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aspqrz02 -> RE: OT: Did the Italian armed forces do anything significant in WW2? (12/17/2015 9:22:25 AM)
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There were a number of reasons for the Regia Marina's poor showing, the top three being ...
1) Fuel
2) Fuel
3) Fuel
When Musso declared war, something like 60% of Italy's Merchant Marine were overseas and were captured or sunk or interned pretty much right away. Piss poor planning (no planning for Il Duce, as it happens).
She had few tankers in any case, and, anyway, imported something like 90+% of her oil needs ... in foreign tankers from foreign controlled sources (yes, there is oil in Libya ... but, back in the day, it wasn't known to exist and, in any case, the deposits were too deep for the drilling technology of the day ... it was another 15-20 years before they were able to be tapped).
Il Duce's careful pre-war planning (ROTFL [:D]) meant that Italy had virtually no oil reserves (as Germany did).
The entire country would have ground to a halt (those parts that required oil, anyway ... the Navy, the Air Force, a significant chunk of industry) if Hitler hadn't authorised emergency supplies.
The supplies for the Regia Marina were stripped, against their wishes, from the Kriegsmarine's allocation of the German strategic oil reserves and overall production. And that amount was barely enough to keep the engines of the larger ships and, indeed, most Italian warships, at maintenance levels (shutting down a marine engine means that it can take days, perhaps longer, to start it up again, on big ships) ... and, therefore, sitting more or less immobile in port.
What fuel there was for the warships was mainly reserved for the lighter craft escorting convoys to North Africa ... and the few sorties by larger fleet units were usually done at the behest of the Germans, or after cajoling extra fuel out of them (or simply from extended periods of saving).
There were other problems, too ...
* Italian ships were designed for operations in the Mediterranean, a very different environment than the Atlantic ... and the few ships (including subs) that served outside the Med tended to suffer from those shortcomings (Italian subs were not notably successful compared to German subs).
* Il Duce didn't want his pretty toys broken ... and the Naval High Command got that message in spades. A lot of their battle decisions (or decisions to break off battles) are known to have been significantly, probably overly, influenced by that desire.
* The Navy reflected Italian society fairly closely (not as much as the Army, and more so than the airforce) in that the Officer class was very stratified, insular, and slow to accept new ideas and there was a considerable gulf between the officers and their men (less so than in the Army, though, as noted) ... and High Command and Ship captains reflected a peacetime promotion system based on class, social contacts, and political reliability ... and wasn't able to overcome those limits (unlike the RN or USN, where they were less severe to begin with and were overcome more quickly, though still taking several years).
Why couldn't Malta be taken.
Well, it probably could have been ... but there were limiting factors.
1) Lack of shipping (most of the Merchant Marine was lost and the rest was oversubscribed trying to supply the Aegean islands, North Africa, Albania, Greece etc.)
2) Lack of fuel. For all services.
3) The Italian Airforce showed itself to be marginally capable, and certainly incapable of supporting an invasion by itself. The Luftwaffe would have had to have been involved as it was the force that actually brought Malta to its knees with bombing ...
Unfortunately, the additional Luftflotte that enabled the Luftwaffe to do that and support Rommel in North Africa and operations in Greece and the Aegean was pre-allocated for Barbarossa, and had to eventually be withdrawn for such ... after that an already marginal operation was even more so.
The Italians had some Paras, but no one knew how well they would perform *as* Paras in an invasion. They would have had to have been supported by the German Paras, but Hitler was wary of committing them ... they had been savaged during the invasion of France and the Low Countries (something like half of all the Ju-52s available were lost during those operations) and their performance in the invasion of Crete was, well, marginal ... and losses so bad that Hitler was reluctant to ever commit them *as* Paras ever again (and losses of Ju-52s were horrific).
So, yes, it could have been attempted. Yes, it could well have succeeded, but losses would have been nasty ... and what would the gain have been?
It would have put an operational crimp in sub attacks vs Axis convoys to North Africa, but not as much as to make any real difference ... most of the reason for the success of Allied Sub attacks was Enigma not Malta.
Crete. Well, the Luftwaffe said it could take the place by air. It did, barely, but losses were so horrendous (men and equipment) that Hitler never allowed Paras to be used on the same scale again.
And it was a close run thing. A slightly more competent Allied commander, and slightly more competent Allied unit commanders and a little luck and the invasion would have failed. It was that close, if you care to read up on it.
The German sea-reinforcements were committed in commandeered coasters and fishing caiques and were savaged, and mostly destroyed, by the RN.
Phil
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