IJN Battleship availability chart (Full Version)

All Forums >> [New Releases from Matrix Games] >> War in the Pacific: Admiral's Edition



Message

ChuckBerger -> IJN Battleship availability chart (5/25/2015 4:18:32 AM)

I'm working on destroyers... but that will take awhile. In the meantime, I did the battleships, since there's only a couple of them.

One question: Kirishima's TROM, as reproduced at Combined Fleet, has her receiving "serious damage after being swamped by successive waves" while returning home from the Pearl Harbor raid, enough to require drydock time. www.combinedfleet.com/kirishima.htm I put this in the chart, but I've never heard this before, and couldn't find any other account of it. Anyone?

Otherwise, again not too many surprises in doing the battleship chart, as their stories are fairly well known. Striking how little the IJN battleships actually did, aside from the 4 Kongos. A lot of training, standby, and work as expensive steel hotels. Not a lot of battle. Amazing that the IJN had total big-gun dominance during 1942, and couldn't manage to find a way to exploit it.

The course of the war wouldn't really have changed at all had Japan only had the 4 Kongos at the start of it! The others did literally nothing of note until Leyte Gulf.

I also wonder whether Ise/Hyuga/Fuso/Yamashiro could've all been converted to full CVs, with more or less the same resources as the Ise/Hyuga hybrid conversions plus Shinano conversion took. That might have given 4 additional CVs for Phillipine Sea.

[image]local://upfiles/21922/76FAA4EA2E58475AB630624BDCBB0BA5.jpg[/image]



wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/25/2015 4:39:59 AM)

The problem with the IJN BBs was they were too expensive to lose until it was way too late. The gun club kept thinking there was going to be a decisive battle line engagement at some point, but it was a doomed strategy about as useful as still digging WWI trenches for a static front in 1943.

Bill



SierraJuliet -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/25/2015 5:24:27 AM)

Yet another case of hindsight having a bearing on the way we play the game. If those big ships are going to go down at some point they had better do something useful before they do so.



crsutton -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/25/2015 5:00:01 PM)

I really do not put a lot of emphasis on sinking Japanese BBs early in the game. Japanese players tend to overuse them without regard to the fuel they are eating up. And if they are alive, they are sucking up a lot of gas. It is great to sink one but I would much rather sink DDs Without DDs the bigger ships are lame ducks later in the war anyways.



Lokasenna -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/25/2015 6:54:19 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: crsutton

I really do not put a lot of emphasis on sinking Japanese BBs early in the game. Japanese players tend to overuse them without regard to the fuel they are eating up. And if they are alive, they are sucking up a lot of gas. It is great to sink one but I would much rather sink DDs Without DDs the bigger ships are lame ducks later in the war anyways.


Lately, I've been seeing them escorted by mere E's [:D]. I understand why, but it's funny to me. Japan is already short on DDs. Every one that you sink just makes it worse.



spence -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/25/2015 8:02:54 PM)

quote:

. A lot of training, standby, and work as expensive steel hotels. Not a lot of battle. Amazing that the IJN had total big-gun dominance during 1942, and couldn't manage to find a way to exploit it.

The course of the war wouldn't really have changed at all had Japan only had the 4 Kongos at the start of it! The others did literally nothing of note until Leyte Gulf.


Considering how they performed at Leyte Gulf was all that training useful? Was the sea too calm for their gunnery expertise off Samar[8|]?



crsutton -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/26/2015 2:30:12 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence

quote:

. A lot of training, standby, and work as expensive steel hotels. Not a lot of battle. Amazing that the IJN had total big-gun dominance during 1942, and couldn't manage to find a way to exploit it.

The course of the war wouldn't really have changed at all had Japan only had the 4 Kongos at the start of it! The others did literally nothing of note until Leyte Gulf.


Considering how they performed at Leyte Gulf was all that training useful? Was the sea too calm for their gunnery expertise off Samar[8|]?


Pretty hazy and smoky at Leyte Gulf with some rain squalls to boot. No amount of expertise could compensate for the lack of visibility and modern fire control systems. Frequent course changes due to constant air harassment was a factor too. The surprised Allies were still fighting on a whole different level at that stage of the war. It was like a blind bear trying to take on a rat terrier. [;)]



spence -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/26/2015 11:11:32 PM)

Except that the IJN blind bear had 3 to 1 odds in DDs and then got to add in all those cruisers and 4 BBs. IJN cruisers and destroyers did quite well during the war although no so well off Samar. Japanese BB fleets and the senior admirals commanding them did no better than the Italians or the Germans. The Japanese BBs don't even have a tactical victory to their credit similar to Bismarck sinking the Hood.



wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 12:21:43 AM)

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill



mind_messing -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 12:37:54 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Lokasenna


quote:

ORIGINAL: crsutton

I really do not put a lot of emphasis on sinking Japanese BBs early in the game. Japanese players tend to overuse them without regard to the fuel they are eating up. And if they are alive, they are sucking up a lot of gas. It is great to sink one but I would much rather sink DDs Without DDs the bigger ships are lame ducks later in the war anyways.


Lately, I've been seeing them escorted by mere E's [:D]. I understand why, but it's funny to me. Japan is already short on DDs. Every one that you sink just makes it worse.


No need for Fleet destroyers on the Taberfane Express, just the old torpedo boats to keep your subs at bay :)

I'll swap them out for the Matsu when they start arriving next month. I like those little 30+ knot E-class ships, I wish I'd two hundred more...



mind_messing -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 12:42:39 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill


Interesting background on Kurita. I wonder how things would have changed if there had been one of the "go down with both broadsides firing" types in overall command. The Japanese would likely have suffered even worse losses, but what might they have gained in return?



jamesjohns -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 2:52:55 AM)

quote:

Interesting background on Kurita. I wonder how things would have changed if there had been one of the "go down with both broadsides firing" types in overall command. The Japanese would likely have suffered even worse losses, but what might they have gained in return?


Please correct me if I am wrong but just more deaths for both sides and no real influence on the course or outcome of the war. Perhaps more of Taffy 3 but if they would have continued would they not have been then between more of 7th fleet to the south and 3rd fleet to the north?




crsutton -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 3:42:07 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill


They fired off an incredible amount of ammo for the modest damage that they inflicted. They were just too dependent on visual spotting and spotting was quite difficult that day. I read that all the treaty cruisers and pre war BBs had very slow turrets and with the older fire control systems frequent course changes really affected gunnery. The Japanese ships at Leyte had to constantly change course to avoid the numerous harassing air attacks that the Americans threw at them. Combine that with the poor visibility and you can then understand why they were not hitting much.



Lokasenna -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 3:49:19 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Having Kurita in command of the Central Force was also a factor at Samar. Kurita was one of the most cautious admirals in the IJN about casualties in lost causes. His father was an academic who studied Japanese history and Kurita grew up in a house full of history books. Kurita knew the whole Code of Bushido thing was BS and he knew exactly why. He knew what the real Samurai code was it didn't call for throwing away lives for a lost cause. There were certain codes of honor that led some Samurai to sacrifice themselves, but it was different from wholesale throwing away lives.

Kurita followed orders. He engaged the Americans with the Center Force, did as much damage as he could before the fast carrier aircraft showed up (he didn't know they would be out of range until later than day), and then ran to keep from taking further casualties. His force had already been whittled down by submarines and air attack the previous day. He didn't want to see his force wiped out.

I had never thought about it, but Spence is right, the Japanese BBs never won a single tactical victory. Every time the Americans encountered them they lost. The Battle Off Samar was the best they did and their performance was very poor when you look at the force disparity.

Bill


I always liked Kurita. Great admiral, seems to me, just ended up on the "wrong" side.

I thought the committal of the Kongos at Guadalcanal was OK, but I think the IJN got gunshy afterwards. They lost both, but it seems to me that they were unlucky with the Hiei while the Kirishima did get straight dominated. Let's also not forget that prior to the battles on November 13-14 (or was it 14-15?), they did successfully bombard Henderson during a night and just about knocked it out of action. No operational Henderson and the USMC is in trouble, which I think predicated the naval battles. Remember also that the IJN technically had carrier superiority at this time of the war, though perhaps they didn't know it. Those bombardment shells were something, at least so far as I can surmise from semi-scientific/semi-artistic schematic drawings.



spence -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/27/2015 8:28:54 PM)

quote:

they did successfully bombard Henderson during a night and just about knocked it out of action. No operational Henderson and the USMC is in trouble,


They just about knocked it out of action is key. By the end of the day Marine SBDs and fighters were bombing and strafing the transports which were the BB's raison d'etrre. Although the reinforcements landed gave the Japanese a "one off shot" at capturing Henderson Field by land the principle effect in the end was to give them more mouths to feed with fewer ships.

Further the bombardment seems not to have been repeatable in the short term. And so the day after the day after the bombardment the situation for the IJA reverted to what it had been before: food, ammunition and medical supplies dependent on the vagaries of the wind and the tide (which governed the arrival of the barrels in which those commodities were stored). IJ merchant hulls were not welcome in Ironbottom Sound.



ChuckBerger -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/28/2015 12:36:45 AM)

Kurita at Samar faced a conundrum...

On the one hand, there would never be a better opportunity (or indeed, any opportunity at all) for the IJN to inflict damage in surface action on the American fleet. This he must have known. So if the goal was to inflict damage, no matter what the cost, he made the wrong call.

Yet he also must have known that his opportunity to inflict serious damage was limited. He had just witnessed the extreme difficulty his force had prosecuting a naval battle while under constant air attack, and undoubtedly he knew that the air attacks would continue and probably intensify. Plus the likely presence of US battleships. So even though this was the best remaining opportunity for the IJN battle fleet to inflict damage on the Americans, still it was not a very good opportunity. At best, he was looking at trading his ships for another couple of US CVEs, or maybe at the outside some of Oldendorf's old battleships.

And then he must also have known, in his heart of hearts, that this was not a "decisive" battle, in the sense of a battle that could change the outcome of the war. It wasn't 1942 anymore. There was no longer any real opportunity for Japan to win the war, or even to fight to a stalemate. Even if he managed to repel the Philippines invasion completely, all that does is buy a few months. I think all Japanese leaders must have known this by 1944, even if they didn't admit it to anyone or to themselves.

In the face of all that, what's a reasonable "goal" for Kurita? If it's to inflict damage at any price, he made the wrong decision. If it's not to waste his men's lives for little return, and no real strategic impact, then he made the right decision. I think on balance his choice was the right one. But then again, I think Japan should have surrendered in 1944, if not earlier...




wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/28/2015 2:59:18 AM)

In a sense it was a decisive battle, but one in which Japan could only lose. After Leyte the IJN didn't have the capability to put ships to sea to do much of anything. The one exception was the Yamato's suicide mission to Okinawa and that was such a shoestring operation they only had enough fuel for a one way trip and could only escort with one CL and a handful of DDs.

Bill



spence -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/28/2015 9:23:47 PM)

Sorry for hi-jacking this thread. It just that IMHO IJN battleships are grossly over-rated as to crew readiness and overall capability.

There are a lot of photos of the Battle Off Samar in which the IJN BB's got exactly the battle that they had practiced for all those long years. Supposedly they practiced in bad weather. Having spent several years at sea this picture seems to show pretty close to the best one can expect. The picture is also notable since it is one of the few photos in existence wherein both a US ship and an IJN ship are visible (I think the original was taken from one of the other CVEs which was somewhat further away than the photo indicates - it may be a digitized enhancement of the original where the ship from which the photo was taken is in the foreground: ~2000 yds away from Gambier Bay)

http://www.brianacuff.com/Samar/28.jpg



wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/29/2015 1:45:37 AM)

I think there were some things going on at Samar are not well modeled in the game. For one thing visibility was poor that day as someone commented above and the Japanese depended on optical rangefinders. The quality of bunker sea in use was much worse than earlier in the war. The Japanese ended up in a stern chase which prevented them from bringing all guns into action.

I don't know for sure, but I suspect the BB crews' quality had also declined during the war. It was common in other navies to draw crew members away from established crews to serve on newly commissioned ships. The IJN expanded less than most other navies during the war, but they did commission a lot of smaller ships as well as a number of carriers. Even if the crews hadn't been drawn off, they may have just been rusty from years of inaction.

Bill



Symon -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/29/2015 5:40:06 PM)

Just a teensy thought for all the IJ BB enthusiasts, out there. And a small take on why the IJN didn't use them

A rough run-in, in the Solomons by 8th Fleet. Rabaul to Guadalcanal is ~650 nm. That’s 2 days at nominal cruise speed; one-out, one-back.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 880 + 280 = ~1160 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed, and up to 6900 tons at full speed (although 4030 tons would be a better allowance assuming 50/50 cruise/full power fuel consumption).

A more robust run-in by elements of 4th Fleet. Truk to Guadalcanal is ~1350 nm. That’s 8 days out and back (4 days one way), at nominal cruise speed.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 3520 + 1056 = ~4575 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed. Allowing for a 1 day full power run-in and 1 day full power withdrawal that’s ~3450 tons at cruise, and 6850 tons at combat. That’s 10300 tons of fuel for a 2xBB bombardment mission. Of course Yamato used ~20% more fuel/day than the ‘typical’ IJ BB, so is it any surprise that she was used as a hotel and floating gas station?

Ciao. JWE.



spence -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/29/2015 9:15:28 PM)

quote:

I think there were some things going on at Samar are not well modeled in the game. For one thing visibility was poor that day as someone commented above and the Japanese depended on optical rangefinders. The quality of bunker sea in use was much worse than earlier in the war. The Japanese ended up in a stern chase which prevented them from bringing all guns into action.

I don't know for sure, but I suspect the BB crews' quality had also declined during the war. It was common in other navies to draw crew members away from established crews to serve on newly commissioned ships. The IJN expanded less than most other navies during the war, but they did commission a lot of smaller ships as well as a number of carriers. Even if the crews hadn't been drawn off, they may have just been rusty from years of inaction.

Bill



Did you look at the picture? The IJN cruiser is probably 7-8000 yards beyond Gambier Bay. The BB's were turned and fled USS Johnson's torpedo attack (turning away to comb the wakes rather than turning into). But the IJN cruisers got plenty close. Given the obvious visual conditions your argument about quality holds true for the IJN cruisers' failure to annihilate Taffy 3 but frankly the IJN BBs never displayed, in any of their actions any especial acumen. Even the 2 Kongo's action against USS Edsall can hardly be called a demonstration of their prowess.

If the US found it hard to send its old BBs to the South Pacific because it took too much fuel to operate there it seems pretty much for sure the IJN would have held them back for exactly the same reason (considering relative supplies of oil). If it is possible for the Japanese then something may well be wrong with the game mechanics that provide the IJN with way too much fuel. I've read that the Midway Operation used up a whole year of the fleet's supply of fuel...seems moving all those thirsty BBs cost the IJN plenty.

The IJN BB's for the most part did nothing during the entire length of the war. Their sole accomplishment seeems to have been shared between but 2 of their ships and was never repeated. Faced with someone who could shoot back about all they can claim is sinking a WWI retread DD.



wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/29/2015 10:43:57 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: Symon

Just a teensy thought for all the IJ BB enthusiasts, out there. And a small take on why the IJN didn't use them

A rough run-in, in the Solomons by 8th Fleet. Rabaul to Guadalcanal is ~650 nm. That’s 2 days at nominal cruise speed; one-out, one-back.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 880 + 280 = ~1160 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed, and up to 6900 tons at full speed (although 4030 tons would be a better allowance assuming 50/50 cruise/full power fuel consumption).

A more robust run-in by elements of 4th Fleet. Truk to Guadalcanal is ~1350 nm. That’s 8 days out and back (4 days one way), at nominal cruise speed.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 3520 + 1056 = ~4575 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed. Allowing for a 1 day full power run-in and 1 day full power withdrawal that’s ~3450 tons at cruise, and 6850 tons at combat. That’s 10300 tons of fuel for a 2xBB bombardment mission. Of course Yamato used ~20% more fuel/day than the ‘typical’ IJ BB, so is it any surprise that she was used as a hotel and floating gas station?

Ciao. JWE.



They didn't have the fuel supply to support the BBs. Most of the BBs spent a lot of time in the SRA to be close to the fuel supply.

Bill



wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/29/2015 10:59:28 PM)


quote:

I think there were some things going on at Samar are not well modeled in the game. For one thing visibility was poor that day as someone commented above and the Japanese depended on optical rangefinders. The quality of bunker sea in use was much worse than earlier in the war. The Japanese ended up in a stern chase which prevented them from bringing all guns into action.

I don't know for sure, but I suspect the BB crews' quality had also declined during the war. It was common in other navies to draw crew members away from established crews to serve on newly commissioned ships. The IJN expanded less than most other navies during the war, but they did commission a lot of smaller ships as well as a number of carriers. Even if the crews hadn't been drawn off, they may have just been rusty from years of inaction.

Bill


quote:

ORIGINAL: spence
Did you look at the picture? The IJN cruiser is probably 7-8000 yards beyond Gambier Bay. The BB's were turned and fled USS Johnson's torpedo attack (turning away to comb the wakes rather than turning into). But the IJN cruisers got plenty close. Given the obvious visual conditions your argument about quality holds true for the IJN cruisers' failure to annihilate Taffy 3 but frankly the IJN BBs never displayed, in any of their actions any especial acumen. Even the 2 Kongo's action against USS Edsall can hardly be called a demonstration of their prowess.

If the US found it hard to send its old BBs to the South Pacific because it took too much fuel to operate there it seems pretty much for sure the IJN would have held them back for exactly the same reason (considering relative supplies of oil). If it is possible for the Japanese then something may well be wrong with the game mechanics that provide the IJN with way too much fuel. I've read that the Midway Operation used up a whole year of the fleet's supply of fuel...seems moving all those thirsty BBs cost the IJN plenty.

The IJN BB's for the most part did nothing during the entire length of the war. Their sole accomplishment seeems to have been shared between but 2 of their ships and was never repeated. Faced with someone who could shoot back about all they can claim is sinking a WWI retread DD.


From what I've read the order to turn away from the torpedoes instead of into them was a mistaken call by someone on the bridge and it was too late to change once given.

When did IJN battleships engage WW I era US DDs? At Guadalcanal I believe the DDs were ones built in the 30s and Taffy 3s screen were all war built ships. The carriers of Taffy 3 were built together. There are pictures of the Vancouver shipyard with all the carriers of Taffy 3 lined up side by side getting fitted out.

The aggressiveness of Taffy 3s screen really unnerved many. There were reports that the US DDs were actually CLs. The Johnston was especially bold. Commander Evans took them in so close the Kongo could not depress her guns low enough to shoot at them. They fired everything in the magazine at the Kongo including paint rounds.

On top of the aggressive screen, all the planes from all the CVEs were attacking the IJN ships. The Wildcats strafed until they were out of ammo and the TBFs made fake torpedo runs when their torpedoes were spent. It made Kurita think he was under attack by elements from the fast carriers and not just planes from the CVEs. He decided to scoot before the main attacks from the fast carriers showed up.

I believe the only ships to close the gap on the CVEs were the Tone and Chikuma which I don't believe had any experience in surface combat. Both had always been used with the carriers as scouting cruisers. Another problem the IJN had was they were mostly firing AP rounds which went right through the unarmored carriers. There were a number of rounds that hit the carriers and went through them before going off.

Samar happened because of a major strategic screw up on the part of Halsey, one that followed him the rest of his life. However the US commanders did everything right tactically to unnerve the Japanese and convince them that a much larger force was nearby than was actually there.

Bill



spence -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/30/2015 12:05:51 AM)

If you had looked at the photo you would probably have recognized a Tone Class cruiser off on the horizon. Interestingly Tone, Chikuma, Hiei, Kirishima and Kido Butai's dive bombers won their fight against USS Edsall (a lone Clemson Class DD South of Java. I'll admit I was wrong. The IJN BBs can claim a tactical victory after all. I'm impressed[8|]




Buckrock -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/30/2015 1:04:50 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: spence
Did you look at the picture? The IJN cruiser is probably 7-8000 yards beyond Gambier Bay. The BB's were turned and fled USS Johnson's torpedo attack (turning away to comb the wakes rather than turning into). But the IJN cruisers got plenty close. Given the obvious visual conditions your argument about quality holds true for the IJN cruisers' failure to annihilate Taffy 3 but frankly the IJN BBs never displayed, in any of their actions any especial acumen. Even the 2 Kongo's action against USS Edsall can hardly be called a demonstration of their prowess.


The Gambier Bay was initially slown (down to 11 knots) by damage from long range fire, likely from one or two of the Japanese BBs over 20,000yds away. As she drifted back and became the rear most carrier (replacing Kalinin Bay), Gambier Bay was then targeted and hit hard from beyond 10,000 yds away by a Japanese cruiser (Tone), the damage causing serious flooding and power loss.

It was only after this that Japanese warships closed to the ranges suggested in the photo to deliver the final hits to the Gambier Bay. From the accounts of the US CVE's involved, this final "close range" attack to finish off Gambier Bay appears to be the only time Japanese warships got to target the carriers that day from less than 10,000yds.

And just as an observation, the photo seems to have been somewhat enhanced from the original, likely to better show the (assumed) Japanese warship in the distance. I have zero experience with photographic interpretation but might the cropping and enhancement be giving the Japanese warship the perspective of being closer to the Gambier Bay than in the original photo?

As for the Edsall's demise, destroyers capable of evading would likely not expect to be hit by battleship gunfire from beyond 20,000yds. IMO, the only real indictment on the Japanese BBs that day was that they thought sending almost 300 14" shells toward a destroyer at that range was worth the effort.

quote:


I've read that the Midway Operation used up a whole year of the fleet's supply of fuel...seems moving all those thirsty BBs cost the IJN plenty.

The Japanese would have been in real trouble if this was true for their planned yearly wartime oil allocation. In fact, the Midway/Aleutians Operation used up four months worth. Luckily for the Japanese, this substantial expenditure of oil was countered in the second half of 1942 by the better than expected supply coming in from captured East Indies oil fields.




Jorge_Stanbury -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/30/2015 6:53:48 PM)

The Japanese were in trouble!

according to HP Willmotts "Empires in Balance" I quote:

"With or without war and with or without the indies, the Japanese had problems -- if their calculations were accurate.
It almost goes without saying, however, that their figures were wildly inaccurate. The Japanese vastly overestimated their own potential and drastically underestimated their requirements. The notion of a single major engagement showed that the navy really had no inkling of the kind of war it was going to fight. In the first year of the war the navy used 60 percent more oil that it was allowed under any review or plan. Its operations consumed 30,520,000 barrels - 80 percent of the assessed national needs for 1941-1942. Its declining needs thereafter reflected its losses, not its commitments. The Indies maximum production was about 16,670,000 barrels in 1943, actually more than allowed for in the August review, but outflow to Japan fell 60 percent in 1944, mainly because of tanker losses and direct fueling of the navy in southern ports. Domestic production never exceeded 3,400,000 barrels in a year (1943)"

The plans he is referring are:
- Estimates done by the joint Army-Navy committee done in June 1941. This assumed a shortage of 4.4 million barrels in September 1944
- Navy revision done in August 1941: this saw a period of crisis - low reserve, no shortage - from September 1943 to September 1944.
The navy revision assumed significant increases in production in the 3rd year of war, for both the DEI (30,000,000 barrels) and domestic production (4,500,000 barrels). This estimates were very far away from reality



Symon -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/30/2015 9:15:15 PM)

quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson
quote:

ORIGINAL: Symon
Just a teensy thought for all the IJ BB enthusiasts, out there. And a small take on why the IJN didn't use them

A rough run-in, in the Solomons by 8th Fleet. Rabaul to Guadalcanal is ~650 nm. That’s 2 days at nominal cruise speed; one-out, one-back.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 880 + 280 = ~1160 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed, and up to 6900 tons at full speed (although 4030 tons would be a better allowance assuming 50/50 cruise/full power fuel consumption).

A more robust run-in by elements of 4th Fleet. Truk to Guadalcanal is ~1350 nm. That’s 8 days out and back (4 days one way), at nominal cruise speed.
2x BBs, 4x DDs = 3520 + 1056 = ~4575 tons of fuel at nominal cruise speed. Allowing for a 1 day full power run-in and 1 day full power withdrawal that’s ~3450 tons at cruise, and 6850 tons at combat. That’s 10300 tons of fuel for a 2xBB bombardment mission. Of course Yamato used ~20% more fuel/day than the ‘typical’ IJ BB, so is it any surprise that she was used as a hotel and floating gas station?

Ciao. JWE.

They didn't have the fuel supply to support the BBs. Most of the BBs spent a lot of time in the SRA to be close to the fuel supply.

Bill


That was kinda sorta the point, Bill. Just thought I would do some simple numbers for folks that have difficulties with linguistic concepts [8D]

Ciao. JWE



wdolson -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/30/2015 10:34:39 PM)

Sorry, didn't make it clear we were in agreement.

Bill



Zorch -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/30/2015 11:50:42 PM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Sorry, didn't make it clear we were in agreement.

Bill

Agree with you both - besides the fuel issues, cruisers were the best ships for the Solomons campaign. I don't understand why Oi and Kitakami weren't used there. A broadside of 40 torpedoes at night would have been even more devastating than the historical ones.



jamesjohns -> RE: IJN Battleship availability chart (5/31/2015 12:29:01 AM)

Thanks for the numbers showing the fuel issue Japan faced in WWII. I knew they had problems and the Yamato was a 1 way trip due to fuel but to see the numbers really sheds new light on it, hard to fathom the amount needed to move a ship, let alone a BB.

Any idea in US gallons how much it is?



Page: [1] 2   next >   >>

Valid CSS!




Forum Software © ASPPlayground.NET Advanced Edition 2.4.5 ANSI
1.152344