes in the distance. However, once the torpedo hit both commanders made the assumption that this must have come from a submarine. As the crew of Jersey fought successfully to save their ship, the Juno went off in search of a U-boat that was never there, and the two German destroyers made a hasty getaway. With hindsight it is not easy to understand why they did not press home the attack given that surprise and thus advantage was with them. But in any case, the German destroyers reached home and their minefield would account for two ships (and a third damaged) in the coming days. Jersey, with the aid of her sister, managed to reach port too. 10 officers and crew had died in the attack. A week later another such operation was launched with the target being the northeast coast off Newcastle. For this attack the Germans gathered together five destroyers; Hermann Kunne, Friedrich Ihn, Erich Steinbrinck, Richard Beitzen and Bruno Heinemann. After laying their mines undetected, the destroyers headed back across the North Sea in the early hours of the 13th where they would be met by Konteradmiral Lutjens and his force of light cruisers off Heligoland. The destroyers parting gifts would in due course claim 11 merchant ships totalling almost 19,000 tons and damage others including the destroyer HMS Kelly which, on the 14th, struck one of the mines while attending a tanker that had been damaged having struck one of the mines herself. While all this was unfolding off the English coast, further events were taking place in the North Sea. We now head back to the submarine Salmon. On the morning of the 13th while still on patrol she came across the 51,000 ton liner SS Bremen. At the outset of the war Bremen had been on her way to New York but managed to turn around and, successfully evading the RN, she put into the Soviet harbour of Murmansk. She had been holed up there for three months when she was ordered to make a dash for Germany. Unfortunately for the British, when Salmon came across her she was under air escort and Bickford decided not to risk an attack against the liner. However, later that morning Salmon came across a large number of German warships. These were Lutjen’s cruisers – Koln, Leipzig and Nurnberg – and the five destroyers they were escorting back to Germany from their mine-laying operation. Although the range was over 11,000 yards, this was not a target to be let go. Bickford fired a salvo at eleven second intervals. Explosions were heard but Salmon quickly came under counterattack and Bickford ordered her to dive. Depth charges were fired at her for over an hour before all went quiet and she surfaced to check out the position. However there was nothing to find and, completely out of torpedoes, she returned for home. What Bickford did not know was that two of his torpedoes had struck home and both the Leipzig and the Nurnberg had been damaged – Leipzig seriously so. Furthermore during the next day, the submarine HMS Ursula (Lt-Cdr Philips), which was patrolling off the German coast, came across the limping Leipzig and her escorts and made ready for an attack. All torpedoes missed the cruiser, but one hit one of her escorts, the F9. Both Ursula and Leipzig were able to make their escape, unlike the F9 which quickly sank with heavy loss of life (cannot get exact detail). The light cruiser Leipzig. Although she would survive the attentions of Salmon and Ursula and would be patched up, she was never fully operational again. [image]local://upfiles/28156/41755DA1E0934F758708CD7108182314.jpg[/image] The F9. Ten of the ‘F-class’ Flottenbegleiter were built between 1934 and 1938. They were designed as inner escorts for the Deutschland-class but they proved to be something of a disaster. Poor sea boats and with an engine that was simply too unreliable, these vessels were soon relegated to backwater, non-combat duties. [image]local://upfiles/28156/D8EF361977FD4B69B6C62CBA4C091E83.jpg[/image] Despite the growing evidence, quite incredibly, the British remained unaware of just what was taking place right under their very noses…… Sources: The Gathering Storm (Geirr H Haarr) Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-45 (Jurgen Rohwer) British Submarines 1938-45 (Osprey) Kriegsmarine Coastal Forces (Osprey)

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