OT: USS Houston (Full Version)

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NigelKentarus -> OT: USS Houston (3/1/2016 11:14:00 PM)

Interesting trivia about the Houston I found today.

http://usnhistory.navylive.dodlive.mil/final-days-of-uss-houston-the-galloping-ghost-of-the-java-coast/




Big B -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/2/2016 3:32:19 AM)

Thanks for sharing NigelKentarus [;)]

This page from NavSource has a lot of great pictures of her...




wdolson -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/2/2016 3:41:57 AM)

There is a recent book about the Houston called Ship of Ghosts. It's a good read both on the early days in the DEI and how POWs were treated.





crsutton -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/2/2016 2:01:00 PM)

An older book is "The Ghost that Died at Sundra Straight" written by her former gunnery officer. A more personal account. Two things stick in my mind. One is how delicate big guns are. He reported that by the end of Houston's short but fierce fighting career, the linings of the eight inch guns were protruding from the barrels and the shells fired by the ship would tumble in the air as a result. Also, how dangerous and mostly useless scouting aircraft were on the cruisers. To the point that they have a very difficult time getting airborne from the water in heavy tropical air and how vulnerable they were to the concussion of the big guns. Now I understand why they were eventually removed from surface warships.




dr.hal -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/2/2016 3:17:26 PM)

Bill is right, "Ship of Ghosts" by Hornfischer is really great. A more general read of the whole Asiatic Fleet (including the fate of all the smaller ships) is "The Fleet The Gods Forgot" by Winslow and published by the Naval Institute. Gives really good details. Hal




wdolson -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/3/2016 2:45:57 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: crsutton

An older book is "The Ghost that Died at Sundra Straight" written by her former gunnery officer. A more personal account. Two things stick in my mind. One is how delicate big guns are. He reported that by the end of Houston's short but fierce fighting career, the linings of the eight inch guns were protruding from the barrels and the shells fired by the ship would tumble in the air as a result. Also, how dangerous and mostly useless scouting aircraft were on the cruisers. To the point that they have a very difficult time getting airborne from the water in heavy tropical air and how vulnerable they were to the concussion of the big guns. Now I understand why they were eventually removed from surface warships.


I believe the Houston was due for some downtime for refit and repair when the war started. The ammunition stores for the Asiatic Fleet were also very old. They had a terrible time with dud AA rounds. The age of the ammunition may have contributed to the fast wear on the guns.

In any case, despite the loss of a number of CAs in 1942, the US concentrated on building CLs instead until quite late in the war when single cartridge ammunition became available for 8 inch guns. CAs built before mid-1944 needed a separate shell and powder bag that slowed loading of the gun. The CAs commissioned in late 1944 on had just a single piece ammo like smaller caliber guns. It raised the firing rate of CAs dramatically.

Though it didn't mean much in the end. I don't think any Baltimores or Clevelands were ever in a surface engagement. The only opportunity would have been at Surigao Strait, but I think all the cruisers there were treaty cruisers. Some probably participated in bombardment missions, but generally CAs and fast BBs were dedicated to carrier escort. In the end it would have been better to fit them out like Atlantas, though an Iowa would have looked pretty weird sporting a mass of 5 inch turrets instead of 16 inch guns. There are pictures of the Wyoming with the main armament replaced with 5 inch turrets.

Big gun ships were necessary before aircraft became very capable, but by WW II they were obsolete in their designed role and mostly only useful for other tasks. Most surface battles in the Pacific with ships larger than DDs happened to a large extent because
1) air power failed to press their advantage correctly
2) there wasn't enough air power in a given area
3) one side sent in so many surface ships air power couldn't sink them all

In the case at Leyte it was a combination of #1 and #3.

Bill




BBfanboy -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/3/2016 4:30:57 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Though it didn't mean much in the end. I don't think any Baltimores or Clevelands were ever in a surface engagement. ...
Bill

You're forgetting the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in November/43. 4 Clevelands stopped a Japanese TF trying to interdict the landings on New Britain. The Clevelands got a first salvo hit on a CL and proceeded to smother it with 6" fire. They also took the IJN CAs under fire and the two of them collided while trying to avoid the stream of shells arcing toward them. Admiral "Tip" Merrill avoided the usual Long Lance attacks by executing a series of countermarches so that the Japanese never had a single point to aim at.

After this battle the CLs were retiring toward New Guinea to replenish ammo when they came under heavy air attack. Such were the improvements in AA that the 4 Clevelands beat off the attack without damage, and shot down some of the attackers too (don't recall how many or what ratio). After this battle the IJN ceased trying to use surface ships to confront allied surface ships until Leyte Gulf.

There was at least one Cleveland CL at Surigao Strait - USS Denver shot up both Japanese DDs and USS Albert W. Grant.




Big B -> RE: OT: USS Houston (3/4/2016 1:37:37 AM)


quote:

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy


quote:

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Though it didn't mean much in the end. I don't think any Baltimores or Clevelands were ever in a surface engagement. ...
Bill

You're forgetting the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in November/43. 4 Clevelands stopped a Japanese TF trying to interdict the landings on New Britain. The Clevelands got a first salvo hit on a CL and proceeded to smother it with 6" fire. They also took the IJN CAs under fire and the two of them collided while trying to avoid the stream of shells arcing toward them. Admiral "Tip" Merrill avoided the usual Long Lance attacks by executing a series of countermarches so that the Japanese never had a single point to aim at.

After this battle the CLs were retiring toward New Guinea to replenish ammo when they came under heavy air attack. Such were the improvements in AA that the 4 Clevelands beat off the attack without damage, and shot down some of the attackers too (don't recall how many or what ratio). After this battle the IJN ceased trying to use surface ships to confront allied surface ships until Leyte Gulf.

There was at least one Cleveland CL at Surigao Strait - USS Denver shot up both Japanese DDs and USS Albert W. Grant.



and also no one remembers First Kula Gulf 1943...

quote:

First Battle of Kula Gulf , March 5, 1943
by Vincent P. O'Hara

Japanese destroyers Minegumo and Murasame had sailed from Shortlands on a routine mission to deliver supplies to Vila on the southern tip of Kolombangara Island. At 2330 on March 4, they arrived safely off Vila and discharged their cargo into barges. As they began their run home, bearing northeast into Kula Gulf, Murasame’s lookout saw white flashes on the horizon. These flashes were the guns of light cruisers Montpelier, Cleveland, and Denver screened by destroyers Conway, Waller and Cony. This force had set out to bombard and harass the Japanese forces at Vila. Enroute they received news that two cruisers had been sighted departing Shortlands and were in their vicinity. "Black Cat" PBY Catalina spotter aircraft picked up the Japanese vessels followed by American radar at 0057 at a range of 15,200 yards.

In this action the American commander, Stanton “Tip” Merrill, did not agonize over opening fire like Scott, Callaghan or Wright did in their battles off Guadalcanal. At 0101, just four minutes after the radar data had been received and interpreted, the American light cruisers had their initial salvo in the air from a range of 10,000 yards. Waller followed with torpedoes one minute later. Murasame was straddled by the first salvo. Within a minute the sixth salvo of concentrated 6” radar directed cruiser fire hit home, causing serious damage. Then Waller’s torpedoes struck Murasame, the first torpedo hits achieved by an American warship other than a submarine or PT boat in the Pacific since the battle of Balikpapan. The Japanese destroyer exploded and sank by 0115. Fire was shifted to Minegumo at 0106. She returned fire and tried to escape, but was hit repeatedly and sank at 0130. The Americans did not suffer any damage in this engagement. After dispatching the two destroyers they proceeded to complete their bombardment mission. Montpelier fired 1,800 5” and 6” shells in fifteen minutes during the surface engagement and 700 more during the shore bombardment following.

While this engagement was brief and completely one-sided, it is significant in several respects. The Americans demonstrated improvements in their use of radar, their destroyers finally managed to add torpedoes to their arsenal and their commander acted promptly and decisively.




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