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Alfred -> RE: Gnashing of Teeth: Cries of Fury (7/16/2017 1:04:03 AM)
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quote:
ORIGINAL: Lowpe
quote:
ORIGINAL: Alfred
Well, if one were to speculate ....[:)]
Your opponent is clearly attempting to work several axes simultaneously.
1. Alaska/Aleutians.
2. Midway/Central Pacific.
3. Northern New Guinea/Solomons.
4. Eastern DEI (probable as per enemy carrier units in Gulf of Carpentaria).
5. Burma.
As to #1, with Seward consolidated he can move on Anchorage and island hop across the Aleutians. This campaign is self propelled but only once both Seward and Kodiak are consolidated. There is no need for Midway to be Allied.
As to #2, Midway per se is not indispensable for a CenPac campaign. However, carrier support is indispensable. The Midway victory, at least in the short term, has almost certainly destroyed the Allied carrier and a substantial part of the ancillary amphibious assets which had been earmarked for this campaign. I doubt that the Allies are disposed to relocating (before they have accomplished their current tasks) from elsewhere the necessary assets to quickly revive this axis. The focus here will probably swing to solely finishing the recapture of Hawaii. Again, Allied possession of Midway is not absolutely essential, although it is useful to safeguard SLOC, for a CenPac drive towards the Marianas.
As to #3, once Rabaul is consolidated this will become an island hopping Allied campaign which can proceed without substantial Allied carrier assets. It is not a campaign where the KB is likely to be effective as there will be too many interlocking Allied airbases.
As to #4, a resupply of Darwin would almost certainly be incorporated into an eastern DEI offensive anyway. You should not assume those Allied carrier assets in the Gulf of Carpentaria are only tasked with the passive objective of escorting a supply convoy. Assume they are ultimately aiming for Ambon/Timor with the aim of eliminating your Boela/Babo oil source and down the track your Makassar Strait oil convoys from Java/eastern Borneo. This axis is an existential threat to you. Although the lack of sea room here is a malus for KB operations it is also a problem for Allied carriers who face the additional problem of confronting Japanese interlocking airbases.
As to #5, much depends on two considerations:
- do the Allies really want to rescue the trapped LCUs northeast of Shwebo (and are also aware they have other Allied divisions facing potential destruction and thus potential rescue)
- do they have substantial uncommitted LCUs here or are they already committed/on board ships in the Gulf of Carpentaria/held back for a #6 axis involving a direct assault out of the western wormhole on Sumatra/Java
I point out the possibility that the Allies may not really care much about their trapped units in Burma because it may all be a sophisticated ruse to get you to commit your reserves to Burma and thus make #4 (and if there is also a #6) much easier for the Allies.
Based on the above, the KB needs to be positioned to confront #4 (and if #6 is also on the cards, that too) before interlocking Allied airbases become available. This is why the KB is largely irrelevant for confronting #1, #2 (in the short term), #3 and #5. It is why you were very wise to not allow the KB to "exploit" the Midway victory.
As always, passive defence will not succeed in defending against a well orchestrated Allied invasion. What is needed to defeat an Allied sea borne invasion is control of the air and sea. With control there is a chance of defeating them on the beaches or bringing in reinforcements/allowing counter invasion.
Alfred
Thank you Alfred. I had to re-read the post several times, pretty much true for all your posts.
With respect to #1, the Alaska Axis -- do you think the Allies will await the coming spring before launching more invasions?
No. Most Allied players overlook subtlety and rely merely upon brute strength. Your opponent will not take into account the seasons in determining whether more invasions are appropriate.
At Seward, Japanese artillery has been having a field day despite heavy naval bombardments. But it is only a matter of time before Allied infantry there recovers from their disablements from landing. I can reinforce with troops from Anchorage, but then that leaves it vulnerable to invasion...but I am leaning that way especially in the winter time.
I would reinforce but only just enough to hold Seward. The entire northern campaign is being run on a shoestring basis (as evidenced by CVEs used as mobile CAP traps). As such your opponent almost certainly is relying on the unload, capture, reload, move onto next base rinse and repeat approach. If he has some spare land assets he might move on Anchorage once Seward is captured even if Japanese resistance remains at Seward but he won't leap frog to Anchorage whilst Seward remains a Japanese base. He will be counting on Allied air support out of Seward for any move on Anchorage.
Supplies are good there probably thru winter. I could even fly in a some infantry...but I fear he will ignore it and head west instead.
This is not a problem for you. The ideal situation for you during winter is to have control of bases with Allied LCs present and a constant need for Allied resupply convoys. A few IJN surface combat forces comprised of nothing larger than destroyers could wreck havoc and engage in a very profitable campaign.
Winter will greatly impede air operations and it inflicts greater wear and tear on ships. A lack of nearby Allied bases imposes severe constraints eg it forces air support to be provided by carriers and not only will the air operations be sporadic but the ships themselves will not be able to remain at sea long, whereas you have LBA and ports to address the wear and tear.
The wise Allied course of action is to consolidate both Seward and Kodiak as useful air bases and ports before proceeding onto Anchorage and the island hopping to the west.[/I]
Midway --We are still fighting a backburner war in Hawaii and the islands to the southsouthwest are still mine too.
3 Rabaul...mines are gone at Rabaul and daily cruiser bombardment task forces are hitting my troops. Setting up and staffing the next several defensive lines. Allies will need CV support for Manus I bet...or think they do.[;)]
Lavish carrier support for a move on Manus would be nice but it isn't essential. In any case he can always burrow temporarily from the Armada off northern Australia if need be. But essentially this is an island hopping campaign (especially if back filling) which in the absence of the KB can be conducted with just a couple of CVEs.
4. I fear the SRA invasion route more than anything and hopefully have some time to develop some countermeasures there. I think I will have the time....I think Midway caused the Allies to pull in their aggressiveness just a bit. We shall see.
5. I think, initially, rescuing the first two divisions that I trapped, months and months ago, has led the Allies down a very poor decision tree here. You are probably correct that the Allies now probably don't care about the original two cut off divisions, but probably do care about the next two Aussie divisions cut off, and in all probability don't consider the other troops at jeopardy.
For months Burma just looks to be a theatre where the Allies have no plan. It is very hard to see what exactly is the focus here hence why I wonder whether it is a giant ruse.
Irrespective of what the Allies really have in mind for Burma you are doing precisely the correct thing here. I always point out that defeat awaits Japanese players who simply rely on moving LCUs to defensive positions and there await the Allied hammer blow to fall. Yet practically all Japanese players do the opposite and switch over to a passive defence. A passive defence will always, with absolutely no exception, fail. Only an active defence can succeed the subtlety lying in understanding the difference between and active defence and an active offence, the two are not the same thing. There is no better active defence than trapping enemy LCUs and then proceeding to destroy them. The point is that once the Allies have undisputed the initiative, it is game over for Japan the only question remaining when.[/I]
To the degree it is all a feint to draw Japanese strength...the British Navy is almost full strength, and I will not oppose it....so this is the great threat here.
I am working to be able to shape and control the battlefield...or at least I think I am. Part of it depends upon how well the Allies watch the turns...and not see thru my deceptions.
Many thanks...I thought for sure I would be lambasted on the forum for not giving full chase at Midway.[;)]
Hindsight is the realm of second rate kibitzers.
There is always a risk with any decision made in the present. At the time of the Midway victory the Allied Armada in the Gulf of Carpentaria had not been spotted. The wise course of action was to assume that the Allied fleet carriers, which had not be seen for a while and had not been deployed to Alaska or Midway were available for action some where. Just like in tennis a volleyer returns to the "T" after playing a shot close to the side line, continuing to "exploit" the Midway victory left you on the sidelines no where near the "T". Now if the Midway victory had been over fleet carriers and the opportunity to sink more fleet carriers had been present then a "full chase" might have been in order. But not for the meagre potential gains weighed up against the potential risks elsewhere.[/I]
Alfred
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