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TIMJOT -> Re: Defense of the Philippines (4/14/2003 4:58:19 AM)
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[QUOTE]Originally posted by LTCMTS
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[B]I agree on the probable ineffectiveness of B-17 strikes on TAiwan except for the comments by the Japanese that such a strike might have caught their a/c on the ground as the fog lifted in interviews with the SBSS. And Kearny had his own ax to grind. Besides, use them before you lose, them, which was the eventual fate.
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Yes if they launched an immediate dawn attack, they might have caught them on the ground, but as I said the FEAF had no idea where those airfields were and trying to find them in the fog would have been even more hopeless. Thats why the only morning raid that was considered was against Takao Harbor. I say save them, before you lose them, so you can use them. Sending all of them down to Delmonte and then useing all 35 B17s in a concentrated attack against the landings would have perhaps been the most effective use of them.
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As far as holding as much of the Philippines as possible, the main island Luzon had more landing sites than any force could have covered, especially an organization as understrength as the 26 Cav (PS) and the Philippine Div. The Japanese would have found a lightly or undercovered beach, gotten troops ashore and proceeded to pry the US/PA defenders out of every blocking position they assumed and forcing them to fight through IJA blocking positions on their retreat to Bataan, which is what historically happened. Supplies positioned forward to support the OPLAN were lost to the Japanese who used them to support their own ops. Remember that the Japanese had to invade the Philippines between OCtober and December, when the rice crop was harvested, allowing the IJA to "live off the land" through foraging from commercial storage sites.
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That isnt entirely correct. Actually their are relatively few suitable landing sites on Luzon. A jagged coast and rough terrain coupled with the Zambales Mountains in the east and the Sierrea Madres Mnts in the west prohibits any large scale landings from all but a few areas. Specifically Linguyen Gulf in the north, Subic Bay in the east and Lamon bay in the west. Linguyen was the obvious choice because it provided multiple landing sites and direct access to Luzon's central plain and thus Manila. Subic was impossible because of Fort Windt (think small Corregidore). Lamon bay, where the Japanese also landed, was not ideal because rough terrain and Leguna de Bay made defence of Manila from the south much more easier than from the north. All US army pre-war planning assumed that the main landings would be in North at Linguyen with perhaps secondary diversionary landings in the south at Lamon bay. As it turned out, it was precisely what did happen.
What I was purposeing was a formation of a quick reaction force, Combineing the PS 27 Cav, the 192nd & 194 tank Bns. 108 M3 Stuarts, the seventy-five; 75mm SPMs halftracks; with the Philipine Division. Baseing it at or near Linguyen where it could counterattack and possibly repell a landing when it was most vulnerable, ala Wake.
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If the Japanese had waited until 1942, then the situation would have been better for the US. But as indicated before, the Japanese strategic situation couldn't wait till Oct-Dec 42 for the next years harvest. Yet if they had, the 32d ID (ARNG), a medium tank battalion and enough equipment to bring the Philippine Division to the 1941 triangular MTOE would have become available by Feb 42 and the PA would have been further along in its training program. Of course, any reading of the official history would bring some doubt on whether the PA divisions other than the 1st and 2d would have reached a sufficient level of readiness by even May 42. A larger force, however, would still, with Japanese control of the air and sea, only add to the "bag" if not relieved by the USN.
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The time table had much more to do with the oil reserve situation and the monsoon seasons than any consideration to the rice crops. Remember they expected to complete the conquest of the PI in 50 days. Rice had to be an afterthought. Had the attack taken place in April then all 10 PA divisions would have been fully equiped albeit mostly with WWI surplus and had 5 months additional training. Certainly they would not been up to the level of the scouts, but they would have been suitable for at least static defence.
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Once the US lost any ability to contest air superiority by the Japanese, and with the freedom represented by control of the local seas, the Japanese could pick and chose their landing areas outside the coverage of US coastal defenses, or even invaded the surrounding islands like Visayen and Mondanao to set up air bases to stage to from Taiwan and French Indo China. A larger, better prepared force could have caused more casualties, but the combined wisdom of Army officers in the Philippines from 1902 to 1941 was that the shores could not be held. Additions to the force structure would only allow the US to extend the size of its perimeter of defense beyond Bataan. In TOAW-COW, with the forces that would have been available in Feb 42, I have been able to hold the Japanese north of Manilla across the northern neck of Luzon, but eventual they come ashore in the south and flank me.
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Yes combined wisdom between 1902-1941, but that did not take into consideration of airpower and the vulnerabilty of amphip landings to said airpower. It was the high expectations of the B17of being a force multiplier ( proven misplaced ) that brought about the about face in the first place. By April, FEAF was expected to have 4 Heavy Bmr groups consisting of 272 bombers with 68 in reserve, 2 pursuit groups of 130 fighters each and at least 1 light bomber group of 52 A-24's. Couple this with the allocation of $10,000,000 for airfield construction and the Japanese gaining initial airsuperiorty is in doubt. Also USAFFE "Inland Seas Defence Progam" had also been authorized and schedule for completion by April 42. It entailed 46 155mm guns , four 8" guns and 4 12" railway guns to be emplaced to cover the all the main entrances to the PI inland seas, virtually ensureing that interior communications would be maintained through a Japanese attack and hindering greatly the ability to simply pick and choose to attack where they pleased.
TOAW-COW is a great game, but it really doesnt model supply and terrain difficulties sufficiently enough to be truely representative of Luzon campaign. Not to mention the no air or sea interdiction of amphibious forces is a serious liability against a successful defense. I know, because I too made a TOAW-COW Hypothetical scenerio, but with forces that would be available in April 42. Im curious did you use the canned Luzon 42 scenerio oob or did you use your own? Also did you also correspondingly strengthen the IJA 14th Army or did you leave it historical? And finally did you post your scenerio anywhere? because I would be interested playing it.
Regards.
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